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ABSTRACT 
 
EVOLUTION, NATURALISM, AND THEISM: 
AN INCONSISTENT TRIAD? 
 
David H. Gordon, B.A., M.A. 
Marquette University, 2018 
 
Philosophy in the 19th century experienced a ‘turn from idealism,’ when idealist 
philosophies were largely abandoned for materialist ones.  Scientific naturalism is now 
considered by many analytic philosophers to be the new orthodoxy, largely in part due to 
the success of the scientific method.  The New Atheists, such as Daniel Dennett and 
Richard Dawkins, claim it is Darwin in particular who deserves much of the credit for 
repudiating the traditional Mind-first world view.  Some, like Alvin Plantinga and 
Michael Behe, maintain the opposite, that evolution casts doubt on naturalism and 
supports theism.  This dissertation seeks to determine just what exactly the logical 
implications of evolutionary theory are.  Is evolution incompatible with theism?  Does the 
acceptance of evolution necessarily entail naturalism and preclude theism?  Is it possible, 
as naturalism maintains, that everything can be reduced to physical processes, or are there 
too many recalcitrant phenomena that defy reduction?   
  
 Answering these involves a detailed analysis of the concepts, ‘evolution,’ 
‘naturalism,’ and ‘theism.’  Just what exactly does accepting evolutionary theory entail?  
How is it different from Darwinism?  Is evolution guided or unguided?  What is 
naturalism?  There are many different types of metaphysical naturalists:  eliminative 
materialists, physicalists, and emergent property dualists.  What is the relationship 
between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism?  Theism affirms a 
creator God who sustains all being, who is transcendent and yet immanent.  So if theism 
posits a God who is active in the world, does this mean that scientific investigation may 
at times have to admit supernatural explanations when natural ones fail? 
 
My general conclusion is a type of mitigated skepticism – that given evolution, 
neither naturalism nor theism logically follows.  As to whether evolution is guided or 
unguided, the only correct position is ‘undetermined.’   In this instance metaphysical 
positions may fill in the gaps in knowledge by projection, but cannot fulfill the necessary 
and sufficient conditions required for knowledge.  Metaphysical naturalism and theism 
are worldviews that an individual adopts as the most overall coherent explanation of the 
wide variety of experiences, intuitions, and reflections on their life. Whether evolution 
offers evidence for one and against the other is often based upon one’s prior metaphysical 
assumptions, since all facts are theory laden.  The underdetermination of theory allows 
for multiple theories to cover the same phenomena, with each offering an epistemically 
adequate explanation.  However, numerous recalcitrant anomalies which defy scientific 
explanation and reduction present problems for the strict naturalist.  While neither 
naturalism nor theism can be determined to be objectively true, one can offer reasons for 
choosing one or the other on the basis of overall coherence.  
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CHAPTER ONE – 
THE PROBLEM:  RECONCILING SEEMINGLY INCOMPATIBLES – 
THEISM AND EVOLUTION 
 
 
 
 Any person who imagines that the heavens are mindless, when their 
remarkable order and regularity beyond belief ensure the total preservation 
and well-being of everything in the universe, must himself be regarded as 
out of his mind….The person who observes these facts would display not 
merely ignorance but also impiety if he said that the gods do not exist…To 
sum up, the existence of the gods is so crystal-clear that I regard anyone 
who denies it as being virtually out of his mind. 1  – Cicero  
 
  I was merely thinking God's thoughts after him. Since we astronomers are 
priests of the highest God in regard to the book of nature, it benefits us to be 
thoughtful, not of the glory of our minds, but rather, above all else, of the 
glory of God.2 – Kepler 
 
  When someone asks me:  ‘Can you believe in God and Evolution,’ I 
always respond:  ‘That depends.  What do you mean by ‘God’ and what 
do you mean by ‘evolution’?3 – Jay Richards 
  The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by 
God – it is not ‘produced’ by the parents – and also that it is immortal; it 
does not perish when it separates from the body at death.4 – Catechism of 
the Catholic Church 
  The Argument from Design depends on an inductive inference:  where 
there’s smoke, there’s fire; and where there’s design, there’s 
mind….Before Darwin, a ‘Mind-first’ view of the universe reigned 
unchallenged….Darwin described a process he called natural selection, a 
mindless, purposeless, mechanical process.5 – Daniel Dennett  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, trans. by P.G. Walsh  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1997), 67, 62. 
2 http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Johannes_Kepler 
3 Jay Richards, in “Introduction,” God and Evolution, ed. by Jay Richards  (Seattle:  Discovery Institute 
Press, 2010), 7. 
4 The Catechism of the Catholic Church  (Mahwah, NJ:  Paulist Press, 1994), 93 (paragraph 366). 
5 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea  (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 1995), 30, 33, 34.  
Dennett’s interpretation of Darwin here is skewed.  Darwin’s beliefs varied over time, but he generally 
believed God was the author of the laws of nature, hence believed in a Mind-first universe.  See Ch. 2.4. 
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1.  The Problem:  The Conflict Thesis 
 
 The second half of the 19th century experienced an ever-increasing conflict 
between religion and science, with a resulting intellectual shift towards naturalism, 
roughly the view that all that exists is the natural world.  Charles Taylor sees this as the 
period in which unbelief came of age.6  He attempts to tell the ‘story’ of what made this 
unbelief possible, a story which would have seemed incredible to anyone living in 
previous centuries during which atheism was not tolerated.  What fueled this shift?  It is 
no coincidence that this change in the intellectual climate was encouraged by the 1859 
publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, followed by his The Descent of Man in 
1871.  Taylor sees “the standard story of the Victorians’ loss of faith…[as] caused by the 
impact of Darwinian evolution, which is held…to have refuted the Bible….His theory 
gave an important push towards a materialist, reductive view of the cosmos, from which 
all teleology was purged.”7  The rise of Biblical criticism further undermined Scripture as 
the infallible word of God; instead, it was interpreted more as a human document with 
multiple authors.8  Darwin’s theory seemed to confirm this suspicion, for if the Bible 
really is the Word of God and evolutionary theory is true, it would be discussed in the 
Bible, since clearly God would know what creation entails and how it occurred.   So in 
the triad of theism, evolution, and naturalism, theism was increasingly seen as the 
                                                 
6 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age  (Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
374. 
7 Ibid., p 378-379. 
8 For a summary of the Document Hypothesis, or the thesis that there are four authors and an editor of the 
Pentateuch (J, P, E, and D), see Richard Elliott Friedman, Who Wrote the Bible? (New York:  HarperOne, 
1989). 
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weakest link.  Naturalism became the standard view, and with it a hostility to the 
existence of any kind of non-natural entity. 
 The fundamental assertions of the Western theistic tradition are that there is a God 
who has a spiritual immaterial nature, and that this nature is first in the order of being.   
The Judeo-Christian worldview has God at the top of the Great Chain of Being, creating 
the world and imposing order onto it.  Thus nature reveals the plan of the Creator.   
Daniel Dennett sees Darwin as the first person to radically challenge, if not overthrow, 
this “Mind-first” view of the universe.  The radical import of Darwin’s ideas is that they 
offer an alternative explanation of the order of the universe, an explanation which shows 
how order can arise out of a mindless, mechanical process.  Previously the order of the 
universe could only be accounted for by recourse to a Great Artificer in the sky, a 
watchmaker deity.  Darwin inverts the Mind-first process by demonstrating how species 
can originate from the bottom up, from matter rather than mind, thereby making the 
existence of God a superfluous hypothesis.  Dennett therefore sees evolutionary theory as 
a ‘Universal Acid’ which dissolved the Mind-first view of the universe.  Thus the claim 
by some that “Darwin has refuted the Bible.”9     
 But has Darwin really spoiled the church picnic?  Has he proven theism and any 
Mind-first metaphysic to be nothing but myth and error, the worldview of a young, 
immature, childish humanity unable to face the specter of a godless universe?  Are theists 
afraid of the view that we are nothing but specks of dust floating adrift on a minor planet 
orbiting a sun in a galaxy containing 200-400 billion stars, and in a universe with 80-100 
billion galaxies?  A common interpretation of evolutionary biology today is that it 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p 562. 
4 
 
 
 
provides a ‘self-sufficient’ explanation of life within what Charles Taylor calls a ‘closed 
world system,’ or natural universe, one that is not contingent upon anything.  But does 
evolutionary theory provide overwhelming evidence in favor of such a naturalistic view? 
If so, evolutionary theory poses a problem for everyone who is a theist and believes in 
evolution, for theism and evolutionary theory would be incompatible.  
However, people like Stephen Jay Gould and Alvin Plantinga deny that 
evolutionary theory is incompatible with theism.  Gould argues science cannot make 
assertions about religion, since it is beyond its realm of expertise, and Plantinga argues 
that the probability our epistemic faculties would be reliable is low if they arose from 
strictly naturalistic causes.  The aim of this study is to demonstrate (A) that people like 
Daniel Dennett do not make their case that evolutionary theory necessarily entails 
naturalism and disproves theism and (B) that naturalism fails to account for all the 
features of the universe and hence is inadequate as a comprehensive worldview.  Thomas 
Nagel argues that a great number of recalcitrant phenomena (such as the order of the 
universe and the existence of laws of nature) defy materialist, naturalist reduction.10  
David Chalmers believes the hard problem of consciousness defies a materialist 
reduction.  As a result, the best that naturalistic materialism can offer is an incomplete 
picture of the universe.  Simply issuing a promissory note to science in the hope that one 
day it will be complete and able to explain these phenomena is itself a type of faith in 
science that is unwarranted.  Thus evolutionary theory does not entail naturalism.  One 
can believe in evolution, i.e., assert that Adam had ancestors, and still be a theist.   
 
                                                 
10 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos:  Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian View of the Cosmos is Almost 
Certainly False  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2012), 16-17. 
5 
 
 
 
2.  Mapping the Possible Implications Evolutionary Theory Might Have 
 
 Asking what the logical implications of evolutionary theory are could result in a 
wide range of answers to a number of diverse questions.  Examining some of these 
briefly is worthwhile to help understand which implications will or will not be considered 
in this study.  Anyone working in the philosophy of mind is aware that evolutionary 
theory has very strong implications on the nature of mind.  Does evolutionary theory 
disprove mind/body substance dualism, or the claim that humans have a divinely created 
soul, by arguing that rationality is simply the result of having the most highly developed 
neo-cortex on the planet?  What implications might evolutionary theory have on the free 
will/determinism debate?  Is it possible that we are we genetically determined?  What 
implications does evolution have for human nature?  If humans share a common ancestor 
with primates, are we more like our murderous, patriarchal chimpanzee cousins, or 
promiscuous, matriarchal, pacifistic bonobos?  There are also implications that 
evolutionary theory has for sexuality.  Are men programmed to try to have as many mates 
as possible?  Is evolutionary success measured by the number of offspring one has?  Was 
serial monogamy, rather than monogamy, more ‘natural’ to our ancestors?11  What 
implications does evolution have for social, economic, and political thought?  And there 
are more logical implications in the field of ethics.  What would an ethic based upon 
evolutionary theory or naturalism look like?  What implications does evolutionary theory 
have for race theory?  Do races exist, or are they social constructions?  
                                                 
11 Helen Fisher, Why We Love, The Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love  (New York:  Henry Holt and 
Co., 2004), 134.  She states:  “So here’s my theory:  perhaps like robins, foxes, and many other serially 
monogamous creatures, ancestral humans living some 3.5 million years ago paired with a mate only long 
enough to rear a single child through infancy – about four years.” 
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The subtitle of the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection is, ‘Or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.’  ‘Race’ is not a term normally 
applied to animal and plant subvarieties; it is usually only applied to humans.  Is Darwin 
suggesting in the subtitle that human races are locked in a struggle with one another, or 
that some are favoured?  Is this a possible implication of the Origin?  There have been 
many attempts to work out the implications of Darwin’s theory in recent history.  Some 
people believe that Hitler’s mindset was due, at least in part, to the work of several 
German Darwinists, primarily Ernest Haeckel.12  It has been argued that Hitler used 
Darwinist principles to justify his racial ideology and militant attitude toward other 
nations and races.  His expansionist policies to secure Lebensraum (living space) can also 
be seen against the backdrop of the struggle to survive.  Certain remarks of Darwin’s can 
be interpreted as supporting both eugenics and Social Darwinism.  Darwin states in The 
Descent of Man that civilized society, by providing asylums for the sick and insane, 
medicine for the sick, and handouts to the poor, allows “the weak members of civilized 
societies to propagate their kind…care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a 
domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, no breeder is so ignorant as to 
allow his worst animals to reproduce.”13  Darwin then states that the bad effects of 
providing care to the less fit out of sympathy are at least kept in check by the fact that 
“the weaker and inferior members of society do not marry so freely as the sound.”14  It is 
                                                 
12 Richard Weikart, From Darwin to Hitler  (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 24-29. 
13 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (New York:  Penguin Books, 2004), 159. 
14 Ibid., 160. 
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argued that this passage helped provide the impetus to Hitler’s belief that the state should 
be in control of its citizens’ reproduction, and that the state should become a ‘biocracy.’15   
But to say that Nazism is a necessary logical implication of evolutionary theory is 
a difficult claim to justify.  The form of Darwinism that was prominent in Germany was 
Ernest Haeckel’s distorted form of social Darwinism, and Haeckel’s books outsold 
Darwin’s there.16  But Nazism had many influences.  Robert Richards thinks that it is 
difficult to establish the causal influence of evolution on any particular person, and even 
if one could, he argues, the logical implications of evolution do not result in Nazism.  
Roberts notes that the historical roots of Christian anti-Semitism long preceded the rise of 
evolution.  Richards thinks Nazism lacked any kind of coherent guiding ideology, let 
alone the ideas of Darwin.  Nazi racism reflected more the irrationality of Nazi madness 
and hatred, than the logical results of a well thought out, applied Darwinism.17   
James Moore and Adrian Desmond, who have written several biographies of 
Darwin, also claim that Darwin’s ideas lead not to racism and eugenics, but to the racial 
brotherhood of all men.  They argue that the ideas Darwin presents in The Descent of 
Man attempt to demonstrate the common ancestry of all humans from animals, thereby 
demonstrating the ultimate unity of the human species.  Darwin did not see blacks and 
whites as separate species, but as siblings sharing common descent through a ‘joint 
ancestor’ who was African, not European.18  Moore and Desmond claim that Darwin saw 
unity in and continuity across the races, although others saw disunity and difference.  
                                                 
15 Jerry Bergman, Hitler and the Nazi Darwinian Worldview  (Kitchener, Ontario:  Joshua Press Inc., 
2014), 29, 34, 44, 106. 
16 Yvonne Sherratt, Hitler’s Philosophers  (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2014), 54-56. 
17 Robert J. Richards, Was Hitler a Darwinian?  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2013), 196-200. 
18 Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin’s Sacred Cause, How a Hatred of Slavery Shaped Darwin’s 
Views on Human Evolution  (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), xvii-xviii. 
8 
 
 
 
While on the Beagle, Darwin argued with Captain Fitzroy and others over slavery, and 
found any attempt to justify the slave trade repugnant.19  His later theory to a certain 
extent rejected teleology, or the idea that evolution is progressive.  Natural selection 
favors individuals that are best adapted to a particular environment.  A higher degree of 
adaption does not imply in any way an overall qualitative ‘superiority.’   
Darwin believed that the human race was “split into climatically adapted 
clusters.”20  Dark skin is simply an adaptation that helps protect one from the blistering 
tropical sun.  Similarly, sickle cell anemia helps protect Africans from malaria.  These are 
simply adaptations favored by a tropical climate, but in and of themselves there is no 
qualitative superiority or inferiority in possessing them, apart from the particular 
environment one finds oneself in. As humans moved out of Africa and into northern 
climates, their skin color changed in response to the changing environmental pressures.  
In The Descent of Man, Darwin recognizes that “a tropical sun, which burns and blisters a 
white skin, does not injure a black one at all.”21  While Darwin has an intuition that skin 
pigmentation is related to climate, he knows nothing of melanin or of the body’s ability to 
produce vitamin D in response to sunlight, and so admits he is “unable to judge” if skin 
color is acquired by means of natural selection.  Darwin will ultimately attribute the 
differences in races to sexual selection, or the belief that differing tastes in beauty, which 
he sees as cultural (analogous to different tastes in music among cultures), as leading to 
different preferences in mating choices.  He states:  “We have thus far been baffled in all 
                                                 
19 Adrian Desmond and James Moore, “Introduction,” in Charles Darwin’s The Descent of Man (New 
York:  Penguin Books, 2004), xxvii-xxx. 
20 Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin, the Life of a Tormented Evolutionist  (New York:  Warner 
Books, 1991), 241. 
21 Darwin, The Descent of Man, 226-7.  
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our attempts to account for the differences between the races of man; but there remains 
one important agency, namely Sexual Selection, which appears to have acted powerfully 
on man….It has seemed to me highly probable that sexual selection has played an 
important part in differentiating the races of man.”22 
Today we know that skin pigmentation and other alleged markers of ‘race’ are 
only a small part of the entire human genome.  Richard Lewontin’s famous 1972 article, 
‘The Apportionment of Human Diversity,’ argues that racial taxonomic classifications 
among humans are a social construct, rooted in culture, with no genetic basis.  Lewontin 
argues that because “genetic variation within the so-called ‘races’ is far greater than 
between the most typical members of one race and another,” human racial taxonomic 
classifications are a myth.23  This has led some anthropologists to conclude that all 
humans are “Africans ‘under the skin.’”24  Other anthropologists argue that Lewontin 
misinterprets the data, and that overall genetic variance is not that important, since a 
change in a single gene can radically alter the overall structure of an organism.25   
Christopher Hitchens believes this is just another example of how science and 
evolution disprove the Bible.  He notes that slavery is condoned by the Bible.  He argues, 
“Christian preachers of all kinds had justified slavery until the American Civil War and 
even afterwards, on the supposed biblical warrant that of the three sons of Noah (Shem, 
Ham, and Japhet), Ham had been cursed and cast into servitude.”26  Evolution and the 
genetic similarity amongst all humans undermines the notion of ‘race,’ and therefore 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 129, 19. 
23 Brian Garvey, Philosophy of Biology  (Montreal:  McGill-Queens University Press, 2007), 209-210. 
24 Pamela R. Willoughby, The Evolution of Modern Humans in Africa  (Lanham, MD:  AltaMira Press, 
2007), 331. 
25 Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending, The 10,000 Year Explosion:  How Civilization Accelerated 
Human Evolution  (New York:  Basic Books, 2009), 15-18. 
26 Christopher Hitchens, god is not Great  (New York:  Hatchett Book Group, 2007), 166-167. 
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discredits slavery as being justified on either a racial basis, or as the result of a perceived 
divine punishment. This debate is relevant because it shows how an understanding of race 
that has been based upon the Bible, has been replaced by another understanding of race 
based upon a modern understanding of genetics.   
This study will attempt to narrow the field of the possible logical implications of 
evolutionary theory by primarily concerning itself with those implications evolutionary 
theory has for the metaphysics of theism and naturalism.  Does evolution occur only 
through natural means, or merely primarily through natural means?  What does it mean to 
say something is ‘natural’?  Does the belief that evolution is not a guided process 
necessitate that one should adopt physicalism as a metaphysic?  Can evolution give rise 
to non-physical, emergent properties such as mental content, semantic understanding, 
numerical and moral values, or even a soul?  Or are there phenomena in the universe 
which cannot be accounted for in terms of the random processes favored by evolution?  If 
so, do they require the guidance of an intelligent designer?  Since evolution occurs only if 
life, complexity, and a physical world exist, can evolution explain the origin of life, 
complexity, or the world?  Last, since evolutionary theory is a scientific theory, can the 
scientific method be employed to determine the credibility of beliefs involving the 
supernatural, or the theistic God?    
 
3.  Models the relationship between Religion and Science might take 
 
 Some cast evolution as just the latest battle in the long history of warfare between 
science and religion.  As a result, asking what implications evolution has for theism is 
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similar to asking whether science is compatible with religion in general.  Compatibility 
here means logical consistency.  Consistent statements are those that can both be true at 
the same time.  Contradictory statements mean that if one is true, the other must be false, 
and vice versa, that is, the statements must differ in truth value.27  Asking whether 
evolution, naturalism, and theism are compatible, or logically consistent, means asking 
whether they can all be true.  If this is possible, then they are logically consistent.  If one 
of them must be false, given that the others are true, this means that they are logically 
inconsistent, and perhaps contradictory.  As will be demonstrated, theism and 
metaphysical naturalism will be contradictory positions, therefore entailing that 
evolution, naturalism, and theism are inconsistent, or incompatible. 
The Scientific Revolution is considered revolutionary because it completely 
changed the medieval worldview that existed prior to the rise of science.    Science is 
often portrayed as being discontinuous with the medieval worldview, which was 
essentially religious in outlook.  That science was ‘revolutionary’ in overthrowing this 
worldview is one of the assumptions of the Incompatibility or Warfare thesis.  This thesis 
argues that there is a tension between science and religion, that they are discontinuous 
rather than continuous.  However, this assumption is not necessarily true.  The Scientific 
Revolution did not ‘overthrow’ the medieval worldview, it simply transformed it.28  Yes, 
there is discontinuity, but there is also much continuity.  Scientific thinkers built upon the 
work of many ‘natural philosophers.’  These early ‘scientists’ were often religious and 
saw themselves as studying God’s creation.  To them science was a form of natural 
                                                 
27 Stan Baronett, Logic (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2016), 352-3. 
28 Maria Boas, The Scientific Renaissance 1450-1630  (New York:  Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), ix. 
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theology.  So to the first scientists, if there was a weak link in the chain, it wasn’t science 
or religion, it was naturalism.   
It is a central claim of the New Atheists that science, and the scientific method, 
disprove religion, and more particularly, theism, which portrays God as a transcendent 
being who actively governs the natural world.  The New Atheists also assert that 
evolutionary theory in particular discredits theism and supports naturalism.  However, 
these claims need to be examined, for they are by no means self-evident.  Evolutionary 
theory wasn’t seriously considered as an acceptable hypothesis until the publication of 
Darwin’s Origin in 1859.   The New Atheists see it as the latest and most decisive battle 
in the long history of ‘warfare’ between science and religion.  However, there are 
alternatives to the ‘conflict’ or ‘warfare’ model.  Some see science and religion as 
compatible, rather than incompatible.  So before we consider whether evolution favors 
naturalism or theism, let us first consider the history of the relationship between science 
and religion, so that alternative models to the ‘conflict’ thesis are given their due. 
 Religion and science can be seen as either being compatible or incompatible. 
What does it mean to say that religion and science are compatible?  It is to say that they 
are logically consistent.  Consider the claim that they are similar in a variety of ways.  
One proposed similarity is that the questions they raise and the goals they seek are 
similar.  They both investigate and seek to determine what there is metaphysically and 
what is ultimately real.   According to this view, scientists are investigating God’s 
creation, and in coming to understand the nature of the created world, are coming to 
know the nature of the mind of the architect of nature, God.  As Einstein famously said, 
“I want to know God’s thoughts,” meaning that an understanding of the laws that govern 
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physics is a reflection of the divine mind that is the source and origin of those laws.  Thus 
all truth, including truth about the physical world, is none other than God’s truth.  To say 
that religion and science are incompatible is to say that while they both investigate 
common questions, their theories and answers to these questions are incompatible with 
one another.  To see them as two separate fields is to argue that they each ask different 
questions and use different methods in answering them.  
 Ian Barbour, in his book Religion in an Age of Science, sketches four possible 
models to describe the way that Religion and Science may interact.29  (1) The Conflict 
model, as noted, asserts that science and religion are incompatible, in that both fields 
involve or make inconsistent claims about reality.  The Conflict model presents two 
possibilities:  science triumphs over religion, or religion defeats science (a third 
possibility is that both are false).  (2) The Independence model is not so much a model 
stating that the two are incompatible, as that each constitutes a separate domain and 
addresses different questions.  (3) The Dialogue model and (4) the Integration model both 
assert the continuity between science and religion, with the latter asserting a higher 
degree of continuity.  In the Dialogue model, there is overlap and interaction between the 
two, as there is in the field of natural theology as traditionally conceived.  In the 
Integration model, the two fields essentially merge into the same field, with current 
scientific theory mandating a reformulation of traditional theological doctrines.  Michael 
Ruse, in his introduction to Bertrand Russell’s Religion and Science, also invokes these 
four models, but gives them slightly different names:  Opposition or warfare, Separate, 
                                                 
29 Ian Barbour, Religion and Science:  Historical and Contemporary Issues  (New York:  Harper Collins, 
1997), 77-107. 
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Dialogue, and Integrative.30  John Haught combines the Dialogue and Integration models 
into the same category, which he calls ‘Convergence.’31  Alister McGrath labels them 
‘Confrontational Models’ and ‘Non-confrontational Models’ (Distinct and Convergent).32       
If the subject matter of science and religion do not overlap, but address different 
domains, as in the Independence model, then there doesn’t appear that there is much of a 
problem.  Just as there is no tension or friction between the subject matters of engineering 
and poetry, as there doesn’t seem much overlap between them, similarly if there is no 
overlap between science and religion then there should be no friction between them.  It is 
within the Conflict model, rather than the Independence model, that problems appear to 
arise.  Science and religion are seen as incompatible, if not contradictory.  For the New 
Atheists, science and religion do overlap and are contradictory.  One is forced to choose 
between them.  One of their central claims is that the findings of science refute the claims 
of religion, as science is built upon evidence, whereas faith is not.  Adherents to the 
Conflict model claim that the recent findings of science demonstrate that Biblical claims 
about human origins and the metaphysical nature of human beings are false.   
 
4.  The Historical Origins of Science and the ‘Continuity Question’ 
 
A common characteristic of the New Atheists is that theistic belief is neither 
rational nor justifiable.  Is it true that theistic belief is not rational, that all faith is blind 
faith, lacking any justification whatsoever?  This seems to be a peculiar interpretation of 
                                                 
30 Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), viii-ix. 
31 John Haught, Science and Faith  (Mahwah, NJ:  Paulist Press, 2013), 10-20. 
32 Alister McGrath, Science & Religion  (Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 44-50. 
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theistic faith, as there is a long philosophical tradition which sees faith as compatible with 
reason.  In other words, there seems to be continuity, rather than discontinuity, between 
religion and science, and faith and reason.  This tradition has long blended theology and 
metaphysics, and found good reasons for faith.  People who claim religion is discredited 
by science often believe in a master narrative which casts religion and theology as 
nothing but superstitious belief that hinders the development of a scientific outlook.  
However, science grew out of a philosophical tradition that began as a rational inquiry 
into the nature of reality, one that appealed to supernatural causes as much as natural 
causes.  The term ‘science’ is of relatively recent coinage, first introduced with its current 
meaning in the nineteenth century.  Prior to this, any systematic attempt to explain nature 
was known as ‘natural philosophy.’33  The first scientists were philosophers of nature 
whose attempt to explain the natural world was intertwined with issues related to 
metaphysics, ethics, and religion.   
Several historians of science have denigrated the contributions of ancient Greek 
and medieval philosophers, stating that what they were doing was speculative and could 
not be considered ‘real science.’   This is the ‘continuity question,’ whether ancient Greek 
philosophy and the medieval religious worldview are continuous with modern science.  
David Lindberg cites the views of Francis Bacon, Voltaire, and Jacob Burckhardt as 
adherents of the discontinuity camp.  Bacon wanted to start over, to begin anew, not with 
the views of the ancient philosophers, but with data based on a detailed study of nature.  
He argues in the The New Organon that when discussing the history of science, “neither 
                                                 
33 Gillian Barker and Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2014),  4. 
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the Arabians nor the Schoolmen need to be mentioned, who in the intermediate times 
rather crushed the sciences with a multitude of treatises, than increased their weight.”34    
The historian of science Pierre Duhem, on the other hand, is one of the proponents 
of continuity between early and modern science.  He believed that “the method of the 
physical sciences was defined by Plato and the Pythagoreans of his day,” not the more 
customary candidates of Galileo, Descartes, and Bacon.35  Similarly, Ernst Mayr claims 
that “no one had a greater influence on the subsequent development of science” than 
Plato and Aristotle.36  If one was concerned only with the history of modern science, or 
the modern scientific method, one might begin with the 1543 publication of Copernicus’s 
On the Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres, which is said to have inaugurated the 
scientific revolution.  But it is doubtful that this ‘scientific revolution’ would have 
happened without the foundation that was laid by the inquiries into nature that began with 
the ancient Greek philosophers.  Nor was the investigation of nature considered a 
separate discipline from theology.  Copernicus was the canon of the cathedral of 
Frauenburg, although he never became a priest.  It was Pope Leo X’s invitation to 
astronomers to reform the calendar that led Copernicus to write On the Revolution of the 
Heavenly Spheres.37   
Plato’s contribution to science was concerned with mathematical reasoning, and 
of truths self-evidently known to reason, which were akin to ethical values in being 
immutable.  In contrast to the deductively certain truths of math, Plato took little interest 
                                                 
34 David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
357-8. 
35 John Deely and Raymond Nogar, The Problem of Evolution: a Study of the Philosophical Repercussions 
of Evolutionary Science  (New York:  Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973), 32. 
36 Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought:  Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance  (Cambridge:  
Belknap Press, 1982), 87. 
37 Anthony M. Alioto, A History of Western Science  (Englewood Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987), 176. 
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in earthly things.38  In the Apology, Socrates states:  “What I do, as I move around among 
you, is just this:  I try to persuade you, whether younger or older, to give less priority, and 
devote less zeal, to the care of your bodies or of your money than to the care of your soul 
and trying to make it as good as it can be.”39  Socrates’s concern was decidedly inward, 
rather than outward.  Plato essentially believed in Heraclitus’s notion of flux – that 
everything in the sensible world was always in the process of change.  This is rooted in 
Heraclitus’s famous saying, ‘you can’t step into the same river twice.’40  The water that 
you stepped into yesterday is different from the water that you step into today.  The only 
phenomena that seem immune from change are the truths of mathematics.  The 
Pythagorean Theorem is true for all time and does not change, hence is immutable.  The 
square of the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle is always equal to the sum of the 
square of its sides.  This is not a sensible observation, but is only known only through the 
mind, intelligibly.  Hence Plato made a sharp division between the intelligible and 
sensible.  Plato’s ‘forms’ are the conceptual equivalent of these mathematical truths 
designating eternal, transcendent essences which are unchanging, the primary ones being 
the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.  Mathematics is the bridge to knowledge of the 
permanent, the stable, the transcendent, and so was the main field of study at the 
Academy.   
Aristotle, on the other hand, based his self-evident axioms empirically.  It was 
self-evident that the earth was motionless, or that “the speed of an object’s fall was 
                                                 
38 Isaac Asimov, Asimov’s New Guide to Science  (New York:  Basic Books, 1984), 9-10. 
39 Plato, ‘Apology,’ in The Last Days of Socrates, trans. by Christopher Rowe (New York:  Penguin Books, 
2010), 48, (30a-30b). 
40 Heraclitus, “Fragments,” in The PreSocratics, ed. by Philip Wheelwright  (New York:  Macmillan, 
1989), 71. 
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proportional to its weight (anyone could see that a stone fell faster than a feather.)”41  It 
wasn’t until Galileo that anyone thought of testing these axioms.  Nevertheless, we are all 
intellectual heirs or ‘children’ of Aristotle, because our scientific outlook is indebted to 
Aristotle’s empiricism.  Aristotle is considered the father of many of the sciences, among 
them logic, physics, biology, zoology, politics, and metaphysics.  Richard Rubenstein 
terms the Medieval Renaissance, the ‘Aristotelian Revolution,’ because it was sparked by 
the rediscovery of the writings of Aristotle in the 12th and 13th centuries (as well as the 
rise of the first universities at that time).  This in turn provided the foundation for modern 
science and helped to fuel the birth of the Scientific Revolution.  Rubenstein believes the 
beginning of the debate over the compatibility of science and religion started not with 
Galileo’s trial, but with the rediscovery of Aristotle’s writings.42  However, the debate 
could not be accurately called the debate between science and religion because at the time 
science, as understood today, did not exist.  It should be clear that Rubenstein’s claim is 
not that Aristotle is the father of modern science, for his methods were clearly different 
and there is little emphasis on experimentation in his thought.  But without Aristotle’s 
empirical method, it is impossible to tell when modern science would have emerged.  
Thus Ernst Mayr says, “No one prior to Darwin has made a greater contribution to our 
understanding of the living world than Aristotle.”43  
  The Aristotelian approach is much more compatible with the modern scientific 
outlook than Plato’s epistemology because it does take an active interest in the external 
world and is rooted in sense experience.  Aristotle’s metaphysics rejected the 
                                                 
41 Asimov, Asimov’s New Guide to Science, 10. 
42 Richard E. Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children; How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient 
Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages  (Orlando, FL:  Harcourt Inc., 2003), 6-7. 
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otherworldly nature of the forms and believed that forms or essences were real, but only 
resided in the things which they typify.  Aristotle’s hylomorphism is discussed in several 
places.  In the Physics, he argues that all concrete particulars are the hylomorphic 
composite of the twin constituents Form and Matter.  This is confusing because Aristotle 
uses the term ‘form’ in a similar but different way from Plato.  The Greek word for Form 
is eidos, or ‘idea,’ the same word Plato uses to refer to his non-material Forms as 
immutable universal essences which are somehow the explanation of the intelligibility of 
material particulars.  Plato did not believe that essences are embodied in material 
particulars.  Rather, they stand apart from particulars, and it is only through the relation 
of ‘participation’ that they are connected with the particulars which seek to imitate or 
copy them.  For Plato, Socrates strives to be a rational animal, whereas for Aristotle, 
Socrates essentially is, potentially if not actually, a rational animal.44   Aristotle weds a 
sensible object’s form to its matter.  The form of the human body for Aristotle is a 
rational soul and inherent in this soul are the capacities of being rational. 
Aristotle uses the same Greek word eidos for both species and form.  In the 
Categories Aristotle uses eidos to mean ‘species,’ which are a secondary substance, but 
in the Metaphysics the term eidos is the form that matter takes in a hylomorphic 
composite.45  In the Categories that which is ontologically basic are particulars, not 
universals.  But in the Metaphysics, with the introduction of hylomorphism, form is 
equated with a thing’s essence and eventually substance.  “By form I mean the essence of 
                                                 
44 Jonathan Lear, Aristotle:  The Desire to Understand  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
269. 
45 S. Marc Cohen, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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each thing and its primary substance.”46   “Substance is the indwelling form.”47  Cohen 
sees the motivation of Aristotle’s identification of essence as substance as “clearly anti-
Platonic.”  Whereas Plato saw the Forms as existing separately from the objects and 
minds that participated in them, Aristotle wants to identify what a thing is with its 
essential substance.48  This is why in Raphael’s painting of the ‘Academy.’  Plato is 
holding a copy of the Timaeus, which argues there are two worlds, the physical world of 
change, and the eternal world which never changes.  He is pointing upward, as if to 
demonstrate that Forms, that which is substantive and truly real, are transcendent and lie 
beyond this world.  Aristotle is pointing downward towards the ground, as if in 
disagreement, and indicating his belief that Forms are immanent.  This reflects the 
differences in their metaphysics and epistemologies.  Plato believes that the study of math 
reveals a universe governed by and patterned after a transcendent realm of rational 
Forms.  Aristotle, on the other hand, appears to be more of a naturalist who believes the 
starting place is empirical data, which can be trusted to provide knowledge of physical 
essences.   
 Aristotle’s Physics states that to know what something is, is to know its four 
causes:  material (what it’s made of), formal (its essence), efficient (that which moves 
something to come into being), and final (the end towards which it serves).  Although 
Aristotle’s hylomorphism makes the forms immanent by placing them in matter, Aristotle 
is not necessarily a naturalist.  Involved in coming to know the four causes is an 
                                                 
46 Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. by Jonathan Barnes  (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1984), 1630, 
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47 Ibid., 1637, 1037a29. 
48 S. Marc Cohen, “Individual and Essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Paideia, Special Aristotle Issue 
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understanding of their metaphysical nature.  Aristotle’s Metaphysics begins by stating 
“All men by nature desire to know.”  Aristotle believes that a supernatural godhead is 
necessary to explain the motion of the universe – an Unmoved Mover who is the pure 
actuality that celestial beings seek.  Later authors will argue that humans are “the being in 
quest of the ground of existence,” which is God, who is pure actuality and thus self-
sufficient.  So one can interpret Aristotle as saying that what human understanding seeks 
is found in God.49   
 
5.  The Medieval Scholastic Synthesis and Counter reactions 
 
 This fundamental difference between Plato and Aristotle is important in the 
debate between science and religion because their views will be incorporated into the 
theistic traditions of Judaism (Maimonides), Christianity (Augustine, Aquinas), and Islam 
(Avicenna, Averroes) during the Middle Ages.  This approach employed human reason 
and Greek philosophy into the service of helping to understand theistic faith based on 
revelation.  Reason was seen as compatible with faith.  It could serve to illuminate and 
support its tenets, but it was not an equal.  Reason and natural philosophy were 
considered to be the ‘handmaiden’ of the faith.  Aquinas believed that reason could 
establish some of “the preambles of the faith,” such as God’s existence, as well as 
disprove objections made against the faith.50   
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 Augustine’s theological synthesis combined the dominant Neoplatonism of his 
time with the Christian tradition.  His interpretation remained authoritative and fairly 
normative until the time of Aquinas.  Augustine saw Platonism as compatible with his 
Christian faith because he identified the Platonic Forms with ideas in the mind of God.  
However, for Plato the forms had their own ontological existence, similar to the 
Pythagorean Theorem.  Under the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, the forms radiated or 
emanated from the One.  For Plato, knowledge of the Forms was evidence of the 
immortality of the soul, for one cannot learn what, for instance, equality is sensibly.  
Since no things of this world ever exhibit perfect equality, then the only way one could 
have learned this was by living a previous life, in which, in a disincarnate state one was 
exposed to the transcendent Form for equality.  Thus all knowledge is recollection, or 
anamnesis, learning is simply remembering things known in a previous life. 51  Yet 
reincarnation is rejected by Christianity, thereby cutting off this pathway to knowledge of 
the highest Form, the Good.  Augustine solves this problem by arguing that this is 
evidence for the necessity of the Incarnation, in which the divine forms descend in order 
that humans may come to know them.  Jesus is the Neoplatonic nous made flesh, the 
logos, who embodies Goodness itself.  If you want to become acquainted with the Good, 
then you must read the Bible, which contains the record of the only person to live a 
sinless life, Jesus.  The Good is not known through anamnesis, but through divine 
revelation.   
The problem here, is that Neoplatonism is based on a cosmology of emanation, in 
which everything radiates outward from the One in hierarchical fashion.  It is more 
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pantheism with gradated levels of being than theism, and may not be compatible with the 
theist’s belief in creation rather than emanation.  The material universe, since it is the 
furthest emanation from the One, is of less being than the spiritual and ideal forms they 
reflect.  The things of this world are ephemeral, not fully real.  This is incompatible with 
the Christian account of creation in a single direct act by God, along with the claim that 
the physical world is good.  The belief that God creates a unique human soul for each 
individual, made in the image of God, is also incompatible with the Neoplatonist view 
that each soul is a drop or spark of the divine, immortal and capable of countless 
incarnations in human and animal form.     
 Due to the decline of the Roman Empire, as well as a decline of scholars fluent in 
Greek, many of the works of Aristotle were lost to the Latin speaking West.  With the 
rise of Christianity, and the emphasis on the salvation of one’s soul and otherworldly 
happiness, interest in the natural philosophy of Aristotle waned.  In the sixth century, 
Boethius, who was one of the last scholars fluent in both Roman and Greek, was in the 
process of translating all the great works of antiquity into Latin before he fell out of favor 
with the Ostrogoth King of Italy, Theodoric, and was imprisoned and executed.  Boethius 
was one of the last Westerners to study at Plato’s Academy before the Christian Emperor 
Justinian closed it in 531 because it was a center of pagan learning.  He did, however, 
manage to translate Plato’s Timaeus as well as the first six books from Aristotle’s work 
on Logic, the Organon.  But after the rise of Islam, this was all of the ancient Greek 
philosophy that was to be known by the West for the next 600 years.  It was not until the 
middle of the twelfth century into the thirteenth, when the Muslims were driven out of 
Spain, that copies of Aristotle were recovered from the libraries of Cordova and 
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Barcelona.  Much of Spain as well as Sicily had been in Muslim hands from 902 to 1091.   
Many see this event as the precipitating event that would eventually give rise to science.  
However, not only were Aristotle’s works recovered, but so were many commentaries on 
them by Islamic scholars, most notably Avicenna and Averroes.52  In addition, many 
other Islamic works on science were also translated.  Works by Hippocrates, and Galen 
must not be overlooked, and may have played as much a part in fueling the renaissance as 
Aristotle’s corpus.   
Thomas Aquinas was then commissioned to synthesize the teachings of the 
Christian faith with the philosophy of Aristotle, to ‘Christianize’ Aristotle.  While it is 
beyond the scope of this study to summarize Aquinas, considering a few points that are 
relevant to our topic will be of help.  To begin with, it is obvious that Aquinas’s synthesis 
is different from Augustine’s.  Augustine believed the fall abrogated humanity from the 
divine, that because of the fall all of humanity, including reason, has been tainted.  
Aquinas, on the other hand, sees nature as continuous with the divine, and as a result, 
reason can be perfected by grace.  Humans using reason can know some truths about 
God, and what can’t be known using reason may be known through divine revelation.  
God’s existence can be demonstrated in five different ways, by proceeding a posteriori, 
with things known to the senses.  But that God is triune in nature, cannot be known, and 
hence must be revealed.  Aquinas therefore believed that those parts of Aristotle which 
were speculative and contrary to Christian belief could be ignored.  Therefore, in general, 
Aristotle’s thought could be made compatible with Christian teaching. 
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Similarly, Aristotle’s empirical realism is maintained by Aquinas, but with a few 
changes.  Aristotle believed the world was eternal.  This allows him to maintain 
substantial essences are permanent, while at the same time not transcendent, thus residing 
in things.  Contingent things, therefore, can be dependent upon other contingent things 
for their being, as long as there is an infinite series (which Aquinas denies there can be).  
But if the universe has a beginning, as theism believes, then God, the only subsistent 
Being for whom existence and essence, or Being and Essence, are one, must be the 
necessary cause of contingent things.53  Hence underlying the being of all objects of 
scientific study is the ultimate source of Being, God.  Because the sciences study only 
various beings, parts of Being, but not Being itself, “metaphysics does not depend 
completely upon the content of Aristotelian science.”54  No science studies existence per 
se, only metaphysics does.  This shows that while the content of the two realms is 
different, they are also interdependent.  There could be no sciences without God as the 
creator and sustainer of the being of the objects science studies.  Thus if one pursues 
metaphysical analysis far enough, contemplation of the Being of beings will ultimately 
lead one to God.  Universal essences are eternal not because they were in contingent 
things, but because they were in the mind of the God who made them.  Through 
abstraction and intuitive induction of particulars, a thing’s quiddity, or essence, can be 
known by human beings.  
Aquinas clearly stands in the compatibilist tradition, believing that reason and 
faith, science and religion, are compatible.  Aquinas believed that Aristotelian philosophy 
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served the truth and used human reason toward that end.  Christian theology also served 
truth, but employed divine revelation to arrive at truths that lay beyond reason.  Both 
traditions sought truth, and the only difference between them was their methodology.55  
God, as the author of truth, has also revealed himself in history and supplied knowledge 
of those truths that lay beyond human reason.  Thus faith completes reason.56   
However, not everyone agreed with him and saw problems with his synthesis.  
Aristotle’s vision of God was a self-absorbed God, a God concerned only with pure 
actuality, hence himself.  He was needed only to explain motion.  Neither being the 
Creator of the universe, nor concerned with it, Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is not the type 
of God to whom one could pray or who would concern himself with answering prayer.  
This is obviously incompatible with Christian thought.  Aristotle is also ambiguous, if not 
dismissive, of the possibility of human immortality.  In De Anima 3:5 he states that only 
the Active Intellect is eternal.  To what extent this allows for a personal identity that 
survives death is open to debate.  So for these reasons and others, Aquinas’s synthesis 
was rejected by the incompatibilists, who saw the compatibility of reason and faith, 
natural philosophy and theology, as untenable.   
The initial rejection came in the form of a book written by Giles of Rome, entitled 
The Errors of the Philosophers, which critiqued the work of Aristotle and the Islamic 
commentators.  This culminated in the Paris condemnations of 1277 issued by Bishop 
Etienne Tempier.57  These critics believed the Christian faith should be unadulterated, not 
tainted with pagan philosophy.  They were continuing in the footsteps of Tertullian, who 
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asked ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’  Luther would also be the intellectual heir 
of this position, rejecting the Scholastic synthesis in several different areas.  In his 
“Disputation against Scholastic Theology,” he claims that “Aristotle is to theology what 
darkness is to light.”  Luther claims that reason has been contaminated by the Fall to such 
an extent that natural theology is severely limited.  Luther also regarded Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics as incompatible with Christian teaching, arguing that Aquinas’s synthesis of the 
two resulted in a Pelagian form of works’ righteousness.58  Richard Rubenstein 
summarizes why one might be skeptical of any attempt to ‘Christianize’ Aristotle:   
  Aristotle does not appear to be aware that the world of the senses is a 
place of suffering and unreality, or that there is a better, more real world to 
come…His writings have nothing to say about God the creator or the 
Redeemer, and pay little attention to our sinfulness or its consequences in 
the afterlife.  In Aristotle’s view, time and space exist eternally.  Nature 
governs itself without divine interference, and human reason, far from 
being crippled, is perfectly adequate to secure man’s knowledge, good 
behavior, and happiness…From a Christian perspective, this worldview is 
godless.59  
 Later Humanists would take the opposite approach.  They rejected the Thomistic 
synthesis because it was too Christian, in that it made science subservient to the Church.  
They wanted to pursue science without the interference of the Church.  Hence Thomas’s 
synthesis, based on compatibility, was opposed by those on both the religious side and 
the scientific side.  The humanists wanted science to be a strictly secular enterprise, 
governed only by scientists.  Francis Bacon will also advocate the uncoupling of science 
and Scholastic theology.  Aquinas was a theologian, not a scientist, and hence should 
play no role in affecting a synthesis between the two.  Humanists like Erasmus rejected 
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the type of science practiced in the universities because it was too indebted to 
scholasticism, which he saw as sterile and in need of repudiation.60  However, since the 
humanists saw the practice of science as a separate sphere from the practice of religion, 
they may be said to be the early advocates of the Independence model rather than the 
Conflict model.    
 
6.  The rise of the Scientific Revolution:  Galileo and the Copernican Revolution 
Incompatibilists usually accept the grand narrative told by A.D. White’s History 
of the Warfare of Science with Theology, published in 1896.  White narrates one battle 
after another in the long history of this warfare, in every scientific field.  Each concludes, 
White says, with a decisive victory of science over religion.  He states, “the dogmas 
developed in strict adherence to Scripture and the conceptions held in the Church during 
many centuries ‘always, everywhere, and by all,’ were, on the whole, steadily hostile to 
truth.” 61   The three major battles he uses to support this conclusion are:  geocentrism and 
heliocentrism, creationism and evolution, and the divine origin of humans and their 
subsequent fall.  Each of these ‘battles’ merits consideration, but the main focus of this 
study is evolution.  The Scientific Revolution is said to have begun with the publication 
in 1543 of Copernicus’s On the Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres.  However, while this 
date is convenient, if one were alive at the time it is doubtful one would have thought 
anything revolutionary occurred.  It took close to 150 years for astronomers to 
unanimously support heliocentrism, and the heliocentrism they accepted was not the 
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Copernican model.  The publication of Copernicus’s book hardly created a stir because 
very few people could understand it, since it involved a great deal of mathematical 
reasoning.  Nor could his reasoning be said to depart from Scholastic methods in favor of 
modern scientific methods.  His case for heliocentrism rested not upon any hard empirical 
evidence, but rather upon an appeal to Pythagorean harmony.  If anything, the empirical 
evidence seemed to disprove Copernican heliocentrism, because it predicted stellar 
parallax, a phenomenon which was not detected until 1838.  Copernicus rejected the 
Ptolemaic system, with all its equants and epicycles, because he believed it was 
inconsistent and lacked harmony.  Heliocentrism, on the other hand, was a much more 
satisfactory explanation of planetary retrogression, i.e., the perceived backward 
movement of planets, as it demonstrated why the planets might appear to reverse their 
direction.  But because Copernicus, in accord with the Scholastic and Aristotelian belief, 
held that the orbits of celestial bodies must be circular (because circles are perfect, as 
must be celestial bodies), he himself needed eccentrics and epicycles to maintain his 
system’s alleged superior harmony to that of the Ptolemaic system.62    
Copernicus’s theory was less dependent upon observations than on the overall 
coherence of theory.  Tycho Brahe, on the other hand, was much more of an empiricist, 
obsessively recording his naked eye observations of the night sky.  As a result, he 
combined both the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, arguing that the sun revolved 
around the earth, but that all the other planets revolved around the sun.  When he died, his 
collection of data on the orbit of Mars passed into the hands of his assistant, Johannes 
Kepler.  Anthony Alioto claims that it was “Kepler who made the Copernican 
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Revolution.”63  Kepler could not accept epicycles, either Ptolemaic or Copernican, and 
from the precise measurements of Mars’ orbit, came to conclude that planets orbited the 
sun in ellipses with the sun not at the center, but at the focal point of the ellipse.  This 
realization served as the basis of his three laws of planetary motion, which are stated as 
mathematical laws.  Thomas Kuhn concurs with Alioto’s judgment that Kepler had 
enough evidence to convince a mathematician and astronomer of heliocentrism, but that 
his arguments were too mathematical and esoteric to be of much use in the court of public 
opinion.64 
Galileo provided the kind of evidence that could convince a layman untrained in 
math of the truth of heliocentrism.  He did so in the form a telescope.  There it was for 
anyone who cared to look – the mountains of the moon, the four satellites of Jupiter, the 
rings of Saturn, and the numerous stars of the Milky Way.  But the most critical piece of 
evidence provided by Galileo’s telescope was the fulfillment of a prediction made by 
Copernicans, that if heliocentrism was true, then Venus should undergo phases like the 
moon.  Galileo’s telescope confirmed that it did.  It is interesting to note that a historian 
of science like Thomas Kuhn fails to even mention Galileo’s trouble with the Catholic 
Church for championing heliocentrism, whereas Bertrand Russell, in his book Religion 
and Science, makes Galileo’s trial the central focus.  Why is this?  It is perhaps because 
Kuhn sees Science and Religion as separate spheres, whereas Russell does not.  Galileo’s 
case is a textbook example of the Conflict Thesis for Russell, evidence that religion and 
science are in conflict with one another, and as in the example of Galileo, it is science 
that wins out.  
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So just what threat exactly did Galileo’s support of heliocentrism pose to the 
Catholic Church?  As noted, Copernicus favored heliocentrism because of its overall 
coherence or harmony, not because of any new evidence.  What Galileo provides is hard 
evidence that clearly favors heliocentrism over geocentrism.  From the years 1610 to 
1613, he published the findings he obtained through the use of his telescope and 
explicitly stated they supported Copernicanism.  This led the Catholic Church to 
condemn Copernicanism in 1616.  The Scholastic synthesis had combined 
Aristotelianism with the teachings of the Bible.  Both Aristotle and the Bible asserted a 
fixed earth at the center of the universe; however, Aristotle believed the earth was a 
sphere, whereas passages in the Bible suggested the earth was flat.  Psalm 93:1 and 96:10 
state:  “the world is firmly established, it cannot be moved.”  At Joshua 10:12-13, Joshua 
commands the sun to stand still and it does.  This implies it is the sun that travels across 
the sky while the earth is fixed.  In arguing for heliocentrism, Galileo states that these 
passages should be interpreted figuratively, and not literally.  But the Council of Trent in 
1546 had “explicitly limited the interpretation of the Bible to the bishops and councils of 
the church.”65  Galileo was neither a theologian nor a church official.  His 
pronouncements on what the correct interpretation of Scripture is challenged the 
authority the Church claimed only for its magisterium in response to Protestant debates.  
Galileo’s claim provoked the Church to act.   In 1616 it issued a decree stating that 
“Copernicanism was false and completely contrary to the Divine Scriptures.”66  As a 
result Copernicus’s On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres was placed on the Index 
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of Forbidden books, and Galileo told he could discuss it only hypothetically.  When 
Galileo argued forcefully once again for Copernicanism in his 1632 work, Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, a trial was held the following year, in which 
Galileo was forced to denounce heliocentrism.  But only over time, rather than due to the 
publication of a single book, can one say that a scientific revolution took place and that 
heliocentrism became accepted.67 
 
7.  Darwin’s Implications for the Western Philosophic Tradition:  the Death of Essentialism?   
 
The claim that Darwinism is corrosive applies not only to religion, but to parts of 
the Western philosophic tradition.  At the core of Western thought is Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s essentialism, which argues that what makes a species a species is its 
unchanging and eternal essence.  Daniel Dennett states, “the taxonomy of living things 
Darwin inherited was thus itself a direct descendant, via Aristotle, of Plato’s essentialism.  
In fact, the word ‘species’ was at one point a standard translation of Plato’s Greek word 
for Form or Idea, eidos.  Individual members came and went, but the species itself 
remained unchanged and unchangeable.”68  For the ancient Greeks, fixity of species 
meant that species do not change because of Platonic Forms and Aristotelian substances, 
not because of divine creation.  It has been argued that Darwin overthrew essentialism by 
arguing that species are neither eternal nor immutable, that they evolve over time through 
the process of natural selection. The Mind-first assumptions of Platonic Idealism and 
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Aristotelian realism are thereby inverted, exposing essences as nothing but mutating 
genes and arbitrary names, arising not from a mind, but an algorithmic process called 
natural selection.  Darwin states, “I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for 
the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other.”69   
Thus ‘species’ is not defined by some transcendent Form or eternal essence.  The 
term simply reflects morphological similarities or an ability to interbreed with other 
individuals.  Thus by denying fixity of species, Darwin claims there is no Platonic form 
corresponding to a species, nor an Aristotelian essence joined to the material substance.  
Universal essences, rather than being unchanging and permanent, are now dynamic, not 
outside of the Heraclitian flux.  Modern science now interprets these essences as various 
combinations of atoms, electrons, protons, neutrons, elements, molecules, RNA, DNA, 
and cell biology.  Modern science thus views previous metaphysical systems as simply 
primitive attempts to explain what modern science does a better job of, rendering them 
interesting but no longer to be taken seriously at a metaphysical, trans-empirical level. 
Elliott Sober calls this process ‘The Death of Essentialism.’70  He notes the irony 
in Darwin’s choice of the title for his book, On the Origin of Species.  It is ironic because 
Darwin is in fact making an argument that there is no such thing as ‘species,’ since 
species are fluid and morph into one another.  In asserting that species have an origin, or 
come into being through natural selection, he is on the one hand stating they are real 
things.  But on the other hand, he is paradoxically arguing that species change and are 
mutable.  If an essence describes that which does not change, while only its accidental 
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properties change, and essences are akin to natural kinds or species, then a paradox 
results.  In denying that species are fixed, he is denying they have an essence.  Yet he 
wants to argue something comes into being through the process of natural selection, 
namely, species.  The only way to resolve this contradiction is to state that species should 
not be understood as essences, at least in the Platonic or Aristotelian model.  The term 
‘species’ simply names “historical entities rather than natural kinds” which can be traced 
through ancestral branching.71  Sober argues that biologists today would not even define 
species strictly in terms of phenotypic or genetic similarities.  He states that if a mutant 
tiger arose that was neither striped nor carnivorous, traits which are considered essential 
traits of tigers, the tiger would still be considered a tiger.72  In population genetics, there 
is no such thing as a species, if all members of a species have the exact same kind of 
essential nature.  Ernst Mayr, the father of population genetics, states that we should not 
“think essentialistically…that all the members of a species are fundamentally the same.  
No!  The whole point of evolution is:  each one is different.”73  Each individual is 
genetically unique.  There is no such thing as a species essence. 
 However, the position that Darwinism constitutes ‘the death of essentialism’ was 
hotly debated amongst the biologists of Darwin’s time.  Some believed that evolution is 
guided by a divine being toward intelligent creatures, that there is a type, or kind, of 
being that naturally is realized as evolution ‘progresses.’  Asa Gray and Charles Lyell 
argued with Darwin that evolution could be a guided process, one that is pushed toward 
the development of rational beings like us.  Darwin, however, thought this smacked too 
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much of special creationism and favored strictly natural selection.  It might be a process 
set up by God, but once set up, he felt, it required no guidance.74  In interpreting 
Darwinism as resulting in the death of essentialism, Sober is siding with Darwin against 
Gray, Lyell, and intelligent design, opting instead for the view that evolution occurs in a 
strictly natural, random way.  But this is not a foregone conclusion.  There could be 
creatures an intelligent designer has in mind when creating.  They might constitute 
natural kinds, or essences.  Clearly, beings ‘made in the image of God’ would constitute 
such a kind.  Essences also transcend species, and could be seen as constituting moral 
values in the way that Socrates envisioned, such as the essence or Form of Goodness 
itself.  In some theistic frameworks, even if God set up the laws of nature and allows 
evolution to proceed in a natural manner, moral values might be immune from the 
working of evolutionary processes.  If evolutionary theory is not fatal to moral realism, 
i.e., the claim that moral values or essences objectively exist, then Darwin is not 
necessarily fatal to essentialism.  
 
8.  Has Darwin refuted the Bible? 
 
Another major battle between science and religion that White cites is the debate 
over human origins and the Fall.  Since this is a claim made in the Bible, based on a 
literal interpretation of Genesis and the story of Adam’s creation and subsequent fall, if 
evolution demonstrates there was no historical Adam, then the incompatibilist might 
make the claim, as Taylor states, that ‘Darwin has refuted the Bible.’75  The Western 
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theist tradition asserts that each human has a soul that was created out of nothing by God, 
which is immaterial, and survives death.  This central claim is based upon the creation 
story found in the first three chapters of Genesis.  It asserts that Adam and Eve’s bodies 
were created by God out of the dust of the earth, and their souls ‘breathed’ into them by 
God.  Up until the time of Darwin, most Western theists believed that Adam and Eve 
were real people, and all human beings were descended from them.  Evolution seems to 
discredit this story by saying that human beings evolved from other animals, and that 
Adam and Eve, if they existed at all, had not only human ancestors, but common ancestry 
with other primates.  
The implications of this are enormous for Christian theology.  Even if one 
attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency by interpreting the first three chapters of 
Genesis allegorically, rather than literally, the problem still persists.  The New Atheists 
are certainly aware of the implications a non-existent Adam has for Christian theology.  
Richard Dawkins states: “To cap it all, Adam, the supposed perpetrator of the original 
sin, never existed in the first place:  an awkward fact – excusably unknown to Paul but 
presumably known to an omniscient God (and Jesus, if you believe he was God) – which 
fundamentally undermines the premise of the whole theory….Jesus had himself tortured 
and executed, in vicarious punishment for a symbolic sin committed by a non-existent 
individual?  As I said, barking mad.”76  Christopher Hitchens finds the whole theology of 
atonement, built upon expiating the sin of Adam, ridiculous, calling it “the nonsense story 
of Adam’s ‘Fall.’”77  He rejects “the idea of a vicarious atonement,” since Adam did not 
exist, nor pass on a fallen nature which is in need of expiation.  He states he cannot 
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“accept that I am responsible for the flogging and mocking and crucifixion, in which I 
had no say and no part,” or “that the agony was necessary in order to compensate for an 
earlier crime in which I also had no part, the sin of Adam.”78  Hitchens instead says that it 
is religion that is the original sin, for “presenting a false picture of the world.”79   
 
9.  Conclusion:  There is Philosophical and Scientific Continuity with Religion  
 
The first half of the nineteenth century saw the flowering of idealism.  But in the 
second half of the century the intellectual climate changed.   The ‘Turn from Idealism’ 
toward secular materialism was made by both philosophers and the general public alike.80  
Idealists do not have to be supernaturalists.  Idealists believe that consciousness 
structures reality, and if one believes consciousness emerges from matter, and then 
structures reality, the result is an idealistic framework grounded in naturalism.  
Schopenhauer takes this position, although he argues that blind will has priority over 
conceptual thinking.  Marx reversed the direction of German Idealism by turning it on its 
head, claiming that dialectical historical forces head not towards the Absolute but rather 
Communist materialism.  Freud agreed with Schopenhauer that deep unconscious forces, 
not reason, are in the driver’s seat of our will.  Nietzsche rejected both religion and 
reason as the foundation of values and argued that what was needed was the courage to 
confront the void left by the death of God.  Sartre too believes “There is no human 
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nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it.”81  Louis Pasteur developed 
the field of microbiology by recognizing the role that natural, rather than supernatural, 
causes play in the formation of disease through infection by germs and microorganisms, 
with this leading to the invention of pasteurization in 1862.  The Scientific Revolution 
and its many notable scientific discoveries helped fuel the turn from idealism by 
providing natural, rather than supernatural, causes and explanations for a wide variety of 
phenomena. 
Dennett believes Darwin and the scientific revolution are truly a universal acid, 
that not only idealism but all of pre-Darwinian philosophy is somehow suspect, tainted by 
a primitive worldview that has been rendered obsolete.  He states, “Darwin shows we 
don’t need to draw the line in an essentialist way.  What is the difference between a 
variety and a species?  It is the Socratic activity of definition-mongering or essence-
hunting… Sometimes almost everyone can see the pointlessness of the quest.”82  Thus the 
danger of Darwin’s ideas is that they run the risk of being a universal acid, so corrosive 
they threaten to dissolve all of the Western intellectual tradition, both religious and 
philosophical.83  However, as noted, it has been shown that Darwin has not necessarily 
discredited all types of Platonic forms or universal essences.  Nor has Darwin overthrown 
the entire medieval scholastic tradition.  Parts of the theistic mesh, or web of belief, might 
stand in need of mending, or reformulating, but the whole tradition has not been 
invalidated.  Contrary to the New Atheists’ claim that there is no rational basis for 
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theism, there is much more continuity between the medieval tradition and modern science 
than the New Atheists recognize.   
 It is true to some extent that everything changes after Darwin.  To read someone 
who wrote before Darwin feels different, disjointed, lacking something that someone who 
has written after Darwin appears to grasp.  Darwin is a game changer.  The theory that he 
develops changes the entire human worldview.  One can understand analytic 
philosophy’s seemingly dismissal of all that has been written prior to the 20th century.  
The basic beliefs upon which one begins to construct a worldview changed with Darwin 
– not just in science, but in theology as well.   To some, Darwin provides a sufficient 
explanation for the origin of all human beings by a strictly natural process, one that took 
several billion years to move from single celled organisms to the human neo-cortex.  The 
earth and the role humans play in the universe have also fundamentally shifted, from 
being at the center of God’s creation, to being but a speck of dust in a universe with 10 
billion galaxies, each containing 100 billion stars.  That means that our sun is just one of 
a billion trillion stars (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 stars).  The human place in the 
universe has drastically shrunken with the arrival of the Darwinian and modern scientific 
worldview.  Thus one could argue that another implication of the Darwinian worldview is 
nihilism.  That topic, however, is beyond the scope of this project.  Let us first consider 
whether or not the 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 stars that make up the natural, 
observable world are all there is.84 
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CHAPTER TWO – 
A CONTEMPORARY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM:  NATURALISM 
  
 
  God is, like Santa Clause, a myth of childhood, not anything a sane, 
undeluded adult could literally believe in.  That God must be abandoned 
altogether…There have been those who thought they saw Darwin letting the 
worst possible cat out of the bag:  nihilism….What exactly are the 
implications of Darwin’s idea?1 – Daniel Dennett 
 
  I have yet to see any good reason to suppose that theology is a subject at 
all….The nineteenth century is the last time when it was possible for an 
educated person to admit to believing in miracles like the virgin birth without 
embarrassment.2 – Richard Dawkins 
 
   All attempts to reconcile faith with science and reason are consigned to 
failure.3 – Christopher Hitchens 
 
  Many philosophers and scientists now reject Descartes’ separation of mind 
and body, spirit and matter, as the concession to Christian piety that it surely 
was… Most scientists consider themselves physicalists; this means, among 
other things, that they believe that our mental and spiritual lives are wholly 
dependent upon the workings of our brains.  On this account, when the brain 
dies, the stream of our being must come to an end.4  – Sam Harris 
 
Darwinism is the story of humanity’s liberation from the delusion that its 
destiny is controlled by a power higher than itself.5 – Phillip E. Johnson 
 
  Dualism is less a theory of mind than it is an empty space waiting for a 
genuine theory of mind to be put in it…The important point about the 
standard evolutionary story is that the human species and all of its features 
are the wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process…We are 
creatures of matter.  And we should learn to live with that fact.  Arguments 
like these have moved most (but not all) of the professional community to 
embrace some form of materialism.6 – Paul Churchland  
 
  Nearly everybody nowadays wants to be a ‘naturalist.’7 – David Papineau 
 
  There is physics and there is stamp collecting.8 – Ernest Rutherford 
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1.  Defining Naturalism 
 
 
To define metaphysical naturalism by claiming it is the position that “reality is 
exhausted by nature,” is not very informative.9  Whose idea of nature?  Thales thought 
the arche, or the principle element of all things, was water; Anaximenes thought it air; 
Anaximander thought it indeterminate; Democritus thought it was atoms and the void 
between them; Parmenides, that it was the One; for Pythagoras, number.  On one 
interpretation, Spinoza’s view of nature was pantheism (which, taken literally, entails that 
naturalism is not equivalent to atheism).  For Leibniz nature was comprised of monads.  
Newton and Descartes saw the natural world as a mechanism, whereas for Berkeley 
nature was a collection of thoughts in God’s mind.   R.G. Collingworth states that, “the 
word ‘nature’ is on the whole most often used in a collective sense for the sum total or 
aggregate of natural things.”10  But once again, who tells us what should be included in 
the collective aggregate?  Are minds, but not souls, included?  Are mental contents, 
beliefs, qualia, moral values, free will, human causal agency, mathematical objects, 
universals, a substantial self, or the paranormal?   
Because science studies ‘nature,’ most people would turn to science to tell us 
what exists.  If this were the case, how many people would say, “Oh, you want to know 
what exists?  It’s what the Standard Model of Physics says exists, the twelve elemental 
properties, quarks and leptons.”  Yet this is what the current physics says exists, but how 
many people even know what the difference between a top quark and a muon is?  In 
                                                 
9 Papineau, David, “Naturalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/naturalism/>. 
10 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1945), 43. 
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addition, this leaves the content of the term ‘naturalism’ open, dependent upon the 
current scientific understanding of the day, which changes on a frequent basis.  It also 
implies a unified acceptance by science of what it studies and the methods of how it 
studies it, which is not necessarily the case.  But the biggest problem is that it appears 
circular.  Metaphysical naturalism is informed by methodological naturalism to tell it 
what exists, but methodological naturalism, as an a priori rule, only considers ‘natural’ 
phenomena.  It also assumes a type of scientific realism, as opposed to instrumentalism, 
in that the concepts and particles assumed by scientific theories are supposed to denote 
entities that actually exist.    
The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition of philosophical 
naturalism:  “A view of the world, and of man’s relation to it, in which only the operation 
of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces is admitted or 
assumed.”11  This is the only definition that the OED gives for philosophical naturalism.  
What is interesting is that it seems to contain a negative definition.  Naturalism is 
opposed to supernaturalism.  It is stated that about the time that Darwin published The 
Origin of Species, philosophy experienced what is called ‘The turn from Idealism.’  In 
other words, philosophers turned away from the Mind-first view of reality, away from the 
supernaturalism of traditional theism.  But if they turned away from this worldview, what 
did they turn toward?  Some idealists are not supernaturalists (e.g., Schopenhauer, Left 
Hegelian Marxists).  The OED, in defining naturalism as a turn away from 
supernaturalism, lacks specificity over just what is positively asserted by this, other than 
vague ‘natural laws and forces.’  If naturalism is the absence of supernaturalism, what is 
                                                 
11 Oxford English Dictionary  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2012), s.v. ‘naturalism.’ 
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supernaturalism?  The absence of naturalism?  What is health?  The absence of disease.  
What is disease?  The absence of health.  While naturalism can be defined as a negative 
position, as the rejection of supernaturalism, be it theism, or the assertion of Platonic 
forms, or transcendent moral values, defining something by its antonym does not really 
tell us what it is.  We need a more substantive definition than this. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary offers a bit more guidance.  It defines 
‘naturalism’ as “a theory denying that an event or object has any supernatural 
significance; specifically:  the doctrine that scientific laws are adequate to account for all 
phenomena.”  The key term here is ‘adequate.’  This simply means that theoretically a 
natural explanation can be given for any entity or event, in an ‘adequate’ way, i.e., in a 
way that is epistemically satisfactory.  However, this does not mean that every entity or 
event does not have a supernatural origin; it only means that natural explanations are 
‘adequate’ enough to give an account of them.  In addition to opposition to 
supernaturalism, Richard Dawkins, in The God Delusion, goes a step further than 
naturalism as ‘adequacy.’  He claims that any event or object seen to be supernatural, 
rather than natural, is ‘invented,’ i.e., fictional.  He states, “I decry supernaturalism in all 
its forms…I am attacking God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever 
and whenever they have been or will be invented.”12   
David Papineau sees supernaturalism as a form of dualism (natural/supernatural), 
and rejects dualism in all its forms in favor of naturalism.  If this is the case, it seems that 
if naturalism is true, supernaturalism is false.  What then is supernaturalism?  Rem 
Edwards lists what he considers to be the family traits of supernaturalism:  
1. Nature is not the only thing that exists 
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2. The supernaturalist is not an immanentist; nature is nonpersonal, but it may 
express the will and purposes of a being beyond nature 
3. Nature is contingent and created 
4. Some natural events have supernatural causes 
5. There are other avenues of truth besides the scientific method, be it reason, 
faith, or revelation  
6. The humanistic philosophy of man and ethics are inadequate13 
 
So if naturalism is the contrary or opposite of supernaturalism, i.e., if asserting 
naturalism is equivalent to denying supernaturalism, then one can prima facie say that a 
naturalist rejects all of the above propositions.  This would define naturalism as saying:  
nature is all that exists; nature is nonpersonal and expresses no will or purpose of a being 
beyond it; that which makes up nature is necessary and eternal; no natural events have 
supernatural causes; the only reliable path to truth is the scientific method; and the 
humanistic philosophy of man and ethics is adequate.  These propositions also just 
happen to be the family traits that Edwards lists for his definition of naturalism.14  This 
definition is a substantial improvement over the OED’s.  However, Edwards states each 
of these propositions are only traits of supernaturalism based upon a family resemblance.  
In other words, a supernaturalist might not agree to all of them.  But which ones are 
necessary, and which are not?  This is not apparent.  But it is important to determine, 
because if naturalism is defined in relation to supernaturalism, if some of these traits are 
left out, it will change the definition of naturalism as well.   
 Let us now consider another definition of naturalism that goes beyond the basic 
one offered by the OED.  The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines naturalism in the 
following way: 
   In general the view that everything is natural, i.e., that everything there 
is belongs to the world of nature, and so can be studied by the methods 
                                                 
13 Rem B. Edwards, Reason and Religion  (New York:  Harcourt Brace Janovich, Inc., 1972), 167. 
14 Ibid., 138. 
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appropriate for studying that world, and the apparent exceptions can be 
somehow explained away…The more general application is to philosophy 
as a whole, and again involves both the objects studied and the methods 
used in studying them, i.e., both metaphysics and epistemology.  In 
metaphysics naturalism is perhaps most obviously akin to materialism, but 
it does not have to be materialistic.  What it insists on is that the world of 
nature should form a single sphere without incursion from outside by souls 
or spirits, divine or human, and without having to accommodate strange 
entities like non-natural values or substantive abstract universals.  But it 
need not reject the phenomena of consciousness, nor even identify them 
somehow with material phenomena.15 
 
 This definition includes, but goes beyond, the OED’s anti-supernaturalism.  It 
implies that in its philosophical form, naturalism is akin to scientism, i.e., the view that 
philosophy should adopt the metaphysics and methodology of the natural sciences.  This 
definition clarifies what is meant by Webster’s use of the term ‘adequacy,’ that “apparent 
exceptions can be somehow explained away.”  This definition also distinguishes between 
metaphysical naturalism and epistemological naturalism as a method.  The former defines 
the objects to be studied and the latter describes the methods used to study them.  
However, one should notice that we have a ‘tail-wagging-the-dog’ problem.  Is 
metaphysical naturalism arrived at using methodological naturalism?  If so, then isn’t this 
the obvious conclusion?  If one’s method allows for only natural entities and events to be 
considered, then only natural causes will be allowed and its metaphysic will thereby be 
naturalistic?  If only the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws 
and forces is admitted or assumed from the outset, how is it possible to substantiate the 
fundamental claim of metaphysical naturalism, that all that exists is nature, in a non-
circular way?  If it cannot, then metaphysical naturalism is just a dogmatic assumption.  
Similarly, on what basis does one appeal in order to stipulate that the rules governing 
                                                 
15 Alan Lacey, in Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich  (New York:  Oxford University 
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methodological naturalism should rule out supernatural explanations – on the basis of 
metaphysical naturalism?  This too is circular.   
Lacking proper justification for either position, each runs the risk of simply being 
dogmatic. Without good epistemic grounds for either, why should one favor metaphysical 
naturalism as the most likely ontology, or view methodological naturalism as the 
privileged epistemology?  In case one is not familiar with the debate, “the naturalist 
claims to have epistemic, explanatory, and methodological superiority on his or her 
side.”16  But on what grounds do they claim this epistemic superiority?  The only non-
circular way that naturalism can justify itself, is by appeal to either induction or the 
overall coherence of its ‘grand story,’ i.e., its ‘adequacy,’ its ability to ‘explain away’ or 
supposedly account for all the phenomena said to exist.  Yet there are many phenomena 
which critics claim naturalism fails to account for.  In other words, there are critics who 
find the ‘grand story’ or narrative of theism a better overall explanation for many 
recalcitrant phenomena that naturalism fails to ‘explain away’ in an empirically adequate 
way.  These will be considered later. 
 
2.  Types of Naturalism 
 
 A distinction stated in the Oxford Companion definition is that metaphysical 
naturalism is closely related to materialism, although not necessarily.  The position that 
all that exists is matter is called ‘physicalism,’ which as a species of naturalism.  It is also 
called strict naturalism or reductive naturalism.  Physicalism is “the thesis that all natural 
                                                 
16 William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Naturalism, A Critical Analysis, ed. by William Lane Craig and 
J.P. Moreland  (New York:  Routledge, 2002), xii. 
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phenomena are…physical,” that all that exists is the physical world.  As such, the natural 
sciences, physics in particular, is given a privileged epistemic authority for investigating 
reality.  The only things that exist are those that physics tell us exist.  Strict naturalists are 
also committed to the causal closure of the universe, and only allow for physical causes 
of events.  As a result, strict naturalism is reductionistic.  All natural beliefs that we have 
about ourselves, including that we act based on values, purposes, and intentions, that 
consciousness is somehow different from our body, that mental events are somehow 
different from bodily events, or that there is an enduring self or soul, that we are free to 
make choices, even that we have beliefs, all of these are false.  All mental events and the 
content that make them up can ultimately be reduced to and found to be identical with 
brain events.  Strict naturalists like Papineau, Dennett, Crick, and Churchland, “insist that 
all action is determined to occur by non-mental events.”17  Papineau sees “an externalist 
approach to epistemology as the essence of naturalism,” in other words, the very content 
of what is thought or said is dependent in some way upon the external world.18   
Strict naturalists are also adherents of scientism, the belief that the entities posited 
by science are the only entities that may be considered ontologically real. Any object 
which is said to exist but be beyond the methods of science to investigate is immediately 
suspect and disqualified as a possible explanation.  Strict naturalists who reject every type 
of abstract object, such as numbers or Platonic forms, are also termed ‘global naturalists.’ 
One difficulty that strong, global naturalists, such as Dennett and Churchland, face is how 
to reduce or explain away mental entities, especially when our everyday experience 
                                                 
17 Stewart Goetz & Charles Talliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
2008), 14-17. 
18 Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, 1. 
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seems to confirm the existence of beliefs, intentions, and moral values, and rejects the 
notion that consciousness is causally inert.  If they cannot, then they must adopt a weaker 
form of naturalism, and admit that strict global naturalism is false because it is unable to 
account for these things.  
 Not all types of naturalism are this strong in their claims. A weaker form of 
naturalism, local naturalism, is open to the existence of abstract entities such as sets, 
numbers, and properties and relations that, while non-spatiotemporal, are nevertheless 
open to study by science.19  This type of naturalism is ‘critical’ of strict physicalism and 
sees it as insufficient and unable to explain many of these phenomena.  Critical 
naturalism is also referred to as ‘emergent naturalism’ in that it allows for supervenient 
properties to arise or emerge from various complex physical processes with novel 
properties.20  Supervenient properties are considered to be novel in that they cannot be 
reduced to the sum of their parts.  Though they are still dependent in some way upon their 
physical base, they are not necessarily identical to them.  Hence emergent naturalism is 
considered non-reductionistic.  Examples of non-reductive properties might include 
moral and aesthetic values, abstract entities such as sets or universal terms, mental 
properties such as qualia, and free agency.  This form of naturalism shows that naturalism 
is not necessarily synonymous with materialism.  Emergent naturalism allows for the 
emergence of psychophysical properties that are unlike their bases.  Some even argue that 
it opens the door not only for minds to emerge, but maybe even God as well.   
                                                 
19 J.P. Moreland, “The Ontological Status of Properties,’ in Naturalism, A Critical Analysis, ed. by William 
Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland  (New York:  Routledge, 2002), 78-79. 
20 Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (New York:  Harper & Row Publ., 1981), s.v. ‘critical 
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In his book Science and Religion, Bertrand Russell spends several pages 
discussing the emergentist views of Samuel Alexander, which he sees as similar to 
Bergson’s ‘creative evolution.’  Terrence Deacon, in his book Incomplete Nature, states 
that the ‘most prominent’ emergentists are Alexander, C.D. Broad, and Conway Lloyd 
Morgan.21  Alexander’s 1920 book Space, Time, and Deity, was the outcome of the 
Gifford Lectures he delivered in 1916-18.  In it he argues that higher and more complex 
entities emerge out of matter.  From the fundamental stuff of the universe found in space 
and time, other entities may emerge, like life, consciousness, values (Beauty, Goodness, 
Truth), freedom, and ultimately deity.  Alexander’s philosophy may be described as non-
reductionist in that he argues that consciousness of an object cannot be reduced to either 
the object or the consciousness that is contemplating the object.  Although the mind does 
have its basis in neural processes, conscious awareness appears to be more than just an 
epiphenomenon.22  He also argues for a type of direct realism, and holds that not only 
primary qualities, but secondary qualities as well, are in things, and that both are known, 
and “enjoyed,” by the mind.  To these qualities he adds the emergence of tertiary 
qualities of value, such as Beauty and Goodness.  Like Berkeley, he believes the reality 
of an object implies a subject to perceive it, the subject here being a conscious being 
whose awareness seems to be more than just a property of the body.  Since we perceive 
the quality of Beauty in things, Beauty as a value must exist.  The next step above mind 
in “the pattern of growth of things in time,” is the emergence of deity, whose properties 
Alexander seems reluctant to explain, as the complex properties that emerge in higher 
                                                 
21 Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature:  How Mind Emerged from Matter  (New York:  W.W. Norton & 
Co., 2013),  154-158. 
22 Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, Vol I  (New York:  Dover Publications, 1966), v, ix, xiii, 15-
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steps of the process possess properties which cannot be known or predicted with any 
precision.23   
Alexander’s thought could even be interpreted as a type of ‘evolutionary theism,’ 
although it is difficult to see his views as compatible with traditional theism.  His system 
is not theistic in the sense that deity is not prior to, nor outside of space and time, but 
arises from immanent processes within them.  Nor is his system pantheistic in that deity 
emerges from matter and is not a co-aspect of it, as it is in Spinoza.24  Similarly, there are 
those who interpret the new physics as lending itself to a new type of religion, one that is 
monistic (but since the scope of this study is limited to traditional theism, we will not 
concern ourselves with them).25  Russell, however, the confident naturalist, remains 
skeptical.  He states, “Emergent evolutionists, having become persuaded that God did not 
create the world, are content to say that the world is creating God.  But beyond the name, 
such a God has almost nothing in common with the object of traditional worship.”26  
Nevertheless, the point pursued here is this:  Alexander is important to mention in that he 
demonstrates that atheism does not necessarily follow from materialism.   
Barry Stroud discusses ‘open-minded,’ or expansive naturalism, because he thinks 
that there are various phenomena that give strict physicalists problems, such as numbers, 
the laws of logic, moral values, and normative practices within science.  Others call this 
‘broad’ naturalism.  Strict naturalists believe we can reduce human consciousness to 
physical properties without loss.  David Chalmers argues that people who want to do 
away with consciousness, mental content, and semantic understanding, “fail to account 
                                                 
23 Ibid., Vol II, 349. 
24 Ibid., xvii-xix. 
25 See Gary Zukov’s  The Dancing Wu Li Masters, or Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics.   
26 Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 215. 
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for the reality of consciousness.”27  Open-minded, or broad, naturalists are willing to 
admit such things as subjective experience, a self, free will, and moral values, but still 
remain within the framework of an overall naturalism, perhaps believing these 
phenomena will eventually be resolved in a natural way.28  This position seems to allow 
for recalcitrant properties, such as ethical non-naturalism, or numerical non-naturalism. 
Thomas Nagel might fit in here, as a non-reductive emergentist, or as one who feels strict 
naturalism fails to explain certain things.  Yet one wonders if this position is consistent. 
How is it possible to be a naturalist, and claim that there are certain non-natural 
properties and values (which are also somehow natural, but we cannot really explain how 
or why they are natural).  How this position solves anything, or what it is ‘open’ to, is 
debatable.  The position ignores the fact that non-naturalists use these exact same 
phenomena as evidence against naturalism. 
Personal or subjective naturalism is a type of naturalism that may be based upon 
Bayesian probability and thus sees naturalism as a personal belief, but not as one that can 
be determined to hold objectively.  It is non-evangelistic in that it does not try to impose 
this view on others, in the way that Imperialist naturalists do.  This would be the quiet, 
tamed form of naturalism that still retains some humility about the human capability to 
establish grand metaphysical generalizations.  As a result, it does not seek to proselytize 
and convert others to this view.  These types of naturalists merely hold naturalism to be 
the way that they see the world hanging together, but this view remains their personal 
outlook and they don’t think everyone should see the world in the same way.  They might 
                                                 
27 David Chalmers, as quoted by Kelly James Clark in ‘Naturalism and its Discontents,’ in The Blackwell 
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even be open to theism as a possibility because they recognize different people have 
different experiences.  Personal naturalism would probably coincide with open-minded 
naturalism in that it recognizes that there is always more to learn, that finite individuals 
with a finite number of experiences are never in possession of certain knowledge.  They 
recognize the truth to Hamlet saying, “There are more things in heaven and earth, 
Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”29  
Imperialist naturalists on the other hand claim to know that naturalism is true.  In 
other words, they not only believe naturalism is true, but they go beyond this just being a 
personal belief that can be measured in Bayesian probability, to making the claim that 
naturalism is objectively true and has been proven through science.  This is the claim that 
Jaegwon Kim makes in saying that a commitment to naturalism, especially physicalism, 
“is imperialistic” because it demands “full coverage.”30  This characterization sounds like 
scientism, which states that only science is a reliable method for achieving truth.  But 
how can an imperialist naturalist know that metaphysical naturalism is true, other than by 
using the methods of science?  He can’t.   John Haught notes the problem:  “Scientism 
tells us to take nothing on faith, and yet it takes faith to make a commitment to 
scientism.” 31  He claims that this type of naturalist conflates scientism with science, 
confusing the methods of science with the metaphysical stance that all that exists is the 
natural world.  A scientist may be open to theism and other methods beyond the scientific 
method.  So science is not the same as scientism, unless you are an Imperialist naturalist.  
Imperialist naturalists usually make some claim to the effect that science disproves 
                                                 
29 Hamlet, 1.5.167-8 
30 William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, eds, Naturalism:  A Critical Analysis, (New York:  Routledge, 
2000), xi. 
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theism and proves naturalism objectively, and that science can somehow determine this. 
This claim exceeds the more modest claim that it is merely a personal belief that 
metaphysical naturalism is true.  An imperialist naturalist is not content to hold that 
naturalism is his/her own personal vision of how things hang together; he/she claims that 
everyone should be a naturalist because this in fact has been demonstrated by science to 
be the way things hang together.  Whether this claim to knowledge exceeds the limits of 
science will be the subject of Chapters 5 and 7.   
Numbered among the imperialist naturalists are the New Atheists, such as 
Dennett, Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens.  They are the evangelists of Strict Naturalism 
and proclaim the Gospel of Scientism.  They are the ‘in your face’ proselytizers, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Naturalism, who knock on your door and leave pamphlets in your 
mailbox, urging you to convert to the Gospel of Atheism.  In the God Delusion, Dawkins 
states, “If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when 
they put it down.”  The New Atheists are to atheism what the fundamentalists are to 
theism.   They have very firm convictions that they are in possession of the truth, and are 
therefore intolerant of anyone who disagrees with them.  They adhere to a strict 
reductionist interpretation of all religious phenomena, and claim that religion is evil and 
call for it to be stamped out.  All write books aimed at the general public.  So vocal and 
discourteous are they in voicing their opinion, that some have claimed, “the new atheists 
give atheism a bad name.”32  The following are a list of their core beliefs: 
1. Theistic Belief is not rational, nor justifiable. 
2. Naturalism, usually strict naturalism, i.e., physicalism, is true. 
3. Others should convert from theism to naturalism. 
4. The public, not merely their scientific or philosophical peers, need to convinced. 
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5. Convinced that atheism is known to be true and/or certain. 
6. Intolerance for those who disagree with the above. 
7. Religious phenomena can be explained naturalistically. 
8. Religion is evil, a public nuisance to be eradicated. 
9. Science is the only reliable method of obtaining truth about reality. 
10.   Evolution is a strictly natural process. 
 
What is dramatically ‘new’ about the naturalism of the new atheists?  What do the 
new atheists add to atheism that somehow differentiates them in a major way from the 
‘old’ atheists?  It is the last condition mentioned above, that of evolution.  The claim has 
been made that the new atheism isn’t really new, that “everything that is said by the likes 
of Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, and Dennett had already been said, and said better, by 
Russell, Paine, Feuerbach, Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, and others.”33  However, this isn’t 
quite true.  These new atheists claim that science, particularly evolution, is on their side.  
Dawkins illustrates this point in the following passage from The Blind Watchmaker: 
   I could not imagine being an atheist at any time before 1859, when 
Darwin’s Origin of Species was published…Hume did not offer any 
alternative explanation for apparent design, but left the question 
open…although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, 
Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.34  
 
 
 
3.  Examples of Naturalists 
3.1  Nietzsche’s ‘Promiscuous Naturalism’ 
 
Nietzsche deserves to be classified as a naturalist on the sole basis of his 
pronounced anti-supernaturalism.  One could argue that he is the trendsetter in the 
movement towards naturalism, for he was not afraid to proclaim publically the death of 
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God.  The question now is, did Darwin provided the ammunition?  Nietzsche proclaimed 
God’s demise in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which was published in 1883, twenty-four 
years after Darwin published the Origin of Species, and twelve years after The Descent of 
Man.  Is there a causal connection?  Does Nietzsche use Darwin to justify naturalism?  
The tentative answer is no, but Darwin’s theory does add to the growth of secularism and 
the public mood that Nietzsche bears witness to taking over Europe.  Nietzsche makes 
several references to Darwin throughout his books, but his passionate anti-theism is a 
departure from Darwin’s reluctant skepticism.  
In the second chapter of his 1888 book, Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche discusses 
‘the Problem of Socrates.’  Nietzsche casts his form of naturalism as an affirmation of 
this world, in opposition to those, such as Socrates, whose supernaturalism judges that 
this life is “no good.”35  He argues that the key to understanding Socrates’s negative 
attitude towards life is the person of Socrates himself.  Socrates was ugly and “the 
anthropologists amongst the criminologists tell us that the typical criminal is ugly.”36  
Socrates was a plebe, a member of the working class, and members of the working class 
have always been jealous of nobility.  Nietzsche claims that Socrates developed his 
dialectical method out of “plebian ressentiment,” as a way to avenge himself against the 
aristocracy who kept him down.  Previously, Nietzsche claims, arguing was frowned 
upon by good society.  Socrates’ constant arguing was considered bad manners, hence his 
being charged with corrupting the youth.  But by claiming the ability to reason well is the 
highest good to man, he has turned the tables on the aristocracy.  It is now the 
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philosopher who should govern, not the aristocracy.  Nietzsche states that “Socrates was 
a buffoon who got himself taken seriously.”37  He chose to die because he knew he was 
sick.  Athens was forced to condemn him.38  Socrates’ criminal “decadence” is obvious 
by his attributing his “auditory hallucinations” to a guardian angel, or ‘daemon.’39 
Why doesn’t Nietzsche like Socrates?  Why the unusual ad hominem against the 
father of philosophy?  Nietzsche considers Socrates as the source of the ‘great lie’ that 
this world is merely illusory, and that a higher reality lays behind it.  Nietzsche is afraid 
that belief in an afterlife devalues this life.  In The Gay Science, he states, “The Christian 
resolve to find the world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad.”40   Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave similarly argues that this world is only the apparent world, and the 
realm of the Forms that transcends it, is the true world.  Nietzsche sees himself as the 
‘cure’ to Socrates.  He declares this world is the only world.  Against Socrates, Nietzsche 
proposes four theses: 
1.   Any reality other than this one (the apparent world) is not 
demonstrable. 
2.  The ‘true world’ has been constructed out of opposition to this one. 
3.  To say there is another, better world is to invent fables. 
4.  There is no distinction between a ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ world; to say so 
is a ‘suggestion of decadence.’41   
 
  The question now is, did Darwinism influence Nietzsche’s famous proclamation 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that God is dead?  Does Nietzsche cite Darwin and evolution 
as the cause of Europe’s declining faith?  Several passages in his writings appear to 
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generate that view.  He states in The AntiChrist, “We have learned differently.  We have 
become more modest in every way.  We no longer derive man from ‘the spirit,’ or ‘the 
deity’; we have placed him back among the animals.  We consider him the stronger 
animal because he is the most cunning:  his spirituality is a consequence of this.”42  This 
passage clearly states that Nietzsche accepted the evolutionist claim that humans were 
animals who had evolved from lower life forms, not the product of divine creation.  
Consciousness is a product of natural processes, not a qualitative difference between 
humans and animals based upon human claims to possession of a soul.  He makes a 
similar claim in The Gay Science when he states, “When will we complete our de-
deification of nature?  When may we begin to ‘naturalize’ humanity in terms of a pure, 
newly discovered newly redeemed Nature?”43   
Rudiger Safranski sees Nietzsche as simply imbibing the spirit of his day as the 
natural sciences and evolution were making significant advances.   
  Instead of looking up to the divine, man was gazing down to the animal 
kingdom.  The ape had replaced God as an object of inquiry.  God had lost 
his jurisdiction over nature as well as over society, history, and the 
individual.  In the second half of the nineteenth century, society and 
history were also viewed as something that could be understood and 
explained on their own terms.  Any theological hypothesis had become 
superfluous.44 
 
Nietzsche saw his philosophy as working out the implications of a naturalist 
worldview.  Given naturalism, what follows?  How does one overcome nihilism?  From 
the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, Daniel Dennett voices the opinion that 
“there have been those who thought they saw Darwin letting the worst possible cat out of 
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the bag:  nihilism.” 45  Nietzsche foresees the possibility that nihilism might result from a 
naturalist metaphysic, and so Zarathustra is quick to follow up the announcement of the 
death of God with the proclamation of the Overman, or the creative genius or artist who 
gives style to oneself.  Life is now seen as something to be enjoyed, not denigrated.  The 
question now arises:  Does Nietzsche consider the Overman to be the next level in the 
evolution of human beings?  Is Nietzsche giving support to the Nazi eugenics program 
and urging on the development of a higher, master race?  The answer is, no.  At this time 
Darwinism had no explanation for heredity.  Nietzsche therefore argues “that ‘heredity,’ 
as something quite unexplained, cannot be employed as an explanation.”46  In the 1880’s 
natural selection was just one of several plausible scientific theories, but there was no 
consensus that natural selection of favored variations was the primary means by which 
organisms evolved.  The importance of Nietzsche’s Overman is aesthetic, because he 
advances human culture.  The overman was the artistic genius, the Beethoven, the 
Goethe, the Wagner.47  Nietzsche knew nothing of genes.  It is a mistake to think that his 
view of the Overman as an artist supported the Nazi vision of the ‘blonde beast.’  With 
the later development of genetics, some racist German evolutionists might have corrupted 
Nietzsche’s philosophy so as to imply this, but Nietzsche’s talk of a ‘higher’ being was 
directed at individuals who are aesthetically superior, not based on biology or race.  Nor 
were his remarks a reflection of a Hegelian notion of collective, or national advancement. 
  Man as a species is not progressing.  Higher types are indeed attained, 
but they do not last…Among men, the higher types, the lucky strokes of 
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evolution, perish most easily as fortunes change.  They are exposed to 
every kind of decadence…The brief spell of beauty, of genius, of Caesar, 
is sui generis:  such things are not inherited.48 
   
In addition, there are several passages in The Will to Power under the heading 
‘Anti-Darwinism.’  Nietzsche rejected Darwin’s vision, as transmitted by German 
evolutionists, as too weak.  The ‘struggle for existence’ is merely preliminary to 
Nietzsche; what mattered is not just to exist and survive, but to triumph.  The herd exists, 
but the overman flourishes.  Darwin’s dictum of the struggle of existence, the struggle to 
survive, became, under Nietzsche, not only the struggle for power, but the “will to 
overpower.”49  Darwin placed too much emphasis on “the influence of external 
circumstances,” and overlooked the internal forces of will, “the tremendous shaping, 
form-creating force working from within which utilizes and exploits external 
circumstances.”50  In addition, German Darwinists still adhered to teleology, which 
Nietzsche did not.  Last, Nietzsche’s form of naturalism lacks one of the central 
characteristics that define naturalism, that of scientism.  Nietzsche did not endorse or give 
backing to the scientific interpretation of nature.  Instead, he saw it as simply one of 
many ways to organize the world, but by no means as being the only way or the 
normatively preferred way.   
For these reasons, Nietzsche, while espousing metaphysical naturalism, eschews 
the methodologies of the sciences, as well as the reductionism of physicalism.  His 
metaphysic of the will to power, as formulated in his writings, eludes the confirmatory 
expectations of science.  He sees the artistic, and the scientific, and the religious, and the 
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moral view of the world all as symptoms of a single ‘ruling drive,’ viz., the will to 
power.51  Science, he claims, denies that this will is exercised.52  In addition, his aesthetic 
values appear to elude reduction, as well as his normative claim that the values of master 
morality should not be overtaken by the ‘decadence’ of slave morality.  His discussion of 
‘higher types’ of human beings also eludes scientific classification.  For this reason, 
Christian Emden states that Nietzsche’s naturalism is ‘promiscuous,’ following John 
Dupre’s coinage of the term.  Dupre uses the term to denote a type of ontological 
pluralism that eludes the classification of the traditional sciences and, as a result, 
precipitates what he calls ‘metaphysical disorder’ (as it departs from the ‘order’ of 
classification as determined by methodological naturalism).53  In other words, Nietzsche 
wants to adhere to a type of metaphysical naturalism, but not one that replaces 
supernaturalism with a metaphysics governed by the methods of scientific rationality.  
Emden therefore classifies Nietzsche’s metaphysics as ‘promiscuous’ in the following 
way:    
  Nietzsche, on this view, seems to adopt something akin to what John 
Dupre has termed ‘promiscuous realism’:  ‘there are countless legitimate, 
objectively grounded ways of classifying objects in the world,’ which 
‘often cross-classify one another in indefinitely complex ways.’  Such an 
understanding of realism stands in the background of Nietzsche’s 
philosophical naturalism; taking philosophical naturalism seriously means 
to renounce the much-cherished idea of a unity of science.54 
 
 
 
3.2  Dennett:  the ‘Evangelist of Unbelief”  
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 The title of Daniel Dennett’s book on religion, Breaking the Spell, insinuates that 
anyone who believes in religion is ‘under a spell’ that needs to be broken.  He begins 
with the assumption that religion is a natural phenomenon.  What is immediately strange 
about this is the assumption Dennett makes that religion is a ‘natural phenomenon,’ i.e., 
solely a human phenomenon having no supernatural origin at all.55  Since Darwin showed 
that humans are a product of the natural environment, Dennett argues human traits and 
characteristics can all be analyzed using the methods of the natural sciences.  Thus 
religion can be placed under the microscope of science and be evaluated through the lens 
of evolution.  Dennett states, “Can’t we just accept the obvious fact that religion is a 
human phenomenon and that humans are mammals, and hence products of evolution, and 
then leave the biological underpinnings of religion at that?”56  This is a claim that any 
self-respecting theist would immediately reject.  The reason religion exists (according to 
the religious realist) is due to the fact that there is a God who created the universe and us 
and calls us into relationship with God.  A theist realist would immediately counter by 
stating that religion is of supernatural, rather than natural, origin.  The claim that the 
Christian church is of supernatural origin is a historical one, linked to (1) a divine being 
becoming incarnate in this world, and (2) the actions of the Holy Spirit calling people to 
witness to this act.  Many Christians thus would argue the church itself is of supernatural 
origin. 
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 This is an important point.  If the events that religion records and celebrates are 
supernatural, then religion escapes scientific study.  If they are merely natural events, 
then they may well fall under scientific study.  If they are supernatural, then Dennett’s 
claim that religion should be held to the same standard of epistemic justification as 
science, is not valid.  Dennett’s argument is valid only if religion is a strictly natural 
phenomenon.  Nevertheless, let us consider Dennett’s argument.  Dennett assumes that 
religion can be studied as a natural phenomenon, and can therefore be evaluated by 
evolutionary theory.  If something exists, it must provide some kind of evolutionary 
benefit or else it would have been swept away.  So the question is, given that Dennett 
thinks religion is a ‘pointless accident,’ how come evolution hasn’t swept it away?  He 
states that religion “is a hugely costly endeavor, and evolutionary biology shows that 
nothing so costly just happens.  Any such regular expenditure of time and energy has to 
be balanced by something of ‘value’ obtained.”57   So the question then becomes, if 
religion exists because it is of value in evolutionary terms, in that it increases one’s 
fitness in differential reproduction by helping one outcompete others for replicating their 
genes, what is this value?  Dennett attempts to solve the problem in the way that a 
detective or lawyer might try to solve a crime, by asking cui bono, ‘who benefits,’ and in 
what way, from being religious?  How is religion of value in giving one a reproductive 
edge over others?  “What pays for religion?”58      
 Again, Dennett sees religion’s benefit not in supernatural terms but in natural 
ones.  Dennett is oblivious to the supernatural reasons one might be religious because 
they simply don’t show up in his worldview.  Instead, one is religious because religion 
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benefits one in several ways.  It benefits people psychologically in that it makes them feel 
good.  Also, divination helps solve problems.  Before there was modern medicine, there 
was shamanic healing, whose hypnotic rituals may have had psychosomatic benefits.59  
But the best reason to be religious is that it provide places to meet potential mates, or 
what Dennett refers to as “leks – the mating meeting places sometimes called ‘nature’s 
nightclubs’ – where males (usually of avian species) gather to “strut their stuff” by 
putting on competitive performances to impress local females.60  This all has a very 
Freudian pansexuality or Schopenhaurian pessimism about it.  People don’t go to church 
to worship God or in response to an encounter with a divine reality; they go in hope of 
finding sex partners. 
 It is possible for Dennett to believe this because he himself lacks the 
understanding to see that people go to church to worship God.  But God does not exist for 
Dennett – that is his starting point.  Religion does not exist for supernatural reasons, 
because God exists and calls human into communion with God.  Religion is not a 
response to a divine being ‘out there.’  Religion has its roots in primitive human 
practices.  It began as folk religion, “the sorts of religion that have no written creeds, no 
theologians, no hierarchy of officials,” and consists of “stories about gods or supernatural 
ancestors, prohibited and obligatory practices.”61  It began with a misplaced ‘intentional 
stance,’ with humans attributing intentional states to objects and forces of nature.62  All 
primitive religions are based on animism, on seeing the world of nature as essentially 
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peopled with spirits and beings.  Organized religion is merely the formalized 
institutionalization of this process.   
 One might wonder how cultural behaviors fall within the domain of natural 
selection, a theory that supposedly influences the replication of genes, not beliefs.  
Dennett, following Dawkins, believes that religion is memetic.  He argues that evolution 
occurs whenever the following conditions are met:  replication, variation (mutation), and 
differential fitness (competition).63  Just as genes replicate and those that are fit get 
passed on, so do memes, Dawkins’ term for units of cultural information which can be 
replicated and passed on.64  Ideas, like genes, face stiff competition.  Only the fittest 
memes survive and spread.  A good example of a fit meme is an internet video that goes 
viral and is ‘replicated’ by more people watching it, which helps to foster its future 
survival in the public’s consciousness.  Dennett begins Breaking the Spell with an 
epigraph from Hugh Pyper that states “If ‘survival of the fittest’ has any validity as a 
slogan, then the Bible seems a fair candidate for the accolade of the fittest of texts.”65  In 
other words, the Bible is an example of a fit meme, because it has successfully been 
replicated as a cultural unit of transmission, and has been passed on and spread over the 
entire planet, lasting for thousands of years.    
 The central claim of Dennett’s 1996 book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, is that 
evolution is ‘mindless,’ i.e., unguided, and strictly the result of natural processes.  Prior to 
Darwin, a “Mind-first” view of the universe reigned.  This is basically the same as saying 
that the primary stuff of reality is God, who is a spiritual being, and that the material 
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universe is secondary to God, who created the universe.  Dennett claims that natural 
selection shows how a mindless, purposeless, process can give rise to complex organisms 
who no longer need a divine designer to account for their being.66  “Darwin’s dangerous 
idea…[is that] something as mindless and mechanical as an algorithm could produce…an 
antelope, the wing of the eagle, [an] orchid.”67  If there exists such things as minds, they 
are a secondary effect that has emerged through natural processes as an adaptive trait.  
Dennett calls this, ‘Darwin’s inversion:’ Darwin has inverted the mind first, matter 
second order of the universe, into matter first, mind second.  Dennett also rejects the 
argument that God is the ‘First cause,’ because this only invites the question, who created 
God?  “If God created and designed all these wonderful things, who created God?  
Supergod?  And who created Supergod?  Superdupergod?  Or did God create himself?”68 
Thus Dennett’s form of naturalism is strict physicalism of the reductionist type.  
He thinks everybody should be a reductionist in the weak sense of the world, stating that 
“Darwin’s dangerous idea is reductionism incarnate,” i.e., a universal acid that might well 
dissolve all that we hold dear, including minds, meanings, and purposes.69  This type of 
reductionism, however, he claims is ‘greedy.’  Dennett does not want reductionism to go 
so far as to dissolve ‘meaning,’ and his attempt to save humans from Darwinian nihilism 
takes up most of the rest of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea.   In this sense, his project is 
similar to Nietzsche’s.  He argues that good reductionism is “simply the commitment to 
non-question-begging science without any cheating by embracing mysteries or miracles.”  
Good reductionism does not resort to what he calls ‘skyhooks,’ or hooks that fall 
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miraculously from the heavens to cause physical effects.   Skyhooks include creationism, 
intelligent design, and the type of miracles found in the Bible.  Theism believes in an 
open universe with supernatural causation, with skyhooks.  Dennett rejects them, arguing 
instead not only for a causally closed universe, but one with no supernatural realm 
beyond it.  Thus only cranes, hooks that are entrenched in the earth, i.e., only natural 
causes for effects, are acceptable.  
 
3.3  Dawkins:  Religion is Bad Science  
 
Dawkins’ book The Blind Watchmaker, examines William Paley’s design 
argument, which states that just as one can infer the existence of a watchmaker based 
upon the order found in a watch, so one can infer the existence of God based upon the 
complex order found in an eye. The point of the title is that you can explain life and its 
complexity without recourse to God.  The watchmaker is blind because evolution is a 
process that is guided not by a conscious agent who has intentions and creates according 
to a designed plan, but by a blind process of nature.  Thus The Blind Watchmaker is not 
only an argument against theism, as it is also an argument for metaphysical naturalism.  
Dawkins’ book was published in 1986.  Michael Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box was 
published in 1996.  Stephen Meyer’s Signature in the Cell was published in 2009.  All 
three books are concerned with biological complexity, which William Paley’s design 
argument addresses.  Paley likens the complexity of a watch to the complexity of an eye; 
just as the order found in a watch warrants the inference that it is a human artifact, and 
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there was a watchmaker, so the complex eye warrants the inference that there is a divine 
artificer.   
Dawkins anticipated Behe’s and Meyer’s updated biochemical arguments to an 
extent, because he had heard them before, but in different form.  Francis Hitching’s 1982 
book called The Neck of the Giraffe, or Where Darwin Went Wrong, makes a similar case 
for a divine designer.  Dawkins claims evolution by natural processes is a better 
explanation than supernatural intervention.  Or, if you like, he prefers Dennett’s cranes to 
the theist’s skyhooks.  He argues that in nature you have bad design.  Human eyes have 
the nerve ‘wires’ coming out in front of the retinal plates, rather than behind them.  “This 
means that the light…has to pass through a forest of connecting wires….It is the principle 
of the thing that would offend any tidy-minded engineer.”70  An intelligent designer 
would not have designed them like that.  He uses this as evidence we were not designed – 
that an intelligent designer would have done a better job.  In The God Delusion, he states, 
“many of our human ailments…result directly from the fact that we now walk upright 
with a body that was shaped over hundreds of millions of years to walk on all fours.”71  
The same principle applies to a halibut’s eyes, one of which has slowly been rotated to its 
side so that it can lie on the ocean floor.  An intelligent designer would have just placed 
them both on top, like a skate’s.72  This type of complexity is achievable he argues 
through the accumulation of small, gradual changes, but not all at once.  In Climbing 
Mount Improbable, he uses the metaphor of a mountain. “On one side of the mountain is 
a sheer cliff, impossible to climb, but on the other side is a gentle slope to the 
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summit…Evolution creeps up the gentle slope to the summit…creationists are blind to all 
but the daunting precipice at the front.”73  
In the preface to the paperback edition of The God Delusion, Dawkins states, “I 
suspect that for many people the main reason they cling to religion is not that it is 
consoling, but that they have been let down by our educational system…They have 
simply not been properly taught Darwin’s astounding alternative.”74  In this opening 
statement Dawkins clearly identifies himself as an adherent to the ‘warfare’ or ‘conflict’ 
model between science and religion.  For Dawkins it is clearly science or religion, for he 
sees them as incompatible, and he obviously favors the former, arguing that simple 
instruction in the fundamentals of evolutionary theory will lead one to reject the latter.  
Dawkins even rejects any complementarity between them, any possibility of adhering to 
both science and religion.  Religion, for Dawkins, is simply bad science, and good 
science will show that this is so.  As a result, Dawkins exudes certainty that science will 
win the day and prove religion wrong. 
Why is this so?  Why will science emerge as triumphant?  Because it has evidence 
on its side, whereas religion has none on its side, and the evidence of science is against it.  
For this reason, Dawkins is an evidentialist.  He is unwilling to believe anything without 
good evidence.  On the other hand, “the whole point of religious faith, its strength and 
chief glory, is that it does not depend on rational justification.”75  Given the strong 
epistemic requirements for a scientific theory to be accepted, he cannot understand “the 
disproportionate privileging of religion,” which requires none.76  He states that as a 
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scientist, he only forms beliefs on the basis of evidence.  This is why he believes in 
evolution, because the evidence supports it.  What would change his mind?  If evidence 
appeared tomorrow, such as rabbit fossils appearing in the Precambrian fossil sediment, 
then he would change his mind.  But none has, he claims.77  Religious faith, on the other 
hand, “is an evil precisely because it requires no justification….Christianity, just as much 
as Islam, teaches children that unquestioned faith is a virtue.  You don’t have to make the 
case for what you believe.”78   
Why does Dawkins think that all the arguments for God’s existence fail?  Is it true 
that there is no good evidence for religious faith?  There must be some evidence for why 
people are religious today, since people have abandoned Greek and Roman polytheism in 
favor of monotheism.  If there is no evidence as to why one believes in one’s religion, 
then one religion is no better or no worse than the next.  Most people would have no 
problem providing evidence as to why they are not polytheists.  Dawkins on the other 
hand, sees no evidence for the idea that “there exists a superhuman, supernatural 
intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, 
including us.”  This belief “is founded on private revelation rather than evidence.”79  This 
last claim is perplexing.  Does he mean that people have faith because they have received 
a personal revelation from God?  If so, wouldn’t this constitute a kind of substantial 
evidence for one holding religious faith?  Isn’t this the type of experience St. Paul had on 
the road to Damascus?  Or does he mean that religious faith is founded on someone else’s 
personal revelation, such as a person believing in Jesus on the secondhand basis of St. 
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Paul’s personal experience?  Even then, wouldn’t this also count as a form of evidence 
for why one has faith, even if one did not receive the revelation oneself?  Either way, 
“private revelation” would appear to most people to constitute good evidence for belief.  
If there were no God, then one would expect no revelation of any kind to occur.  So the 
claim that one had received divine revelation, that the person who received the revelation 
has a trustworthy character, and his/her mental state was not delusional, might constitute 
sufficient enough evidence for one to form faith. 
 If there is no God, then why is there religion?  To tackle this question, remember, 
Dawkins’ starting point is naturalism.  Human beings are the product of natural, 
evolutionary processes.  As a result, if there is such a thing as religion, and humans are its 
cause, then it too is a phenomenon that is subject to the pressures of natural selection.  
The question then becomes, what pressures give rise to religion?  One would think 
religious faith, if based on a false belief, would be eliminated based on “Darwinian 
considerations of economy.”   And Dawkins states that “religion is so wasteful, so 
extravagant; and Darwinian selection habitually targets and eliminates waste….If a wild 
animal habitually performs some useless activity, natural selection will favour rival 
individuals who devote the time and energy, instead, to surviving and reproducing.”80  
Religion, for it to survive, must therefore provide some type of benefit or ‘enhancement’ 
that will aid an individual’s survival and further the likelihood that his/her genes will get 
passed on.  Dawkins proposes the traditional reasons:  religion is a like a placebo; it helps 
reduce stress; it offers psychological comfort.81  An even more reductionist view is that 
religion is an aberrant activity, “hyperactivity in a particular node of the brain.”  In fact, 
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Dawkins notes, “visionary religious experiences are related to temporal lobe epilepsy…a 
‘god centre’ in the brain.’”82   
  Ever the reductionist, Dawkins states that he anticipated Helen Fisher’s findings 
that love is associated with the release of dopamine, norepinephrine, and oxytocin, and 
suggest that love of God “may be startling reminiscent of [emotional reactions] more 
ordinarily associated with sexual love.”83  But the natural explanation for the origin of 
religion he favors most is that religion is based on imprinting, social conditioning by 
one’s parents.  He states that natural selection favors children who have been taught to 
obey their parents and elders, and who believe whatever they are told by them.  “Such 
trusting obedience is valuable for survival….On this model we should expect…different 
arbitrary beliefs, none of which have any factual basis, will be handed down.”84  Religion 
is a holdover of a primitive worldview, socially handed down through the generations, 
and “once infected, the child will grow up and infect the next generation with the same 
nonsense…Once entrenched in a culture they persist.”85  As a result, religion is 
‘invented,’ and can be explained in terms of natural rather than supernatural causes. 
 
3.4  Hitchens:  The Case for ‘Antitheism’   
 
The title of Hitchen’s 2007 book, god is not Great, is a parody of the Takbir, or 
the Arabic phrase ‘Allahuh Akhbar’ – ‘God is great,’ or, as it is sometimes translated, 
‘God is greater,’ or ‘greatest.’ ‘Allah’ is obviously the personal name of God in Islam.  
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The Takbir is most commonly used in prayer and in the call to prayer.  Hitchens’ 
inversion of the Takbir is an example of his contentious, mocking attitude, but is not 
aimed particularly at Islam, but at all religion.  The subtitle of Hitchens’ book is ‘how 
religion poisons everything.’  This appears to parallel Salman Rushdie’s 2002 article, 
‘Religion, as ever, is the poison in India’s blood,’ and Hitchens makes several allusions 
to Rushdie’s critique of religion throughout his book.   Hitchens basically runs religion 
through the hedonistic calculus and claims that if you add up all the good that religion 
does, then subtract all the harm it does, the harm would outweigh the good.  Just look at 
the major cities that start with the letter B, he says:  Belfast, Beirut, Bombay, Belgrade, 
Bethlehem, and Baghdad.  He has visited all six and proceeds to list all the “religiously 
inspired cruelty” that has occurred in them.86  Harris does the same thing in The End of 
Faith, thus trying to reinforce the association between religion and violence in the 
reader’s mind.87  What conclusion does Hitchens draw from all of this?  That all religion, 
everywhere, is a poison.  He points to the sordid history of the Catholic Church and its 
participation in witch burning, the Crusades, the Inquisition, and anti-Semitism to support 
his conclusion.  However, this is an argument against the violence associated, 
contingently, with certain theistic beliefs.  It is not an argument that supernaturalism is 
false.  Of course, the values he puts on the numbers are biased and inflated because he 
sees religion as being untrue, and therefore of no positive value.   
Hitchens claims to be just a quiet atheist who likes to sit peacefully at home, but 
is unable to because religious zealots keep intruding into his world and trying to force 
their irrational beliefs on him.  He claims it is religious people who are trying to instill 
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their beliefs into him, while he just wants to be left alone.  He states, “I would be quite 
content …to ‘respect’ their belief,” as long as “they in turn leave me alone.  But this, 
religion is incapable of doing.  As I write these words, and as you read them, people of 
faith are in their different ways planning your and my destruction.”88  However, this is 
not really true.  He is doing more than just sitting at home, wanting to be left alone.  He 
would not be writing books as an apologist for atheism if he cared only about his own 
beliefs.  He sees atheism as more than just his own personal beliefs, he sees it as 
objectively true, and wants to stamp out religious belief wherever he can.  His approach 
to religion is not ‘this is my view, take it or leave it,’ but ‘my worldview is objectively 
correct and unless you see things my way, you’re an idiot.’  For these reasons he could be 
considered an imperialist naturalist.  Like Dennett, his claims go far beyond the 
subjective, personal opinion that religion is wrong.   As an evidentialist, he states, “we 
distrust anything that contradicts science or outrages reason.”89  He then goes on to try to 
make the case that religion is absurd, irrational, and objectively wrong.  Science and 
rationality can disprove theism and prove atheism.  Religion harms or poisons society, 
and therefore should be done away with.  However, it seems Hitchens’ real problem is 
with senseless violence and humans treating other humans badly, not God.  As much as 
Hitchens would like the reader to believe otherwise, the central message of theism, and of 
all three monotheistic faiths, is that God is love.  God would probably not condone the 
laundry list of wrongs that Hitchens tries to associate with religion. 
Hitchens believes he can reconstruct the origin of much of religion.  Religion did 
not arise in response to a divine being entering into a relationship with humans, because 
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there is no divine being.  Therefore, if religion exists, it has to have been invented by 
humans, a charge he repeatedly makes.  He argues that the “foundational books” of 
religion “are transparent fables….it is a man-made imposition,…an enemy of science and 
inquiry.…It has subsisted largely on lies and fears, and been the accomplice of ignorance 
and guilt as well as slavery, genocide, racism, and tyranny.”90  If Moses was the author of 
the Torah, why does he speak of himself in the third person, as in ‘the Lord spoke unto 
Moses’?91  This leads him to conclude, “there was no flight from Egypt, no wandering in 
the desert, and no dramatic conquest of the Promised Land.  It was all, quite simply and 
very ineptly, made up at a much later date.”92  In addition, no good God would command 
his chosen people to commit genocide on the Canaanites.  Hitchens believes that the 
murder the Jews have done in God’s name, only “helps to make the case for 
‘antitheism.’”93 
But how can Hitchens be so sure that all of the Western monotheistic tradition, 
which arose more than 3,000 years ago, is nothing but folk tales?  He claims that by 
looking at the origin of a contemporary religion, one which has arisen in the last two 
centuries, the Mormon Church, we can gain insight into the origin of all religion.  The 
crucial piece of evidence in understanding Joseph Smith was that he was convicted of 
“defrauding citizens by organizing mad gold digging expeditions” in March of 1826, in 
Bainbridge, New York.94  This occurred eighteen months before he claimed to have 
discovered buried golden plates containing the hidden history of the American peoples 
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claiming they descended from a tribe of Jews who fled to America in 600BC.  That is all 
the evidence Hitchens needs to convince him that Joseph Smith was one of the greatest 
con artists of all time, and Abraham, Moses, Mary, Jesus, and Muhammad were no 
different – all swindlers.  All religion is cut of the same cloth:  pre-scientific ignorance, 
superstition, and outright deception.  “Religion comes from the period of human 
prehistory where nobody…had the smallest idea what was going on.”95   
Christopher Hitchens was a professional journalist, and the fact is evident.  He 
was not trained as a philosopher, or a theologian, or a neuroscientist, or a biologist, and 
his arguments are fairly shallow compared to those of Dennett, Dawkins, and the 
Churchlands.  His arguments lack any discussion of the philosophical or cognitive 
science literature, and he attempts to make up for it through the use of witty rhetoric.  He 
is trying to do what the logical positivists did with the verification principle to eviscerate 
metaphysics – permanently eliminate it – but he doesn’t know this, because he doesn’t 
know any philosophy.  He seems to know little to nothing of the philosophy of mind, 
such as the problem of intentionality or qualia that concerns Dennett and others.  His 
chapter on design lacks any understanding of biochemistry, understanding that Dawkins, 
Behe, and Meyer obviously have.  It is hard to call him a scientist, or in favor of 
scientism, as he fails to discuss the nature of science, or its method, or its findings.  
Hitchens includes writings from Darwin in The Portable Atheist, and prefaces them with 
the claim that Darwin had “slowly abolished his faith.”96  While Darwin at the end of his 
life did indeed have his doubts that Jesus was the Son of God, he unmistakably states that 
he was not an atheist.  In a letter he wrote to John Fordyce in 1879, he states:  “In my 
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most extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of denying the 
existence of a God.  I think that generally (& more and more so as I grow older) but not 
always, that an agnostic would be the most correct description of my state of mind.”97 
Hitchens’ knowledge of Darwin is extremely thin.  He spends only one paragraph 
in god is not Great discussing Darwin’s vast literary corpus:  the 450 pages of The 
Voyage of the Beagle, the 400 pages of the Origin of Species (six editions, each with 
subtle revisions), the 700 pages of Descent of Man (originally published in 1871 as two 
volumes, each 450 pages; he also published a revised version in 1874), the 900 pages of 
The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, the 400 pages of The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, the 150 pages of The Formation of 
Vegetable Mold through the Action of Worms, the 200 pages of Darwin’s Autobiography, 
the 24 volumes of The Correspondence of Charles Darwin (the last volume alone is 
1,000 pages), not to mention Darwin’s work on the formation of coral atolls, barnacles, 
orchids, insects, plant movement, and four notebooks.  Darwin wrote in total 25 books 
during his lifetime, yet Hitchens mentions none of them.  The sole purpose of this 
paragraph is to make the claim that Darwin’s Christian wife, Emma, influenced him to 
use the word ‘creation’ in his writings.98  Yet even for this he offers no evidence or 
citation to support it.  That is the extent of Hitchens’ scholarly discussion of Darwin.   
Hitchens is full of contempt, ad hominems, and sarcastic disdain for anyone 
whose views differ from his own.  He calls Augustine “a self-centered fantasist and an 
earth-centered ignoramus.”99  He irreverently retells the stories of the Old Testament, 
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New Testament, and Koran, simply to point out anachronisms and “innumerable 
contradictions and incoherencies” (does anybody really believe Abraham lived to be 175 
years old?  Or that the rainbow is a covenant with God?), claiming the texts were written 
long after the main characters were dead, and are all just fabrications.100  He states, “the 
case of the Virgin Birth is the easiest possible proof that humans were involved in the 
manufacture of a legend.”101  Last, he states “nothing proves the man-made character of 
religion as obviously as the sick mind that designed hell.”102  Hitchens reflects the 
outlook of a well-traveled and well-read intellectual, a modern secularist who finds it 
easy to scorn the beliefs of ages past and mock them as pre-scientific superstition.  His 
arguments are no more than empty rhetoric; his conclusions are asserted rather than 
inferred, and if any premises are given, they are usually questionable.  
 
3.5  Harris’s Evidentialism   
 
Sam Harris begins his 2006 book, Letter to a Christian Nation, with the statement 
that “the Bible is either the word of God, or it isn’t.”103  What exactly he is trying to say 
is hard to determine, but he implies that either you interpret the Bible literally, and 
believe every word in it is spoken by God, or you don’t.  In The End of Faith, Harris at 
least recognizes there are other positions, such as those taken by religious moderates who 
“loosely interpret (or simply ignore) much of their canons” and “retreat from scriptural 
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literalism.”104  How to interpret the Bible has been a subject of debate throughout the 
ages and was one of the reasons for the Reformation.  Many today would think of the 
Bible as being the human record of God’s self-revelation, couched in the worldview of 
the people who wrote it, but not the revelation itself.  This is very different from being a 
literalist, which implies a belief in the literal truth of Genesis and a Creationist 
worldview.  His next statement is equally puzzling.  “Either the Bible is just an ordinary 
book, written by mortals, or it isn’t.”105  The Bible is obviously not an ordinary book, as 
it records the deeds of a people whom it is claimed God entered into covenant with, as 
well as the story of a man who claimed to be divine.  It also provides evidence to support 
a causally open universe, one in which supernatural agents can enter and interact.  It 
seems the only option Harris can entertain, given his naturalist metaphysic, is to sweep 
the Bible away as being the product of solely human origin.  This is abundantly obvious, 
given his many anti-theistic remarks.  For example, he argues that if the Bible were of 
divine origin, written by an omniscient being, “why doesn’t the Bible say anything about 
electricity, or about DNA, or about the actual age and size of the universe?”106  
 His next point is that the Koran states that Jesus was not divine.  Just as Christians 
claim the Bible is the Word of God, and that Jesus was divine, Muslims believe that the 
Koran is the infallible word of God, and that Jesus is not divine.  If both of them “are 
believed to be nothing less than verbatim transcripts of God’s utterances,” then at least 
one of them must be wrong, but which one?107  Both, according to Harris.  Why?  
Because both sets of Scripture make ludicrous claims, so neither should be believed.  
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Both texts claim that Jesus was born from Mary through a virgin birth.  Yet everyone 
knows virgins don’t get pregnant.  Apparently the authors of Luke and Matthew didn’t 
know their Hebrew, and translated the Hebrew word for ‘young woman’ (almah) in 
Isaiah 7:14 into the Greek word for ‘virgin’ (Parthenos).  “Another strike against the 
doctrine of the virgin birth is that the other evangelists, Mark and John, seem to know 
nothing about it,” Harris argues.108  In any case, “the virgin birth of Jesus” is a 
“preposterous idea.” 109 
Harris then goes on to cite the Bible’s moral prohibitions against adultery, 
homosexuality, violating the Sabbath, blasphemy, and serving other gods, sins all of 
which the Bible says are punishable by death.110  Again, Harris claims, either you believe 
this is what God commands or you don’t.  Since no one wants to advocate stoning 
someone to death, the obvious conclusion is that the Bible isn’t the word of God, and that 
misguided mortals with a warped sense of morality were its real authors.  Yet when is the 
last time you heard of Christians stoning someone to death for committing adultery, or 
committing sodomy, or taking the Lord’s name in vain?  Harris focuses on a few 
passages from Deuteronomy and Leviticus and says that a person must accept the entire 
Bible, including these passages, or else reject the whole Bible as being God’s word.111  
Of course he doesn’t focus on the passages many consider to be the central message of 
the Bible, such as 1 Corinthians 13, which places love as the highest virtue.  When asked 
to sum up the law and prophets, Jesus says to love God with all your heart and all your 
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soul and all your mind and your neighbor as yourself. (Mt. 22:37-39)  Jesus says in Mark 
9:35, “anyone who wants to be first must be the very last, and the servant of all,” for it is 
the nature of love to serve others selflessly.  Jesus is simply quoting passages from the 
Old Testament here.  People of faith are called by God into service, to love.  This is the 
ideal.  Granted religious people often fall short of this ideal, but they are the ones who 
should be condemned, not the religion.   
Nietzsche states in The Antichrist “in truth, there was only one Christian, and he 
died on the cross.”112  Even Nietzsche seems to admit that the only person who ever lived 
a truly Christian lifestyle, one rooted entirely in sacrificial love for God and others, was 
Jesus.  Gandhi similarly said, “I love Christ.  It’s just that so many of you Christians are 
so unlike Christ.  If Christians would really live according to the teachings of Christ, as 
found in the Bible, all of India would be Christian today.”113  The only religion that 
doesn’t have an ethic that offends Harris’s sensibilities is the Jain doctrine of ahimsa, or 
non-violence.  Harris fails to mention that Jesus commanded one to resist evil by non-
violently turning the other cheek.  Mennonites have made non-violence one of the 
centerpieces of their tradition, although it is difficult to see how far non-violence would 
go when dealing with a Hitler or a Stalin.  For this reason Augustine and Aquinas 
developed just war theory.  But if the central message of the Bible is love, who really 
could object to the call that people act in a more loving way?  
 Harris, on the other hand, goes out of his way to find obscure passages from the 
Bible, so that he can twist the message of the Bible into something else.  For instance, he 
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asks who in their right mind would follow a book that condones slavery, or allows one to 
sell their daughter as a sex slave?  Justifying one’s morality upon the Bible, he says, is 
“faith-based irrationality.”114  Harris cherry picks passages which deliberately offer up a 
warped view of Scripture, thus fashioning a straw man one is easily willing to reject.  Part 
of the caricature of faith he presents is that the Catholic Church is not only responsible 
for overpopulation, poverty, and the spread of HIV, but its anti-Semitism paved the way 
for Nazism.  His parody extends to Muslims as well, whom he portrays as blood thirsty 
extremists willing to murder one over the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad in a 
cartoon.  Atheism, on the other hand, is very well behaved and rational.  When, he asks, 
“was the last atheist riot?”115   
 For these reasons, Harris rejects religion and prescribes atheism as the cure to 
irrational faith.  He argues religion compels the faithful to believe what he considers to be 
the utmost nonsense, with little to no justification.  Thus Harris is an evidentialist.  Any 
belief that is held on insufficient evidence should be rejected.  He argues that all people 
who make claims to knowledge about the world are required to justify their beliefs, 
except for religious beliefs.  Justification must be in the form of empirical evidence, 
logical consistency, or coherence.116  Yet he argues religious beliefs lack all of these, and 
this is why “Pascal’s wager, Kierkegaard’s leap of faith, and other epistemological ponzi 
schemes won’t do.”117  He says, “we have names for people who have many beliefs for 
which there is no rational justification…we call them ‘mad,’ ‘psychotic,’ or 
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‘delusional.’”118  Why are people atheists?  Because Harris claims it is the only 
reasonable position if the alternative is accepting unjustified religious beliefs.  He cites 
the Holocaust (which he recasts so as to make it a Christian rather than Nazi 
phenomenon), the genocide in Rwanda, and the fact that in the twentieth century five 
hundred million people died of small pox as evidence that the traditional theist 
conception of God is incoherent.  How could a loving, caring God allow such atrocities to 
occur?  The only conclusion one is left to draw is that “the Biblical God is a fiction, like 
Zeus and the thousands of other dead gods whom most sane human beings now 
ignore.”119    
 Harris is therefore skeptical of putting people who are religious in high public 
office.  He is skeptical of people like the late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, or 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft, who believe that civil law is grounded in divine 
law.  As Harris rejects divine law, on what then does he ground his ethic?  Like many 
naturalists, Harris advocates the ethics of personal pleasure, Hedonism, in the form of 
“sensory neuron stimulation.”  He states “pleasure is the norm.”120  He advocates 
abolishing all ‘sin’ or ‘vice laws’ that are based upon theistic morality that aim to 
regulate the pursuit of non-violent pleasure.  He adds that these laws are considered 
‘victimless crimes,’ i.e., they are private rather than public matters, and the government 
should have no control over “what people do in the privacy of their own homes.”121  As a 
result he wants to do away with all laws forbidding pornography, prostitution, abortion, 
sodomy, homosexuality, and stem cell research.  He believes the government should also 
                                                 
118 Ibid., 72. 
119 Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation, 55. 
120 Harris, The End of Faith, 160. 
121 Ibid., 159. 
83 
 
 
 
legalize a wide variety of pleasure producing drugs that stimulate the nervous system, 
among them LSD, mescaline, psilocybin, DMT, MDMA, and marijuana.  He states, 
“marijuana kills no one…In fact, nearly everything human beings do – driving cars, 
flying planes, hitting golf balls – is more dangerous than smoking marijuana in the 
privacy of one’s own home.”122  Harris would have us believe people of faith are 
delusional, irrational, and ‘mad,’ yet the naturalistic ethic he offers to replace it with is an 
ethic dedicated to the pursuit of base sensual pleasure.   
Does Sam Harris believe in freedom of opinion?  No.  He states, “it is time we 
recognized that belief is not a private matter.”123  He cites the belief of the 9/11 hijackers 
that what they were doing was God’s will as an example of unjustified beliefs which are 
dangerous to society.  The fault of Muslim extremists is their intolerance of anyone with 
a differing viewpoint.  Harris claims intolerance is a fundamental vice of faith; the 
stronger the faith, the stronger the intolerance.124  No one denies that we should not 
tolerate those who threaten society with violence or terrorist acts.  However, it does not 
follow from the fact that just because a few religious people resort to terrorism, that all 
religious people are a threat or that all religion is to blame.  If a person wants to pray to 
God in the privacy of their own home, it is hard to see how that is a threat to anyone.  If 
Harris objects to anyone possessing religious faith, no matter how benign it may be, his 
intolerance is no different from that of exclusivist, fundamentalist extremists.  Harris 
urges us to put an end to both individual and collective religious faith, and turns to 
neuroscience to replace it.  Just as no one practices alchemy anymore, he argues, “faith-
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based religion must suffer the same slide into obsolescence.”125  But his message is 
inconsistent, and the religions he rails against are a caricature of faith, and as a result it is 
difficult to accept his arguments. 
 
3.6  The Churchlands:  Eliminative Materialism 
 
 Paul Churchland, like Dennett and Hitchens, sees the origin of religion as the 
product of cultural and social conditioning.  He notes that “Christianity is centered in 
Europe and the Americas, Islam in Africa and the Middle East, Hinduism in India, and 
Buddhism in the Orient.  Which illustrates what we all suspected anyway:  that social 
forces are the primary determinants of religious people in general.”126  As a result, he 
rejects “the explanatory impotence of dualism as compared to materialism.”127  He argues 
that all the problems in philosophy of mind will be resolved after the field of 
neuroscience has progressed sufficiently.  It’s not a matter of if, but when.  To this extent, 
Churchland is an adherent of scientism and metaphysical naturalism of the reductive 
type; he believes all mental states can be replaced by brain states.   
Churchland is famous for espousing ‘eliminative materialism,’ which wants to 
eliminate the ‘folk psychology’ we use when speaking of mental states because it seems 
to assume a Cartesian ghost in the machine.  He states that, “Eliminative materialism is 
the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a 
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radically false theory.”128  He thinks that our ordinary language, divided into 
subject/object talk, is defective and needs to be replaced.  A famous example of what this 
might look like was given by Richard Rorty when he stated that instead of saying “I am 
in pain,” which implies a substantial self that is experiencing a property of the body, we 
should say “my C-fibers are firing.”129  Churchland sees the folk psychology of personal 
identity as a leftover from an earlier, pre-scientific stage in our historical development, “a 
stage the neuroscientists may help us to transcend.”130  Even ‘beliefs’ will be eliminated 
because methodological materialism does not recognize the “familiar mentalistic 
phenomena recognized in folk psychology.”131  However, the term ‘folk psychology’ is a 
pejorative label for causally interactive mind/body substance dualism, and thus 
constitutes a persuasive definition.  It implies that dualism is a simpleminded, primitive, 
and naïve position that no one takes seriously anymore.  Though the term ‘folk 
psychology’ does not originate with Churchland, it is evidence of subliminal propaganda 
that many strict naturalists employ to undermine alternative metaphysical positions.   
 The evidence he draws on to support his position is from the field of 
neuroscience.  He begins with an analysis of the human brain, which consists of 1011 or 
100 billion neurons.  The average neuron has 3,000 connections with other neurons 
because of its branching dendrites and axons.  The overall interconnectivity of the entire 
system is around 1014 or 100 trillion connections, a figure which suggests the enormous 
complexity and computing power of the brain.132  He argues that the fact that various 
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psychoactive drugs can control mental illness, suggests their origin is biological.  In other 
words, if you interfere with the chemical activities of the neurons, you interfere with the 
person’s personality and identity.133  This suggests their neural basis.  One is also able to 
determine what part of the brain is involved in various cognitive functions on the basis of 
stroke damage and other individuals who have brain damage in very precise areas of their 
brain.134  As a result, he thinks “the weight of evidence indicates that conscious 
intelligence is a wholly natural phenomenon,” the outcome of billions of years of blind 
evolutionary processes.135       
Patricia Churchland is also a professor of philosophy at the University of 
California San Diego along with her husband.  In her latest book, Touching a Nerve:  The 
Self as Brain, she argues that the traditional philosophy of mind approach involves very 
little neuroscience.  She says her students are “drawn to the sciences of the brain as to a 
night bonfire.”136  She follows Owen Flanagan in characterizing this restless interest as 
‘neuroexistentialism.’  Her definition of naturalism is that the mind is made up of “only 
brain stuff,” as opposed to “soul stuff.”137   As evidence, she cites antibiotics, anesthesia, 
hallucinogens, stroke victims, and split-brain experiments to support naturalism.  She 
argues that techniques for studying the brain have only arisen in the last few decades.  
The knowledge of how the brain works makes it increasingly unlikely that there is a soul.  
Prior to the rise of neuroscience, consciousness was considered “too deep a mystery for 
us ever to understand.  Give up trying…no one will ever solve the mystery.”138  However, 
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she argues that neuroscience is increasingly solving this mystery, to such an extent that 
she feels comfortable concluding “the soul and the brain are one and the same; what we 
think of as the soul is the brain, and what we think of as the brain is the brain.”139   
The second half of her book attempts to make the ‘hard problem’ of 
consciousness and all the sticky problems associated with it, disappear with a single wave 
of her hand and the invocation of ‘neuroscience.’  She cites several scientific studies 
linking neurochemicals in the brain with love and sex.  One study suggests prairie voles 
are monogamous, while montane voles are not, due to the presence of vasopressin in the 
former but not in the latter. 140   However, while monogamy in voles may be related to the 
secretion of dopamine, oxytocin, and vasopressin and the absence of stress hormones, it 
is hard to say that these studies can account for the human phenomena of ‘love.’  It is 
clear that Churchland is trying to force the inference, that love can simply be reduced to 
chemicals in the brain.  But it is difficult to make the transition from studies on prairie 
voles to human behavior.  Human monogamy and marriage involve ethical commitments 
that surpass the ability of chemicals to determine.  In addition, humans experience many 
different kinds of love besides erotic love.  While it might be possible to associate mating 
with hormones, the love of God or agape love seems less easy to reduce to the presence 
or absence of chemicals in the brain.  Luther believed that human love was essentially 
selfish and seeks its own interests, and that true love was impossible without the 
incarnation.  This would make the phenomenon of human love the product of a 
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supernatural event, and explain human love as an extension of and participation in, God’s 
love.141   
Churchland also gives the standard naturalist response to near-death experiences, 
as resulting from the release of ketamine or as due to other neurobiological causes, such 
as anoxia, hypoxia, hallucination, or outright self-deception.142  Like most skeptics, she 
says near-death experiences prove nothing, because the person isn’t really dead.  Victor 
Stenger, in God, the Failed Hypothesis, argues the same thing.  However, this 
explanation does not give the phenomena the justice they deserve.  An honest, in-depth 
reading of the near-death literature reveals them to be very complex and persuasive to 
those who have them.  The people who have them are convinced by them that death is not 
the end of human existence.  Churchland dismisses near-death experiences too quickly 
and it is doubtful she has read the near-death literature.  
Last, Churchland tries to reduce morality to purely neurobiological conditions.  
Reptiles eat their young, whereas mammals love, nurture, and care for their young.  So 
morality is the result of having a mammalian brain.  “The expanding circles of caring 
characteristic of humans and many other mammals – extending beyond an individual and 
her offspring to include my mate, my kin, and my affiliates – is the expanding of the 
magic circle of me and mine.”143  But the phenomena of animals caring for one another is 
too primitive to be related to human ethics.  Human ethics entertains notions of right and 
wrong, matters of moral obligation, and involve deliberation and the weighing of good 
over bad, not to mention free choice.  A detailed analysis of morality and other 
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phenomena like near-death experiences demonstrates that they defy her overly-simplistic 
reduction.  This suggests that ‘folk psychology’ might survive after all, despite its 
attempted elimination by the Churchlands.  
The philosopher of science Michael Silberstein recently declared in his paper 
‘After the Philosophy of Mind:  Replacing Scholasticism with Science,’ that “the 
philosophy of mind is over.”144  Like the Churchlands, he believes that the philosophy of 
mind has and should be reduced to a field of the biological sciences, that the debates over 
the essence of mental states and their content can now be settled by the philosophy of 
cognitive science and neuroscience.  Like Quine, he thinks that “the philosophy of 
science is philosophy enough.”  The philosophy of mind should be replaced by cognitive 
science, or neurophilosophy, and by implication, the philosophy of religion would 
become neurotheology, or as Nietzsche and Harris believe, just fables.  Yet Silberstein 
really gives no reason for this assertion.  As with so many naturalists, it appears to be just 
a dogmatic claim.  It is not enough to just summarize the field of cognitive science and 
say, these are your choices now, interactive dualism is no longer on the menu.  One 
doesn’t dismiss one’s opponent by simply stating that the opponent’s position isn’t an 
option.  The case for theism remains to be considered.  It’s not enough to point the finger 
at Darwin, and say, ‘That’s why I’m a naturalist,’ for the reasons we shall now consider.   
 
4.  Was Darwin a Naturalist?  
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 Contrary to all those naturalists who want to claim Darwin is on their side, the 
answer to the question, was Darwin a naturalist? is, no.  If he were, why did he train for a 
career in the ministry?  If he were, the Origin would not begin with an epigraph from 
William Whewell, an Anglican priest, philosopher, and historian of science, which reads:   
  But with regard to the material world, we can at least go so far as this – 
we can perceive that events are brought about not by insulated 
interpositions of Divine power, exerted in each particular case, but by the 
establishment of general laws.145  
 
Darwin came to see God as creating not by making each individual species 
piecemeal, but rather through ‘the establishment of general laws,’ i.e., the laws of 
modification of species by means of natural selection.  This by no means can be seen as 
an endorsement of naturalism, as it clearly cites a supernatural being as the source of the 
laws of nature.  In the second edition of The Origin of Species, which came out the year 
after the first, Darwin added another epigraph from the English theologian Joseph Butler.  
It reads: 
  The only distinct meaning of the word ‘natural’ is stated, fixed, or 
settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an 
intelligent agent to render it so, i.e., to effect it continually or at stated 
times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once.146  
  
 This statement seems to be clarifying what Darwin means by ‘natural 
selection.’  It is not a natural process in the sense that naturalism is opposed to 
supernaturalism.  Natural processes have been put into place and set up by “an 
intelligent agent,” and left to run their course.  This ‘running their course’ is the 
course which is governed by the laws of nature, which the intelligent agent has 
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determined and effected.  This is a far cry from strict metaphysical naturalism 
which affirms that all that exists is the material universe and its natural processes, 
minus any supernatural author.  Not only does Darwin begin The Origin of 
Species with two quotations referring to a divine power and intelligent agent, but 
he also ends The Origin with a reference again to a supernatural Creator, with this 
quotation in the next to last paragraph of the book: 
  To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed 
on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and 
present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes, 
like those determining the birth and death of the individual.147   
 
  This passage reiterates what is stated in the first epigraph by Whewell, that 
to Darwin (“to my mind”) it seemed more dignified for God to create by means of 
natural selection, then to have to keep intervening in the natural world to create 
anew each independent species.  Then, to cap it all off, in the 2nd edition of The 
Origin, Darwin changes the very last line of the book, which read, “There is 
grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally 
breathed into a few forms or into one…”  Darwin adds after ‘breathed,’ the phrase 
‘by the Creator.’148  
 A truly scientific response to the question of whether Darwin was a naturalist or a 
theist, should be, who cares?  The private beliefs on questions of God should have no 
bearing on scientific theories.   The theological ideas or personal preferences behind the 
founder of a scientific theory shouldn’t matter.  Did Einstein prefer Bach to Beethoven?  
As it pertains to the theory of relativity, who cares?  Similarly, it should be completely 
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irrelevant what Darwin’s metaphysical preferences were.  In addition, Darwin was just 
one person.  What matters is not so much what Darwin believed, as what the scientific 
community believes.  In science, a new theory is not considered valid until after another 
investigator has put the theory to the same test and confirmed it.  As a result, Isaac 
Asimov concludes, “science is the product not of individuals but of a ‘scientific 
community.’”149  The problem here is that the question of whether or not evolution is the 
result of natural or guided process is not necessarily something one can easily put to the 
test.  As Darwin himself notes, a supernaturalist could easily say that God works through 
natural, secondary causes.  All one might see is the natural processes, not the God who 
set it up.   
However, while the subjective beliefs of the scientist often are irrelevant to the 
claims of their scientific theory, in this instance, for various reasons, it might matter what 
the scientist’s personal opinions are.  Darwin is not a research scientist operating under 
the paradigm of normal science.  He is a game changer, a revolutionary thinker.  This 
makes his beliefs concerning the implications of his theory for the field of metaphysics 
relevant.  Did Darwin think that evolution by means of natural selection was a strictly 
naturalistic process?  What he thought on the matter helped shape the interpretation of his 
theory as it was debated.  In addition, each scientist who is confronted with the teachings 
of evolutionary theory, is inevitably faced with the same issue that Darwin confronted:  Is 
evolution a strictly naturalistic process?  Can it account for the origin of all forms of life, 
not just species, in strictly naturalistic terms?   Does Darwin allow for supernatural 
guidance of evolutionary processes, as Wallace did?  Or does a detailed account of the 
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laws of evolution seem to rule out the type of theism portrayed in the western traditions 
of natural theology, revealed religion, and personal experience? 
Nevertheless, Asimov is correct that it is the final determination of the community 
of scientists in evaluating scientific theories that matters, rather than the subjective views 
of individual scientists.  So perhaps the question we should be asking is not, Was Darwin 
a naturalist, but does the scientific community adhere to naturalism?  How did Darwin’s 
fellow scientists interpret the matter?  There were some who found in the doctrine of 
evolution a welcome challenge to the control the church exercised over society and 
science.  Darwin’s bulldog, T.H. Huxley, saw the theory as leading to naturalism and 
agnosticism.  There were others who wanted Darwin to leave open the possibility of 
divine guidance, and rule out evolution by strictly natural processes.  Asa Gray, professor 
of natural history at Harvard, and the geologist Charles Lyell, were in this camp.  “Their 
creator seemed more hands-on, actively leading evolution on…guiding variations.”150  
Darwin on the other hand felt intelligent design smacked too much of special creation.  
Darwin felt natural selection was a more elegant and dignified way of creating than God 
having to constantly intervene and create adapted species for each particular ecological 
niche.  Maintaining belief in providence as guiding the whole process made natural 
selection somehow ‘superfluous’ to Darwin.   
Daniel Dennett tries to make it look as if Darwin was influenced by Gray into 
remaining open to supernaturalism.  He states, “In 1860 Darwin wrote, ‘I am inclined to 
look at everything as resulting from designed laws.’  It seemed that he had left open the 
possibility that God did His handiwork by designing an automatic design-maker.  Asa 
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Gray came up with this marriage of convenience:  God intended the ‘stream of 
variations.’”151  Unlike Darwin, Gray wasn’t arguing for merely a form of deist ‘designed 
laws.’  Gray thought it was perfectly reasonable that God could intervene and guide the 
process as well.  Gray was trying to reconcile evolution with theism, without it 
degenerating into Darwin’s deism.  Wallace, the ‘cofounder’ of natural selection, became 
a spiritualist later in life, and thought that human consciousness could not arise from 
strictly natural processes.  He also felt that mathematics defied reduction.  But Dennett, 
Dawkins, and Hitchens write off Darwin’s use of religious language in his writings as 
concessions to his religious friends and his wife.  Dennett and Dawkins insist that Darwin 
saw natural selection as strictly that, a natural process.  Dawkins writes, “Darwin and 
Wallace…provided explanations of our existence that completely rejected supernatural 
agents.”152  This simply is not true.  Darwin was open to the laws of nature being 
designed by a supernatural agent, and Wallace felt human consciousness to be the result 
of special creation. 
However, it is true that Darwin’s faith weakened over time and at his death he 
was much more skeptical.  He never became a full-fledged atheist or strict naturalist, 
though, as some want to claim.  Darwin’s faith transitioned from a weak theism, to the 
type of deism found in the quotations above, to a more skeptical, agnostic position shortly 
before his death.  Supposedly the death of his daughter Annie in 1851, and the realization 
of the great suffering involved in the process of evolution by selection, ate away at his 
faith.  Naturalists claim this led to his abandoning faith completely, but Darwin does not 
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state this.  Nevertheless, naturalists point to passages such as the following in Darwin’s 
1876 Autobiography, to support their position.   
  I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in 
some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist.  
This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can 
remember, when I wrote the Origin of Species; and it is since that time 
that it has very gradually with many fluctuations become weaker.153 
 
While Darwin admits that his Christian faith was ultimately undermined by his 
theory, he does not state that it led him to atheism, or strict naturalism, but rather towards 
a kind of creaturely agnosticism.  He states in The Variation of Animals that he found the 
question of God’s existence “insoluble,” an issue that is incapable of being solved, a 
mystery, and forever beyond the power of humans to know with certainty.154  It is ironic 
that the New Atheists use Darwin as a kind of atheist saint in order to advance their 
cause.  Yet in a conversation with John Fordyce, Darwin said, “in my most extreme 
fluctuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of denying the existence of a 
God.”155  M.A. Corey concludes that, “Popular opinion has it that Charles Darwin was a 
radical atheist…The fact is, however, that Darwin wasn’t an atheist at all.  He was a 
radical deist, which is to say that he believed in the existence of a distant primordial 
Creator, who created self-organizing atoms and then allowed them to evolve on their own 
according to natural law.”156  So when the New Atheists use Darwin to declare that 
naturalism is ‘the answer,’ or the solution to the problem of the science vs. religion 
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debate, and should be the new ‘orthodoxy,’ that is not how Darwin saw it.  Using his own 
words, Darwin considered the problem not solved, but ‘insoluble.’  
How might a theist respond to Darwin’s concern over the problem of suffering?  
People who have had near-death experiences state that their experience of the afterlife 
was one of pure joy, peace, and love.  It is so blissful that they wish to stay there, and 
some have described coming back to their body like returning to Hell.  St. Teresa, after 
experiencing hell in a vision, said that the suffering of this world is nothing in 
comparison.157  St. Julian of Norwich, similarly, claims that she expressed her concerns 
about the existence of sin in a vision to Jesus, who responded, “all shall be well, and all 
shall be well, and all manner of things shall be well.”158  She claimed to see that God 
holds the universe in the palm of his hand and will eventually right all wrongs, that ‘all is 
well.’  Similarly, the Jesuit spiritual teacher Anthony de Mello writes, “all mystics – 
Catholic, Christian, non-Christian, no matter what their theology, no matter what their 
religion – are unanimous on one thing:  that all is well, all is well.” 159  The Book of 
Revelation similarly states that God “will wipe every tear from their eyes.  There will be 
no more death or mourning or crying or pain.”  (Rev. 21:4) 
To say that Darwin was an atheist, and that acceptance of evolution must entail 
naturalism, is an unjustified inference.  Contrary to what Dennett says, Darwin is not a 
‘universal acid.’  However, Darwin may be corrosive.  The God of theism does appear 
incompatible with the view of the universe that Darwin espoused.  While Darwin may 
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have believed in a causally closed universe, his belief that evolution was a strictly 
naturalistic process was not unanimous amongst the scientific community.  Asa Gray, 
George Lyell, and Alfred Wallace, all sought to reconcile Darwin’s vision of evolution 
with theism.  The strictly Darwinian worldview, however, is incompatible with the vision 
of God in Scripture, but it is not fatal to a God as the author of the laws of nature.  The 
Biblical God is a sovereign who rules God’s Kingdom and His people run to Him in 
times of trouble, asking Him to intervene on their behalf.  Choosing to have God on your 
side is a variation that may be said to favored by natural selection.  The Biblical God 
portrays a God who is actively managing His kingdom.  God guides and protects those 
who fear him and who love Him.  God is a lawgiver, who punishes disobedience and 
rewards faith, a God who listens to prayers and grants favors, enters into alliances, 
anoints kings, and raises up prophets.  According to this worldview there is a shepherd 
who guards his flock, and it is not nature alone who determines who lives and who dies.    
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CHAPTER THREE –  
 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY:  DARWINISM AND THE MODERN 
EVOLUTIONARY SYNTHESIS 
 
 
  Whether one likes it or not, the age belongs to Darwin.1 – Michael T. 
Ghiselin 
  One general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, 
namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die.2 – 
Darwin  
 Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted 
object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the 
higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, 
with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms 
or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to 
the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most 
beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.3 – 
Darwin  
 
  Is man an ape or an angel?4 – Benjamin Disraeli 
 
  Today Darwin is the ‘scientist’ to reckon with.5 – Desmond and Moore 
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3 Ibid., 384. 
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1.  The Origin as ‘One Long Argument’ – An Argument against Special Creationism 
 
 
 
 In the concluding chapter of the On the Origin of Species Darwin states that his 
volume is “one long argument.”6  Everyone knows that the Origin is an argument for 
evolution, but it is also an argument against Creationism, which was the predominant 
theory of the origin of species of his time and culture.  Even Darwin was an adherent of 
this theory when he left England on board the HMS Beagle in 1861.  He calls this theory 
or worldview “the ordinary view of each species having been independently created” by 
the direct action of God.7  It is against this ‘ordinary view’ that many of his arguments are 
directed. Throughout the Origin Darwin makes statements such as the following:  ‘How 
inexplicable are these facts on the ordinary view of creation!”8  Whether he is talking 
about the fossil record, homologous structures, or embryology, Darwin feels descent by 
modification is a better explanation of the facts than the ordinary view, special creation.  
So before considering what Darwin’s argument is, let us first consider the worldview that 
his argument is trying to refute. 
 Darwin’s undergraduate degree was not in biology or even the sciences.  He had 
tried to follow in his father’s footsteps as a physician, and enrolled at the University of 
Edinburgh in 1825 to study medicine, but he could not stomach the sight of surgery.  He 
then transferred to Cambridge in 1827 to study theology, hoping to pursue a career as a 
country parson so that he could follow his avocation as a naturalist.  At Cambridge 
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theology students were required to read the works of William Paley.9  As a result, Darwin 
was well-acquainted with the arguments in William Paley’s Natural Theology.  Darwin 
took Paley’s writings as a paradigmatic statement of the creationist worldview.  Peter 
Bowler states that Darwin was “captivated” by Paley’s arguments.10  Stephen Jay Gould 
argues that the Origin is an attempt to refute Paley’s arguments in particular.11  So what 
is Paley’s argument?  It is an argument by analogy.  For Paley, just as it is valid to infer 
that the order in a watch reflects the ordered design in the mind of a watchmaker, so too 
the order in nature reflects the ordered design in the mind of a divine being.  Nature is 
ordered in that each species is genuinely well-suited or adapted to its own particular 
environment.  In addition, the argument is strengthened by the fact that the complexity 
found in a watch is exceeded by that found in nature, as in the case of an eye.12  Darwin 
also accepted that species are well adapted to their environment, but instead of positing a 
divine being miraculously creating each species, he sees adaptation as the result of 
natural selection.  In other words, Darwin sees adaptation as the result of natural 
processes, not the result of divine design.      
 The belief in the independent, miraculous creation of each species by God is just 
one of several basic beliefs, both religious and secular, of the pre-Darwinian worldview.  
Ernest Mayr lists several others: 
1.  The earth is relatively young, and has remained unchanged since 
creation. 
2.  Species are fixed; they do not change. 
3.  The world was created by a wise and benign God. 
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10 Peter Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution  (Baltimore:  John Hopkins University Press, 1988), 21. 
11 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory  (Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press, 2002), 121. 
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4.  Anthropocentrism:  the world was created for the benefit of human 
beings, who are the highest corporeal beings in existence.13    
 
 The first belief of the pre-Darwinian worldview is in a young earth, one that has 
remained unchanged since the time of creation, roughly 6,000 years ago.  This date was 
arrived at by taking the biblical creation story in Genesis as literally true and then tracing 
the genealogy of the people mentioned in the Bible.  This allowed the Archbishop of 
Armagh, James Ussher, in 1650 to set the date of creation at Sunday, October 23, 4004, 
B.C.  Similarly, the Jewish calendar begins with the origin of the universe.  That means 
that the Gregorian calendar year 2016 is the 5777th year since creation.     
 The second belief in fixity of species meant that species were unchanging.14  This 
belief is derived from the Bible, which says that each species was created by God.   It 
also has a basis in philosophy.  Plato believed that the species reflected transcendent 
forms, eternal essences which they are based upon.  Aristotle believed species are eternal, 
that they have always existed substantially as forms wedded to matter.  He believed that 
an acorn became an oak tree, not an elm tree, because it possessed an oak essence.  This 
typological or essentialist view of species posits that an inner essence or type defines 
each species and is fixed.  Moreover, the species can be ranked in a metaphysical 
hierarchy of a Great Chain of Being, with God, complete Being and perfection, at the top, 
followed by Angels (for Augustine), then humans, animals, plants, matter with form, and 
last, matter without form.  That the species are fixed means that they are static and cannot 
move up or down the ladder of Being.   
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 The third belief, that the world was designed by a wise and benign creator again 
reflects the Genesis story that God created the universe for the purpose of humanity.  This 
belief is based upon the theory that each species was created with a distinct purpose in 
mind.  Thus Nature reflects the benevolence and wisdom of divine design.  This allowed 
Leibniz to conclude that this is the best of all possible worlds.15  Each species is uniquely 
designed and adapted to its environment through a divinely ordained teleology, for God 
does not do anything without sufficient reason.  Thus each species and the world are here 
for a reason, which may not be evident to us but is known to God.   
 Fourth and last, is the anthropocentric belief in the uniqueness and superiority of 
human beings.  Humans are at the top of the chain of being in this world because they 
alone have souls.  Other animals do not.  All other organisms are merely physical 
creatures and have no spiritual nature.  For Aristotle, what distinguishes humans from all 
other species is that they have a rational soul.  In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the human 
soul is made in the image of God and reflects God’s spiritual, personal nature.  God has 
also granted humans dominion as lords or stewards over all of divine creation.  Building 
upon the previous belief in the fixity of species, this precludes animals from ever 
evolving into human beings.  Hence, between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom 
there is a sharp line, with humans radically different from all other living things, not just 
quantitatively but qualitatively. 
 It is this worldview that the Origin and the Descent seek to refute, and especially 
the doctrine that species originated by divine fiat or special creation.  Darwin left 
England in 1831 on board the HMS Beagle as a firm believer in the fixity of species and 
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many of the other beliefs of the ‘ordinary view.’  Yet he ended the voyage no longer 
accepting the ordinary view of creation.  Why?  What happened while on the Beagle?  
Throughout the Origin Darwin notes facts again and again which he claims the ordinary 
view cannot plausibly explain, but which the theory of descent with modification can.   
  He who believes that each being has been created as we now see it…He 
who believes in separate and innumerable acts of creation will say, in 
these cases it has pleased the Creator to cause a being of one type to take 
the place of one of another type…He who believes in the struggle for 
existence and in the principle of natural selection, will acknowledge that 
every organic being is constantly endeavoring to increase in numbers.16  
  On the view that each species has been independently created, with all its 
parts as we now see them, I can see no explanation.  But on the view that 
groups of species have descended from other species, and have been 
modified through natural selection, I think we can obtain some light.17   
  On the ordinary view of each species having been independently 
created…I do not see that any explanation can be given.18  
  Many other facts are explicable on this theory [descent with 
modification]…how [ever they are] inexplicable on the theory of 
creation.19 
 
 So what are these facts that Darwin finds to be ‘inexplicable’ by special creation, 
yet ‘explicable’ by evolution?  A year into the trip Darwin was confronted with fossils of 
ancient extinct animals which resembled living animals in the same vicinity, but which 
were much larger.  He began to suspect they were ancestors of the forms now present, 
which had changed over time.20  As a result, he came to believe in transmutation of 
species over long periods of time.   Transmutation of species, however, requires large 
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amounts of time.  In addition, Darwin’s belief in a young earth had been weakened 
through prior acquaintance with Lamarckism, which was the main evolutionary theory of 
his day and to which he had been exposed while studying at the University of Edinburgh.  
But his belief in a young earth was further weakened when he read Lyell’s Principles of 
Geology while on board the Beagle.  Lyell, the father of modern geology, was an 
adherent of uniformitarianism, or the belief that the earth’s features were caused by the 
same uniform process one sees now, such as volcanism, earthquakes, and erosion, but 
over long periods of time.    
 Some argue that Darwinism is simply the extension of Lyell’s principles of 
geology to biology.  Just as Lyell argued that the kind of processes which are currently 
observable can and do shape and change the geology of the planet over long periods of 
time, so Darwin argued that processes of natural selection acting upon variation which 
are currently observable can give rise to species morphing into something different over 
long periods of time.  The isolation of a breeding population can, over a long period of 
time, create large enough differences among populations of what were the same species 
so that they can no longer interbreed.  Hence, a new species is formed.  Thus, just as 
current geological formations can be explained by natural processes, so too can evolution 
explain how current species arose through analogous natural processes. 
 On his travels aboard the Beagle Darwin found many variations of multiple 
species.  He came to the conclusion that it would be absurd for God to create all these 
varieties and species, each requiring a separate act of creation.  But it is largely due to his 
observations of the finches in the Galapagos Islands that Darwin also came to doubt the 
fixity of species, i.e., the idea that a species has an essence that cannot change (be that 
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essence instilled through participation in a transcendent form, an immanent substantial 
form, or divine implantation).  Darwin initially thought the thirteen types of finches he 
observed on the islands were just variations of the kind found on the mainland.  But when 
he returned to England he was informed that each variety was in fact a different species.  
He found this odd.  Why would God make finches in South America different from 
finches in North America, or different finches in each of the islands in the Galapagos?  In 
addition, if the creation story found in Genesis is literally true and the earth is only 
roughly 6,000 years old, this is not enough time for these species to change, for “some 
forms of life change most slowly.”  That requires “enormous periods of time.”21  Thus 
Darwin came to believe the earth must be much older than creationists believed.  
 In searching for a mechanism to explain how species change, in the fall of 1838 
Darwin stumbled upon the economist Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principles of 
Population.  He then extended Malthus’s argument from the human to the natural 
world.22  Populations tend to outstrip the food supply, resulting in competition for limited 
resources.  The fit obtain these resources, the less fit do not, thus giving rise to famine, 
starvation, and extinction.  Darwin extends this pessimistic scenario from the human to 
the natural world, but in doing so he seems to deny belief in a perfect world, ruled by a 
benevolent and loving God, as maintained by orthodox theologians.23  A frequent 
metaphor which Darwin employs is that the world is a battlefield, in which “each lives by 
a struggle” and predation.  In short, “the law of battle” reigns.24  In fact, each life is a 
“battle within battle,” and all members of current species exist because of the countless 
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deaths of unworthy members of other, or their own, species.25  Would a truly kind, 
caring, benevolent God really create a world with such suffering and death, a world 
Tennyson famously characterized as “red in tooth and claw”?  This realization is often 
cited as contributing to Darwin’s eventual loss of faith.  As he says:  “What war between 
insect and insect – between insects, snails and other animals with birds and beasts of prey 
– all striving to increase, and all feeding on each other…The dependency of one organic 
being on another, as of a parasite on its prey.”26  
 Last, the idea that humans evolved from animals seems to entail that there is no 
Great chain of being, no static hierarchy with humans at the pinnacle.  Evolution seems to 
entail that no organism stands at the top.  As Darwin saw it, evolution is the result of 
apparently random processes, and hence cannot be seen as progressive.  Evolution is not 
the result of divine fiat or the unfolding of a teleological process.  It is progressive only in 
that it creates organisms that are well-adapted to their environment.  Other than this, 
evolution entails no value judgments as to what is good, better, or best.  It thus seems to 
sound the death knell for the type of anthropomorphism found in the Bible, which says 
that humans stand at the center of creation.27  Darwin does not directly address the issue 
of anthropocentrism in the Origin.  He avoids discussing the origin of the human species 
in the Origin because of its controversial nature.  But in his later works, The Variation of 
Animals and Plants under Domestication, published in 1868, and The Descent of Man, 
published in 1871, he extends the principles of descent with modification to human 
beings.  This is a logical continuation of the Origin, for if living organisms have come 
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into being through evolutionary processes, and human beings are living organisms, then 
they too must have evolved from lower life forms.  In keeping with the scientific 
principle of simplicity, Darwin tries to show the continuity between human and animal 
world.  He thus opposes creationists who believe in a radical discontinuity.      
 The ability to love is often interpreted by theologians as transcending the merely 
physical, and as something that makes humans ‘special.’  Whereas sexual reproduction 
and romantic love are thought to be physical, Platonic and Christian agape love are 
thought to be transcendent, hence spiritual, and thus evidence of the human soul.  
Darwin, on the other hand, maintains that all higher animals manifest similar passions, 
affections, and emotions, including a sense of humor.28  He will expound upon this topic 
at great length throughout The Descent of Man, when he tries to show the continuity 
between animal and human behavior.  In the Origin, Darwin subscribes to the “utilitarian 
doctrine that every detail of structure has been produced for the good of its possessor.”29  
In other words, he thinks that for every trait an organism has, there should be an 
evolutionary reason for its existence.  So the existence of a trait is nothing other than a 
variation which favored that organism’s adaption to its environment, and hence helped to 
ensure its survival.  In accounting for the human ability to love, Darwin provides a 
natural rather than supernatural explanation.  Love is simply an emotion, not unlike 
similar emotions all other higher animals share.  It evolved because there is an adaptive 
advantage to possessing it. 
 But there is a problem.  Not all traits provide organisms with an adaptive 
advantage.  A prime example is a male peacock’s tail.  It is actually a hindrance because 
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it makes it more difficult for the peacock to move about and evade predators.  Why, then, 
does it exist if it offers no adaptive advantage?  Darwinian theorists think that sexual 
selection, rather than natural selection, provides the answer.  The male peacock’s tail has 
evolved because it attracts female peacocks.   Similarly, some evolutionary psychologists, 
such as Geoffrey Miller in his book The Mating Mind, see the incredible intellect of 
human beings not as evidence of a divinely created soul, but as the result of a long 
process of sexual selection.30  Our female ancestors chose to mate with those members of 
the opposite sex that could express themselves intelligently, with language or music, or 
who had advanced tool making abilities which contributed to more successful hunting 
and so on.  As a result, Miller believes that the human mind is the product of courtship, 
not divine fiat.  This argument appears to be implied in Darwin’s Descent of Man.  It also 
finds post-Darwinian support in the fact that human beings share roughly 98% of their 
DNA with chimpanzees.  Man is little more than a chimpanzee with a big brain and no 
hair.  Humans have thus been knocked off their anthropocentric pedestal.  In brief:  Why 
do humans have the ability to reason?  Not because they are made in the image of God, 
but because female hominids liked male hominids with highly intelligent brains who 
could perform survival-and-reproductive-related tasks better than those with lesser brains.   
 
2.  The Origin as ‘One Long Argument’ – An Argument for Natural Selection 
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As noted, the concluding chapter of the Origin begins with Darwin stating that his 
volume is “one long argument.”31  So far, this has been interpreted as one long negative 
argument, an argument geared to refute the ‘ordinary view’ of special creation.  Darwin 
rejects the ordinary view because it fails to explain various facts.  But his argument is 
also a positive argument, an argument for an alternative account of how species 
originated.  This is an argument for descent with modification by means of natural 
selection. The virtue of descent with modification is its explanatory power, its ability to 
explain various facts in a more satisfactory way.  But what are Darwin’s arguments for 
evolution, in his own words?  Mark Twain once quipped a ‘Classic’ is “something 
everyone wants to have read and no one wants to read.”32  Today, many people say they 
are familiar with and understand the ideas of evolution, but how many people have 
actually read the Origin, or know what Darwin’s actual arguments for evolution are? 
 Darwin begins the Origin with an argument by analogy.  Chapter One begins with 
a discussion of domesticated animals.  He probably begins this way because doing so 
would appeal to a larger number of people.  Anyone with firsthand knowledge of the 
domesticated animals who knows that they show variation.   Breeders of domesticated 
animals use variation as they select and cultivate their own breeds.  Breeders know 
something that contradicts the ordinary view, namely, that an animal’s nature is 
“something quite plastic,” something that can be molded to the breeder’s own desires.33  
In other words, they know that species are not fixed.  By selecting useful or desired 
variations, breeders could greatly influence the type of animal produced over the course 
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of many generations.  Darwin gives the example of the domestication of horses.  He 
argues that over the course of history, man has selected swifter horses for breeding, and 
that given enough time, centuries or more, a sub-breed could turn into a distinct breed.  
He then asks, cannot “something analogous…apply in nature?”34   
 What is this ‘something analogous’ that may apply in nature?  In the second 
chapter, ‘Variation under Nature,’ he claims that just as variation exists in animals 
involved in domestic breeding, so variation exists in natural settings.  So if variations can 
be selected for by humans, thereby shaping and perhaps creating distinct species, then so 
can the selective pressures of the natural world mold and create species.  Darwin asks, 
“Can the principle of selection, which we have seen is so potent in the hands of man, 
apply in nature?”35  One might ask how nature, lacking conscious intention, can choose 
or select which variations to breed.  The significant difference between the two is that the 
selection of traits in domestic breeding is guided by conscious intention, whereas in 
natural selection it is a blind process.  The argument itself seems to suggest that since a 
conscious mind is at work in the domestic breeding of animals, so must a conscious mind 
be at work behind the breeding of animals in nature.  The very term ‘selection’ implies a 
conscious process, a selector doing the selecting.  Darwin’s attributing selection to 
natural forces seems to personify them and posit a conscious process behind such 
selection, at the same time that he is denying the existence of such a conscious process.  
He attempts to skirt the issue by calling it “unconscious selection.”36  Unconscious 
selection is a process similar to the workings of Adam Smith’s invisible hand, an 
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impersonal, non-conscious mechanism that makes transactions in the marketplace work 
out advantageously.   Darwin states that “each new species is formed by having had some 
advantage in the struggle for life over other and preceding forms.”37  Thus a variation is 
‘selected’ for by nature if it increases the chances for the survival and for the 
reproductive success of the organism that possesses it.  Despite the disanalogy between 
domestic and natural selection, Darwin states that the conclusion we can draw, based 
upon the analogy, is that “individual differences [in nature] …afford materials for natural 
selection to accumulate, in the same manner as man can accumulate in any given 
direction individual differences in his domesticated productions.”38  
 Darwin has thus described the process by which species originate as one of 
adaptation.  The fit are those who are best adapted to their environment.  They 
successfully compete for limited resources and are able to find mates, reproduce, and 
pass on their adapted variations to their offspring.  Darwin summarizes natural selection 
in what is perhaps his most famous and oft quoted passage: 
   Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from 
whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an 
individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other 
organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that 
individual, and will generally be inherited by its offspring.  The offspring, 
also, will thus have a better chance of surviving…I have called this 
principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the 
term Natural Selection.39   
  
  Nature selects and cultivates those variations which are beneficial to the survival 
of the organism in its particular niche, similar to the way that a breeder selects traits he 
seeks to breed.  So in Darwin’s analogy, the domestic breeders are the primary analogue, 
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and the selective pressures of the natural world acting upon the organism are the 
secondary analogue.  Because domestic animals are similar to wild animals in that they 
both show variations which can be either beneficial or injurious to them, and because 
these traits are inheritable in both domestic and natural settings, the process of artificial 
selection in domestic breeding is the analogue for the process of natural selection in 
nature. 
 Darwin did not strike upon the concept of natural selection until after he had 
returned to England in 1836.  In 1838, after he had read the economist Thomas Malthus’s 
Essay on the Principles of Population he was able to offer an adequate explanation of 
how such change is possible.  Malthus was a doomsday economist, arguing that human 
populations grew exponentially while food supplies did not. Therefore populations are 
kept in check by competition for these resources.  The fittest obtain resources needed for 
survival while the rest face famine, starvation, and eventually death.  Darwin applied this 
view in a way Malthus had not, to other species.  My view, he said, “is the doctrine of 
Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms.”40  He 
thus saw competition as the key to understanding evolution.   
  The extent to which Darwin’s theory mirrors Malthus’ theory can be easily seen 
in the following propositions which summarize his argument for evolution through 
natural selection: 
1. Species produce offspring at a faster rate than food supplies and other 
resources can sustain them. 
2. There is variation, a variety of non-shared traits, in each species. 
3. Due to growing numbers, individuals must compete for limited resources. 
4. Those individuals whose variations the environment favors obtain the needed 
resources and are more likely to reproduce and pass on the variation.   
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5. The environment determines which traits are beneficial for survival and 
reproduction and which are not. 
6. Traits are inherited and passed on. 
7. Over long periods of time, new species emerge from individuals with 
successful variations. 
8. Geographic isolation can also give rise to the birth of a new species in 
response to the selective pressures of their unique location.41        
 
 Darwin supplements this general argument with a particular one.  Darwin himself 
was a pigeon breeder and claimed to have owned at one time or another every different 
variety of pigeon.  Of all the different varieties, he was “fully convinced that they all have 
descended… from the rock-pigeon” through selective breeding.42  Why the rock pigeon?  
Because they breed on rocks and are immune to predators.  They therefore occupy a 
stable niche in the environment, a niche which is immune to predators, thus ensuring 
longevity.  The inductive amplification here is from (a) descent with modification from a 
common ancestor or single variety (rock pigeon) to all the varieties of a single species 
(varieties of pigeons), to (b) “all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth 
have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed.”43  
 
3.  Pangenesis:  Darwin’s Attempt to Explain the ‘Laws’ of Variation and Inheritance  
 
 The Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries posited that 
the material world was governed by laws of motion and gravitation.  Darwin, seeking the 
approval of the scientific community for the acceptance of his theory, aimed to bolster his 
case by discovering and revealing the ‘laws’ governing descent with modification.  He 
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clearly sees his entire theory of descent with modification by means of natural selection 
as “one general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, multiply, 
vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die.”44  This passage suggests that evolution is 
a process involving “the survival of the fittest.”  This is the famous phrase frequently 
associated with Darwinism today.  Yet it was actually coined by Ernst Haeckel to 
characterize Darwinism.  However, Darwin himself, in the fifth edition of the Origin, 
agrees that this characterization is “equally convenient” with his understanding of natural 
selection and begins to use it as well.  The fit survive and the weak perish, Darwin clearly 
believes, because the “law of battle” reigns supreme in the natural world.45   
 But when it comes to the actual ‘laws’ governing variation and inheritance, 
Darwin runs into problems.   Natural selection is the “the preservation of favourable 
variations and the rejection of injurious variations.”46  Darwin’s entire theory is based 
upon the existence of variations and the ability of beneficial ones to be inherited and 
passed on.  But how do variations come about?  And how are they transmitted through 
inheritance?  Unless Darwin can explain why variations occur and how they operate, his 
entire theory appears mere speculation.  Darwin frequently refers to the ‘laws’ governing 
variation and inheritance and the biological world.  However, his theory of inheritance 
isn’t a law in the strict scientific sense, since it lacks the predictive power associated with 
scientific laws.  In addition, in a related point, the laws of heredity are not scientific in 
that they are probabilistic and not deterministic, in that they are not of the form ‘All A are 
B.’   Darwin is correct in asserting that there are laws governing variation and 
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inheritance.  But even if we can call a probabilistic statement with strict predictive power 
a law, there is still another problem.  It is that Darwin is unable to state what these 
statistical laws are because the statistical techniques needed to analyze changing 
variability in populations had not been developed during Darwin’s lifetime.47  As a result, 
Darwin speculates a great deal in the Origin, doing the best he can with what he has, 
discussing the ‘laws of variation’ that natural selection acts upon, while at the same time 
remaining unable to state what these laws are.  Basically he asserts that the processes that 
govern heredity are law-like, but his understanding of these laws is speculative and 
uncertain.   
 Since natural selection depends upon variation, and cannot proceed without it, 
unless Darwin can provide a full account of why variation occurs and what the laws 
governing it are, his theory is incomplete.  For this reason, Darwin devotes chapter five of 
the Origin to the “Laws of Variation.”  His argument is based on the assumption that 
variation in species is a constant, that those variations selected by nature will be 
preserved just as they as in domestic breeding.  But his main problem is that he cannot 
explain why these variations exist or how they are transmitted to offspring.  Today it is 
difficult to read the Origin because it appears primitive and outdated.  Reading it is 
similar to reading an 18th century medical treatise on how to treat infection when the 
author has no real understanding of bacteria or viruses.  From a modern standpoint, the 
reader sees an author groping around in the dark for an answer that we know but he 
doesn’t.  One cannot help but feel that Darwin and the Origin are no longer important, 
that the scientific worldview of his day is primitive, blighted, and eclipsed by our modern 
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understanding of biology and molecular genetics.  This admission of ignorance is 
repeatedly recognized in chapters 6-8 of the Origin, in which Darwin discusses the 
difficulties of his theory.  Here he admits that “the laws governing inheritance are quite 
unknown,”48 that “variability is governed by many unknown laws,”49 and that “our 
ignorance of the laws of variation is profound.”50  Therefore, he concludes, “we should 
be extremely cautious in inferring” what these laws might be.51  
As a result, it is fair to ask, what led Darwin to infer that there are laws of 
variation?  That there is variation is established by Darwin in the first two chapters of the 
Origin.  There he establishes the ubiquity of variation amongst both domesticated and 
wild animals.  Based on his observations of domesticated dogs and pigeons, for example, 
he states, “I cannot doubt that there has been an immense amount of inherited 
variation.”52  Today we know that variation is governed by genes, but Darwin had no 
understanding of genetics.    
Darwin essentially posits a ‘black box’ to account for variation.  He called this 
hypothetical explanatory model of heredity, based upon blending inheritance, 
‘pangenesis.’  He speculates that inheritance is based on ‘gemmules,’ tiny hypothetical 
hereditary particles that transmit variations from parent to offspring, blending them.  
Gemmules circulate in our blood and migrate to reproductive cells where they are passed 
on to one’s offspring.  In The Descent of Man, Darwin states:  “by the aid of the 
hypothesis of pangenesis…every unit or cell of the body throws off gemmules or 
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undeveloped atoms, which are transmitted to the offspring of both sexes.”53  Offspring 
inherit the same amount of gemmules from both parents, thus blending or fusing them 
together through inheritance.  For instance, if a child had one tall and one short parent, he 
will be a blend of both, hence of middle height.  Darwin’s theory of heredity by 
pangenesis was not officially stated until 1868, but it was conceived of much earlier, and 
one sees hints of it in the Origin. In one passage, he discusses how much of one’s (as we 
would say) genetic material is passed on to descendants.  He states that “after twelve 
generations, the proportion of blood, to use a common expression, of any one ancestor, is 
only 1 in 2048.”54   
 Biologists rejected this theory for the obvious reason that variations would be lost 
through dilution.  Fleeming Jenkin published a devastating review of the Origin in 1867, 
critiquing in particular Darwin’s theory of pangenesis.  He demonstrated that blending 
did not work, that new variations would be diluted or swamped by continued 
interbreeding.  For example, if a variation occurs whereby a person has a very high IQ, 
and he mates with someone with an average IQ, their child’s IQ will be somewhere in the 
middle.  The obvious problem is that the high IQ variation will be ‘washed out’ as time 
goes on, as more and more descendants continue to mate with people of average 
intelligence.  It would ultimately be lost and everyone will be of the same intelligence 
(and height, and skin color, and athletic ability, and so on).55  Darwin’s theory of heredity 
by pangenesis seemed hopelessly flawed.  It was even further discredited by August 
Weismann’s research in the 1880s.  Weismann demonstrated that somatic cells cannot 
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influence germ cells, thereby discrediting the inheritance of acquired traits.56  Mendel 
later added to the argument against pangenesis when his experiments became known in 
1900.  They further demonstrated that blended inheritance was by no means a ‘law’ of 
heredity.  Without today’s understanding of genetics, Darwin’s ‘laws of inheritance,’ is, 
by his own admission, confused and speculative. 
 
4.  The Descent of Man and Sexual Selection 
 
Darwin would have been better off not discussing inheritance as he was ignorant 
of the way in which variations occur, and hence pangenesis was mere speculation.  
However, he could not avoid it as the inheritance of variations which made one better 
adapted was central to his theory.  However, he did manage to avoid other topics which 
were also just as difficult to explain, among them the origin of life itself, the origin of the 
cosmos, and the origin of human beings.  However, he implied at the end of the Origin 
that his theory could be applied to humans.  Darwin was wise in stopping short of 
discussing human origins.  While most naturalists accepted some form of evolution in the 
1860’s, most stopped short of claiming that it accounted for human origins, and instead 
argued that the higher faculties were a difference not in degree, but in kind, from the 
animals.  Fellow naturalists of Darwin argued that the higher faculties of humans, such as 
morality and rationality, could only be accounted for by an act of divine creation.57 
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 It is against this compromise position that Darwin aimed his arguments in The 
Descent of Man, first published in 1871, in an attempt to demonstrate that humans 
descended from animals and no special creation by God was needed.  In other words, 
human origins could be derived from the strictly natural process of natural selection 
acting upon random variations.  While his argument is aimed against the divine origin of 
humans, this does not make Darwin a naturalist, as he left open the question as to whether 
or not God was the author of the principles governing these natural processes.  His 
overall strategy is to show that animals are not the brutes we think they are, and they 
possess many of the same behaviors and capabilities that humans do, only in primitive 
form.  He does so in an attempt to make descent from animals appear plausible.  He 
compares and contrasts numerous species, telling anecdotes and stories that demonstrate 
that animals and insects are much more complex and intelligent creatures than we often 
give them credit for.  He also tries to show that humans and animals share many 
homologous structures, both in our bones and our behavior. 
 In turning his sights on humans, his first task is to determine if humans constitute 
one species or several.  In the Origin Darwin states that he looks upon the term ‘species’ 
as referring not to types or kinds, since species can change over time, but as merely 
names which apply to similarities among individuals.58  In this he is following the 
Morphological Species Concept, which categorizes species on the basis of similar body 
structure.  However, he also is aware that many naturalists use the ability to interbreed to 
categorize individuals (the Biological Species Concept).  As a result, he asks whether the 
bodily differences between the races of man warrants classification as subspecies, or are 
                                                 
58 Darwin, The Origin of Species, 52. 
120 
 
 
 
similar enough to make them all members of the same species.  He also spends several 
pages in Ch. 7, ‘The Races of Man,’ discussing whether or not mulattoes or hybrids of 
different races are fertile or not, something which we no longer question, but in Darwin’s 
time there were not many scientific studies on.  He concludes that all the races appear 
able to interbreed with varying success, thus suggesting a single species rather than 
multiple ones.  He ultimately sides with the monogenists, or those who believe all races 
share a common descent from a single origin, which he speculates as being Africa.59  In 
doing so, he rejected polygenism, or the idea that races descended from different 
ancestral species of apes or stemmed from multiple origins in other locations than Africa.  
He also rejected Co-Adamism, the belief that the races are the result of separate divine 
creations of other humans at the same time as Adam. 
 Having opted for the unity of the human races as one distinct species, he is now 
left having to explain why racial differences exist.  He begins by recognizing the fact that 
“Man differs conspicuously from all the other Primates in being almost naked.”60  Not 
only does this characteristic also provide support for a single species, since the similarity 
is universal, but it leads to a more interesting question as to why humans lack hair?  What 
evolutionary advantage do humans obtain through natural selection in being hairless?  
One advantage natural selection bestows upon this trait is that it is easier to find and 
eliminate ticks and other parasites.  It might be affected by the type of climate one lives 
in, as it is easier to cool the body with less hair in a hot environment.61  However, Darwin 
notices another reason for humans’ lack of hair.  He writes, “the view which seems to me 
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the most probable is that man, or rather woman, became divested of hair for ornamental 
purposes.”62  In other words, in our evolutionary history, women preferred men who 
lacked hair, and mated with them more often than their hairier counterparts, thus giving 
rise to less hairy offspring.  Thus he would consider hairiness, or the lack thereof, a 
secondary sexual characteristic, and not just the result of natural selection.  Similarly, he 
spends several pages discussing why beards are not found among some races of men, 
concluding that sexual selection must account for the difference.63   
It is in attempting to explain these racial differences that Darwin recognizes 
another mechanism at work in evolution apart from natural selection – which he calls 
‘sexual selection.’  He realizes that sexual selection plays a role not only in human 
evolution, but also in the animal kingdom.  He states, “I perhaps attributed too much to 
the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest…I did not formerly consider 
sufficiently the existence of structures, which…are neither beneficial nor injurious and 
this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights.”64  Natural selection favors those 
variations which confer a survival benefit upon the individual.  But sexual selection 
favors secondary characteristics which may offer no survival benefit to the individual 
whatsoever, but are chosen for by members of the opposite sex for no other reason than 
that they find them appealing.  The tail of a peacock is the most common example of a 
trait chosen through sexual selection, as the tail offers no survival value to the peacock, 
and, if anything, draws the attention of predators and hinders the peacock from eluding 
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them.  Natural selection alone would cull out such burdensome features, but because of 
sexual selection they are a favored trait.65 
Sexual selection can occur in two ways.  The first is through female preference or 
choice.  If natural selection is survival of the fittest, sexual selection is survival of the 
prettiest.  Here the female prefers those males which are more aesthetically pleasing to 
them, such as the peahen preferring those peacocks with more elaborate tails.  The second 
is by favoring those variations which give males an advantage over other males in the 
competition for mating rights with females.  Large horns in ruminants may not 
necessarily be a trait that female ruminants prefer, but it does allow those males who have 
them to outcompete those who lack them.  Sexual selection based on female choice is 
called ‘intersexual selection.’  Sexual selection based on competition among members of 
the same sex is called ‘intrasexual selection.’66  Species in which sexual selection plays a 
role may see large differences between male and female individuals.  This is called 
sexual dimorphism.  Walruses can weigh three times as much as the females, as large size 
amongst males is a factor in driving off rival males and protecting a harem (intrasexual 
selection).  The brilliant plumage of male birds is preferred by females, perhaps because 
brilliant colors are aesthetically more pleasing to females, or stand as a sign of good 
health (intersexual selection).67  
Darwin even argues that the evolution by means of sexual selection may have 
played a role in the development of our mental, moral, and aesthetic values.  Darwin 
argues that our higher mental faculties might have evolved through sexual selection in 
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that women preferred men who could write poetry, or use language, or show sympathy 
for others, or sing songs.  He spends a great deal of time showing how these traits are 
displayed in a more primitive form in other animals, such as birds, apes, and dogs.  
However, Darwin has been accused of anthropomorphism because he appears to attribute 
to animals and insects the ability to judge and choose mates on the basis of aesthetic 
qualities and choice.  It might be reasonable to assert that human races have different 
aesthetic values and thus prefer different types of beauty in choosing sexual mates, but 
can the same be said for birds or insects?   
While many of Darwin’s conclusions in The Descent of Man are drawn from 
analogies between lower animals and humans (as sexual selection functions in the 
animals, so should it in humans), and therefore appear speculative, the findings of 
modern evolutionary anthropologists have provided support for them, particularly 
Darwin’s account of human origins.  Based upon morphological homologies in bodily 
structure between humans, apes and gorillas, Darwin speculated that humans most likely 
originated in Africa.  He argues, “It is therefore probable that Africa was formerly 
inhabited by extinct apes closely allied to the gorilla and the chimpanzee; and as these 
two species are now man’s nearest allies, it is somewhat more probable that our early 
progenitors lived on the African continent than elsewhere.”68   
Numerous fossil finds since Darwin’s time appear to have confirmed his hunch.  
The only known human fossil finds in Darwin’s time were Neanderthal fossils found in 
1856 in a German cave in the Neandertal valley.  But it was the discovery of an 
Australopithecus africanus (meaning ‘southern ape’) skull by Raymond Dart in 1925 that 
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finally provided hard evidence for Darwin’s speculation.  This skull is over 500,000 years 
old, but further fossil finds established that the australopithecine line goes back over 2 
million years.  In the last million years, there have been at least four human lines:  Homo 
erectus, who may have been the ancestor of Homo heidelbergensis, who is considered the 
ancestor of both Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens.69  Further fossil finds in the 
1970’s, like that of Lucy, a largely complete Australopithecus afarensis skeleton found in 
the Rift Valley in Ethiopia by Donald Johanson, dating back roughly 3.2 million years 
ago, provided additional support for the out of Africa hypothesis.  The oldest fossil finds 
of a hominid ancestor that might have been bipedal, are those of an Ardipithecus ramidus 
skeleton found in Ethiopia, dating back 4.4 million years ago.   
The addition of the term ‘recent’ to Darwin’s out of Africa model (RAO, or recent 
African origin) is largely due to the mapping of the human genome and other genetic and 
DNA evidence like mitochondria.  This first migration out of Africa was by members of 
the Homo erectus species, who expanded into Southern Asia around 1.75 million years 
ago, but died out about 173,000 years ago and were replaced by Homo Sapiens.  It is now 
believed that all humans alive today descended from a small band of humans, perhaps as 
small as 150, who migrated out of Africa roughly 50-55,000 years ago.70  Based upon 
DNA mapping of cell mitochondria, researchers believe that all humans today descend 
from ‘Mitochondrial Eve,’ who might have lived between 135,000 and 200,000 years ago 
in Africa.71  Similarly, all Y chromosomes in men can be traced back to a single male, 
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‘Adam,’ estimated to have lived between 80,000 to 142,000 years ago in central or 
northwestern Africa.72  These findings, mostly made in the last decade, have established 
the RAO model as the orthodox model of human origins.   
 
5.  The Eclipse of Darwin: Alternatives to Natural Selection as the Source of Species Origination 
 
 Darwin’s thought is frequently characterized as revolutionary.  The phrase ‘the 
Darwinian revolution’ is bandied about, as if to simply record the obvious fact that 
Darwin completely changed the way we look at the world.  Just as Copernicus effected a 
revolution in astronomy, and Newton one in physics, so Darwin did in biology.  He 
challenged and overthrew a scientific paradigm of his age.  However common this 
understanding of Darwin’s thought may be, it is mistaken.  Many of Darwin’s insights 
and central ideas were not generally accepted until roughly 80 years after the publication 
of the Origin.  That is when the modern evolutionary synthesis occurred.  Only after that 
time might it be claimed that a scientific revolution in biology had occurred.  The period 
prior to the modern evolutionary synthesis is therefore referred to by Peter Bowler as ‘the 
eclipse of Darwinism,’ and by Stephen Jay Gould as ‘the marginalization of Darwinism.’ 
 Darwin was not the first person to advance the theory of evolution. He was simply 
the first to offer a serious explanation of how the process of evolution occurred, namely, 
by means of natural selection.  In 1844, Robert Chambers published his Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation.  He argued that organisms evolved in a linear, abrupt way 
similar to saltations, or sudden leaps or changes.  However, he failed to specify a 
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mechanism as to how this occurred, other than perhaps through divine intervention.  The 
negative reaction of the scientific community to Vestiges impelled Darwin to carefully 
form his arguments and tighten his evidence for natural selection before going public.  As 
a result, Darwin’s book, unlike Chambers, had a much more positive reception.  
However, while Darwin encountered relatively little difficulty in convincing others to 
accept the general concept of evolution, he had a much more difficult time convincing 
them that natural selection was the mechanism by which it occurs.   
 Even then, Darwin’s argument for natural selection failed to convince everyone.  
While many of the anti-selectionists during the eclipse thought that natural selection 
occurred, they believed it played a minor role in evolution, serving a primarily negative 
function of eliminating the unfit (an “executioners role”).  They believed natural selection 
was incapable of playing the positive role of producing variation and new species.73  
Even today, not all evolutionary biologists agree that natural selection is the sole process 
by which evolution occurs.  In addition to sexual selection, genetic drift can also produce 
a change in the gene content of a population over time when some variations become 
more widespread than others through no other means than chance (rather than through the 
action of natural or sexual selection).74  This is especially pronounced when a gene 
population becomes isolated and there are few founders, thereby limiting future 
generations to those variations which the founders possess.  Gould calls this ‘Founders 
drift.’75   
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But Darwin did not understand even the very basic facts about why species 
displayed variation because he had no understanding of DNA or genetics.  It was not until 
Gregor Mendel’s insights were combined with Darwin’s, and a new understanding of 
genetics was added to the mix in the 1940s and 50s, that biologists effected what is called 
the modern evolutionary synthesis.  In fact, without the ability to explain variation and 
inheritance, what exactly Darwin meant by ‘evolution by means of natural selection’ was 
not at all clear during the eclipse. 
 While a few biologists immediately adopted Darwin’s view, many rejected it.  
Ironically, Darwin’s chief defender, T.H. Huxley, nicknamed ‘Darwin’s bulldog,’ did not 
accept natural selection as the driving force of evolution.  Many evolutionists proposed 
alternative mechanisms.  Theists, Essentialists, neo-Lamarckians, Geoffroyists, 
Orthogenesists, and Saltationists all proposed alternative mechanisms, which will be 
discussed below.  During the 1920s and 1930s virtually all major works on evolution 
were antiselectionist.76  One biology textbook has argued that Darwin basically “went too 
far, too fast.”77  Darwin was forced to speculate as to how variations were inheritable.  
Although Mendel was conducting his work on genetics with pea plants at the time that 
Darwin published the Origin, the importance of Mendel’s work went unrecognized for 
close to 50 years.  Of all the alternative mechanisms proposed to account for variation 
during the eclipse, Vernon Kellogg in 1907 identified three as the most significant:  
Lamarckism, orthogenesis, and saltationism.78  All three affirm the negative role natural 
selection plays, but deny that it is capable of playing any positive role beyond the 
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microevolutionary scale.  They argue that small microvariations, while real, do not 
constitute enough of a change to be the source of new species on the macro-level, even 
when accumulated through natural selection.   
 
5.1  Lamarckism 
 During the eclipse many believed that it was Lamarck (1744-1829), not Darwin, 
who was the true father of evolution.  His work represented the first comprehensive 
attempt to prove that all living things descend from primitive ancestors.79   His central 
belief is in the “inheritance of acquired traits,” i.e., in the view that a species could 
change to adapt to its environment, and pass on an acquired trait to its young.  The 
example commonly used to illustrate this point is the giraffe’s long neck.  In stretching its 
neck muscles to reach higher leaves on trees, a giraffe naturally extends its neck, and in 
the process changes itself into a giraffe with a longer neck.  Similarly, a weight lifter will 
change his body form through exercise, and pass on this change to his offspring.  Today 
we know this view is false, but in Darwin’s time it was not known to be so.  Prior to the 
discovery of melanin, in Darwin’s time it was believed that people in Africa had dark 
skin color because they had inherited ever-darkening tans of their ancestors.80  If this 
were true, the children of pirates would be born with more scars on their faces than the 
children of non-pirates, and Jewish children would be born circumcised.  But they are 
not. 
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 One can see Darwin wrestling with this problem in the Origin.  What is the effect 
of a biological change, due, for example, to muscle use (or disuse)?  Can traits acquired 
through use and disuse be inherited?  Darwin felt that birds living in water grow webbed 
feet, whereas domesticated waterfowl will have stronger legs based on use and disuse.  
Could variations, such as dwarf plants on an alpine summit, simply be the result of the 
external environment?81  Darwin’s theory of heredity by pangenesis is open to the 
inclusion of the Lamarckian notion of the inheritance of acquired traits.  Because the 
gemmules circulate through the blood, they can be affected by bodily changes.  
Gemmules that have been affected can make their way to the reproductive organs where 
they can be transmitted to offspring.  As a result, bodily changes could be inherited by 
future generations.   This makes Darwin, like Lamarck, an adherent of soft inheritance.  
Soft inheritance holds that acquired characteristics can be inherited and blended in 
offspring, whereas hard inheritance holds that the traits of offspring are unaffected by 
environment.  Darwin incorrectly sided with Lamarck and soft inheritance on this issue.   
 Ernst Mayr believes that August Weismann (1834-1914) is the foremost 
evolutionist, other than Darwin, of the nineteenth century.  Weismann began his career 
believing in soft inheritance.  But in an attempt to determine whether acquired traits were 
inherited, Weismann cut off the tails of 901 mice over the course of 19 successive 
generations.  He failed to obtain a single mouse without a full-length tail.  Mayr thus 
credits Weismann with the refutation of soft inheritance, thereby paving the way for 
Mendelian genetics and hard inheritance.   
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 But what made Weismann’s conversion final was his observation and that of 
cytologists, that future germ cells “are set aside after the first mitotic divisions of the 
developing embryo and no longer have any physiological connection with the body 
cells.”82  The later distinction between genotype and phenotype is analogous to 
Weismann’s division between germ plasm and soma, or bodily cells.  The genotype will 
later be identified with an organism’s genetic makeup, which is relatively immune from 
the environment (except from things like radiation, which can cause mutations), while the 
phenotype is the individual’s physical character and is the result of interaction between 
the environment and the genotype.83  Mayr holds that the publication of Weismann’s 
essay, On Heredity, in 1883, marks the beginning of Neo-Darwinism, i.e., Darwinism 
without the inheritance of acquired characteristics.84 
 
5.2  Orthogenesis 
 Whereas Lamarck thought that inheritable traits were influenced by external 
factors, others saw internal processes at work.  Those who held to Orthogenesis believed 
that there was an internal direction which guided and shaped the evolutionary process.  
The term itself literally means “straight (line) generation.”85  Whereas Darwin believed 
evolution is based on the selective pressures of the environment shaping the random 
variations that organisms display, adherents to orthogenesis believed the process was 
guided and directed, rather than random.86  Orthogenesis is associated with embryology 
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and homologous structures.  It looks for patterns in the development of an embryo and in 
the structures of all living things in order to determine where such development is 
naturally headed.  Orthogenesis is based upon Haeckel’s biogenetic law of recapitulation, 
which is that the developing embryo ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, meaning that as 
the embryo develops, it adds new, more complex structures onto previous ontological 
structures.87  Each embryo has the potential to take its development to the next level of 
complexity through a kind of quantum leap, by which it evolves along an internal channel 
into a higher form on the chain of Being.  Thus as species develop and work their way 
‘up’ the taxonomic system, they are driven from one type to the next, from less ordered to 
more ordered, by an “intrinsic finalistic principle” of improvement.   
 Orthogenesis appears teleological because it is progressive; it claims that 
organisms evolve in an orderly, purpose-driven direction.  Although the major 
orthogenesists, Eimer, Hyatt, and Whitman, claimed to reject teleology, orthogenesis was 
appropriated by those who sought to maintain “divine superintendence of the 
evolutionary process.”88  Orthogenesis is ripe for this interpretation because it is 
directional.  Species advance upward, eventually arriving at human beings.  Darwin, on 
the other hand, claims that species branch out, many traveling down dead-end streets that 
lead nowhere.  However, the orthogenesists are similar to Darwin in that they saw the 
pre-determined internal channels or lines along which organisms evolve as having 
physical causes, not supernatural ones.  But because they had no concrete evidence to 
support their claims, other than the pseudo-science of embryology, these ‘internal 
channels’ remained vague and elusive, although no more so than Aristotle’s concept of a 
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final cause.  As a result, orthogenesis resembled traditional teleology enough to give rise 
to ‘theistic evolutionism,’ for orthogenesis seemed to demonstrate that the existence of 
rational beings like humans is the natural outcome or final goal of evolutionary history.  
Orthogenesis met a generally warm reception because it incorporates reason as the 
outcome of the evolutionary process, which is a cornerstone of the anthropocentric 
worldview, and a core belief of the pre-Darwinian worldview.  In fact, Mayr argues that it 
was Kant’s acceptance of teleology that influenced German evolutionists along the lines 
of orthogenetic thought.89  Since Darwin’s denial of teleology and directionality made the 
appearance of man a random event that need not have occurred, many evolutionists as a 
result rejected his principle of natural selection. 
 
5.3.  Saltationism 
 If anyone today were asked what the evidence for evolution is, he or she would 
probably point to the fossil record.  The fossil record seems to present the most tangible 
evidence for the evolution of species over time.  Why then does Darwin not discuss the 
fossil record until chapters nine and ten of the Origin?  The answer is that the fossil 
record in Darwin’s lifetime was very incomplete.  Darwin himself states that “the 
geological record is extremely imperfect; that only a small portion of the globe has been 
explored with care; that only certain classes of organic beings have been largely 
preserved in a fossil state.”90  In Darwin’s time, the most ancient human fossil known 
was a Neanderthal skull discovered in Germany in 1856.  At that time, it was viewed as a 
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“deformed or degenerate example of a modern human.”91  In addition, there was no 
radioactive carbon dating at the time to determine its age.  So an appeal to the fossil 
record might have raised more problems than it solved for Darwin’s theory.  Questions 
which might have been asked include:  Why has no one discovered any fossils for the 
transitional organisms Darwin claims once existed?  Why is there a sudden appearance of 
a great many fossils in one period, the Cambrian explosion, but no fossils from the prior 
period (no pre-Cambrian fossils)?   
 The fact that the fossil record seems to suggest the sudden appearance of life 
during Cambrian times might itself suggest that life appeared suddenly all at once, rather 
than gradually, as Darwin maintains.  In addition, the fossil record is disjointed, with gaps 
rather than continuity:  older life forms suddenly disappear, and are quickly replaced by 
newer ones.  These facts seem to suggest that evolution proceeds abruptly, with sudden 
changes, or ‘saltations’ (from the Latin word ‘saltus,’ or leap).  However, saltations 
appear to violate one of the ‘laws’ that Darwin claims governs evolution.  According to 
Darwin, organisms evolve gradually through the accumulation of minute changes.  There 
are no abrupt or dramatic changes.  Darwin calls this “the canon of ‘Natura non facit 
saltum,’” a doctrine adhered to by Leibniz and Linnaeus that means that nature makes no 
leaps, no jumps, no saltations.92  This is perhaps the reason that Darwin does not begin 
his arguments for evolution in the Origin with a discussion of the fossil record.  In fact, 
Darwin himself notes how difficult it is for an invertebrate to be turned into a fossil.   
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To counter the possible evidence that the fossil record might provide for 
saltationism, Darwin repeats, in a mantra-like manner, that the “process of modification 
must be extremely slow.”93  Saltationism asserts that species make sudden transitions 
from one kind or type to another.  Darwin asserts the accumulation of small, gradual 
changes via natural selection.  Such a theory requires an old earth, not a young earth.  
Darwin here extends Lyell’s uniformitarianism to the biological world.  Change is 
gradual; nature proceeds through small variations over long periods of time.  These small 
changes eventually result in big changes.  He repeats this point in many places: 
   I do believe that natural selection will always act very slowly, often only 
at long intervals of time, and generally on only a very few of the 
inhabitants of the same region at the same time.94   
 
   Natural selection can act only by taking advantage of slight successive 
variations; she can never take a leap, but must advance by the shortest and 
slowest steps.95  
 
   As natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive, 
favourable variations, it can produce no great or sudden modification; it 
can act only by very short and slow steps.96  
 
 However, the physicist William Thomson (the later Lord Kelvin) argued in 1868 
that the age of the earth was less than 100 million years.  He reached this conclusion by 
using the principles of thermodynamics to calculate that it would not take longer than 100 
million years for a body the size of the earth to cool down from a molten state.  Darwin 
thought that his theory required a much greater length of time than this, but he had no 
way to counter the physicist’s arguments.  He simply felt that Kelvin was wrong.97  In the 
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end, Darwin proved correct, because radioactivity provides a source of heat that Kelvin 
was unaware of.  At the time, however, Kelvin’s arguments, along with Fleeming 
Jenkin’s demonstration in 1867 that pangenesis does not work, drove people away from 
Darwin’s theory and into the arms of the saltationists.  The virtue of saltationism is that it 
allows for quick sudden leaps of the type found in the fossil record, and these sudden 
leaps could be made within Kelvin’s time frame.  Better still for saltationism, Mendel’s 
laws of inheritance later paved the way for the discovery of modern genetics.  Subsequent 
saltationists saw genetic mutations as the basis of these jumps.  The evidence seemed to 
suggest that nature does indeed make leaps.  
 The fortunes of saltationism rose as those of the Lamarckians declined.  
Saltationism is almost synonymous with a belief in macro-level genetic mutations.  
Lamarckism seemed a refuted theory after Weismann’s experiments in the 1880s proved 
fatal to soft inheritance, and hard inheritance appeared to be proven by the rediscovery of 
Mendel’s laws in 1900.  The person most responsible for popularizing saltationism was 
also one of the rediscoverers of Mendel’s 1865 paper, Hugo de Vries (the other two were 
Carl Correns and Erich Seysengegg).  De Vries believed that large scale mutations 
effected jumps in evolution, jumps that produced new species.  Thus saltations occur 
through genetic mutation at the macro-level.  Small mutations that accumulated over time 
on the micro-level could result in variation but were not sufficient to produce complex 
organs such as the eye.  The appearance of such a complex organ on the biological scene 
necessitated complex systems coming into being all at once.  De Vries is also partly 
responsible for coining the term ‘gene’ to describe the hereditary material that mutates.  
He rejected Darwin’s theory of pangenesis, according to which gemmules are the cells 
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that migrate from somatic to germ cells, thus enabling acquired characteristics to be 
inherited.  Instead, DeVries postulated cellular units of heredity, but denied they were 
able to partake in intercellular movement.  To avoid confusion with Darwin’s units, he 
called his units ‘pangenes,’ which Johannsen later shortened to ‘genes.’98 
 
6.  The Rediscovery of Mendel 
 
 It is commonly held that Darwinism was made complete by the discovery of 
modern genetics.  It is assumed that Darwin provided most of the components of 
evolutionary theory, and the missing components were obtained when Mendel’s laws of 
inheritance were rediscovered in the spring of 1900.  This is incorrect.  Darwinism 
technically refers to descent through modification primarily by means of natural 
selection.  Darwin sees adaptation or fitness as resulting from environmental pressures 
selecting which variations are beneficial or injurious and rewarding the former with 
survival and reproduction, while consigning the latter to the dust heap of history.  Darwin 
is adept at explaining how natural selection occurs, but fails to provide an adequate 
account of how or why variation occurs and how variations are inherited.  He proposes 
the theory of heredity by pangenesis, or blended inheritance, to explain how variations 
are passed on to offspring.  But as noted above, this theory is a ‘black box,’ a device 
needed to perform a certain empirically verifiable function, but whose inner workings are 
unknown.   
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 It was assumed, at least by Darwin, that once the ‘black box’ of variation and 
inheritance was opened up and its operations revealed, that the needed pieces of Darwin’s 
puzzle would be supplied and the scientific revolution complete.  But this is not what 
happened.  Mendel did not really open up the black box of genetics and reveal how it 
works.  He merely discovered various patterns of inheritance.  For his discovery, Mendel 
has been called the ‘prophet’ or ‘pioneer’ of genetics.  But this too is to grant more to 
Mendel’s discovery than he stated, since Mendel knew nothing of genes, chromosomes, 
or DNA.  He simply ascribed inherited traits as ‘units’ or ‘factors’ which were passed on 
unchanged to the next generation.99  It could be argued that Mendel’s ‘units’ were just 
another ‘black box’ left to be opened by later scientists.          
 Mendel began experimenting with the common pea plant Pisum sativum at 
roughly the same time that Darwin was writing the Origin.  He published his results in 
1866, but they were not noticed until 1900.  According to Darwin’s theory, if pea plants 
flowers come in two colors, white and purple, cross breeding the white with the purple 
flowered plant would result in an intermediate color, such as mauve.  However, this does 
not happen, as Mendel demonstrated.  Mendel cross-pollinated purebred pea plants that 
exhibited seven different traits which were passed consistently onto their offspring:  
flower color (purple or white), flower position (axil or terminal), stem length (long or 
short), seed shape (smooth or wrinkled), seed color (yellow or green), pod shape (inflated 
or constricted), and pod color (yellow or green).100  
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  When Mendel cross-pollinated pea plants which are heterozygous rather than 
homozygous, i.e., having two different rather than identical alleles for a given gene, he 
discovered their offspring inherit their traits in a quantifiably predictable way.  For 
instance, when Mendel cross bred a tall plant with a short plant, he determined that the 
first generation would all exhibit the dominant characteristic, in this case, they would all 
be tall.  But in the second generation he found that for every three plants which 
demonstrated the dominant trait, one would exhibit the recessive trait.  So for every three 
tall plants, he would get one short one.  This 3:1 ratio not only applies to pea plants, but 
to inheritance across the board; it is a universal law of inheritance.  As a result, it became 
clear to Mendel that hereditary units are not blended.  Rather, each parent contributes his 
or her own hereditary units to the next generation, which may not show up until the 
second generation. 
 Later geneticists would discover plants are heterozygous because they have two 
different rather than identical alleles for a given gene.  Each parent contributes his or her 
own allele, or gene, for each trait, which has been derived from either one of their parents 
during sex cell formation, or meiosis.101  If a gene is heterozygous, the gene which is not 
expressed can still appear in future generations.  This led to the important discovery that 
all living things which reproduce sexually are actually more genetically diverse (their 
genotype) than they outwardly physically appear (phenotype).   
 Mendel’s principles were the ‘laws of inheritance’ that Darwin had been seeking.  
But instead of these principles establishing the truth of Darwinism, they were actually 
used against natural selection and in support of ‘saltationism.’  Saltationists believed that 
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genetic mutations can be large enough to result in an entirely different type of creature, a 
new species.  Even Darwin, despite his gradualism, seems open, at times, to large, sudden 
changes.  In some passages in the Origin, Darwin speculates that variation could produce 
“monstrosities,” and all it would take is one such “hopeful monster,” to become the father 
of an entirely new species.102  However, Darwin’s deeper adherence to the “canon of 
‘Natura non facit saltum,’” that ‘nature does not make leaps’ – weighs heavily against 
this.  In the first chapter of the Origin Darwin admits that abrupt changes occur, there are 
‘monstrosities,’ what we consider today large scale genetic mutations, but he believes 
they are selected against, and so die off.  If, however, they are not selected against, as 
Saltationists assert sometimes occur, then they give rise to entirely new species.  In that 
case, natural selection and the pressures of the environment acting on small mutations is 
not needed for the appearance of new species. 
 
7.  The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis 
 
 As a result of these considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that the Darwinian 
‘revolution’ was not a revolution in his day, or for a good time thereafter.  Darwinism is 
revolutionary in that it served to cement consensus among scientists in favor of evolution, 
but it was not revolutionary in that it failed to make an adequate case for natural 
selection.  Nor can one argue that Mendel’s findings completed the Darwinian revolution.  
As noted, Mendelian genetics was not immediately seen as compatible with natural 
selection.  Rather, the actual wedding of Mendelian genetics with Darwin’s principle of 
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natural selection took another 30 or more years.  Only then can one truly say that a 
revolution had occurred.  This revolution is known as ‘the modern evolutionary 
synthesis.’  It takes its name from Julian Huxley’s 1942 book, Evolution, The Modern 
Synthesis.  Stephen Jay Gould sees the synthesis as integrating two things together:  
Mendelian genetics and Darwinism.  This synthesis links all the various subdisciplines of 
biology together.103  
 As stated above, pre-Darwinian thought was both typological and essentialist.  In 
accord with the Western monotheistic tradition, each species was created by a divine 
creator with a specific essence that defined that species.  Genesis 1:11 states that on the 
third day “God said, ‘Let the land produce vegetation; seed-bearing plants and trees on 
the land that bear fruit with seed in it, according to their various kinds.’  And it was so.”  
The word ‘kind’ is typological, i.e., it refers to a specific kind or type of plant.  Aristotle’s 
thought is also typological but it is secular, arguing for a static rather than a created 
universe.  Species are not created, but are eternal, each having a different substantial 
essence.  They are also fixed and cannot change, thus precluding the possibility of 
evolution.  Saltationists accept evolution, but in a way that still reflects typological 
thinking. One reason the modern evolutionary synthesis is revolutionary is that it rejects 
all typological and essentialist thought in favor of anti-essentialism.   
Why is the modern evolutionary synthesis anti-essentialist?  Darwin denied that 
species are fixed, and argued that they change and evolve if the pressures of natural 
selection act upon variations within a population.  This is called Population Variation.  
Mayr argues that Darwin’s “basic insight was that the living world consists not of 
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invariable essences (Platonian classes), but of highly variable populations.”104  What the 
source of these variations was and how they are passed on to offspring were questions 
that had to wait for the development of modern genetics and molecular biology for 
answers.  Once those sciences were developed and combined with Darwinism, the 
science of population genetics was born.  But this was roughly 80 years after the 
publication of the Origin.  According to population genetics, each individual is 
genetically unique; each individual is not only unlike members of all other species, but 
also unlike members of their own species.105  Every generation of a population contains a 
great deal of genetic variation, but only some of it is passed on to the next generation, 
because of natural selection.  Only those genetic variations which are best adapted 
survive and get passed on. 
 However, if one of Darwin’s fundamental insights is that a species is not a “fixed 
morphological type but a population of diverse individuals,” there is a problem.106  
Darwin admits in the Origin that one of the most difficult tasks facing a naturalist is 
learning to distinguish one species from another, as well as all the various varieties within 
a species.  In order to categorize individuals according to their species, doesn’t this 
assume an essentialist metaphysic, one that allows for distinctions to be made?  The 
answer is no, for the simple reason that Darwin believed species change and undergo a 
process of transmutation from one form to another.  Still, the problem remains:  what 
constitutes a species if it has no essence?  A new definition of species, one that is not 
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typological, is needed.  And Darwin, knowing nothing about genetic make-up, or DNA, 
cannot define a species in these terms.   
   His own definition of species is evasive.  He states, “I look at the term species, 
as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely 
resembling each other.”107  What this passage makes certain is that Darwin is not an 
essentialist, or typologist.  However, his concept of a species is not the modern biological 
definition either.  If anything, Darwin appears to be a nominalist, holding that species are 
just names categorizing similarities among individuals.  Ultimately, Darwin felt the issue 
was best left up to the taxonomists to determine the criteria by which one distinguishes 
between them.  But in the closing pages of the Origin he makes it clear that the lack of 
immutability or permanence in species has undermined essentialism.  “In short, we shall 
have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera, who admit that 
genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience. This may not be a 
cheering prospect; but we shall at least be freed from the vain search for the undiscovered 
and undiscoverable essence of the term species.”108  Darwin’s nominalism therefore left 
him and future zoologists and botanists who wished to follow him, in a bind as to how to 
classify specimens.   
What, on the other hand, is the modern definition of species?  It is essentially 
provided by the modern evolutionary synthesis.  Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the 
synthesis, faced this difficulty when he was in New Guinea as a young ornithologist in 
the 1920s trying to classify the various species of birds there.  In 1942 he came up with 
what is called the ‘biological species concept’ that defines a species as a group of 
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interbreeding populations.  This now seems obvious, because we now know that only 
organisms which are genetically similar are capable of interbreeding.  But prior to a 
proper understanding of how genes and chromosomes recombine during sexual 
reproduction, this was not obvious.  This is not to say, however, that this definition is 
itself definitive, as several closely related mammal species are capable of interbreeding, 
such as wolves and coyotes, mules and horses, lions and tigers, chimps and bonobos, as 
well as some monkeys, and even Homo sapiens and Neanderthals.109 
 The modern synthesis of evolutionary theory with genetics occurred over a twelve 
year period, from 1936-1947.  During that period, population genetics demonstrated that 
Mendelian genetics were consistent with natural selection.  This demonstration was long 
in coming because it required understanding the mathematics of population geneticists 
and integrating it with the theories of the evolutionary biologists.  Several notable figures 
who paved the way for the synthesis were Fisher, Haldane, and Wright.  Their work was 
highly mathematical and at the time too difficult for the field naturalist to understand.  
But Theodosius Dobzhansky successfully bridged the gap between the field naturalists 
and population geneticists and effected the synthesis.  Consensus among major scientists 
in their various fields soon resulted, consensus that natural selection is indeed the main 
mechanism of evolutionary change and acts upon populations of genetically diverse 
organisms.  United by the synthesis were many subfields of biology, including genetics, 
cytology, botany, paleontology, embryology, systematics, morphology, and in due 
course, molecular biology.110 
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 The modern synthesis is a true revolution in that it constitutes a paradigm shift 
which has achieved widespread consensus and set the agenda for ‘puzzle solving’ within 
‘normal science.’  Evolutionary biology is not Darwinism.  It uses a different conceptual 
apparatus than Darwin’s, employs the terminology of population genetics, and draws 
upon the findings of many fields.   With the discovery of DNA in 1953, an understanding 
of recombination became possible.  Recombination explains variation in a population due 
to the presence of multiple alleles of a gene.  The distinction between genotypes and 
phenotypes is another important distinction for modern evolutionists not found in 
Darwin.  It is, in fact, incompatible with Darwinism strictly speaking.  Darwin attributed 
far too important a role to the environment and the phenotype.  A proper understanding of 
how phenotypes and genotypes interact finally enabled biologists to explain the 
mechanism of inheritance.  Such an understanding shows that evolution depends upon 
both genetic mutations and the selective pressures of the environment.  Evolution cannot 
be adequately explained solely in terms of either one in isolation from the other.  Thus 
the modern synthesis sees evolution as a two-stage process:  the production of variations 
through genetically inherited differences, which are then subject to natural selection.  
Natural selection thus has an effect upon an individual’s abilities to reproduce 
successfully and pass on inherited traits.111  The modern synthesis also recognizes 
mechanisms of evolution other than natural selection, such as “mutation, migration, 
random genetic drift, recombination, linkage, inbreeding, as well as others.”112  To the 
extent that the modern evolutionary synthesis considers all of these, or some possible 
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combination of them, but not just natural selection by itself, to be the engine driving 
evolution, it also is not strictly Darwinian.   
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CHAPTER FOUR –   
THEISM:  TO BE A THEIST IS TO BE COMMITTED TO WHAT? 
 
 
  The Otherworld is not a myth, but a reality, and in all ages there have 
been souls who have been willing to brave the great adventure, and to risk 
all for the chance of bringing back with them some assurance of the future 
life.1   – Jessie L. Weston  
 
  The fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God.’ – Psalm 14:1 
  
  A man can no more diminish God’s glory by refusing to worship Him 
than a lunatic can put out the sun by scribbling the word, ‘darkness’ on the 
walls of his cell.2  – C. S. Lewis 
 
  If you board the wrong train, it is no use running along the corridor in the 
other direction.3 – Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
 
  The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of… It is the heart 
which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith; God felt 
by the heart, not by reason.4 – Blaise Pascal 
 
   Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with 
reason…follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of 
conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his 
capability of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of 
blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to 
a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that 
of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist.5 – Darwin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Jessie L. Weston, From Ritual to Romance  (New York:  Peter Smith, 1941), 175. 
2 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 46-47. 
3  Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy  (Nashville:  Nelson Books, 2010), 187.   
4 Blaise Pascal, Pensees and Other Writings, trans. by Honor Levi  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1995), 157-8. 
5 Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, ed. by Nora Barlow  (New York:  W.W. Norton 
& Co., 1993), 92-93. 
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1.  What is Theism?   
 
 The defining characteristic of theism is belief in a personal god or gods who 
transcend the universe yet in some way are still immanent within it.6   As transcendent, 
the divine is beyond the grasp of any science which seeks knowledge of the material 
universe.  However, because God is active in the universe, He is not entirely unknowable.  
A theistic godhead may be said to be knowable through intuition, reason, personal 
experience in the form of divine revelation or mystical states, or on the basis of morality.  
Monotheism is the belief that there is only one God.  Classical theism attributes certain 
characteristics to God, including being immutable, eternal, omnipotent, benevolent, and 
omniscient, the Creator and sustainer of the universe, and personal.  Open theists claim 
that God is open to prayers and human decision-making.  Some argue that in order to 
allow for human free will, an open theist must qualify some of the traditional 
characteristics of God, such as omniscience and omnipotence.    
 There are many types of theism in addition to the Western monotheistic tradition, 
such as panentheism, polytheism, henotheism, and ditheism.  Pantheism, the view that 
god and the universe are one and the same, might be an attractive alternative because it 
opens up the possibility that much can be known about God, since science and theology 
are basically the same discipline, with the same object of study.  Deism too might be an 
attractive possibility because it holds that God is the creator and first cause of the 
universe, and might have set the universe in motion to evolve according to the laws of 
nature. 7  But it is a central tenet of Western theism that God hears prayers and 
                                                 
6 Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, (New York:  Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), s.v ‘theism.’ 
7 Ibid., s.v. “deism.” 
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supplications, and acts in response to these, and this agency is contrary to the remote, 
aloof deity of deism.   
But it is the central tenets of the Western monotheistic tradition that the New 
Atheists claim are threatened by the findings of evolutionary theory and modern science.  
Hence, the scope of this study will be limited to Western monotheism.  Among the theist 
beliefs which will need to be discussed are the following:  God created the universe ex 
nihilo.  Human beings are a special creation of God in that they are endowed with 
spiritual and immortal souls that are made in God’s image.  Human beings fell into sin 
and as a consequence disrupted their relationship with God.  God is a personal being who 
invites worship and hears prayers and petitions and is concerned about us.  God 
intervenes in history on our behalf.  The record of God’s self-revelation is found in 
scripture.8  But most important of all is the claim that God exists.  Later chapters will 
determine if these claims are consistent with either evolution and/or naturalism. 
 
2.  The Attributes of a Theistic God        
 
 If there is a God, how do we know what God is like?  On what grounds can one 
argue that the qualities attributed to the Western theistic vision of God are preferable to 
those offered by other traditions?  As Richard Dawkins notes, most theists today are 
atheists about former theistic gods like Baal, Thor, Wotan, Poseidon, and Apollo.9  In 
what way can one say that belief in the God of Western monotheism is, or ought to be, 
                                                 
8 James Herrick, The Making of the New Spirituality  (Downers Grove:  InterVarsity Press, 2003), 32-3. 
9 Richard Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain  (New York:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 2003), 150.  Dawkins states: 
“We are all atheists about most of the gods that humanity has ever believed in.  Some of us just go one god 
further.” 
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warranted, while belief in other theistic deities is not?  Is there any objective reason as to 
why one should prefer one over the other?  Is there any way to substantiate the theistic 
claim that the fundamental characteristics of God are omnipotence, omniscience, and 
benevolence?  Can one claim to ‘know’ that God is omnipotent, omniscient and 
benevolent, or are these simply dogmatic assertions one must take on faith?  Or can one 
use reason to work backwards, detective-like, from the effect to the cause, from the 
evidence or sensible clues to God’s having these attributes?  If not, does knowledge of 
them lie in revelation?  Are they rationally consistent with one another?  Can they be 
known with certainty, deductively, or only inductively, i.e., based on statistical 
probability?  Or can one reason abductively that a theistic God is the best explanation for 
the existence of the world, its order, human minds, moral values, human consciousness, 
free will, and religious experience?   
 The Western theistic tradition affirms the following characteristics as central to 
theism:  “the view according to which there is a God who is the creator of the physical 
world and works actively in it to bring about his purposes as well as being omnipotent, 
omniscient, eternal (or timeless) and morally perfect.”10   These characteristics are 
derived from a wide variety of sources, among them natural theology, divine revelation, 
personal experience, sense data, and reasoning.  God is said to be a personal, spiritual 
being much as human beings are.  By personal, we mean that God is a subject, who has a 
conscious will, with basic powers that allow Him to act intentionally in order to freely 
achieve purposes.  God is someone who has beliefs just as we do, but God knows all and 
                                                 
10 Aku Visala, Naturalism, Theism, and the Cognitive Study of Religion:  Religion Explained?  (Surrey:  
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2011), 13. 
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only truths.11  As a person, God has the ability to communicate and can hear prayers, 
which an impersonal Godhead does not.  One could claim that the fundamental difference 
between a theist and a naturalist is that the naturalist sees ultimate reality as an ‘It,’ while 
a theist considers ultimate reality to be a ‘Thou.’  As Martin Buber says, “the man who 
says I-It, stands before things,” whereas “man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to 
his Thou.”12 
However, there is a big difference between God and human beings in the extent of 
these powers.  In the Middle Ages, the dominant model of God was that of “an absolute 
monarch ruling over his kingdom.”13  This model is clearly Biblical in origin, as a central 
message of Jesus is the proclamation of the Kingdom of God.  The Monarchical model is 
an inductive argument from analogy.  Just as a King stands above his people, so God 
stands above the world.  Just as an absolute monarch has absolute power over his people, 
so God has absolute power as well.  However, like all arguments from analogy, there are 
disanalogies among the analogues.  A King is still a finite human being with a body, 
whereas God is neither finite nor corporeal.  God’s power is infinite, whereas a human’s 
is not.  Hence God is said to be omnipotent.  God has the power to create, preserve, and 
destroy the material universe.  Human knowledge is limited, whereas God knows 
everything, hence is omniscient.  God knows what happened on this day in 600 BC, and 
all the days since, whereas humans don’t.  God is said to be eternal, in that he exists 
outside the spatio-temporal universe, and is therefore considered timeless.  Yet at the 
                                                 
11 Richard Swinburne, Is There a God?  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1996), 5. 
12 See Martin Buber, I and Thou  (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 29, 39. 
13 Ian Barbour, Religion and Science:  Historical and Contemporary Issues  (New York:  Harper Collins, 
1997),  306-7. 
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same time, God is also said to be everlasting, in that he has existed at each moment in 
time, in the past, present, and in the future.14   
 Although God transcends the universe, he is also said to be omnipresent, i.e., 
everywhere.  This is possible because God is not only the creator of the universe, but 
remains actively involved in sustaining it and all the various forms found within it.  
Aquinas states that God, as the first, universal cause of all things, governs everything 
directly, although this might be through secondary causes, by means of created things 
exerting causal influence on other created things.  As the sustainer of the universe, “every 
creature’s existing depends on God, so that no creature could exist even for a moment 
without being annihilated were the activity of God’s power not to preserve it in 
existence.”15  Thus the theistic God is said to be both transcendent and immanent, found 
in creation, but not identical to it.  God has ordered the universe in such a way that the 
natural world is governed by laws of nature which determine the causal interactions and 
properties of natural objects, but God, as the author of these laws, can also act by 
suspending these laws and acting directly.  This allows for the miraculous intervention of 
God into the natural world in order to accomplish some divine purpose, such as curing 
people of disease, or responding to prayers.  In addition to these attributes, omniscience, 
omnipotence, and omnipresence, God knows what is right and wrong, he knows what the 
best kind of world for creatures like us is, and he has the ability to freely act to create and 
sustain such a world.16  As a result, humans owe their being and the being of the world 
around us, as well as its goodness, to God.  Therefore, we owe God not only gratitude 
                                                 
14 Swinburne, Is There a God?, 10. 
15 Thomas Aquinas, A Summary of Philosophy, trans. and edited by Richard J. Regan, (Indianapolis:  
Hackett Publishing Co., 2003), 55-58.  Quote from Summa Theologica, I, Q.  104, A. 1. 
16 Swinburne, Is There a God?, 11-14. 
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and worship, but are obligated to obey God’s moral commands, whatever these are taken 
to be, since God is the source of all good things. 
Other core beliefs of theism include the belief that humans are made in the image 
of God, that they have a soul that was created by God ex nihilo, and that the soul is 
immortal.  Also, theism by definition states that naturalism is false, that matter is 
dependent upon and originates from the being of God, who is spiritual in nature and who 
transcends the universe.  Thus theism and Naturalism are said to be inconsistent, i.e., both 
cannot be true at the same time.  They are also contradictory; if theism is true, then 
naturalism is false, and if naturalism is true, then theism is false.  Theists, in order to be 
internally consistent, must assert that naturalism is false, and vice versa. 
 
3.  Is Theism Coherent?  The Limits of Language and the via negativa 
 
 When one says that God is eternal, or that God has always existed, is this a 
sufficient answer to the question, what caused God?  If one says that God is timeless, i.e., 
outside time, then how can God be found within temporality, which the assertion of 
omnipresence demands?  If God is omnipotent, can he build a boulder so big he can’t lift 
it?  The modern updated version of this is, can God microwave a burrito so hot he can’t 
eat it?  If he can, then there’s something he can’t do.  If he can’t, then again there’s 
something he can’t do.  Either way, he’s not omnipotent.  In Book II, chapter 25 of the 
Summa Contra Gentiles, entitled ‘How the Omnipotent God is said to be incapable of 
certain things,’ Aquinas addresses this issue.  He asks similar questions:  Can God make 
something both black and white?  Can God make the past not to have been?  Aquinas 
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solves these questions by placing limits on God’s omnipotence.  God cannot do what is 
logically impossible, like making a round square.  “He cannot make the genus not to be 
predicable of the species, nor lines drawn from a circle’s center to its circumference not 
to be equal, nor the three angles of a rectilinear triangle not to be equal to two right 
angles.”17   
A similar problem arises when God is said to be omnipotent, omniscient, and 
benevolent.  If God is omniscient, then he is said to know everything that happens in the 
universe.  But does this mean that God knows what each of us will do in the future?  
Does this undermine human freedom?  If God is all-good or benevolent, then God would 
want a universe in which there is no evil.  So if God knows everything, then he would 
know that someone is about to commit an evil act.  If God is omnipotent, he could stop 
this person from committing this evil.  If he is benevolent, then he would intervene to 
prevent this evil from occurring.  This is the problem of evil that is commonly raised by 
atheists against the existence of God:  Given the reality of evil, it is inconsistent to argue 
that God is benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent.   
Richard Swinburne has a credible response to this problem.  Just as there are 
limits to God’s omnipotence, there are limits to God’s omniscience.  Just as it is 
impossible for me to know what another person will do tomorrow, God cannot know 
either.  In creating human beings with limited free will, God placed limits on what God 
can and cannot do.  However, Swinburne notes that this “is not the normal Christian (or 
Jewish or Islamic) view,” but it does resolve the problem that the paradoxes of God’s 
                                                 
17 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Two:  Creation, trans. by James F. Anderson  (Notre 
Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 73-75.   
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omnipotence and the problem of evil present for the theist.18  The best of all possible 
worlds is one in which God imposes limits on what God can do or know, but this is the 
price that must be paid in order to allow human beings free will and avoid 
predestinationism.  Swinburne argues that the story of Jonah and the Ninevites supports 
his position.  Jonah is told by God to tell the Ninevites they are about to be destroyed.  
When they repent, God changes his mind, but Jonah gets upset with God for now his 
prophecy did not come true.  The story seems to suggest that God did not know the 
Ninevites would repent, thereby demonstrating God’s omniscience does not include 
knowledge of the choices free beings will make.  Swinburne’s theology is thus labeled a 
‘kenotic’ theology in that it emphasizes “God’s voluntary self-limitation,” and downplays 
claims that God is omnipotent in the absolute sense.19  John Hick’s theodicy is kenotic as 
well, in that God limits his power so as to allow for human freedom, which may give rise 
to immorality and evil.20  
 Another way to avoid the charge that the traditional theistic attributes of God are 
inconsistent is by making the distinction between the Kataphatic and Apophatic.  The 
Kataphatic approach to spirituality makes full use of words and images to describe God.  
God is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, just, perfect, creator, liberator, savior, and 
redeemer.  However, this approach runs the risk of applying finite human concepts onto a 
being that is infinite and stands beyond the sensory temporal world.  For example, we 
frequently refer to God as He.  But God has no body and is supposed to transcend gender.  
As a result, some believe we cannot say anything positive about what/who God is, only 
                                                 
18 Swinburne, Is There a God?, 7-8. 
19 Barbour, Religion and Science, Historical and Contemporary Issues, 358. 
20 Ibid., 315. 
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what God is not.  This is the Apophatic (‘to deny’) approach to spirituality, which 
stresses the mystery of God and advocates passively meeting God in silence.  Since God 
transcends the spatio-temporal world, an intellectual approach to God using the concepts 
and metaphors of this world is inadequate.21  Kant would agree, since “thoughts without 
content are empty.”22   
The process of stripping all concepts and metaphors away from God is sometimes 
called the via negativa, or the negative way, or ‘the way of denial.’  It is advocated by 
philosophers like Maimonides, and mystics such as Dionysius and St. John of the Cross, 
who had experiences of God they claimed to be ineffable, or beyond description.  The via 
negativa states one cannot predicate anything positively about God, since God’s being is 
beyond human comprehension.  Instead, all one can say is what God is not.  Instead of 
saying that God is Eternal, all we can say is that God is neither temporal nor created.  
Instead of saying God is omniscient, all we can say is God is not ignorant.  Instead of 
saying God is omnipotent, what we should say is God is not powerless.  Instead of saying 
God is benevolent, all we can say is God is not malevolent.   
 
4.  The Origins of Theism:   Religious Realism vs. Constructivism 
 
  Why are people religious?  Why do such things as religious phenomena exist?  
Are they truly of divine origin, or merely a human invention?  If the latter, then how can 
one explain their almost universal and transcultural presence?  Why do some people have 
                                                 
21 Bradley P. Holt, Thirsty for God  (Minneapolis, MN:  Fortress Press, 2005), 74-5. 
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith  (New York:  St. Martin’s 
Press, 1965), 93.  A 51 (1781 ed.) or B 75 (1787 ed.).  Other translations read “thoughts without intuitions 
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faith in God, while others don’t?  Religious people claim they are religious because they 
believe there is a supernatural world beyond the natural order of things, and like Plato 
they consider this transcendent world more real than the world of space and time.  They 
believe knowledge of the transcendent world is possible because occasionally it 
intervenes and penetrates our world.  Thus people who are religious often claim they are 
religious because they are responding to a divine reality.  Western theists claim that their 
vision of God and God’s attributes is preferable to other claims because their claims are 
‘truer’ to the way ultimate reality actually is.  Such people are termed ‘realists,’ because 
they believe that their object of study, namely God, exists independently of the human 
mind.  The term ‘God’ denotes an actual being whose existence is independent of our 
knowledge. Thus the monotheistic realist claims he is a monotheist because this is in fact 
the way things are.  So the realist answer to why there is religion is that religion has 
arisen in response to an actual divine being, and there have been those who has 
penetrated the veil separating God from the spatio-temporal world and experienced God, 
and are trying to share their experience of God’s self-disclosure with others.  So a 
religious realist claims he or she derives his concepts about God because this is the way 
things are, there is a God, and that God has made himself known.  In other words: 
   Statements about the existence and nature of God are true if and only if 
there is a divine being with such properties.  Statements about actually 
experiencing the Transcendent are true if and only if there is a 
Transcendent to be experienced.  The claim that God hears prayer is true if 
and only if there is a God who answers prayer.  The claim that humans 
exist after death is true if and only if humans do in fact live subsequent to 
their death.23  
 
                                                 
23 Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, David Basinger, Philosophy of Religion:  
Selected Readings (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 8. 
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 Nonrealists, constructivists, and anti-essentialists argue religious pronouncements 
do not correspond to external realities; religious language and religious concepts are 
simply constructions of human beings and their societies.  So the meanings of religious 
words are based in the peculiar linguistic practices and social conventions of society.  
Religion is simply a human creation, and religious language is rooted not in a 
transcendental experience of the divine, but in human practices and beliefs.  Religion is 
simply a natural, rather than supernatural, event.  For Nietzsche, religion and morality are 
the inventions of the oppressed as a way to turn the tables on their oppressors.  In this life 
we’re down, but in the next life, we will be up and you will be down.  For Freud, religion 
is simply the projection of our infantile need for security and moral authority onto a 
heavenly father figure.  For Durkheim, religion arises not in response to cosmic forces, 
but out of a sociological need for individuals to behave and comply with the norms of 
society.24   
William James defines religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation 
to whatever they may consider the divine.”25   Note that the emphasis in James is on 
‘perceived divinity,’ not divinity itself:  one apprehends oneself to stand not necessarily 
in relation to the divine itself, but to “whatever they may consider the divine.”  However, 
this is not how the mystics experience the sacred.  Mystical states present themselves as 
states of knowledge in which the mystic claims he or she ‘knows’ the experience comes 
from and is of God. 26  Mystics claim their experiences are more than just ‘beliefs,’ and 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 6. 
25 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, (New York:  Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004), 39.  
26 Ibid., 329.  
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on the whole are anti-naturalistic.  However, while mystics claim to have crossed the line 
from constructivism into realism, from belief into reality, because the experience is 
subjective and cannot be transmitted either conceptually or experientially, it is difficult 
for the non-mystic to evaluate their claims on an objective basis. 
   
5.  Natural Theology and Reason:  Arguments for the Existence of God 
 
In the Confessions, Augustine believes the existence and nature of God can be 
discerned in three ways:  by a direct vision or mystical experience, by faith or belief in 
the testimony of others who have experienced God’s self-revelation either through the 
prophets of the Bible or the person of Jesus, and by reason attempting to come to terms 
with the natural desire for God that he feels is implanted in our hearts.27  Augustine 
believed natural knowledge of God was possible by studying creation because the world 
has been ordered by God and reflects God’s mind.  He argues that the existence of things 
themselves demand an explanation, crying out “We did not make ourselves, but he who 
endures forever made us.”28  This type of knowledge is open to all, but the faith that 
Scripture is the Word of God is a gift from God and thus open to fewer people.  Fewer 
still are those people who have experienced God through a mystical experience.   
Since the faculty of reason is supposedly universal amongst all humans, the 
arguments for God’s existence are usually considered first by philosophers.  But what 
does it mean to be rational?  Does it simply mean the ability to construct sound, valid 
                                                 
27 This is evident in Books 7, 8, and 9, detailing the events leading to Augustine’s conversion.  Book 9, 
Chapter 10 discusses an alleged mystical experience Augustine and his mother had at the port by Ostia 
shortly before her death. 
28 Augustine, Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. by John Ryan  (New York:  Doubleday Pub., 1960), 185. 
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arguments?  Are the arguments for God’s existence valid?  Good arguments involve two 
things:  collecting as many facts as possible, and then making good inferential claims 
based on the facts. Given credible premises, reason allows us to determine whether an 
argument for God’s existence is sound or not.  The problem here is determining what 
constitutes good evidence, and whether or not logical necessity is enough to guarantee the 
existence of a being that supposedly transcends space and time.  
There are plenty of proofs attempting to demonstrate that God exists.  But beyond 
God’s existence, what is God is like?  Can we know that as well, or can we only be said 
to ‘believe’ that God exists, and ‘believe’ that God has such and such qualities?  As noted 
earlier, the relationship between reason and faith parallels that of science and religion, 
evolution and theism.  The fundamental stance of the New Atheists and various naturalist 
philosophers who abide by the creed of scientism is that science disproves religion, and 
evolution disproves theism.  Their overall take on the relationship between philosophy 
and religion is that philosophy should come under the domain of science and adopt its 
methods.  Their stance on the relationship between reason and faith is that the two are 
incompatible.  This is actually only one of several possible ways that the relationship 
between reason and faith may play out.  Rem B. Edwards lists six possible ways to relate 
them. 
1. The subordination of philosophy to theology (Aquinas) 
2. The subordination of theology to philosophy (Hegel) 
3. The elimination of theology in favor of philosophy (theistic Rationalism – 
Locke, and atheistic Rationalism – Dewey) 
4. The elimination of philosophy in favor of theology (Fideism, Crisis 
Theologians – Barth, Brunner) 
5. The elimination of the ‘subject matter’ from both philosophy and theology 
(Logical positivism) 
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6. The equating of philosophy and theology as competing historical, rational 
belief systems (Royce, Niebuhr)29 
 
While each of these positions will in one way or another be discussed at some 
point below, for now let us consider the first one, that of Aquinas.  The traditional view 
that knowledge consists of justified true belief requires beliefs to be justified.  Without 
good reasons for faith, faith in God appears to be unjustified and irrational.  Aquinas sees 
in philosophy and natural theology a preamble to faith.  The First Vatican Council 
agreed, stating “that truth comes from the same God and cannot be contradictory.”30  The 
truths of reason must align with the truths of revelation.  However, while Aquinas 
believes that philosophy and reason can be used to prove the existence of God, that only 
gets one so far.  Therefore what reason can’t know about God must be revealed.  Thus 
faith perfects reason; the imperfect wisdom of philosophy is made perfect by the grace of 
God.  That God exists can be demonstrated by reason; that God is triune in nature, that 
God created the world ex nihilo, that humans have been tainted by original sin, that the 
soul is immortal, and that sacraments bestow grace, all must be disclosed by God.  
Aquinas argues: 
  There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God.  Some 
truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason.  Such is the 
truth that God is triune.  But there are some truths which the natural reason 
also is able to reach.  Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the 
like.31  
 
 This position is attractive because it allows the theist to give reasons for his or her 
beliefs.  It may not be enough to convince the naturalist, the positivist, or the strong 
rationalist who demands deductive certainty for every belief, but it at least operates 
                                                 
29 Rem B. Edwards, Reason and Religion  (New York:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), 71-2. 
30 Richard McBrien, Catholicism  (New York:  Harper Collins, 1994), 116. 
31 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1:3, 63. 
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within the framework that it is possible to give good reasons for faith, and does not see 
the two as necessarily conflicting.  Since some religious truths can be known by reason, 
then there is a common ground in which philosophy and religion overlap.  As a result, let 
us consider briefly some of the well-known arguments for the existence of God.   
 
5.1  Existential Argument  
 
Augustine makes an argument for the existence of God that one could call 
existential, one based on disordered love.  Virtue for Augustine consists in the proper 
ordering of love.  If one does not value or love God as our greatest good, then one will be 
dissatisfied, since earthly goods cannot satisfy one as God does.  At the beginning of the 
Confessions, Augustine states, “Thou has made us for thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are 
restless until they find their rest in thee.”32  This statement suggests humans have a 
spiritual need, akin to a thirst, that can only be satisfied by God.  Thirst and hunger 
suggest that we are not self-sufficient, that we are dependent upon God the way we are 
dependent upon water and food.33  Augustine doesn’t give an immediate explanation as to 
why he believes humans are in a naturally restless state.  However, given his Neoplatonic 
interpretation of faith, this statement may offer up a psychologically compelling reason as 
to why humans seek God.  Plato sees the sensible world as less real than the intelligible 
world, because the physical world of particulars is caught up in Heraclitian flux.  The 
                                                 
32 Augustine, Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. by Henry Bettenson  (New York:  Basic Books, 2003), 
Book I. 
33 Holt, Thirsty for God, 11. 
162 
 
 
 
intelligible world, on the other hand, with its mathematical truths and Forms, are immune 
from change.  How can one be happy in a world of constant change?   
 Socrates famously stated in the Apology that the practice of philosophy involves 
learning how to die.  Why?  Philosophy is concerned with cultivating the mind, that part 
of us which is eternal, rather than the pleasures of the body, which are not.  Socrates saw 
the body as temporal, changing.  By focusing on the mind, he was focusing on those parts 
of him which he considered eternal and unchanging.  Augustine makes a similar 
comment in the Confessions, “I sought a happy life in the land of death but it was not 
there.”34  This restless dissatisfaction with the world propels one to seek that which does 
not change, which, in the Neo-Platonic Christian worldview, is God.  God alone is 
permanent.  When God reveals his name to Moses, he simply states, “I AM,” meaning 
my essence is to be.  Aquinas makes a similar claim, that true happiness in this life is not 
possible.  The best that this life offers is an imperfect happiness, because this world lacks 
the fullness of God’s being.  True happiness can only be achieved in a beatific vision of 
the divine, which cannot occur until the next life.  Thus this might be considered an 
existential argument for the existence of God, similar to Kierkegaard’s idea that it is not 
reason but psychological angst, or despair over sin that forces one to make the leap of 
faith into the category of the religious, as Christianity offers forgiveness of sins.35 
 
5.2  Ontological Argument   
 
                                                 
34 Augustine, Confessions, Book IV. 
35 Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong  (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1983), 166-7. 
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The Ontological Argument also follows the Neoplatonist tradition by beginning in 
inwardness.  Saint Anselm gives the classical version of the Ontological argument, 
though it was Kant who gave it that name.  From the outset it is ambiguous as to what 
Anselm’s goal is.  He states at the beginning of the Proslogion, “I do not seek to 
understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand.  For I also believe, 
‘Unless I believe, I shall not understand.’”  This sounds like what he is doing is 
continuing in the Augustinian tradition of faith seeking understanding, of reason being 
subordinate to the faith.  But then he states in the Preface that it is his aim to find a single 
argument that will prove that God exists, that God is the highest good, and that all other 
beings are contingent upon God.  Now this is a different aim.  This sounds not like a soft 
rationalist trying to simply understand one’s faith, but a strong rationalist trying to use 
reason to prove the existence of God.  Perhaps his aim is the latter, but if it doesn’t work, 
he is hedging his bets by also saying it could simply be the former.  His argument is 
simple, and can be stated in a few simple sentences.  God is “that than which none greater 
can be thought.”  God, as the most perfect being, must exist.  Why?  Because if God 
existed only in our mind and not in reality, than we could think of a greater being than 
that, namely one that did exist.  Thus a most perfect being that lacks the predicate of 
existence, is by definition not the most perfect being imaginable, as a more perfect being 
can be imagined, namely one who does possess the predicate of existence.  It is claimed 
that Anselm derived the inspiration for this definition of God from Augustine, who 
believes God is the Ground of Truth, the eternal and all-perfect Being, “something than 
which nothing more excellent or more sublime exists.”36   
                                                 
36 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy  (Garden City, NY:  Image Books, 1985), 2:70. 
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Does the argument work?  Kant’s critique of the Ontological argument is aimed 
explicitly at Descartes’ version of it, rather than Anselm’s.  Descartes explicitly mentions 
the property of existence, stating that he cannot conceive of a God who does not exist 
anymore than he can conceive of a mountain that does not have a valley.  Hence 
existence is a necessary property for a most perfect being.  Most consider the two 
arguments sufficiently similar so that Kant’s objection applies to both.  Kant’s objection 
to the argument is that it assumes that existence is a property that a most perfect being 
must have.  Kant says existence is not a property of things, but rather its precondition for 
having properties.37  A dollar bill has lots of properties, but if did not exist, it would have 
no properties.  Hence, rather than being a property, existence is the basis for having 
properties.  God as the most perfect being might logically entail existence, but this is an 
analytic statement and only demonstrates logical necessity, and cannot make the kind of 
existential declarations that synthetic statements do.  
Alvin Plantinga does not think that Kant’s refutation of Anselm’s argument 
succeeds, for he believes Anselm does not explicitly consider existence a predicate in his 
concept of ‘the being than which none greater can be conceived.’38  Plantinga updates the 
argument by incorporating modal logic into it, thus reformulating it as a modal 
ontological argument.  Restated, it says that in all possible worlds, God as a necessary 
being, must exist.  Plantinga’s updated version of the argument is an improvement over 
Anselm’s and Descartes’, and shows that the Ontological Argument may survive Kant’s 
critique.  While it still might not convince the naturalist, it at least demonstrates that 
                                                 
37 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 504 (A 598, or B 626). 
38 Alvin Plantinga, “Kant’s Objection to the Ontological Argument,”  in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 
LXIII, Oct., 1966, pgs 537, 543.  See also, God and Other Minds.  
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theism can be formulated in a rationally acceptable manner and that Kant’s objection is 
not necessarily fatal to it.   
Paul Tillich dislikes using the word ‘existence’ at all in talking about God.  God 
does not exist in the way that beings in the world exist, and to try to talk of God as 
existing seems to relegate God to just another being alongside all the other beings of this 
world.  Instead, Tillich sees God as the ‘ground of being,’ stating “God is being-itself, not 
a being.”39  This could be seen as a way to overcome the ‘existence is not a predicate’ 
objection.  However, the problem with such a formulation of this concept of God is that 
God, as the personal subject of traditional theism, is thereby cast aside.  Nietzsche’s 
proclamation that ‘God is dead’ means only that the supernatural monarchical God of 
theism has died, but God as the ‘ground of being,’ could well remain alive and well.  
God’s existential status is somehow preserved, but at the cost of changing one’s notion of 
who God is.  Tillich’s characterization of faith as “the state of being ultimately 
concerned” also raises problems. 40  It seems that just about any object of ‘ultimate 
concern’ could be deified, including one’s dog, one’s wife, Mr. T, or the human race 
itself, not just being.  
 
5.3  Cosmological Argument 
 
If Anselm’s argument begins a priori with premises known independently of 
sense experience, and then works outward to existence, Aquinas’s arguments follow the 
Aristotelian tradition and reverse the movement; they begin not from within but from 
                                                 
39 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1951), 237. 
40 Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith  (London:  George Allen and Unwin, 1957), 1. 
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without.  Their starting point is sense experience, from various features of the world 
known empirically.  From these God’s existence is inferred.  Aquinas’s five proofs of 
God’s existence are found in Article Three of the Summa Theologica, and following 
Aristotle’s epistemology, all five are a posteriori.  The first three are versions of the 
Cosmological argument, in that they argue from some observed contingent feature of the 
universe to God being responsible for this feature.  The first argument is from motion.  It 
begins with the observation that in the world some things are in motion.  Whatever is in 
motion is put in motion by something else.  If you follow the cause of motion back far 
enough, you eventually come to God.  This is somewhat similar to Aristotle’s version, 
but for Aristotle God causes motion without being moved, because matter, constituting 
potentiality, seeks God’s pure actuality.   
Aquinas’s second argument is from causality.  It states that all effects must have 
causes.  This is known as the principle of efficient causality, and Aquinas thinks it is 
known a posteriori, although technically it exceeds empirical claims.  Thus Kant claims 
it is actually a synthetic a priori proposition.41  If we have a sculpture, we must have a 
sculptor.  If we have an effect, we must have a cause.  The universe is an effect.  
Therefore it is rational to infer God as its efficient and first cause.  Aquinas’s third 
argument is from possibility and necessity.  It states that our existence is not necessary.  
Nothing demands that any of us exist.  Given our existence, however, our parent’s 
existence is necessary.  But it cannot be ‘parents’ all the way down in an infinite series.  
The series must terminate in a necessary being in order to explain our existence.  The 
existence of a necessary being is required to explain the existence of possible beings.  
                                                 
41 F.C. Copleston, Aquinas  (New York:  Penguin Books, 1991), 31. 
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5.4  Teleological Argument  
 
Aquinas’s fourth and fifth arguments are considered versions of the teleological 
argument, in that they argue that certain features of the universe appear to show design or 
purpose, and need God in order to explain this order.  The fourth argument states that 
there are degrees of perfection, gradations of ‘more’ and ‘less’ perfect, found in all 
things.  Our ideas of good or bad presuppose a standard of perfection against which to 
judge them.  God is this standard.  Aquinas’s last argument state that nature displays 
order, and that nature moves towards certain ends.  There must be an intelligent being 
who ordered the world and directs natural objects toward their ends.  This orderer is 
God.42   
William Paley follows in the footsteps of Aquinas’s argument based on order, but 
he makes his case on the basis of on analogy.  Imagine crossing a heath (not a beach, as 
some often tell the argument) and coming across a stone.  This is quite different from 
coming across a watch.  Why?  One is simply a natural object, whereas the watch shows 
evidence of order or design and hence is a human artifact.  Though one never witnessed 
the watchmaker who constructed it, it is safe to infer that there was one, for watches do 
not just put themselves together in nature.  Similarly, Paley states, “every indication of 
contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in works of 
nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more.”43  Paley 
uses as an example of complex design, an eye.  If we are justified in inferring that there 
                                                 
42 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, ed by Anton C. Pegis  
(New York:  Modern Library, 1948), 24-27. 
43 William Paley, Natural Theology  (Charlottesville, VA:  Ivis Pub., 1986), 17-18. 
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was a watchmaker for the watch, surely we are just as justified in inferring that there was 
an intelligent designer and artificer for the eye, even if we have never witnessed this 
creation.  Just as we make a distinction between the stone and the watch, one having a 
natural explanation the other does not, similarly based on the complexity of the eye, we 
too should reject a purely natural explanation.  
There are two critiques of the teleological argument that some claim are fatal to it.  
Just as Kant was said to have killed the Ontological argument, David Hume and Darwin’s 
critique are said to have killed the Teleological Argument.  However, just as there are 
good counter-arguments against Kant, there are also good counterarguments against 
Hume and Darwin.  David Hume argues that there is a significant enough disanalogy in 
the two analogues (watchmaker and worldmaker) to argue the conclusion is a weak 
inference and hence not justified.  We have seen watchmakers make watches, and many 
watches have been made by many watchmakers.  But there is only one world 
(presumably, given that we reside in a universe and not a multiverse), and we have never 
witnessed any worldmakers.  Hume, under the guise of Philo, asks, “Have worlds ever 
been formed under your eye?”44   No, so one cannot reason from a process one has 
witnessed, to a process one has not.  In addition, the analogy implies that just as there are 
lots of watchmakers who improve upon the earlier efforts of other watchmakers, so too 
there must be lots of earlier worldmakers.  Hence the argument may support polytheism 
rather than monotheism.  Thus it does not follow that the inference that is warranted 
based on the order of the watch, is also warranted based on the order found in the 
universe.   
                                                 
44 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion  (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett, 1980), part II. 
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The second critique is Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection, which does 
provide a way in which complex organs like the eye can come about in a natural process 
without the aid of an intelligent designer. From this perspective there is no difference 
between the rock on the heath, and the eye.  They both have strictly natural origins.  But 
it is not enough to simply say that Darwin proved that the watchmaker is blind, as 
Richard Dawkins argues in The Blind Watchmaker.  Dawkins, after all, is not the all-
knowing and all-seeing master of the universe who has issued the final verdict on the 
matter, and so can declare the matter decided once and for all.  Michael Behe has taken 
up the position of Asa Gray in an intellectual rerun of the Gray & Lyell vs. Darwin 
debate over whether or not evolution is guided.  Behe, a molecular biochemist, argues 
that molecular structure is too complex to have evolved naturally.  He argues that 
Darwinian theory is extremely successful, but “in science, a successful theory is not 
necessarily a correct theory.”45  Newton’s model correctly predicts the outcome of many 
experiments, but it does not explain what gravity is.  His model was corrected by 
Einstein.  Similarly, the Darwinian model cannot explain the biochemical complexity of 
cells, tissues, organs, and organisms.  Behe’s argument is just one of many attempts to 
reformulate the argument from design in such a way as to overcome Dawkins’ claim that 
Darwinism has refuted it. 
Darwin created the ‘black box’ of ‘pangenesis’ to explain heredity, but he did not 
understand the mechanisms by which variations occur, or why they are passed on.  What 
is a ‘black box’?  Behe states it is a “term for a device that does something, but whose 
                                                 
45Michael Behe, “Molecular Machines:  Experimental Support for the Design Inference” 1998, in 
Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Boston:  Cengage, 2007), 457.   
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inner workings are mysterious.”46  Modern biochemistry is a fairly recently developed 
field, and it is currently opening up Darwin’s black boxes.  Behe claims it reveals a 
molecular world which is too complex to be explained by Darwin’s mechanism of natural 
selection.  Furthermore, Behe notes that one field of science was not included in the 
modern evolutionary synthesis, molecular biochemistry, because it did not yet exist.  
Behe claims that the facts revealed by his field are not explained by the other ‘non-
molecular’ sciences that fall under the umbrella of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis.47 
In order to explain why he thinks modern biochemistry resists explanation by 
natural selection, Behe uses an easy-to-understand example – a mousetrap.  A mousetrap 
has five working parts:  a flat wooden platform, a metal hammer, a wire spring, a catch 
release, and a holding bar.  If any one of these five components is removed, the trap will 
not function.  Similarly, cilium are hair like organelles on the surfaces of many plant and 
animal cells that need sliding filaments, connecting proteins, motor proteins, tubulins, 
dynein, and nexin in order to function.  Apart from their proper places in the whole, none 
of these elements contributes to the survival value of an organism, i.e., individually they 
provide the organism no benefit.  It is only when they come together as a whole that they 
contribute to survival value.  Darwin’s theory does not demonstrate how each element 
could be produced.  All of these complex parts have to come into existence at the same 
time for the system to function, an occurrence which is highly unlikely.  Just as an 
intelligent designer is necessary to bring all the parts together in a mousetrap, so an 
intelligent designer is needed to bring all the molecular parts together for any complex 
biological organelle, be it a eukaryotic cell, a cilium, a bacterial flagellum, or an eye.   
                                                 
46 Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box  (New York:  Free Press, 1996), 6.  
47 Ibid., 24-25. 
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Darwin famously said in the Origin, “If it could be demonstrated that any 
complex organ existed, which could not possibly be formed by numerous, successive, 
slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down.”48 Behe thinks he has 
given several examples, not of organs but of ‘simple’ cells that too complex to be 
explained by natural selection.  An intelligent designer, as William Paley’s argument 
suggests, is needed.  Behe calls intelligent design, or the purposeful arrangement of parts 
like a mouse trap, ‘the elephant in the room’ no one considers, because ‘detectives must 
get their man,’ so they never consider elephants.49  A supernatural designer is the 
elephant in the room because the methods of science only allow for natural causes to be 
postulated.  But Behe argues it is the only conclusion that one can justifiably draw from 
the data.   
 
5.5  Fine-Tuning Argument   
 
“Fine Tuning” is another reformulation of the Argument to Design updated by 
recent science.  It takes several forms, as several people have advanced different 
arguments, based upon various fixed constants in nature.  These constants are arbitrary.  
No one knows why they are what they are.  It is logically possible that the force of 
gravity could be stronger or weaker than what it presently is.  Martin Rees, a Cambridge 
astrophysicist and former president of the Royal Society, has published several books on 
the topic.50  In his 1999 book, Just Six Numbers, he examines in detail six constants that 
                                                 
48 Darwin, The Origin of Species, 159. 
49 Behe, “Molecular machines,” 464.   
50 Dawkins, of course, tries to argue that Rees’s argument is somehow an argument for naturalism: he says 
Rees “told me that he goes to church as an ‘unbelieving Anglican…has no theistic beliefs, but shares the 
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appear to be fine-tuned in such a way so as to allow for the formation of life.  If any of 
the constants were tweaked in either direction, life as we know it would not be possible.  
This suggests that an intelligent mind ‘dialed in’ the properties of matter with the 
intention that life might arise.  Robin Collins, in ‘A Scientific Argument for the Existence 
of God,’ offers up his version of the argument, giving five examples:  
1.  If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as little 
as one part in 1060, the universe would have either quickly collapsed or 
expanded too rapidly for stars to form. 
2. If the strong nuclear force that binds protons and neutrons together had 
been stronger or weaker by as little as 5% life would be impossible. 
3. If gravity had been stronger or weaker by one over 1040 then life-
sustaining stars like the sun could not exist. 
4. If the neutron were not about 1.001 times the mass of the proton, all 
protons would have decayed into neutrons or all neutrons would have 
decayed into protons. 
5. If the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker, life would 
be impossible.51 
 
 
 
6.  Revealed Theology and Faith:  Scripture and Miracles 
 
 It is rare that anyone is ever converted to theism by rational proofs.  They appear 
to be sound according to those who have faith, and unsound according to those who lack 
faith.  There is also dissatisfaction with some in adopting a rational approach to God.  
Pascal believed that no rational evidence for God could be given.  How does one come to 
faith then?  Pascal’s advice is to attend religious practices with those who have faith, and 
like a cold, faith is contagious and you might come down with it.  Pascal also famously 
                                                 
poetic naturalism that the cosmos provokes in the other scientists I have mentioned.”  The God Delusion, p 
35.  
51 Robert Collins, ‘A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God,’ in Philosophy of Religion, An 
Anthology, ed. by Louis P. Pojman and Michael Rea  (Belmont, CA:  Thomson Wadsworth, 2003), 75. 
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had a mystical experience of God, which he described in the following peculiar way:  
“from about half past ten at night to about half an hour after midnight, FIRE. God of 
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of philosophers and scholars. Certitude, 
heartfelt joy, peace. God of Jesus Christ.”52  He believed the God that philosophers talk 
about, is not the God he experienced, but rather the God of the Bible, the God of 
Revelation.  There are three ways of looking at Revealed theology and Scripture vis-a-vis 
philosophy:  it complements the philosophical approach but sees philosophy as 
subservient to revealed truths; revealed theology should be subordinate to philosophy; 
and revealed theology eliminates philosophy altogether, seeing it as speculative.   
  The last position is sometimes referred to as fideism, having faith on the basis of 
revealed theology alone, independent of reason.   Tertullian famously stated, ‘What has 
Athens to do with Jerusalem?”  And, “the Son of God has died; it is by all means to be 
believed, because it is absurd.”  While Tertullian’s statements appear to demonstrate that 
faith and reason are incompatible, this is not what Tertullian means.  He himself was 
supposed to have been a lawyer, and much of his writing is considered apologetic.  By 
these statements, he was simply arguing that one should not confuse philosophy with 
revelation.  If this is the way God chose to reveal Himself, who are we, using only human 
tools, to argue?53   
The fiftieth of Luther’s 97 theses (not to be confused with his 95 theses protesting 
indulgences) states that “Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light.”  When it came to 
his eternal salvation, he placed all his chips on Jesus, not on a pagan philosopher who 
                                                 
52 Blaise Pascal, The Mind on Fire; An Anthology of the Writings of Blaise Pascal, ed. by James Houston  
(Elgin, IL:  David C. Cook, 2006), 43. 
53 Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, Volume I  (Nashville:  Abingdon Press, 1989), 174-5. 
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was skeptical of the existence of the soul or a Creator God.   Luther also stated that 
“reason is a whore, the greatest enemy that faith has,” since it could be made to argue 
whatever one wanted it to.  Reason was affected by the fall to such an extent that it was 
too opaque to comprehend God.  Kierkegaard believed that Christianity was based upon a 
paradox that the infinite perfect God became mortal, taking on flesh and dying a sinner’s 
death.  The Crisis Theologians, Karl Barth and Brunner, believed that whenever times of 
great turmoil and trouble arose, God would intervene and reveal his will.  Why do some 
believe that Scripture is God’s self-revelation, while others don’t?  Augustine believed 
that faith, or the belief that God is revealed in and through the person of Jesus, is a gift 
given by God.   
The Bible ‘reveals’ a monotheistic god who is actively involved in the lives of the 
ancient Hebrews, who demanded ethical conduct of the people that he entered into a 
covenant with, and rewarded and punished these people depending upon their obedience 
to His commands and the commitment of their faith.54  God is thus portrayed as forming 
bonds with individuals and entering into covenants with them.  This is important because 
the Revealed Word tradition discloses a God who is fiercely protective of his chosen 
people, guards them against attack, and listens to their prayers and petitions.  He rescued 
them out of slavery in Egypt and guided them through the Wilderness by a white column 
of light at night, and a cloud during the day, and fed them with manna from heaven.  In 
other words, the people of Israel owe their existence as a people to God’s protective 
power.  This is the complete opposite of the survival of the fittest by means of natural 
                                                 
54 See Deuteronomy, chapters 26-29. 
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selection.  It is survival of the faithful by means of supernatural intervention, guidance, 
and protection.  
 The central claim of the New Testament is that God took on human form.  How 
are we to evaluate this claim?  According to legend, Alexander the Great asked an Indian 
holy man “How can one become a god?”  The answer he was given was:  “by doing 
something a man cannot.”  Whether one believes Jesus was divine or not, one cannot 
deny that more than any other man who has ever lived, Jesus, it is claimed, did things no 
ordinary mortal could.  Thus the appeal to his divinity as witnessed by the testimony of 
Scripture, which records his alleged miracles:  a Virgin birth, healing the sick and lame 
(lepers, withered hands, hemorrhaging woman – some just by being touched), eyesight to 
the blind, casting out demons, walking on water, commanding the wind and rain to stop, 
changing water into wine, feeds five thousand with two fish and five loaves of bread, 
reads minds (Samaritan woman at the well), knows the future, heals the soldier’s ear 
Peter strikes off, raises others from the dead, and is himself raised from the dead.  In the 
Gospel of Mark, the first person to recognize Jesus as more than human is a man with an 
unclean spirit, who cries out, “What have you to do with us, Jesus of Nazareth?  Have 
you come to destroy us?  I know who you are, the Holy One of God.” (Mark 1:24)   
Jesus himself makes claims to be preexistent, “I tell you the truth, before 
Abraham was born, I am.” (John 8:58)  Jesus also appears to possess a wisdom that is 
beyond ordinary human ability.  He tells parables which suggest that he had firsthand 
knowledge of God, Heaven, and the afterlife.  As a result, “They were amazed, because 
he taught them as one who had authority.” (Mk 1:22)  He seems to know who is saved 
and who is not, and gives examples, such as the rich man and Lazarus.  Jesus also claims 
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to possess the authority to forgive sins, which the Pharisees believed only God could do.  
Did Jesus think he was divine?  In John 10:30, Jesus states:  “I tell you, the Father and I 
are one.”   
 Given the claims about the divinity of Jesus, C.S. Lewis claims we are faced with 
a trilemma.  Either Jesus is lying, or Jesus is crazy, or he is telling the truth.55  No sane 
rational mere mortal would go about making the claims Jesus makes.  In the Gospel of 
Mark, Jesus is asked by high priest at this trial, “Are you the Christ, the Son of the 
Blessed One?”  Jesus responds, “I am.”  (Mark 14:61-61)  So Jesus is either telling the 
truth, or he is crazy, or he is lying.  These are our options, either Jesus is blaspheming by 
claiming supernatural power, or he is the Christ, although it is also possible Jesus was 
simply mistaken.  The problem is, Jesus is a good person, a morally upright person.  He 
also appeared to be quite sane.  If anything, Jesus comes off as a very wise, warm, 
empathetic, and socially concerned individual.  So it is difficult to “conclude that Jesus 
was a liar or a lunatic.  The only alternative is that he was the Christ, the Son of God, as 
he claimed.”56  The Scriptures also attribute to Jesus those attributes previously stated to 
belong to the theistic God.  “Jesus is presented as being self-existent (Jn 1:4, 14:6; 
omnipresent (Mt 28:20, 18:20); omnipotent (Rev 1:8; Luke 4:39-55; 7:14, 15; Mt 8:26, 
27); and possessing eternal life (1 Jn 5:11, 12, 20; Jn 1:4).”57   
 Is it rational to believe the claims in the Bible, particularly those made in the New 
Testament?  Is it rational to think that God was born of a virgin?  Is it rational to think 
that a man walked on water?  Is it rational to think that a man rose from the dead?  
                                                 
55 C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York:  Macmillan Co., 1960), 40-41. 
56 Josh McDowell, More than a Carpenter (Wheaton, IL:  Tyndale House Publishers, 1977), 33.  
57 Ibid., 11. 
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Tertullian said precisely because it is absurd, he chose to believe.58  Whether or not Jesus 
is God, and whatever the Bible and the various Christian traditions say about Jesus’s 
divinity, belief is ultimately up to the individual.  Kierkegaard says there are no objective 
criteria by which a person can make up his or her mind.  There is either faith or offence.  
Even the people who lived at the time of Jesus and experienced him firsthand had no 
advantage over those who lived later.  Hence the disciple at secondhand has no advantage 
over the disciple at firsthand who saw Jesus.  That Jesus is divine is a belief, and all that 
one can see with one’s eyes is that Jesus was a man.59  One can only see Jesus’s divinity 
through “the eyes of faith.”60  Not everyone who saw Jesus was convinced of his divinity, 
as is evident by his rejection by the Jewish authorities, and his trial and execution.  
 To dismiss the Bible or the Koran by claiming it was written in a pre-Scientific 
period is to miss the point.  Scripture claims to be the record of divine self-revelation, 
which can occur in any period at any time.  The conditions of existence were just the 
same for men living in first millennium BCE as they are today.  They faced the need to 
eat, sleep, and fight off disease and death, just as much as we do.  The only difference is 
that we have refrigerators, McDonald’s, and internet porn, and they didn’t.  This is hardly 
a game changer in anyone’s playbook.  Also, if supernatural beings and causes lie outside 
the ability of science to investigate, because they are non-natural and science concerns 
itself only with natural causes, then science in this day and age is in no better a position 
to assess the claims of Scripture than people living in a pre-scientific age were.  Science 
                                                 
58 Tertullian, De Carne Christi.  Quoted in Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, Volume I  
(Nashville:  Abingdon Press, 1989), 174. 
59 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David Swenson  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1967), 116. 
60 Ibid., 128. 
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concerns itself only with studying objects of creation, not with studying the creator.  The 
central message of the Bible is that there is a loving God who created us and calls us to 
love one another.  This seems to be a claim that lies outside the realm of scientific 
investigation, since science limits itself to the investigation of nature. 
 
7.  Argument from Religious Experience and Mysticism 
 
 It is possible to remain unconvinced by the rational arguments for God’s 
existence.  However, even if the arguments are said to fail, this does not disprove theism. 
It is also possible to see the Bible as the product of a prescientific worldview, an 
interpretation of events that posits a divine being and supernatural events that today may 
be seen as having strictly natural causes.  Wittgenstein himself expressed the opinion to 
Maurice O’Connon Drury that “For me too the Old Testament is a collection of Hebrew 
folklore.”  Wittgenstein also stated in Culture and Value that “Christianity is not based on 
a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says:  now believe!  But 
not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative.”61  So it is 
possible to be unconvinced of theism by argument and also doubt the authority of 
Scripture by claiming it is just one of many grand metanarratives, a narrative about 
narratives that revolves around one grand, central idea.  However, suppose one actually  
has a personal encounter with God.  It would be hard to remain skeptical.  If by an act of 
God, one walked outside one day and looked up into the sky and the curtain hiding God 
was drawn back, revealing God in Heaven surrounded by a throne of angels, it would be 
                                                 
61 Brian R. Clack, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion   (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh 
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hard to remain skeptical after that.  Thus the argument from personal experience appears 
to be the most solid confirmation and proof for God’s existence.  Unfortunately, such 
experiences are not only rare, but may only be convincing to the person who has them. 
 Yet, this is what the mystics claim have happened to them.  They claim to have 
had a firsthand, personal experience of God.  Their belief that God exists is based on this 
claim, which is not dependent upon rational arguments, inferences, or the secondhand 
testimony of others who themselves claim to have experienced God.  As the saying goes, 
‘seeing is believing,’ and as a result personal experience is often the highest court of 
appeal in justifying one’s beliefs.  A mystic is someone who has ‘met’ God, or had some 
kind of encounter with divine reality.  These encounters can take the form of sensory 
experiences or super-sensory perception in which the wall separating the self from the 
divine is somehow temporarily cast aside.  W.T. Stace describes a mystical experience as 
“the apparent fading away, or breaking down, of the boundary walls of the finite self so 
that his personal identity is lost and he feels himself merged or dissolved in an infinite or 
universal ocean of being.”62  
St. Theresa of Avila is one of the best known examples of a mystic.  She had 
several experiences in which she claimed Jesus appeared before her.  This seems to 
confirm religious realism, the claim that God is an objectively existing being, rather than 
a human construction (non-realism), who has revealed himself to various people 
throughout history.  Teresa makes two claims for realism over non-realism.  She says that 
the beauty of the spiritual body of Jesus, the vision of just his hands, far surpassed her 
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ability to imagine it.63  She also says that the experiences completely transformed her life.  
This counts as evidence in favor of religious realism, evidence that she is not the source 
of these visions, and that they could only have resulted from an encounter with a 
supernatural being. 
 This type of experiential religion should be enough to convince the unbeliever of 
the existence of God.  If God does exist, then you would expect that God should be able 
to pull back the curtain at any time and reveal himself to anyone skeptical of his 
existence.  This was enough to convince the most hardened of disbelievers, Saul, on the 
road to Damascus, to change his tune.64  He turned from chief persecutor of the early 
Christians, to chief evangelist.  This divine game of peek-a-boo seems to confirm 
Calvin’s doctrine of predestinationism.  The reason that some people have faith and 
others don’t, is that God reveals himself to some but not to others.   The elect are those 
who are privy to God’s self-revelation, while the reprobate are those from whom God 
remains hidden.  But the ball is clearly in God’s court.  If God desired everyone to be a 
believer, God could theoretically cause everyone to have a Damascene experience.  Thus 
a person who has been ‘chosen,’ in the Calvinist sense, might consider belief in God to be 
a ‘basic belief,’ as Alvin Plantinga argues, in that it is not in need of further justification.  
Plantinga, in fact, gives another example of a ‘basic belief,’ belief in the existence of 
other minds.  However, it is hard to argue that theistic belief is basic to all.  It might be 
basic to the believer who has some privileged access to God, or a personal encounter with 
                                                 
63 St. Teresa, “Religious Experiences,” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Michael Peterson, et al.  (New 
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God, but to those who lack such an experience, it is hard to assert that belief in God is 
basic.     
C.D. Broad argued that religious ‘sense’ is like a sixth sense, similar to the ability 
to hear tones in music.  At the negative end, are the tone deaf (the atheists).  At the other 
extreme are the mystics, the founders of religion, those who are able to experience the 
divine.  These are your Bachs and Beethovens.  Most of us are in between and just enjoy 
the music others create.  These are the lay churchgoers.65  This analogy parallels what is 
commonly referred to as ‘spiritual blindness.’  In Matthew 13:15, Jesus states “they have 
closed their eyes so their eyes cannot see, and their ears cannot hear, and their hearts 
cannot understand.”66  In other words, they may have eyes and ears, but they fail to 
discern any higher spiritual truth.  Those who merely see with their five senses, see the 
natural world, but fail to see the supernatural world.  They are spiritually ‘blind.’  They 
fail to see anything other than what their eyes show them.  Jesus then says to the 
disciples, “but blessed are your eyes, because they see; and your ears, because they 
hear.”67  The disciples are not spiritually blind; they have developed this sixth sense 
Broad is hinting at.  However, the question is left open as to how one acquires this ‘sixth 
sense.’  Is one just born with it, or can one develop it?  Is ‘spiritual sight’ a gift from 
God?  The analogy fails to answer these questions.  
 William James, in his 1902 book The Varieties of Religious Experience, compiles 
case study after case study of individuals who have come to faith through personal, 
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66 NIV translation. 
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transformative experiences of the divine, rather than by means of organized religion or 
rational argument.  The variety of these experiences has a broad range, with mystical 
union at one end to the mere intimation of something greater than oneself at the other.  
James sees the common denominator of all these experiences as a sense of the “divine 
presence,” or “the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in 
harmoniously adjusting ourselves” to it.68  James attempts to adopt the attitude of a 
scientific psychologist and not make any kind of ontological commitment.  Rather, he 
limits himself to “the belief” that this unseen order is real.  His approach is more 
psychological than metaphysical, simply noting that this belief tends to categorically 
apply to all people who consider themselves religious.  James’ approach to religion is like 
that of a psychological detective, empirically investigating claims of supernatural 
occurrences or religious ‘phenomena, in which people see, or allegedly see, this unseen 
order.   
 James’ focus is on sudden conversion experiences, often those considered 
‘mystical,’ in which the seeker appears acted upon by outside forces which have a sudden 
transformative effect upon their entire belief system.  Mystical experiences of the divine 
often appear to the individual who has them as a personal form of revelation.  James 
simply gives account after account of these personal experiences which are taken either 
from historical sources or from the research of Edwin Starbuck, who “amassed a 
collection of statements” while studying the psychology of religion at Harvard.69  The 
end result is, like the experiences themselves, an account of the other world that is “much 
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more convincing than results established by mere logic ever are.”70 For efficiency’s sake, 
let us regard the following testimony as indicative of the many that James cites.  The 
following is a record of the conversion of an irreligious French Jew in 1842 who walked 
into a church while waiting for a friend: 
   All I can say is that in an instant the bandage had fallen from my eyes…I 
came out as from a sepulcher, from an abyss of darkness….On entering 
that church I was in darkness altogether, and on coming out of it I saw the 
fullness of the light…I can explain the change no better than…the analogy 
of one born blind who should suddenly open his eyes to the day.71  
 
Although James himself is concerned with the fruits (the effect) of the religious 
experience) and not the origins (God or natural causes), in many of these sudden 
conversions the person believes their experience to have its source in the divine.  In other 
words, these experiences appear to be of ‘miraculous’ interventions which have God as 
their source.  Many of these stories offer firsthand evidence for the Calvinist doctrine of 
‘election.’  God chooses to reveal something of divine reality to the person, and the 
experience is so compelling that the person undergoes a complete transformation of the 
way she sees the world.  Thus James’ lectures, while supposedly philosophical, almost 
turn into storytelling, stories which to the people who tell them are records of insights 
into the highest order of reality.  James sees these types of experiences as the root and 
cause upon which theological concepts and reasoning are based.  Without the experience, 
the theological scaffolding built upon them may appear merely hollow and without basis.  
“The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument 
is but a surface exhibition.  Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow.”72  
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But how do we know that what the mystic experiences is God and not simply a 
hallucination?  James lists four marks of mystical experiences:  ineffability, noetic 
quality, transiency, and passivity.73   Ineffability would account for placing mysticism 
above logic and theological rationality.  The second trait, the noetic quality, states that 
mystics ‘just know’ the experience is real.  But if one has never experienced the divine, 
how can one know for sure it is God one is experiencing?  James says they just do (or 
rather that the mystics say they just do).  The noetic quality of these states carries with it 
its own self-confirmation, so that the experience possesses “a curious sense of 
authority.”74  The third trait, transiency, implies that mystical states cannot be actively 
sustained, and do not last long (an hour at most).  The last trait, passivity, states that the 
mystic often does nothing to precipitate or initiate the experience; often the mystic has no 
control over it happening.  The person feels ‘grasped and held by a superior power.’  All 
of this provides evidence for religious realism, in that mystical experiences very much 
appear to have an external source.  Mystics do not attribute their experiences to natural 
causes, nor formulate them within a naturalistic worldview.  
However, each one of the traits may be questioned.  There seems to be a 
contradiction in James’ claim that mystical states are ineffable.  If this were so then 
James, who is not a mystic, would be unable to analyze them.  There seem to be two 
approaches to mysticism:  first, to become a mystic oneself, and second, to analyze 
mystical experiences objectively from a philosophical perspective, and assess their 
common characteristics and truth claims about reality.  If mystical experiences are truly 
ineffable, then the philosophical approach seems destined to failure.  Plantinga notes the 
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contradiction in saying that X is ineffable.  In doing so, one has said something about X, 
which contradicts its being ineffable.75  As Lao-tzu states in the Tao Te Ching, “He who 
knows, does not say; he who says, does not know.”76  While the full content of a mystical 
experience cannot be transmitted conceptually, it does seem that something can be said 
about them, or else James’ whole discussion of them is reduced to nonsense.  Richard 
Swinburne, in The Existence of God, does not claim that all religious experience are 
ineffable, but only a few intense ones.  He classifies religious experiences as public or 
private.  In public experiences, one perceives God in a common object or in an 
uncommon event, which one perceives as perhaps miraculous.  In private experiences, 
one experiences God but is able to talk about it and describe it, while a more intense 
experience may be beyond the ability of language to fully describe.  A third possibility is 
that the person just has a general sense of God’s presence.77  
The noetic quality of mystical states is also problematic.  James claims that this 
quality assures the mystic that the experience is real and not an illusion.  James himself 
states that mystical experiences present themselves as states of knowledge to the mystic 
and are self-confirming, but then he, a non-mystic, brackets the true origin of these states.  
When people hear the story of Joan of Arc, they believe that Joan took up arms against 
the English because of a religious experience she had.  Her actions are seen as a response 
to a divine reality.  They are not attributed to hallucinations or imagination.  St. Teresa 
claimed that her visions of Jesus’s hands and glorified body were beyond the ability of 
human imagination to conjure up.  This is why the experience was self-confirming to her. 
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Last, James claims the mystical experiences are transient, or of short duration, and 
are passive, i.e., the mystic does nothing to precipitate them.  Yet these claims again are 
not necessarily true. The writings of several mystics claim that the experience remains 
with them for some time.  Some state that these experiences are like seeds of higher 
consciousness which, when planted, continue to grow and bear fruit.  There are also 
methods of inducing mystical states.  W.T. Stace classifies mystical experiences into two 
kinds:  introvertive and extrovertive.  The extrovertive experience “looks outward 
through the senses,” while the introvertive “looks inward into the mind.”  The 
extrovertive experience is usually uncontrollable and occurs spontaneously; the mystic 
has no power over it, and often is not able to reproduce it.  Extrovertive experiences 
contain sensory elements, but “the multiplicity of material objects – the sea, the sky, the 
houses, the trees – are mystically transfigured so that the One, or the Unity, shines 
through them.”78    
Just about every religion has methods for actively cultivating mystical states.  
Hindus developed the method of raja yoga to achieve union of atman, their souls, with 
Brahman, the monistic godhead pervading all of reality.  Buddhists use the eightfold path 
and meditation to achieve detachment from the world, a state of Nirvana, which may 
involve an unconstructed, conceptually unmediated, unifying awareness of the universe 
which is not necessarily supernatural.  Sufis claim to achieve mystic states by discarding 
all that is not God.  Jews follow the Kabbalah, which was developed out of the unwritten, 
oral tradition which was allegedly revealed to Moses atop Mt. Sinai.  Christian ‘orison,’ 
or centering prayer, may involve earnestly begging God for a glimpse of his being, or to 
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help one meditate so as to become aware of higher consciousness.  So it appears mystics 
may initiate the contact themselves by acting upon the maxim, ‘seek and ye shall find.’ 
 
8.  Argument from Near-Death Experiences 
 
 Does God exist?  Does the soul survive death?  Most people might answer, ‘I 
don’t know.  I haven’t died yet.’  While most of us are not mystics in this life, if God 
exists, sooner or later all of us will become mystics.  If the soul survives death, then when 
we die we will all experience God in the way that mystics claim to in this life.  So will we 
have to wait until we die to find out if there is an afterlife, a loving God with 
characteristics such as theism portrays?  No.  Some people have died and then been 
resuscitated.  All we have to do is ask them, What did you experience?  Reports of near-
death experiences go back as far as Plato.  In the book 10, section 3 of the Republic, Plato 
tells the story of Er, a soldier who is killed in battle.  He is transported to the afterlife 
where he watches the dead judged.  Those who led a just life are allowed entrance into 
heaven where they obtain their reward; those who led unjust lives are led into the earth 
where they are punished.  He was also allowed to witness souls who were to be 
reincarnated pick their next life before drinking from the River of Forgetfulness.  
However, this story may have its basis more in Plato’s attempt to defend the idea that 
being just is its own reward.  
Up until the 1970s there was really nothing in the medical literature about near-
death experiences.  But with the rise of modern technology, it was possible to bring many 
patients back from the brink of death, who might otherwise have died.  Raymond Moody 
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was an undergraduate at the University of Virginia in the 1960’s when he met George 
Ritchie, who was teaching psychiatry.  Ritchie had a NDE (near-death experience) in 
1943 when he was suffering from pneumonia while in the army.  He went on to write an 
account of his experience in 1978 in a book titled Return from Tomorrow.  He claims that 
he met Jesus, who emanated love and compassion and allowed him to see heaven and 
hell.  The central message Jesus imparted to him is that each of us is a child of God, yet 
like Adam, we live as though separated from God.  God calls out to each of us, as he did 
to Adam, “Where are you, Adam?”  In order to make it into the highest realm of life after 
death, one must learn to love like Jesus.79  This Ritchie sees as the message of the cross.   
Moody then started teaching philosophy at East Carolina University. While 
discussing Plato’s Phaedo and the arguments for the immortality of the soul, several 
students came forward claiming they had a near-death experience like Ritchie’s.  When 
Moody entered medicine several years later, he began collecting stories about near-death 
experiences.  His 1975 book, Life after Life, is based on 150 people’s accounts of their 
NDEs.  Moody claims there are roughly fifteen common elements of NDEs:  like 
mystics, people who have had NDEs claim that the experience is indescribable, or 
ineffable; objectively they hear the doctors announce that they are dead, but subjectively 
they still feel alive, outside their bodies looking at them, able to perceive everything that 
is going on around them with great clarity, yet no one seems able to perceive them; 
experiencing a painless state of peace and quiet; hearing some kind of whistling noise 
similar to the wind or beautiful music; traveling down a dark tunnel; leaving their body 
and the world behind; coming out into warm accepting light, meeting deceased relatives 
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and friends; meeting a Being of light, some kind of religious figure, be it God or an 
angel; being asked a question, what good they had done with their life (the central 
Socratic question), how loving they were towards others, what they liked best about life; 
some report seeing an instantaneous review of their life, with their thoughts and deeds 
somehow externalized; experiencing a border or limit which they know is such that if 
they cross there is no return; coming back to their bodies; telling others; describing the 
effect it has had on their lives; conceiving a new view of death; corroborating their 
experience by checking with doctors and others about the events that took place while 
they were near death.80 
  From the reported NDEs, Moody composes a generic near death experience that 
include the most commonly cited characteristics:   
    A man is dying, and as he reaches the point of greatest physical distress, 
he hears himself pronounced dead by his doctor.  He begins to hear an 
uncomfortable noise, a loud ringing or buzzing, and at the same time feels 
himself moving very rapidly through a long dark tunnel.  After this, he 
suddenly finds himself outside of his own physical body, but still in the 
immediate physical environment, and he sees his body from a distance, as 
though he is a spectator.  He watches the resuscitation attempt from this 
unusual vantage point and is in a state of emotional upheaval.  After a 
while, he collects himself and becomes more accustomed to his odd 
condition.  He notices that he still has a ‘body,’ but one of a very different 
nature and with very different powers from the physical body he has left 
behind.  Soon other things begin to happen.  Others come to meet and to 
help him.  He glimpses the spirits of relatives and friends who have 
already died, and a loving, warm spirit of a kind he has never encountered 
before – a being of light – appears before him.  This being asks him a 
question, nonverbally, to make him evaluate his life and helps him along 
by showing him a panoramic, instantaneous playback of the major events 
of his life. At some point he finds himself approaching some sort of barrier 
or border, apparently representing the limit between earthly life and the 
next life.  Yet, he finds that he must go back to the earth, that the time for 
his death has not yet come.  At this point he resists, for by now he is taken 
up with his experiences in the afterlife and does not want to return.  He is 
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overwhelmed by intense feelings of joy, love, and peace.  Despite his 
attitude, though, he somehow reunites with his physical body and lives.  
Later he tries to tell others, but he has trouble doing so.  In the first place, 
he can find no human words adequate to describe these unearthly 
episodes.  He also finds that others scoff, so he stops telling other people.  
Still, the experience affects his life profoundly, especially his views about 
death and its relationship to life.81   
 
If veridical, near-death experiences confirm that death is not the end of human 
life.  They also appear to confirm the presence of a soul that can exist separate from the 
body.  Near-death experiences suggest the complete opposite of Michael Silberstein’s 
claim “the philosophy of mind is over,” that reductionism has triumphed over pre-
scientific Scholastic views of the mind.  Nevertheless, a naturalist would dismiss near- 
death experiences as being supernatural by simply coming up with any number of 
possible natural explanations:  outright fabrication, the result of hypoxia, the release of 
endorphins by the brain to ease the pain of death, a drug induced delusion or 
hallucination, or a projection based on some prior expectation.82   
However, it is very difficult to argue that a NDE is a hallucination because many 
people are able to report events that actually happened.  One woman who had a NDE was 
not only able to describe what the doctors were doing to keep her alive, but also claimed 
that, as she floated up out of the hospital, she saw a blue shoe on a ledge.  A social 
worker named Kim Clark, testified that she went and found the shoe in the exact location 
that the woman said it would be.83  Again, in a recent book, Todd Burpo recounts how his 
son Colton, as a small boy of four, suffered from a case of appendicitis.  Colton claimed 
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he met his great grandfather (‘Pop’) in heaven, whom he never met before, but when 
shown pictures, was able to correctly identify as his great grandfather.  He was also able 
to tell his mother that she had a miscarriage and met his sister in heaven, which is 
information they had never shared with him.84  Pim van Lommel tells the story of a five 
year old who went into a coma after contracting meningitis.  He claims he ‘died’ and met 
a sister he never knew he had, as she died before he was born and his parents hadn’t told 
him about her.  Only when he correctly told them her name, Rietje, did his parents 
believe him.85 
Further evidence that NDEs are veridical is the transformative, life-changing 
effect they have on people, similar to those who have a mystical experience.  Their fear 
of death is gone, and they develop a greater love for other people, and become less 
materialistic and concerned with financial success.  Van Lommel states, “Almost all 
ephemeral and material things, such as a lot of money, a big house, or an expensive car, 
become less important.  People also identify much less with their own body…. ‘I can live 
without my body, but apparently my body cannot live without me.’”86  Instead, people 
who have had NDEs say the experience made them question how well they loved others 
while alive.  One would not expect this kind of radical transformation if these 
experiences were simply hallucinations.   
 
9.  Argument from Parapsychology 
  
                                                 
84 Todd Burpo, Heaven is for Real  (Nashville:  W Publishing Group, 2011), 94-96. 
85 Pim van Lommel, M.D., Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience (New 
York:  HarperCollins Publishers, 2011), 71-2. 
86 Ibid., 55. 
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The argument from parapsychology is similar to the argument from religious 
experience; it is viewed skeptically by those who haven’t experienced paranormal 
phenomena themselves, but to those who have, it is self-confirming.  Professor David 
Ray Griffin of the University of Claremont provides an example which might be 
considered a paradigmatic paranormal event.  His dean once told him the story of a 
couple he knew who hung a picture on a wall, only to find it the next morning on the 
floor.  This process repeated itself over and over.  The naturalist would appeal to ‘natural 
causes,’ saying that the picture just fell.  However, this was ruled out because it would 
have broken if it had.87  In instances like these, supernatural explanations may trump 
natural ones.  D.D. Homes considered himself to be on a “mission to demonstrate 
immortality.”88  He supposedly was witnessed several times levitating, and had the ability 
to make an accordion play by itself. 
A more recent example of the paranormal reminds one of Socrates’ daimon.  It 
tells of a person who visited the World Trade Center the day before it was destroyed and 
heard a ‘voice’ warning her of impending danger.  She tells the story in such a way that 
the ‘voice’ issuing this warning appears to be external to her consciousness, and not a 
product of it. 
    I was in NYC for a trip I make for work almost every year to visit 
money managers on Wall St. We'd stay at either the Marriott WTC, the 
Plaza or the Waldorf. Every time I'd stay at WTC I'd whine because I like 
staying uptown better – nicer rooms, more to do at night. This time was no 
exception. I stayed at the WTC Marriott from 8/8 to 8/11/01. From the 
moment I got to the hotel, I felt this strange, overwhelming urge to go to 
the Observation Deck to check out the view. I felt like I had to go up there. 
After dinner on Thursday, 8/9, I went to the top of the WTC because I felt 
drawn there – no, actually pulled there. I went alone at about 9 p.m. It was 
                                                 
87 Griffin, David Ray, Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality  (Albany:  State University of New 
York Press, 1997), 7. 
88 Arthur Conan Doyle, The History of Spiritualism (Amsterdam:  Fredonia Books, 2003), 186-190. 
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a beautiful night. Clear and warm. The guy sitting there at the top of the 
stairs monitoring access to the roof was really nice and we had a long chat. 
My first thought talking to him was, “I wonder if he'll make it.” The next 
thing that happened was when I was looking out across NYC. I got a 
strange, dark, oppressive ‘voice’ that said, “Take a look, a good look. 
You'll NEVER see this again! It is all going away!” It was sneering, 
gleeful and demonic. I felt I was in the presence of evil. Dark, cruel, evil. 
Oppressive evil. I thought, “This is silly, these buildings survived a 
bombing, what could possibly happen to them?”  My rational mind took in 
the awesome size of the towers and thought what I was feeling was silly. I 
was thrown by the fact that I felt such evil. But the sneering, demonic 
being hovering over the WTC retorted that the buildings would be gone, 
GONE. I would never see this again. “Take a look, a good, long look 
because you'll never see this again.” “Impossible,” said my mind.89 
 
Following Williams James method of examining the consequences such 
encounters have had on those who have experienced them, it is possible to assess the 
experience itself.  There are repeated stories of people moving into houses, only to find 
them haunted, and then fleeing the house never to come back.  A house is probably the 
largest investment a person will make in his or her life.  Why would a rational person 
invest such a large amount of money to buy a house, only to be driven from it?  Why 
would this process repeat itself with each new owner?  It’s not rational to flee from such 
a large investment for no good reason.  An actual encounter with a demonic presence in 
this case is a more likely explanation.  How else does one explain stones being thrown 
from a corner of the room which is empty, a phenomenon frequently reported at 
Coalhouse Fort at the mouth of the Thames River in Tilbury, England?90  How does a 
naturalist explain the video taken from a New Mexico jail closed circuit camera of what 
appears to be a ghost walking across a secured area, passing through several chain link 
fences in the process?91  How does the naturalist explain the widespread phenomena of 
                                                 
89 http://paranormal.about.com/library/blstory_october02_21.htm.   
90 http://ghostwatch.net/ghostwatch/report/41-coalhouse-fort 
91 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qw6iPBb5cqo 
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dreams and premonitions people have of the future?  How does the naturalist explain the 
seer Emmanuel Swedenborg’s ability to simultaneously ‘see’ a fire in Stockholm that 
threatened his house, while he was in London, and then breathe a sigh of relief after 
several hours that it missed his house?  How does a naturalist explain the prophecies 
made by Edgar Cayce, which are too numerous and complex to discuss here?  The Theist 
claims to have an answer, and argues the naturalist does not. 
 
10.  Argument from Morality 
 
It is a central tenet of Plato’s moral realism that the Good is discovered, it is not a 
human construction or invention.  In the allegory of the cave, one is chained from birth in 
a fire-lit cave.  Breaking free, one finds one’s way out of the cave into the sunlight.92  
One ‘discovers’ the sun; it is not an invention or social construction.  It is a reality 
independent of the individual who discovers it.  In the allegory the sun stands for the 
Good.  One discovers something that already exists, that has its own independent reality.  
Once you discover it, you realize you were previously ignorant.  Now you can navigate 
the world not only by the light of the sun, but navigate the world morally, being able to 
judge what is right and what is wrong, by the knowledge of the good.  Christian 
theologians like Augustine, who deny reincarnation, have claimed the Form of the Good 
is revealed in the Incarnation.  Jesus is the embodiment of the divine Form of the Good.  
Jesus is the only person said to have lived a sinless life, a truly good life.   One comes to 
know the Good not through anamnesis, or recollection, but by reading the Bible.  
                                                 
92 Republic, Bk. VII, 514a-520a.   
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Scripture becomes the equivalent of the immutable forms.  “The grass fades and the 
flower withers, but the word of God stands forever.”  (Isaiah 40:8) 
 The goal of scientific naturalism is to describe the world strictly in terms of 
empirical facts, with no room for values.  Nature is said to be value-free.  Values 
therefore seem to suggest a realm that is non-natural.  In a purely naturalist world, how 
can there be values?  If values cannot be found in space and time, an argument can be 
made that values serve as a window or corridor to the God who is the source of all value.  
Values may point to, or at least give credence to, a transcendent God who is the source of 
these values and goodness itself.  While science is said to be descriptive, ethics and 
religion can and do make prescriptive statements.  A strictly naturalistic worldview 
cannot tell you what you ought to do.  Metaphysical naturalism cannot make normative 
statements about how one ought to follow this or that method in science.  In a purely 
naturalistic worldview, all you can do is describe, you cannot prescribe.  So how can you 
have normativity?  Last, if naturalism is true, and all of human behavior is subject to the 
pressures of evolution and natural selection, one would think that behaviors which are 
only geared toward survival will be favored, and these behaviors may be very much at 
odds with the demands of morality. 
 In Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky writes (the translations 
say something similar, but not exactly), “If God does not exist, then everything is 
permitted.”  Many atheists disagree.  Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens finds atheists 
to be very well mannered, and attribute all violence and auto-de-fes to be religiously 
inspired.  But the metaphysical naturalist cannot deny that it is hard for a naturalist to 
ground moral values without committing some form of the naturalistic fallacy.  Kant as 
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well seems to agree with Dostoevsky:  God is needed to ensure that the pursuit of virtue 
and the good is rewarded proportionately with happiness.  If you remove a divine being, 
one who metes out justice in the afterlife, the warrant to aspire to a good lifestyle is 
undermined.  God is like the great policeman in the sky, who sees you even when you’re 
alone, and is needed just as much as the cop on the street.  What happens if you remove 
the police?  This occurred in Montreal in October of 1969 when the police went on strike.  
Anarchy, murder, and mayhem resulted.  The National Assembly of Quebec had to order 
the police back to work.  Similarly, the argument goes, if you remove God from the 
picture, the lack of fear of punishment in the afterlife will give rise to lawlessness.  As 
much as naturalists don’t like to admit it, revealed religion serves as the basis of much of 
Western morality and its legal codes, as well as the perceived enforcer who gives 
sanction to those laws.   
 In the conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant writes “Two things fill 
the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and 
more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law 
within me.”93  It is our invisible self, which contains “the moral law which reveals to me a 
life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world.”94  While Kant is 
known as the destroyer of metaphysics for his refutation of the arguments for God’s 
existence and dismissing speculative theology, the metaphysics that underlies his analysis 
of morality is often forgotten.  In the Critique of Pure Reason, free will and necessity 
generate the third antimony, and any attempt to prove either will result in a contradiction.  
                                                 
93 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 129. 
94 Ibid., 129. 
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But in the Critique of Practical Reason free will is seen as one of the preconditions for 
morality.  ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ for Kant.  He states “when the moral law commands that 
we ought now to be better men, it follows inevitably that we must be able to be better 
men.”95  Moral obligation would be meaningless if we were not free to respond to duty.  
Freedom is incompatible with materialism and therefore is a rejection of naturalism 
(which is perhaps the reason Hegel equated the idea of Spirit with Freedom).  Only a 
metaphysic that remains open to God can account for freedom.96  For this reason, Kant 
argues that the three postulates of practical reason, or conditions which must be 
presupposed but are ultimately unprovable, for morality to exist are:  the existence of 
God, the immortality of the soul, and free will.97 
The fact that we can make moral decisions, for which we are held accountable, is 
testament to a self that is non-spatiotemporal, a self that is beyond the world of 
appearances and hence bound not by the laws of nature but by the moral law.  Naturalism 
nearly entails determinism, a point even Dennett admits.  This would make holding a 
person responsible for their actions absurd.  Even the non-reductivist, emergentist attempt 
to salvage some form of dualism still turns consciousness into an epiphenomenon which 
supervenes on brain processes and is causally inert.  This violates everyone’s common 
sense intuition that he or she is a causal agent.  As a result, the argument from both 
morality and freedom is one that is very difficult for the strict naturalist to overcome.  It 
comes close to a reductio ad absurdum of the position. William James argues in ‘The 
                                                 
95 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. by Theodore M. Greene and 
Hoyt H. Hudson  (New York:  Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 46.  6:50 
96 Karl Ameriks,’ Immanuel Kant,’ in Columbia History of Western Philosophy, ed. by Richard H. Popkin  
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 1999), 500-1. 
97 Peter Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. ‘postulates of practical reason.’ 
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Dilemma of Determinism’ that no one wants to say that the “Brockton murder was called 
for by the rest of the universe.”98  Theism is able to maintain causal agency and moral 
realism, while naturalism is at a loss to explain them.   
 
11.  Conclusion:  The Cumulative Case for God’s Existence as a Tipping Point 
 
The logical positivist Friedrich Waismann, in his essay ‘How I See Philosophy,’ 
argued that philosophical arguments are not “supposed to be proofs and refutations in a 
strict sense.  What the philosopher does is something else.  He builds up a case.”99  Each 
person, after weighing the evidence presented by the philosopher, has to come to his or 
her own decision.  Waismann argues that no philosopher ever ends his case with, Q.E.D., 
because no philosopher ever establishes his case conclusively. 100  “For this reason, no 
‘computing machine’ could do the work of a judge.  If the conclusion necessarily 
followed from its premises, no judge would be needed.”101  Such is the attempt to 
establish the case for theism or naturalism.  Contrary to the claims of the New Atheists, a 
case can be made for theism.  Any Christian on his way to Church on Sunday can give 
you a good reason why he is going to a Christian church, and not a temple dedicated to 
Zeus.  That theism is nothing but fideism, or blind faith involving nothing other than a 
leap of faith with no evidence whatsoever to support it, makes a straw man of religious 
faith.  The theist sees evidence everywhere, as the best explanation for why there is a 
                                                 
98 William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism,” in Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, ed. by Louis P. 
Pojman and Lewis Vaughn  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 412. 
99 Friedrich Waismann, ‘How I See Philosophy,’ in Logical Positivism, ed. by A.J. Ayer  (Glencoe, IL:  
Free Press, 1959), 372. 
100 ‘Quod erat demonstrandum,’ meaning ‘which is what had to be proved.’  The Urban Dictionary defines 
this as the mathematician’s way of saying, ‘I win.’  
101 Waismann, ‘How I See Philosophy,’ in Logical Positivism, 373-5. 
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universe, why there are rational beings, why there are moral values, and why there is 
religious experience.  The naturalist doesn’t see any of this as evidence, or doesn’t want 
to see it as evidence.  Waismann concludes by stating, “To say that metaphysics is 
nonsense is nonsense.  It fails to acknowledge the enormous part played at least in the 
past by those systems.”102  It also fails to see that those systems may have been passed on 
down the ages because many people have found them to be a valid map of reality. 
Rem Edwards believes it is the job of the philosopher to explain “as best he can 
why he believes what he does and why he rejects the chief alternatives to his 
position….Many lines of converging evidence must be put together into a coherent 
case.”103  Each argument adds a stone to the pile, each religious experience adds a stone 
to the pile, each reading of a religious person’s understanding of their faith adds a stone 
to the pile.  The more near-death experiences one reads about, or the more people one 
comes into contact with who claimed to have had one, the more stones added to the pile.  
The more one has experiences of ‘thin places’ where the veil separating this world from 
the next is less opaque, the more stones are added to the pile.  The more one reads the 
arguments for God’s existence, or reads Scripture, or experiences paranormal events 
which defy natural explanation, the more stones are added to the pile.  One day the pile is 
no longer a pile.  Eventually a tipping point is reached and the pile turns into a heap.  
Faith crystallizes.  Each individual argument or experience might not convince one of 
God’s existence.  Yet taken cumulatively, they might push one towards the tipping point 
at which faith precipitates.  A drop in temperature of a degree or two does not make it 
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103 Rem Edwards, Reason and Religion  (New York:  Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1972), 225. 
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snow.  Cumulative drops of a degree or two eventually result in the temperature dropping 
below 32 degrees.  A tipping point is reached, and suddenly rain becomes snow.104   
                                                 
104 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, How Little Things can Make a Big Difference  (New York:  
Black Bay Books, 2002), 13. 
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CHAPTER FIVE –  
NATURALISM:  DISTINGUISHING METAPHYSCIAL FROM 
METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM 
 
 
  Science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not 
that it is not.1 – Wilfrid Sellars 
 
  The methods of science, it is claimed, ‘give us no purchase’ on 
theological propositions – even if the latter are true – and theology 
therefore cannot influence scientific explanation or theory justification. 
Thus, science is said to be religiously neutral, if only because science and 
religion are, by their very natures, epistemically distinct.2 – Alvin 
Plantinga 
 
  By its very nature, science is obliged to leave out any appeal to the 
supernatural, and so its explanations will always sound naturalistic and 
purely physicalist.3 – John Haught 
 
  Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific methods and unscientific 
results... the separation of science and non-science is not only artificial but 
also detrimental to the advancement of knowledge. If we want to 
understand nature, if we want to master our physical surroundings, then 
we must use all ideas, all methods, and not just a small selection of them.4 
– Paul Feyerabend 
 
  The idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on 
too naive a view of man and his social surroundings…there is only one 
principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of 
human development. It is the principle: anything goes.5 – Paul Feyerabend  
 
  Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method 
that encourages variety is also the only method that is comparable with a 
humanitarian outlook.6 – Paul Feyerabend  
 
  All we can say is that scientists proceed in many different ways, that 
rules of method, if mentioned explicitly, are either not obeyed at all, or 
function at most like rules of thumb.7 – Paul Feyerabend  
                                                 
1 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,’ in Science, Perception, and Reality  (London:  
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 173. 
2 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Methodological Naturalism,’ Philosophical Analysis Origins & Design 18:1. 
3 John F. Haught, ‘Darwin, Design, and Divine Providence,’ in Debating Design:  From Darwin to DNA, 
ed. by William Dembski and Michael Ruse  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 231. 
4 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method  (London:  Verso, 1993), 305-6. 
5 Ibid., 18-19. 
6 Ibid., 31-2. 
7 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method  (London:  Verso, 2010), 253. 
202 
 
 
 
1.  How Metaphysical Naturalism differs from Methodological Naturalism 
 
 Chapter Two established the central characteristics of naturalism, and examined 
the different kinds of naturalism as well as discussing some current naturalists.  
Metaphysical naturalism is the view that the natural world is all that exists and the central 
substantive feature of metaphysical naturalism is its anti-transcendentalism.  As such, 
there are no supernatural divine beings or realm of transcendent values or ideas, no 
immaterial souls or spirits, and no disembodied minds.8  Alvin Plantinga defines 
‘naturalism’ as simply “the thought that there is no such person as God, or anything like 
God.”9  Nothing is allowed for that exists outside the processes of nature and the visible 
world.  Anything that comes to be can in principle be given a natural explanation.  This 
holds for strict naturalists, i.e., physicalists of the reductionist type who often are 
eliminativists, and weak naturalists as well, i.e, those who are non-reductionists or 
emergentists.   
This chapter will discuss how metaphysical naturalism is related to the scientific 
method.  Methodological naturalism says that since science is the empirical study of the 
natural world, “scientific theories should be neutral on the question of whether a 
supernatural God exists.”10   Methodological naturalism, being a method rather than a 
metaphysic, is not necessarily incompatible with theism, or belief in a reality which 
transcends the physical.  The scope of methodological naturalism studies the Book of 
Nature, not Revelation, and limits itself to the investigation of natural causes and only 
                                                 
8 Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. ‘naturalism.’ 
9 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2011), ix. 
10 Elliot Sober, “Why Methodological Naturalism?”  In G. Aulette, M. LeClerc, and R. Martinez (eds.), 
Biological Evolution: Facts and Theories: A Critical Appraisal 150 Years after The Origin of Species, 
2011, (Rome: Gregorian Biblical Press, 2011), 359-360. 
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allows for explanations which are natural.  Daniel Dennett uses the imagery of skyhooks 
(a supernatural “‘mind-first’ force or power” such as a deity that resides in the sky) to 
describe theism, and cranes (natural processes) to describe naturalism.  Metaphysical 
naturalists would deny the existence of skyhooks and argue only cranes exist.  
Methodological naturalists would remain neutral on the existence of skyhooks, but try to 
explain phenomena using only cranes.11 
It is possible for a scientist to use methodological naturalism in his scientific 
studies, but adhere to theist beliefs as part of his or her larger metaphysical framework.  
However, if one begins within the framework of metaphysical naturalism, 
methodological naturalism is the only method which offers an accurate depiction of 
reality.  Any theistic causal explanations are necessarily false.  However, if one begins 
within the larger framework of theism, methodological naturalism may be only one of 
several different ways of investigating reality.  In other words, if metaphysical naturalism 
is a true description of reality (the physical universe is causally closed), then 
methodological naturalism is a necessity, and the only proper way to investigate reality.  
If metaphysical naturalism is not a true description of reality (the universe might be 
causally open), then methodological naturalism is not necessarily the only proper method, 
and there might be non-natural events which occur in the universe which methodological 
naturalism cannot account for (the type of events the Bible records).  There might also be 
non-empirical ways of knowing other than methodological naturalism (a priori 
reasoning, or intuition), or types of data and evidence that elude scientific investigation 
(mystical experience or the paranormal). 
                                                 
11 Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 74-83. 
204 
 
 
 
There are several problems facing both metaphysical naturalism and 
methodological naturalism.  The problem for metaphysical naturalism is whether or not it 
is merely a dogmatic assertion, an assumption, or whether there are good epistemic 
grounds to favor it as the most likely ontology.  This is an important issue, because “the 
naturalist claims to have epistemic, explanatory, and methodological superiority on his or 
her side, especially when naturalist positions are understood to have the authority of 
science behind them.”12  So by what means does the naturalist justify their metaphysic 
and method so as to gain the epistemically privileged ground?  A naturalist ontology 
cannot be justified by reason of the naturalistic method, since the reasoning is circular, as 
one assumes what one seeks to prove.  If one from the outset limits oneself to finding 
only what is within one building, it is impossible to make claims as to what exists outside 
that building.  It also leaves us with the problem of which came first, the worldview or 
the method?   
 
2.  Assuming Metaphysical Naturalism or Theism is true, what follows?   
 
2.1  Can one detect God acting in the world?   
 
Let us consider the outlook that follows from adopting either of the two 
alternative metaphysical starting points, naturalism and theism.  What follows if we 
accept theism as our starting point, if we begin by assuming that theism is true?  If theism 
is true, then metaphysical naturalism is false, as a supernatural being exists.  This would 
be the position that Augustine, Aquinas, and Plantinga, would endorse.  If the theist 
                                                 
12 William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Naturalism:  A Critical Analysis  (New York:  Routledge, 2002), 
xii. 
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worldview is true, God is not only transcendent, but immanent, acting in the universe 
through primary and secondary causes.  So according to this worldview, it is perfectly 
conceivable that God can act in the world to cause physical effects.  For example, let us 
say in response to prayers, God miraculously cures a cancer.  Now from the viewpoint of 
methodological naturalism, assuming it to mean that the only path to knowledge is by 
using the methods of natural sciences, there are only two options available.  One could 
wrongly attribute the cure to natural causes by saying the immune system destroyed the 
tumor, or one could simply say the action by which the cancer vanished is unknown.  In 
the first instance, what we have is a false negative, in that we have incorrectly attributed 
the cure to natural causes, when in fact the cure was by supernatural means.  In the 
second instance, we have avoided the error of falsely identifying the cause; nor have we 
overstepped the boundaries of methodological naturalism.  We simply stated that we do 
not have a natural explanation for the event; if the cure was of supernatural origin or not, 
that cannot be determined by the method available.  
Now, let us now assume the opposing metaphysical position, that metaphysical 
naturalism is true.  All that exists is the world of nature, and theism is thereby false.  This 
is the position of Dennett, Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, and the Churchlands.  Once again, 
we have a cancer that suddenly or inexplicably disappears.  Since everything is the result 
of natural, physical processes, let us assume that it is the immune system combined with 
treatment which successfully kills the tumor, and not divine miraculous intervention.  If 
the physician, using methodological naturalism, determines this to be the cause, then he 
or she has correctly identified the cause.   If he or she can’t explain the phenomena, say 
because these types of cancer don’t usually respond to treatment, then the physician 
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should exercise diagnostic humility and announce that the cause is unknown.  If the 
physician is a metaphysical naturalist, he/she believes the cure is stated as unknown not 
because it might be miraculous (which is a priori ruled out), but because science is not 
yet advanced enough to detect the cause.  If the physician was a methodological 
naturalist, but not a metaphysical naturalist, the doctor cannot state any suspicion the cure 
was miraculous since only natural explanations count.  A third alternative is that a doctor 
could reject methodological naturalism and adopt a scientific methodology that was open 
to supernatural as well as natural explanations, and declare the only way the cancer could 
have gone into remission was by supernatural means.  In the third example, only this 
doctor would be able to suggest the cause of the remission is supernatural.  
If the sole difference between the methods of science, and methodological 
naturalism, is that the latter disallows non-natural causation, then this entails that the 
naturalist can distinguish between natural and non-natural processes.  But this might 
prove very difficult.  The Catholic Neo-Thomist position follows Aquinas’s distinction 
between primary and secondary causes.  Aquinas asserted that God is the initial, primary 
cause of the universe.  God created the material elements of the world with their own 
nature, and their causal interaction is now governed by secondary causes, whose ‘natural’ 
causation science discovers.  If the Creator is free “to act ‘beyond nature’…bringing 
about departures from that order,” then the Creator can bypass the secondary causes and 
miraculously act by means of a primary cause.13  Methodological naturalism can be 
formulated so as to say that the limits of its study are confined to God’s secondary, rather 
than primary, causes.  Evolution could follow a strictly natural process, in that the 
                                                 
13 Ernan McMullin, ‘Varieties of Methodological Naturalism, in The Nature of Nature, ed. by Bruce 
Gordon and William Dembski  (Wilmington, DE:  Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2011), 87. 
207 
 
 
 
process follows only secondary causes.  However, even with this view, there is a 
difficulty for the metaphysical naturalist, for on it, God is the sustainer of the universe.  
This means that without God, there would be no ‘natural’ processes at all.  So in a sense, 
all processes are somehow divine in that they are dependent upon God.  Aquinas talks of 
God ‘infusing’ creation with God’s own being.  To the extent that the theist claims that 
natural secondary processes are dependent upon and derived from God’s ability to govern 
and sustain them, they are in some sense causally dependent upon God, since God is the 
author of their natures.   
 
2.2  Primary and Secondary Causes vs. Concurrence 
 
Ernan McMullin, an advocate of the Catholic tradition, notes that the Reformed 
tradition is suspicious of the Thomist and Aristotelian conception of natures, and believes 
they put too much of a constraint on God’s freedom.  The Reformed tradition follows the 
voluntarism of Scotus, which states that God’s will is sovereign and not bound by 
rationality.  The nominalist position advocated by Ockham denies the existence of 
essential natures in things.  There is nothing either necessary or recurrent in nature, and 
everything exists only because it is willed by God.14  In other words, there are no 
secondary causes, only primary ones.  One cannot distinguish between primary and 
secondary acts of God; they are both said to be ‘concurrent.’  Al-Ghazali is the Arabic 
version of Ockham, as he also denies that there are any necessary causal connections.  He 
held that “Observation proves only a simultaneity, not a causation, and in reality there is 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 87. 
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no other cause but God….the apparent and alleged causal connections among things 
other than God are really due to God’s direct action.”15  The overall effect of this position 
is that the line between the natural and supernatural is blurred.  So if the naturalist insists 
that only ‘natural’ processes and causal explanations are allowed, by what criteria does 
one distinguish ‘natural’ events from ‘supernatural’ ones?  The concurrentist position 
says you can’t.  The entire universe is a burning bush or a manifestation of the creator’s 
will.  All of nature gains its being from God.  Remove God’s willing the universe and 
everything collapses.   
Many people who saw Jesus while he was alive saw nothing supernatural about 
him.  Others claimed to have witnessed him perform one supernatural event after another, 
or even claimed that he himself was the supernatural event.  Others did not.  So what one 
sees, natural or supernatural causality, isn’t always apparent to the senses.  The naturalist 
attributes the extinction of dinosaurs to a large asteroid hitting the earth 65 million years 
ago.  But who’s to say God didn’t direct the asteroid to hit the earth?  Can the naturalist 
rule out this possibility?  If God can act through secondary causes in the way that he does 
in primary causes, then God could certainly cloak His causation in ways that appear 
‘natural’ when in fact they are supernatural, and thus invisible to the methodological 
naturalist.  If the burden of proof is on the metaphysical naturalist to prove that only the 
natural world exists, he would have to show that the natural cannot be supernatural.  That 
seems like a very difficult, if not impossible, task. 
Similarly, how can the naturalist determine that a variation has arisen through 
strictly natural processes, and was in no way guided by God, if God could act in such a 
                                                 
15 Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy  (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
1974), 124, 122, 134. 
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way so as to appear completely natural?   If God, foreseeing Hitler’s intentions, decided 
to throw a heart attack Hitler’s way, would the coroner be able to detect the supernatural 
forming of the blood clot that killed him, or merely attribute the death to natural causes?  
An atheist might use this as an example to show that God does not exist, because a good 
God would have caused Hitler to have a heart attack.16  The theist could always respond, 
how do you know there weren’t a thousand potential Hitlers, all worse than the real one, 
to whom God did throw a heart attack their way, but you never knew that because they all 
purportedly died from ‘natural’ causes?  If a theistic God has the ability to act directly by 
means of special creation, then such a God could also likely act in such a way to make 
supernatural causes indistinguishable from naturally occurring ones.  A scientist 
investigating a variation would have no way of determining if the variation was caused 
by solar radiation generating a genetic mutation, or by a direct act of God.  All that the 
scientist would see is that a variation has arisen, but not whether its cause was of natural 
or supernatural origin. 
If the scientist is unable to discern the difference between a natural cause and a 
supernatural one, how can the criterion in methodological naturalism that only natural 
causes count, be justified?  It can’t.  God could have directly caused life to begin, or, as 
the author of nature, God could have done so indirectly in a way that resembled the 
‘natural’ secondary processes of the Miller-Urey experiment, with lightning strikes 
forming organic compounds out of a primordial soup of inorganic water, methane, 
ammonia, and hydrogen.  Similarly, God as the author of creation could have caused the 
first eukaryotic cell to appear directly, or done so in such a way as to make it look like the 
                                                 
16 B.C. Johnson, ‘Why Doesn’t God Intervene to Prevent Evil? in Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, ed. by 
Louis Pojman  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 123. 
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result of a random saltation in which one prokaryote absorbed another cell and turned it 
into its nucleus.  Either way, directly or indirectly, God is the cause.  The naturalist 
cannot therefore rule out that it was God who caused the ‘irreducible complexity’ of the 
eye by guided variation (primary causality), or that God willed it to happen by means of 
strictly natural, unguided processes (secondary causality).  In other words, Daniel 
Dennett’s cranes could all be skyhooks, and there is no way to tell them apart.   
If this is the case, then all methodological naturalism seems to be saying is that all 
interpretations of events must be labeled ‘natural,’ even though there is the possibility 
they are of supernatural origin.  It is just that we can’t tell the difference.  Naturalists 
might justify this conclusion by appealing to Ockham’s razor, which states that the 
simplest explanation is the most likely to be true.  But in the case of Thales’s theory that 
all is water, versus the modern periodic table of elements, which states that there are 
roughly 118 different elements, Ockham’s razor would have you side with the wrong 
theory.17     
The naturalist’s emphasis on the interpretation of all events as ‘natural processes’ 
only, i.e., as having or needing no supernatural dependence, doesn’t even get off the 
ground for the theist who sees God as the necessary creator and sustainer of the 
universe’s being.  If the scientist attributes causality only to ‘nature,’ and nature is in fact 
part of a supernatural causal chain that began with God, then the scientist’s explanation is 
wrong.  When the wind blows, how can the scientist be certain it is a result of the natural 
process of the earth’s heating and cooling of the atmosphere, and not God making the 
wind move?  How can the scientist tell that what is merely ‘natural’ must exclude what is 
                                                 
17 Jim Holt, Why does the World Exist? (New York:  W.W. Norton & Co., 2012), 70. 
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supernatural, when it is a logical possibility that this is a world which only appears to be 
governed by ‘natural’ processes, when in fact the whole natural process is created, 
sustained, and guided by a supernatural being?  As a logical possibility, it cannot be ruled 
out.  While the naturalist might respond, “we have no reason to think it is,” the fact 
remains, metaphysical naturalists cannot rule it out and hence cannot prove that the 
natural world is all that exists.  
Nevertheless, strong methodological naturalism does rule it out.  It seeks an 
empirically adequate explanation, one that is ‘neutral’ concerning the supernatural.  
Why?  Parsimony? Ockham’s razor?  Because ‘only’ allowing natural processes is a 
simpler explanation because it only invokes one metaphysical entity rather than two?  But 
this might be missing the whole long causal explanation that governs the causal chain.  
Some philosophers, such as Descartes and Plantinga, believe that theism ensures the 
rationality and mathematical order of the universe, an order that would be lacking if 
naturalism were true.  In a theist’s universe God ensures that secondary processes are 
ordered (although the voluntarist model might depart from this, it still results in an 
ordered universe).  If all the order in the universe is imposed by a supernatural being and 
gains its being from it, the distinction between natural and supernatural causality is 
blurred.  The point is, if this is in fact the world we live in, and the naturalist justifies the 
natural over the supernatural explanation using Ockham’s razor, they have used 
Ockham’s razor to justify a falsehood. 
 
3.  How do you justify Methodological Naturalism?  Why should only natural causes count? 
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How does the methodological naturalist justify the claim that only natural causes 
should count in science?  If a theistic universe is a possible universe, and a scientist wants 
to determine the true nature of reality, then why should the methods of the sciences only 
allow for natural causes?  By what criteria does one rule out ‘non-natural’ causes?  Is the 
claim that the method of science ought to be methodological naturalism, simply a 
dogmatic assertion made by metaphysical naturalists?  This appears to be a live option. If 
the scientific method is determined by what scientists do in practice, then methodological 
naturalism cannot be considered the method of science.  Isaac Newton resorted to divine 
intervention to correct the orbits of the planets when they deviated from their proper 
trajectory.  Einstein found quantum theory unacceptable, stating “God doesn’t play dice 
with the universe.”18  If the aim of science is to discover the laws of nature, to those who 
believe nature is a creation of God, the aim of science is to discover the mind that created 
it.  Isaacson states Einstein sought to know the mind of God, and saw “God reflected in 
the awe-inspiring beauty, rationality, and unity of nature’s laws.”19  Dawkins, of course, 
claims by ‘God’ Einstein meant ‘Nature.’  He cites Einstein’s statement, “I believe in 
Spinoza’s God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists.”20  Regardless 
of Einstein’s personal religious beliefs, there is no denying that many scientists see nature 
similarly, as the product of a divine mind, and this mind can be known by the rational 
order and quality of the design.  Darwin himself includes in the epigraph to the sixth 
edition of the Origin a quotation from Butler which reflects this line of thinking, rather 
than Dawkins’:  “‘What is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent 
                                                 
18 Walter Isaacson, Einstein, His Life and Universe  (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 2007), 326, 335, 392, 
515. 
19 Ibid., 84. 
20 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 39.   
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to render it so, i.e., to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or 
miraculous does to effect it for once.’ – Butler: Analogy of Revealed Religion.”21 
 
4.  How do you justify Metaphysical Naturalism without referring to Methodological Naturalism?  
   
Previously we assumed theism was true and examined how a scientist might 
investigate the world.  We determined that a scientist would be unable to determine what 
is natural from what is supernatural, thus undermining methodological naturalism.  How 
then can the metaphysical naturalist position be justified?  Let’s say we begin by 
dogmatically asserting metaphysical naturalism, and then use this as a reason to exclude 
non-natural explanations à la methodological naturalism (since we have assumed only 
nature exists), and then argue that because methodological naturalism has found only 
natural explanations for events, this justifies our original position that the supernatural is 
non-existent.  This reasoning is circular, and the fact remains that the original assertion 
was dogmatic.  Methodological naturalism is simply a provisional methodology that 
assumes a causally closed universe, but this may or may not be the case.  Metaphysical 
naturalism and methodological naturalism feed each other, but in a circular way that isn’t 
epistemically justified.  If methodological naturalism is considered the determinant of 
what is real and what is not, how do you justify a method that is itself not the object of 
scientific study?  Science is descriptive, not normative, and methodological naturalism is 
a normative statement about how science ought to conduct itself.  Frank Jackson saw the 
only way out was to simply state that metaphysical naturalism is self-justifying, whatever 
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this might mean.  While dogmatic, it does seem to be the path taken by Dennett, 
Dawkins, et al. 
The logical positivists faced similar problems when they dogmatically asserted 
the Verification Principle, which stated that a synthetic statement is meaningful if and 
only if it is empirically verifiable.  The Verification Principle is designed to weed out 
statements like the following: “Universals exist,” or “The nothing itself nothings,” or 
“God guided the development of complex cells and organs,” and “contraception is 
immoral.”  According to the Verification principle all of these statements are meaningless 
because they cannot be verified.  But the desire to eliminate metaphysics by means of the 
principle produces too much collateral damage.  Since many scientific theories include 
theoretical entities which are not observable, such as the Higgs boson and dark energy, 
according to the Verification principle, these theories are meaningless.  In addition, not 
only are ethics and normative statements eliminated, but the Verification Principle itself 
is not empirically verifiable, hence by its own logic, it too is meaningless.   
 
5.  Rea:  Metaphysical and Methodological Naturalism are Incoherent  
 
These problems have led some theorists to claim that naturalism itself is internally 
inconsistent and needs to be scrapped.  Methodological Naturalism is supposed to be the 
scientific method with limits.  What are the limits?  That only natural explanations count. 
Michael Rea believes that this criterion is added to the scientific method so as to not 
leave open the possibility that metaphysical naturalism could be overturned by science.22  
                                                 
22 Michael Rea, World Without Design, The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism  (Oxford:  Clarendon 
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Metaphysical naturalists want to pledge their allegiance to the scientific method, but if 
they simply say, all that exists is what science says exists, this might leave them open to 
refutation by science.  After all, the first three of Aquinas’ proofs for the existence of God 
begin with simple empirical claims.  If natural explanations are left to compete with non-
natural ones, there is always the possibility that natural explanations might lose out.  
Perhaps substance dualism is a better explanation of near-death experiences than 
physicalism.  The study of near-death experiences can be done scientifically, and if the 
studies are credible, they could provide good scientific evidence against naturalism.23  
  However, if science only allows natural explanations, then non-natural or dualistic 
interpretations of the data are disallowed.  This ensures a pre-determined victory for the 
metaphysical naturalists.  But it does so at the cost of being circular in its justification.  
For these reasons and others, Rea thinks naturalism is incoherent and lacks a rational 
foundation.  As a result, he questions naturalism as scientific orthodoxy and chooses to 
classify naturalism as a ‘research program’ rather than a ‘substantive philosophical 
position.’24  What does he mean by a research program?  That naturalism is predisposed 
to trust “certain ways of acquiring information with respect to various topics 
and…distrust others.”25  However, like all predispositions, they may have been acquired 
in an unreflective and unconscious manner.  
 It is not difficult to see that naturalism is beset with problems.  Imagine a scientist 
at work.  Although the proper concern of a scientist is the external objects of nature, the 
true starting point of any scientist is their own subjectivity.  A scientist begins in 
                                                 
23 See Recollections of Death, A Medical Investigation, by Michael B. Sabom, M.D., as well as 
Consciousness Beyond Life:  The Science of Near Death Experiences, by Pin Van Lommel. 
24 Rea, World Without Design, 52. 
25 Ibid., 2-3. 
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consciousness, a mind that is being guided by the normative methods of the natural 
sciences.  Next, they are confronted by a physical universe which they form a conceptual 
idea of and seek to investigate.  So what seems to be the problem?  First, there is the 
problem of personal identity.  What is the self, the ‘I’ that is doing the inquiring into the 
nature of the universe?  Is it a thinking mental substance, a divinely created soul, or just a 
highly developed brain?  Next, there is the idea of matter.  The materialist says only 
matter exists.  Yet the experience of matter begins in thought, in the mind, in the 
conceptual, and seems to hint that in the thought of thinking the idea that only matter 
exists, there is something inherently self-contradictory.  Hoffding noted the alleged 
internal inconsistency in advocating materialism:  “Kant pointed this out…to carry out 
materialism is to pass beyond it.  For even if we concede to it that our whole world-
conception is a product of our material organization, this material organization itself is 
only an object of consciousness…The struggle between matter and spirit, then, ends in 
favor of the latter.”26   
While emergentism might allow for minds to evolve from purely natural 
processes, emergentism has problems of its own, namely, its denial of causal agency.  In 
addition, there are norms guiding scientists, telling them how they ‘ought’ to investigate 
nature.  But how can ‘oughts’ follow from a purely natural universe, especially when 
science is simply supposed to be descriptive?  How does one justify making prescriptive 
statements?  Last, ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’  If naturalism is true, and causal effects are 
determined by prior conditions, how can I be free to follow what I ‘ought’ to do?  For 
metaphysical naturalism to be consistent, it must be able to explain the universe, the 
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origin of life, the origin of complexity, the origin of the human mind, values, normativity, 
causal agency, and free will.  But as Michael Rea says, naturalism seems unable to do 
this in a satisfactory way. 
 
6.  Strong Methodological Naturalism should be replaced by a Weaker Version  
 
Ernan McMullin thinks that the strong form of methodological naturalism, “the 
prescription that the only valid source of knowledge of the natural world is the natural 
sciences,” is unacceptable to the theist because it concedes too much sovereignty to the 
scientist.27  McMullin lists four to five problem areas of conflict, in which the theist’s 
interpretation of events is likely to conflict with the scientific naturalist’s.  Several of 
these have already been discussed, such as the origin of life, the mind/body problem, and 
guided versus unguided variations in evolutionary processes.  McMullin adds to the list 
of problem areas the Fine Tuning argument, which is a science based argument which 
states that the various constants in physics are fine-tuned so as to allow life to emerge and 
therefore suggest intelligent design.  The problem is that this is a scientific argument, and 
strong methodological naturalism disallows any appeal to supernatural causes.  The 
scientist would have to say therefore the fine-tuning of the universe is just attributable to 
chance.  But the theist would not.  Nor would the theist want to rule out supernatural 
causes for the origin of the universe, of life, of complexity, and he/she would not reduce 
the mind to the brain, or argue that evolution occurs only by means of natural processes.  
Even though these areas all involve scientific matters, conceding ultimate answers to 
                                                 
27 Ernan McMullin, ‘Varieties of Methodological Naturalism,’ in The Nature of Nature, ed. by Bruce 
Gordon and William A. Dembski (Wilmington, DE:  ISI Books, 2011), 83. 
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them to scientists who subscribe to methodological naturalism, concedes too much 
disputed territory to the scientist.  As a result, McMullin does not think strong 
methodological naturalism is worthy of support.  He instead proposes two forms of 
qualified methodological naturalism which do not allow the scientist to be the only 
authority on these matters.   
In his first form of qualified methodological naturalism, sciences will not have an 
exclusive prerogative when it comes to the knowledge of nature.  Instead, they merely 
have “a strong presupposition of their sufficiency for the task.” 28  Non-scientists are not 
to be excluded in discussing the anomalies, or ‘difficult spots’ such as the cause of the 
Big Bang and the origin of life.  In other words, non-natural explanations, explanations 
that may be open to supernatural phenomena, may be allowed.  What this does is allow 
non-natural explanations to compete with natural ones in the method of science.  This 
method would leave out the stipulation that only natural causes are allowed, and allow for 
supernatural causation if it is deemed the best explanation possible for certain 
problematic phenomena.     
For example, a person (Jesus) walks on water.  A person (a Hindu yogi) levitates.  
A person (Swedenborg) ‘sees’ events that are simultaneously taking place hundreds of 
miles away.  A person (George Ritchie) dies and his soul continues on and meets Jesus.   
None of these phenomena is possible according to the laws of nature, and hence science 
must either reserve judgment or come up with a response that is skeptical about a 
supernatural cause:  one is hallucinating, or is deluded, or there is some kind of trickery 
involved.  But if, in all of these examples, the best explanation is that the phenomena in 
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219 
 
 
 
question have a supernatural cause, then why not allow this as a possibility?  Strong 
methodological naturalism seems to dogmatically rule out any appeal to supernatural 
causation, even those that compete with natural ones.  But if no natural explanation can 
account for the origin of the universe, the origin of life, the origin of complexity, the 
‘hard problem’ of consciousness, normative practices, moral values, and free will, then 
why shouldn’t supernatural explanations be considered?  McMullin’s qualified 
methodological naturalism grants non-natural explanations access in these problematic 
areas and allows philosophers and theologians to debate them.  Strong methodological 
naturalism, on the other hand, silences them and allows only the scientist to speak and 
invoke only natural processes.   
 
7.  The Possibility of a Theistic Science:  Plantinga 
 
 If the first version of McMullin’s Qualified methodological naturalism weakens 
the strong form by allowing non-scientists to offer up non-natural explanations in 
problem areas, his second version seeks to expand the field of science.  This version 
seeks to expand the field of science so as to tolerate a ‘theistic science’ one that believes 
the possibility of intelligent design can be investigated in a scientific way.  This version 
seeks to change the famous ‘demarcation’ problem, of having to determine where to set 
the boundary line between science and non-science.  McMullen notes that the historical 
attempt to do this has shown it to be difficult “to specify a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions” that would accomplish this task.29  He is less receptive to this version than the 
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previous one because traditional science has a universally agreed means for resolving 
controversy and assessing claims, which theism does not.  McMullen thinks that ways of 
knowing other than solely through the empirical methods of science should not be 
silenced.  Adherents of this position note that “the term ‘science’ in its original derivation 
from the Latin term Scientia was broader in its normal coverage than it is today.  It 
referred to all forms of knowledge held at that time to count legitimately as knowledge, 
and thus was applicable in such areas as metaphysics and theology.”30  This broader 
definition of science would allow for a theistic science, one in which supernatural 
explanations compete with natural ones.   
The main proponent of this position is Alvin Plantinga, who calls methodological 
naturalism ‘provisional atheism.’31  Plantinga sees the danger in this, namely, the danger 
of indoctrinating graduate students to believe that evolution occurred in a purely 
naturalistic way.  People, even educated people, would, in the future, then be blind to any 
alternative other than atheism.  Plantinga thinks that scientists should be allowed to 
accept the best explanation for the phenomena being investigated, and for Plantinga the 
best explanation for the origin of the universe, life, and complexity, is the supernatural 
one.32  But because of their tacit philosophical method, scientists are not allowed to teach 
any alternative to naturalism.  Being able to teach Theistic Science would at least allow 
students to be able to draw their own conclusions, especially in problematic areas where 
there is insufficient evidence.  J.P. Moreland has echoed similar sentiments, as have 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 89. 
31 Alvin Plantinga, ‘When Faith and Reason Clash:  Evolutions and the Bible,’ in Readings in the 
Philosophy of Science, ed. by Theodore Schick  (Mountain View, CA:  Mayfield Publishing Co., 2000), 
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32 Ibid., 313, 333-5.  
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Stephen Meyer (Signature in the Cell) and Philip Johnson (who calls the position ‘theistic 
realism’ in his book Reason in the Balance).  Under this model, parapsychology could 
actually be considered a science because it is open to supernatural intrusions upon the 
natural world, and considers supernatural explanations as valid. 
Wilfrid Sellars has said, “THE aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to 
understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the 
broadest possible sense of the term.”33  It is ironic Sellars uses the term ‘broadest sense 
possible’ not once, but twice.  If theism is true, God is not only one of the ‘things’ that 
constitute reality, but the primary cause of those ‘things.’  So if one wants to show how 
things hang together ‘in the broadest sense possible,’ why exclude a theory that may well 
contain a good explanation for those things’ existence?  Methodological naturalism paints 
a narrow picture of how things fit together, not a broad one.  What does science have to 
fear from broadening its method to allow for a causally open universe?  If it is true that 
there are no non-natural explanations, then only natural ones will appear.  But why rule 
them out to begin with?  If there are explanatory gaps, the scientist shouldn’t necessarily 
fill them in with unknown natural processes.  The scientist should reserve judgment and 
leave open the possibility of supernatural causes.  A broader method of science doesn’t 
assume that the universe is causally closed.  The broader method of theistic science 
would still include the empirical investigation into reality, but the prohibition that only 
natural explanations are allowed would be repealed.   
In addition, a theistic science would also be open to non-empirical methods of 
obtaining knowledge, since theistic explanations refer to a realm which is not empirically 
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accessible.  As a result, other methods of gaining knowledge should supplement the 
scientific method (not replace, but supplement).  Such as?  A priori intuition and 
judgment.  Introspection.  Divine illumination.  Orison.  Centering prayer.  The workings 
of the Holy Spirit.  Religious and mystical experience.  The reasons of the heart.  Divine 
revelation.  A leap of faith.  Coherence theory.  Vision quest.  Cosmic consciousness.  
Raja Yoga.  Moksha.  Vipassana meditation.  Mindfulness.  Enlightenment.  Achieving 
insight into the Buddha nature or the Buddha mind.  Ground of Being.  Being itself.  The 
sixth sense.  Basic belief.  A sensus divinitatis.  This broadening of methods would reject 
the claims of adherents of Scientism that the scientific method is the only path to 
knowledge, and supplement it with a host of other practices.  It simply reflects the fact 
that if theism is true, science does not have a monopoly on truth, and the scientific 
method should not be authoritarian. 
 
8.  The Transition to a Causally Closed Universe  
 
 At some point science underwent a shift from a causally open universe to a 
causally closed universe, and in doing so, seemed to rule out the possibility of a theistic 
science.  In other words, the underlying metaphysics and assumptions governing the 
conduct of science changed.  The claim is at some point science adopted methodological 
naturalism as its method.  If this in fact happened, when did it happen, and who decided 
that it should happen?  Elliott Sober’s definition of methodological naturalism is that 
“scientific theories should be neutral on the question of whether a supernatural God 
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exists.” 34  This is a statement on method, that only natural explanations are allowed, and 
not a scientific claim that supernatural causation is impossible.  The early empiricist’s 
view of science was open to the possibility of non-natural occurrences as long as they 
involved physical manifestations.  If experience set the boundaries for what may 
constitute knowledge, then any kind of experience conceivable, as long as it is observable 
either to oneself or others, may factor into one’s scientific vision.  In simple enumerative 
induction one cannot carte blanche rule out or disqualify any kind of experience simply 
because it has been judged ‘non-natural.’  Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of God 
begin with empirical facts known to the senses, such as motion.  Does methodological 
naturalism rule out use of God as an explanation of motion?  If this is the best possible 
causal explanation for the universe’s motion, why should it be disallowed?   
The modern ‘received view’ of the method of science has been set by the logical 
positivists.  They sought to eliminate metaphysics from philosophical discourse by means 
of the Verification Principle:  “a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the 
proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.”35  Many 
philosophical problems were the result of language that transcended empirical 
verification.  Such language was judged not as false, but as meaningless.  As a result, we 
can identify three turns here:  the turn toward linguistic analysis, of determining in what 
way a sentence is meaningful; a turn toward naturalism, in that meaning is determined by 
the set of empirical observations that count toward it; and a turn away from idealism, in 
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that metaphysical entities that lay beyond the reach of the spatio-temporal world are 
eviscerated from philosophical discussion. 
Some of the motivation behind the logical positivist’s program was progress of 
science.  The mechanistic view of the world was inherited from both Newton and 
Descartes, who were both dualists and did not rule out causal influence due to spiritual 
forces.  Newton believed that his calculations were proof of God’s occasional 
intervention in nature, as over time the ‘numbers’ were off, requiring God to come in and 
set the planets correctly on their paths.36  Descartes’ vision of a mechanistic universe 
seemed to suggest that the universe was a machine devoid of spiritual content, and set up 
by God with laws and then left to run in accordance with them.  But the transition to a 
causally closed universe really only occurred after the law of the conservation of mass 
was put forth by the French chemist Antoine Lavoisier in 1774.  The law of the 
conservation of energy was developed by several scientists, among them Robert Mayer, 
Ludwig Colding, and James Prescott Joule, but it was Hermann Von Helmholtz’s 1847 
book, On the Conservation of Force, that is credited for gaining widespread acceptance 
of the theory.37  Together, these two laws, along with a new understanding of heat, 
constitute the First law of Thermodynamics, which states that in a closed system, the 
energy of that system remains constant.  Relativity theory showed that mass and energy 
are interchangeable, but can neither be created nor destroyed.   
The first law also states that if the universe is a closed system, and the amount of 
energy and matter in it is fixed, no outside forces can causally interact with it in such a 
way that changes the amount of energy in this system.  For any physical event, there must 
                                                 
36 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1998), 152. 
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be a physical cause, as there is no other possibility.  If methodological naturalism consists 
of the claim that scientific theories should remain neutral about the supernatural or God’s 
existence, the assertion of a causally closed universe does not seem neutral at all.  A 
causally closed universe appears to rule out a theistic God who can create the universe 
and causally act in the world either by originating life, or creating complexity, or guiding 
variations.  However, it is possible to assert that the universe is causally closed and still 
believe in God, just a God who does not act in the world, as a deist might.  
The question now arises whether consciousness, in its role in causal agency, 
constitutes a violation of the law of the conservation of energy.  A central belief of theism 
is the belief that humans are endowed with a spiritual and immortal soul, created by God, 
one that can causally interact with a physical body.  This too appears to be a violation of 
the law of the conversation of energy.  Even though consciousness is radically unlike 
physical processes, a causally closed universe seems to demand that the mind must 
emerge from physical processes.  The problem is that semantic understanding, which 
appears to transcend the physical and hence be irreducible (as Searle’s Chinese Room 
suggests), has to be either identical to brain states, or supervenient upon neurological 
processes, but in a causally inert way.  A similar problem concerns the location of mental 
beliefs.  The only place possible is the brain, for where else could they be located?  But 
no empirical investigation can pinpoint a mental belief in a brain.   
As a result, a causally closed universe seems to rule out substance dualism; there 
can be no Ghost in the machine.  This, says Gilbert Ryle, is a category mistake.  Ryle 
gives three examples of category mistakes:  mistaking a university for the physical 
buildings; mistaking a division as if it were separate from battalions, batteries, and 
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squadrons; and asking, ‘who contributes the team spirit’ after being shown the various 
players in cricket.  Ryle’s 1949 book, The Concept of Mind, is said to have “put the final 
nail in the coffin of ‘Cartesian dualism.’  Ryle claims that Descartes made a category 
mistake in thinking that there is an immaterial mental substance over and beyond a 
person’s behavior and disposition, that the mental belongs in a separate category from the 
bodily and physical.  Though he does not say it, the implication is that God and the 
supernatural is a category mistake as well.  Who in their right mind would want to go 
against science and assert otherwise?  Ryle attempted to solve the problem by writing off 
consciousness and adopting a behaviorist approach to the mind. ”38  Thus Michael 
Silberstein feels justified in proclaiming, “the philosophy of mind is over.”  Science has 
triumphed over the medieval, folk psychology of scholasticism.  Neuroscience, cognitive 
science, and eliminative materialism are now the only items left on the menu. 
By this point, it should be clear that the theist position is threatened.  It does 
appear that science has ruled out theism as a possibility.  But has it?  The law of the 
conservation of energy says it is impossible for anything that isn’t physical to intervene in 
the closed system such as our universe.  Theism asserts God intervenes all the time in the 
physical world (the Israelites constantly ask God to hear their prayers and intervene on 
their behalf).  Science now says this is impossible, that the universe is a causally closed 
system, and that this is an inviolable scientific law.  Has the theist been checkmated by 
science, is it ‘game over’?   To the naturalist, yes, it appears that theistic science, or any 
scientific method other than methodological naturalism, is forbidden by the law of the 
conservation of energy.  But the theist still has an out.  God is not physical, therefore not 
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bound by the laws of nature.  God is a necessary being, not subject to the laws governing 
a contingent creation.  The laws of nature exist because God wills them to, and therefore 
God, being their author, including the one about the conservation of energy, is outside of 
them, and free to override them if he so chooses.  God, not being a physical being, is not 
causally bound by the laws of the nature.  The law of the conservation of energy no more 
binds God and prevents God from acting in the universe, than the law of gravity prevents 
Jesus from walking on water.  These laws are binding for anyone other than their author.  
The theistic God is omnipotent and can do anything, including suspend the laws of 
nature.  If this is true, not merely just believed to be true, but is true, then supernatural 
acts which defy the laws of nature are possible.  As a possibility, the scientific method 
should be open to them, and following McMullin’s suggestion, strong methodological 
naturalism should be qualified so as not to categorically rule out any supernatural 
explanations that might compete with natural explanations, particularly in those problem 
areas in which the phenomena defy reduction. 
 
9.  Who determines what the method of science is?  Is there a method of science? 
 
 McMullin raises an important issue in proposing to change from strong 
methodological naturalism to qualified methodological naturalism.  Who determined that 
the method of science should be strong methodological naturalism, and is it possible to 
change it?  What is the scientific method?  What is science?  Isaac Asimov simply states 
that science is “curiosity, the overwhelming desire to know.”39  The goal of science is to 
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increase knowledge of the world.  The scientific method is important because this method 
is supposed to be the means by which we do this.  The classical empiricist conception of 
science maintains that science is based upon the method of simple enumerative induction, 
in which facts about the world are gathered empirically, and general conclusions or 
hypotheses drawn from them.  This widely held commonsense view of science argues 
that the facts are ‘neutral’ – that they are what they are, objective, and are not subject to 
the vagaries of one’s personal beliefs.  Aristotle’s empiricism was not necessarily 
inductive; it was based more on the discernment of essential natures and principles that 
were somehow self-evident to the senses.   
The title ‘father of the scientific method’ falls upon Roger Bacon (1220-1292), 
who was inspired by Aristotle and Arabic science.  He is the first Western scientist to 
incorporate inductive reasoning into the scientific method.  Francis Bacon (1561-1626) 
was inspired by his namesake, but sought to “move away from Aristotle’s passive 
observation to the experimental methods of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo.”40  Bacon 
saw reliance on Aristotle and traditional philosophical systems, rather than nature, as an 
idol of the mind, an illusion which needed to be swept clean so that science could start 
anew, built firmly on only empirical facts.  What was needed was an army of scientists to 
venture out beyond the pillars of Hercules and gather observations, and perform 
experiments. The early scientific method was based on a form of naïve realism, the idea 
that the facts are “directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via the senses…[and] 
are prior to and independent of theory...and constitute a firm and reliable foundation for 
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scientific knowledge.”41  In order to determine the cause of a phenomenon, Bacon 
suggested listing all of its possible causes and then by experimentation, eliminating faulty 
explanations until only the true cause remained.42  John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) further 
refined this approach.  Thus the common sense view of the scientific method was mapped 
out:  deriving hypotheses from the facts through enumerative induction, which are then 
subject to experimentation, which eliminates those hypotheses which fail the experiment. 
However, simple enumerative induction faces several difficulties.  David Hume 
believed that the causal connection underlying many (not all) inductive inferences is 
never apparent since the connection is never given as a sense impression.  For this reason, 
induction could simply be a bastard of the imagination, the ‘constant conjunction’ of two 
arbitrarily paired random events.  Rather than derived from necessary causal connections, 
induction is based on an expectation formed by association and habit, one that may or 
may not be warranted.43  Another problem induction faces is that induction relies upon 
the principle of the uniformity of nature.  The universe is under no obligation to behave 
in the future as it did in the past.  This is simply an unjustified assumption.  The only way 
to justify induction is circularly, by saying that future events should resemble past events 
because in the past future events resembled past events.  This uses induction to justify 
induction.  Waiving that point, hypotheses can never be conclusively confirmed by 
induction to be true.  They can only be corroborated, made stronger.  Each empirical fact 
that supports a hypothesis may make the hypothesis more likely, but it never conclusively 
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confirms it.  Each new white swan corroborates that ‘all swans are white,’ but it only 
takes one black swan to falsify the proposition.  
Descartes rejected inductive reasoning, as did Karl Popper.  Popper’s solution to 
the problem of induction is falsificationism, which he sees as the heart of the scientific 
method.  Therefore he believed that the line of demarcation separating science from 
pseudo-science is not corroboration but falsification.  Anything can confirm 
psychoanalytic theory or astrology, but can these fields be subjected to an experiment that 
would falsify them?  If not, then they are not scientific theories.  A good scientific theory 
is one that will make a daring prediction, a bold conjecture, the riskier the better, and if it 
passes the test it is corroborated, just as Einstein’s theory of relativity was confirmed by 
Eddington when he demonstrated that the gravity of the sun causes a deflection in the 
light of the stars.  Popper’s method is not built from the ground up inductively, but rather 
uses data to try to deduce predictions from one’s initial conjecture, which experiments 
either corroborate or refute.   
The hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model, is “the most common description of 
good scientific procedure in science textbooks.”44  However, there are several 
formulations of it, and several different philosophers’ versions are usually run together.  
It was initially advanced by William Whewell (who coined the term ‘scientist’ in 1833), 
and then developed by others.45  Whewell rejected the ‘pure empiricism’ of Bacon, 
Locke, and Hume, because he felt “the Idea of Cause...is not borrowed from 
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experience.”46  His History of the Inductive Sciences attempts to trace how science 
progresses from a prelude of mere collection of facts, to an ‘inductive epoch’ by means of 
‘colligation,’ which brings the facts together under a hypothesis.  Whewell reflects the 
influence of Kant and sees the formation of hypotheses as more the result of a creative, 
active mind, than as the direct result of one’s observations. The ‘sequel’ stage occurs 
when a successful theory is further refined by experimentation and application.47  Though 
versions vary, the hypothetico-deductive model follows this basic routine:  one gathers 
some observations, one forms a hypothesis through conjecture (some theorists are open to 
induction) that will explain the data, one deduces predictions from the hypothesis, and 
then tests them.48  One observes swans; forms the hypotheses ‘all swans are white’ by 
means of conjecture or amassed facts; predicts that future swans will be white; and with 
each white swan observed, the hypothesis achieves greater support.  If the prediction 
turns out to be false, then the hypothesis has been falsified and a new one must be 
theorized. 
Karl Popper’s falsification method is considered to be a form of the hypothetico-
deductive model.  In Baconian induction, the hypothesis is derived inductively from a 
large number of facts.  Popper, like Hume, felt arguments based on induction have 
problems.  To avoid these, Popper claimed that hypotheses are not inductively derived 
from the data, but are simply conjectures that guide fact-gathering.  Popper’s model 
seems to suggest the hypothesis should precede the collection of data, rather than being 
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derived from it.49  Popper sought to use deduction rather than induction as his method.  
One deduces predictions from the hypotheses, and if they are proven wrong, then the 
hypothesis is falsified.  This follows the deductive form of Modus Tollens.  If A 
(hypothesis), then B (prediction).  Not B (prediction fails), therefore, not A (hypothesis is 
wrong).  However, what if the prediction is verified?  Is the hypothesis confirmed?  If A 
(hypothesis), then B (prediction).  B (prediction fulfilled), therefore A (hypothesis).  To 
argue this way is to commit the fallacy of Affirming the Consequent.  While affirming 
the consequent by means of a successful prediction may provide some evidence for the 
hypothesis, and suggest a strong inference, it does not necessarily follow.  Once again, 
we see why Popper was wary of saying that a hypothesis could be confirmed.  What 
matters for Popper is Modus Tollens, whether or not the hypothesis has been falsified, not 
Affirming the Consequent, a fallacy which nevertheless suggests a strong inference or 
corroboration, but not confirmation. 
Hempel’s deductive-nomological (D-L) model is also considered a form of the 
hypothetico-deductive model.  Hempel’s model was called ‘the covering law model of 
explanation’ by others, in that “the essence of explanation is to show that the 
phenomenon to be explained is ‘covered’ by some general law of nature.”50  Why do the 
planets follow elliptical orbits?  Planetary motion can be covered under Galileo’s and 
Kepler’s laws of motion, which in turn can be covered under Newtonian laws of motion 
and gravitation, which are then covered by Einsteinian relativity.51  The argument takes 
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the form of deduction, with one premise stating a law of nature, the second particular 
facts, and the conclusion states the explanandum, the observation one seeks to explain.  
As in a deductive argument, if the premises are true and the form valid, the argument is 
sound, and the explanandum is the logical result of the explanans.  This model is called 
the covering law model of explanation because in response to a ‘why’ question (Why is 
the sky blue?), it uses a scientific law (electromagnetic theory of light and differing 
wavelengths of color) and a particular fact (the sun is overhead and the earth’s 
atmosphere at this angle scatters the shorter blue wavelength more frequently than the 
red), to explain the phenomena being asked (why is the sky blue).  It can be symbolically 
stated in the following form: 
1) L1-Ln (the laws) 
2) C1-Ck (the initial conditions) 
3) E (observation statement)52 
 
Premises 1 and 2 constitute the explanans, the statements that do the explaining.  The 
third statement is the conclusion, the explanandum, or phenomena which needs a 
scientific explanation.  Hempel’s model is similar to Popper’s in that “every scientific 
explanation is potentially a prediction.”  The prediction/explanation symmetry thesis 
states that “explanation-after-the-fact could equally well have served as a prediction-
before-the-observed-fact.”53  Hempel’s model also allows for deductive-statistical 
explanations (e.g., respecting the probability of radioactive decay) as well as Inductive-
statistical explanation (probability of successful treatment of a streptococcus infection 
with penicillin).54 
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 The scientific models proposed by the positivists, including ones not discussed 
such as Carnap’s, constitute the ‘received view’ of scientific method (the label the 
‘received view’ is attributed to Hilary Putnam and Frederick Suppe).  The models by no 
means constitute a ‘unified package.’55  Nevertheless, they dominated the philosophy of 
science for the first half of the 20th century.  This is not to say that the ‘received view’ is 
current scientific orthodoxy, because it is not.  The ‘received view’ serves as the basis for 
which contemporary discussion of scientific method begins, and upon which all 
discussion and further critique develops.  “No one standpoint has risen as its successor; 
instead, a number of alternative approaches are now on the table, distinguishable by what 
in the received view they reject.”56  All of the various criticisms of the received view 
cannot be considered in detail here.  Instead, the focus will be on those which are relevant 
to this discussion.   
Pierre Duhem critiqued Popper’s falsificationism by arguing that you can’t test a 
single hypothesis.  Duhem argued that there is no such thing as a crucial experiment upon 
which the fate of a hypothesis turns, because the whole theory is involved in conducting 
an experiment, as well as a host of background assumptions, and you can’t tell which part 
is disproven by a failed experiment.  This insight eventually gets merged with Quine’s 
second dogma of empiricism, which says it is impossible to specify the empirical content 
of any single statement independent of the web of belief.  Together they form the Quine-
Duhem thesis, which take a holistic approach toward science, arguing that all scientific 
claims are interconnected and cannot be tested individually.  While Quine would consider 
it misguided to weave the Homeric gods into one’s web of belief, science posits the 
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existence of physical objects in a similar manner, posits like ‘quarks’ which may or may 
not exist.  Why favor the latter over the former?  The ‘posits’ of science have greater 
pragmatic justification than the ‘posits’ of the Greek gods.  This seems to be Quine’s 
attempt to justify not only science, but a naturalized epistemology (methodological 
naturalism) that is grounded in an ontological naturalism.  The overall coherence of the 
web of belief is able to explain the empirical data encountered on the fringes.  However, 
many of the beliefs and generalizations formed on the basis of the data are 
underdetermined, and underdetermination may give rise to relativism, as Thomas Kuhn 
demonstrates. 57 
Another problem with positivism is that it takes scientific theorizing and testing to 
be independent of context.  But clearly scientific discovery is context dependent, as Kuhn 
demonstrates.  Kuhn differs from Popper and perhaps reflects Quine’s influence in taking 
a more holistic approach to how science is practiced, one derived from viewing scientific 
method from a historical perspective.  Kuhn also dislikes Popper’s emphasis on 
falsificationism.  Kuhn distinguishes between three kinds of science:  pre-paradigmatic, 
normal and revolutionary science.  In the pre-paradigmatic stage there is no consensus 
among the community as to what governing rules or theories account for the phenomena 
in question.  There are a large number of competing schools, each with their own theories 
and variations which attempt to solve some kind of ‘puzzle’ which mystifies them.  
Eventually one ‘paradigm’ gains the widespread acceptance of a community, and after 
that scientists can operate under the umbrella of what Kuhn terms ‘normal’ science.  
However, unlike Popper, what the scientists do in this phase (which is the type of science 
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most often practiced) is not try to falsify or disprove the paradigm, but instead assume it’s 
correct and try to solve outstanding ‘puzzles’ on that assumption.  For Kuhn normal 
science is not subversive to its foundation or its operating principles (whereas for Popper 
it is).  
A paradigm, however, is never ‘true’ for Kuhn; it only achieves its validity through 
the consensus of the scientific community.  No paradigm is without its flaws.  Every 
paradigm is based upon an imperfect, finite sampling of experiences and data.  Hence all 
paradigms are subject to counter-instances, or to use Popper’s terminology, falsifications.  
Kuhn calls phenomena which somehow violate the paradigm ‘anomalies,’ but he does not 
view all anomalies as falsifications.  The ‘discovery’ of oxygen violated the paradigm of 
phlogiston, and the discovery of X-rays violated then current ideas about the possible forms 
of radiation, but did oxygen or X-rays falsify anything? 58   Kuhn also notes that Newton’s 
computations only accounted for half of the moon’s perigee and thus for sixty years after 
his death his theory could not accurately predict the moon’s motion.59  Does this mean that 
we should reject his theory, as Popper would have us do?  Kuhn says not (as it turned out, 
Newton’s math was wrong).  Thus Kuhn concludes “if any and every failure to fit were 
ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times.”60  Another 
challenge for Popper is how to decide how serious a falsification must be in order to falsify 
a theory.  If there are degrees of falsification – how does one decide which are serious and 
which are not? 
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Kuhn also seems to go against Popper’s prohibition of ad hoc modifications, and 
argues that adopting a paradigm will always involve a certain amount of tweaking to try 
to get the theory right.  This isn’t a problem, for how does one tell what is part of the 
theory itself, or merely an ad hoc modification to it?  Are epicycles an ad hoc 
modification to the Ptolemaic system, added after the fact, or were they originally part of 
the understanding how planets behaved while orbiting the earth?  Paradigms are not fixed 
for Kuhn, unable to be amended; instead they are open-ended.  None has ever resolved all 
the problems; there is always more ‘mop-up work’ to be done.  Kuhn likens a paradigm 
to an “accepted judicial decision in the common law; it is an object for further 
articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions.”61   Elsewhere he 
calls a paradigm a ‘map’ and just as a map is not the territory Kuhn similarly argues “it is 
hard to make nature fit a paradigm.”62  
As a result, Kuhn’s “negative view of theories is devastating to any philosophy of 
science built on the premise that theories are the primary bearer of objective scientific 
truth.” 63  No matter how well accepted a paradigm is, it always risks being overthrown.  
The best that can be expected is provisional, convergent truth, but never objective truth.   
Even though the theory is not questioned in normal science, problems will inevitably 
arise or a false prediction made.  If stubborn anomalies resist solution and arouse all the 
energies of the community in a final, last ditch effort to bring them under the existing 
paradigm, then a crisis emerges.  The paradigm is now in danger of being discarded, or in 
Popper’s terms, of being falsified.  Kuhn even cites Popper and states:  “the role thus 
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attributed to falsification is much like the one [I] assign to anomalous experiences, i.e., 
experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory.”64  Although Kuhn 
did not like the term ‘falsification,’ his use of ‘anomaly’ performs an analogous (albeit 
not identical) role to that of ‘falsification.’   
Finally, in the revolutionary stage a radical thinker, often younger and less 
committed to the old ways of thinking, suggests an innovative new way to solve the crisis 
by presenting to the community a new paradigm which is often incompatible with the old 
one.65  This too may agree with Popper’s criterion that confirmations based upon ‘risky 
predictions’ should carry greater weight than those that do not.  Often when a new 
paradigm is introduced it does not generally gain immediate acceptance unless it can 
make such predictions, which are then confirmed.  The bending of light was one of 
Einstein’s risky predictions, and its confirmation by Eddington is what finally led to 
relativity being accepted fourteen years after it was first proposed.  
 It is Kuhn’s last stage, that of revolutionary science in which persistent anomalies 
lead to the dethroning of the current scientific paradigm and its replacement with another, 
that most resembles Popper’s emphasis on falsification.  But as Kuhn has noted, 
revolutionary science is not ‘normal’ science, the type of science which most scientists do 
every day, which is working within a paradigm and assuming its validity in order to 
develop its applications.  The mistake Popper makes, according to Kuhn, is mistaking 
‘revolutionary science’ for normal science, of characterizing “the entire scientific 
enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts.”66  
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10.  There is no method to Science:  Feyerabend 
 
In his book Against Method, Paul Feyerabend argues that there is no method to 
science.  If there is no method, then how can one argue that strong methodological 
naturalism is the method of science, and invoking the non-natural is unscientific, and 
hence should be disqualified as non-science?  Feyerabend argues that it is an underlying 
assumption that science has a rational method which can describe and explain natural 
phenomenon.  Similarly, there is a tendency to see religion in the opposite light, as based 
on beliefs which cannot be logically or empirically supported.  Feyerabend questions 
whether these assumptions are valid, and if science is as rational an enterprise as its 
adherents proclaim.  If not, then the standards and principles governing science are in fact 
no different from those governing religion, and the state is not justified in sanctioning one 
ideology over the other.  Feyerabend’s thesis is that the state should not be engaged in the 
practice of bending the minds of its citizens to the standard of any particular group, 
whether it be scientists, mystics, existentialists, or nudists.  He states “we must stop the 
scientists from taking over education and from teaching as ‘fact’ and as ‘the one true 
method’ whatever the myth of the day happens to be.”67 
 Feyerabend believes there is no consensus among either scientists or philosophers 
upon what science is, or what its primary aim should be – to predict, explain, unify, 
confirm, verify, falsify hypotheses – or by what method it should proceed – induction, 
deduction, probability or simply guessing.  Even the most self-evident examples of what 
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does not count as science – the punching dummy of astrology – is questionable, since 
astronomy grew out of astrology, just as chemistry grew out of alchemy.  Similarly, the 
way that religion is often denigrated as being opposed to science, as the enemy of science 
preventing progress and enlightenment, is also misguided.  One of the central claims of 
the New Atheists is that science is rational, and religion is not.  But if one sees the goal of 
religion as the pursuit of ultimate truth, how is this any different from the goal of 
science?  Science and religion both make claims to truth, and Feyerabend sees scientific 
rationalism as the secular equivalent of the word of God.68  
 Originally trained as a Popperian, after reading Wittgenstein and Kuhn, 
Feyerabend ultimately came not only to reject reason as the foundation of the scientific 
method, but to reject even the notion of there being a scientific method.  Faith in reason 
and science is just a secular form of religion, requiring assent to a certain set of 
unjustifiable assumptions and beliefs.  Reason should not be the arbiter of all other 
traditions because reason itself is simply one of the many traditions.69  If there is such a 
thing as an arbiter in epistemology it is not reason but simply the democratic process 
itself in which each is free to pick and choose the ideology he or she likes best.  Just as 
political candidates use propaganda and coercion to gain office, so which ideas win out is 
largely a matter of persuasion, not reason.  Thus the logical force of one’s arguments 
should have no privileged epistemic value.   Feyerabend argues that what fueled the 
Copernican Revolution was not so much rational arguments as the passion of Galileo.  He 
claims much of the Copernican cosmology was incoherent and appeared as ‘silly’ to his 
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and Galileo’s peers (hence irrational).70  Scientific rationality therefore is not normative; 
it has no method it can prescribe to its followers, and when one examines the history of 
science one finds “there is not a single rule that is not violated at some time or 
other…anything goes.”71   
 Feyerabend came to reject what he called ‘scientific chauvinism:’ “what is 
compatible with science should live, what is not compatible with science should die.”72  
Instead he championed a type of cultural relativism, in which no one view should 
dominate all others.  
   In the years around 1964 Mexicans, blacks, Indians entered the 
university as a result of new educational policies.  There they sat, partly 
curious, partly disdainful, partly simply confused hoping to get an 
‘education’.  What an opportunity, my rationalist friends told me, to 
contribute to the spreading of reason and the improvement of mankind…I 
felt very differently…Who was I to tell these people what and how to 
think?...Their ancestors had developed cultures of their own…These 
cultures have important achievements…Yet they were never examined 
with the respect they deserved…they were ridiculed and replaced as a 
matter of course first by the religion of brotherly love and then by the 
religion of science…73 
 
 Feyerabend refused to pretend that he had anything normative to teach his 
students, i.e., the correct method of scientific inquiry.74  He refused to perpetuate the 
illusion of objective rationality that the yes-men of science proclaimed, seeing it instead 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 114.  Feyerabend states on pg 29:  “When a new view is proposed it faces a hostile audience and 
excellent reasons are needed to gain for it an even moderately fair hearing.  The reasons are produced, but 
they are often disregarded or laughed out of court, and unhappiness is the fate of the bold inventors.”  “It is 
clear that allegiance to the new ideas will have to be brought about by means other than arguments.  It will 
have to be brought about by irrational means such as propaganda, emotion, ad hoc hypotheses, and appeal 
to prejudices of all kinds.  We need these ‘irrational means’ in order to uphold what is nothing but a blind 
faith until we have found the auxiliary sciences, the facts, the arguments that turn the faith into sound 
‘knowledge’.”  
71 Ibid., 14, 19. 
72 Ibid., 36. 
73 Ibid., 263-4. 
74 Ibid., 157.  Nevertheless, Feyerabend still seems to adhere to some principles of critical rationalism, 
those which “take falsifications seriously; increase content; avoid ad hoc hypotheses; ‘be honest’ – 
whatever that means and so on.”   
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as a form of Western cultural imperialism (we know the truth, you don’t, so you’re in 
error and we’re justified in enslaving you).  In an analysis of the power structure of the 
state, Feyerabend sees the state and the state-sponsored educational system as officially 
endorsing the ideology of scientific rationalism and using money, positions, research 
grants, textbooks, and grades to withhold reward and punish those who don’t toe the line 
of scientific orthodoxy.  Against Method tries to turn the tables on those who insist 
science has a normative method that must be followed.  Feyerabend says if science tells 
us to proceed inductively, it is possible to find instances where science proceeded 
counterinductively.  He cites Galileo’s praise for Copernicus and Aristarchus, whom he 
saw proceeding in a counterinductive manner when the facts did not support their 
position.75  Thus he claims science unfolds not by induction (for the facts may be 
subjective, shaped by perception, contradict one’s theory, or be steeped in current 
theories and old ways of thinking), but by speculation, telling stories, or spinning grand 
and novel ‘fairy tales.’76    
 Feyerabend’s reasoning is that if Newton’s mechanics contradicted Galileo’s, and 
Galileo’s contradicted Kepler’s, yet each in its day was considered ‘true,’ didn’t one of 
them prove to be another just-so story?  However, Feyerabend is not saying that all 
scientific theories are just-so stories, or that any theory is as good as the next, as a naïve 
anarchist would claim.77  It is wrong to read Feyerabend as arguing astrology is just as 
good an explanation of events as astronomy.  Feyerabend is simply saying all scientific 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 80-81. 
76 Ibid., 21-2. 
77 Ibid., 231.  The naïve anarchist believes that all rules are worthless and should be given up.  Though the 
assertion ‘anything goes’ implies Feyerabend is a naïve anarchist, he tempers this viewpoint by saying he 
believes in rules, but that these rules have limits or are context-dependent.  Thus the term ‘relativist’ is 
probably more appropriate.  In Against Method he states he longer likes the term anarchism and now 
prefers to use the term Dadaist (p. xiv). 
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theories run the risk of potentially being exposed as fairy tales eventually.  The mistake is 
in thinking that our current scientific worldview is the final true one, a ‘timeless entity’ 
without defect or limits (thus refusing to acknowledge that it might be a fairy tale).78  
Clearly the history of science has borne this insight out – the assumption that the 
foundation of our current scientific worldview is solid, is often discovered not to be 
correct.  So what is needed, then, is a variety of opinions and theories to challenge and 
expose possible cracks in the foundations.  Thus if Popper sees science largely in terms of 
Kuhn’s last stage (anomaly, crisis, and revolution), Feyerabend tends to see science in 
terms of the pre-scientific stage, where a plurality of incommensurable theories flourish 
(i.e., there is no single paradigm that should prevail over all the others as in the ‘normal 
science’ stage).79  The belief that science even offers a unified theory or speaks with a 
single voice is mistaken, as is evident by the current incompatibility of relativity with 
quantum theory.  
Just as Quine attempted to dissolve the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements, Feyerabend attempts to dissolve the distinction between science and non-
science in several ways, the most obvious in denying that rationality is the normative 
method of science.  For our purposes, his insight is that science believes strong 
methodological naturalism is and should be normative.  In addition, as Feyerabend notes 
– though he perhaps exaggerates the strength and importance of this – the values of the 
general (non-scientific) public help control or determine what kind of science is or should 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 106. 
79 Ibid., 146.  Against Kuhn’s notion that crises precipitate revolutions, Feyerabend argues that in the 
Copernican ‘revolution’ there were no anomalies, hence no crisis – in other words, the Ptolemaic system 
was ‘empirically adequate’ to explain the data.  It was only after Copernicus (or Galileo) put forth his thesis 
that there was either a crisis or revolution.  
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be practiced.  The public can do this by managing funding or passing laws, etc.  If the 
general public holds to religious values, they can and should influence how science is 
done.     
According to Hempel, one of the aims of science is explanation.  Well, if a 
hypothesis which best explains the phenomenon in question can be justifiably inferred, 
what rule dictates that supernatural explanations should be de facto ruled out?  If 
scientists are justified in making ontological claims about the existence of unobservable 
particles based upon their observable effects, why can’t the same kind of reasoning be 
employed by philosophers and theologians to reason from the observable effects of this 
world to a possible unobservable cause of it?  In the naturalist evolution vs. intelligent 
design (unguided vs. guided variation) debate, why should a materialistic hypothesis be 
considered as the only legitimate explanation to account for the origin of species?  Can 
science explain what happened the moment before the big bang?  If it cannot and religion 
can provide a satisfactory explanation, why should a non-natural explanation be ruled 
out?  If science can describe the laws of nature, but cannot tell you why there are laws of 
nature, while religion can, why should the latter be excluded from being taught simply 
because it’s non-natural?   
 Feyerabend’s slogan is “Anything goes.”  While many people twist this to mean 
different things, probably the best way to interpret what it means is that there is no fixed 
scientific method, anything goes.   However, it can be interpreted as an overall reflection 
on science itself, that scientific reason does not and should not have a corner on the 
market.80  As a result scientific chauvinism should not privilege science over non-
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scientific worldviews; science can be just as sloppy and irrational as religion.  Nor should 
one act as if all the phenomena in question can be understood by the current scientific 
models.  Current paradigms are never to be treated as true.81  All paradigms and their 
methodologies are open-ended, and always subject to revision.82  According to 
Feyerabend, the principles, rules, standards, and facts of any one theory are never to be 
considered sacrosanct since the evidence supporting that theory is circular, in that the 
facts themselves are constructed and interpreted by the theory itself.  Thus Feyerabend 
argues:  “learning does not go from observation to theory but always involves both 
elements – experience arises together with theoretical assumptions, not before them.”83 
 If competing methodologies are incommensurable, they cannot be used to judge 
one another because they contain different assumptions.  Thus the methods of science 
cannot be used to judge religion, and vice-versa.  The Church should not have attempted 
to silence Galileo just as scientists should not attempt to silence the Church.  Just as 
religion cannot be defended on purely rational grounds, neither can science.  Thus the 
state should not give its official sanction to any one particular ideology, or allow only one 
perspective to be heard, thereby silencing all the others as intellectual heresy.  Though 
Feyerabend ultimately rejects Popper’s rationalism, he still shares Popper’s belief in an 
open society.  “In a democracy ‘reason’ has just as much right to be heard and to be 
                                                 
81 Ibid, 132-2.  Feyerabend writes:  “Galileo was advised [by the Church] to teach Copernicus as a 
hypothesis; he was forbidden to teach it as a truth…there are now many scientists, especially in high 
energy physics, who view all theories as instruments of prediction and reject truth-talk as being 
metaphysical and speculative…To 16th and 17th- century scientists, only a few astronomers thought of 
deferents and epicycles as real roads in the sky; most regarded them as roads on paper which might aid 
calculation but which had no counterpart in reality.”   
82 Ibid., 156. 
83 Ibid., 149. 
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expressed as ‘unreason’ especially in view of the fact that one man’s ‘reason’ is the other 
man’s insanity.”84   
 
11.  Elliott Sober:  Is the Scientific Method a Myth?  
 
 When trying to answer the question, does science have a method, Elliott Sober, as 
might be expected of a philosopher of biology, turns to Darwin for the answer.  He states 
that in a letter to his friend, Joseph Hooker, Darwin discussed the problem of how to 
classify species.  He said there are two kinds of biologists when it comes to this issue, 
lumpers and splitters.  The lumpers emphasize the similarities, so have fewer species than 
the splitters, who emphasize the differences.  Sober then uses these two categories in an 
analogy on how to address the question of scientific method.  He states that the historians 
of science are the splitters, who argue “the methods used in a scientific discipline have 
changed through time and that different scientific disciplines have different 
methodologies.”85  Kuhn and Feyerabend are splitters.  Philosophers of science on the 
other hand are lumpers; they see their job as normative, as describing “the methods that 
scientists ought to use.”  Historians reason that if this doesn’t happen in real life, then talk 
of normativity even in theory is absurd.   
 Which brings us once again back to Darwin.  What was Darwin’s method in 
practicing science?  Sober doesn’t really address this point.  He sees the thrust of 
Darwin’s argument as twofold:  not just for descent with modification by means of 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 161. 
85 Ellitt Sober, ‘Is the Scientific Method a Myth?’ in Metode Science Studies Journal, 5 (2015):  195-199.  
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natural selection, but for common ancestry as well.  Sober then uses a probability 
argument developed by Ian Hacking to show how one could not confirm, but make a case 
for Darwin’s conclusion.  Sober argues it is impossible to make a deductive argument in 
this case.  Scientific laws and theories often go far beyond the observations that are used 
to support them.  Rather, he says, the best one can do is approach this problem using 
probability and hope to show the argument is strong rather than weak.  He concludes that 
the probability that humans and monkeys have a common ancestor, given both have 
tailbones, is greater than the probability that they don’t have common ancestors.  
Therefore, Darwin’s theory of common ancestry is a strong argument.  The method of 
science he has used to justify this conclusion is statistical inference.  Thus science has a 
method, according to Sober, which he has just illustrated.   
But this could not have been the identical method of Darwin, as Sober is using a 
method of statistical reasoning developed by Ian Hacking in his 1965 book, The Logic of 
Statistical Inference.  So Sober’s response to the question, is the scientific method a 
myth, is no, the scientific method involves applying the law of likelihood to the evidence.  
In doing so, he seems to imply that Ian Hacking’s method, using the updated logic of 
statistical probability, as well as Neo-Bayesian theory, should be normative.  But his 
invocation of Darwin into his explanation of why, implies that Darwin reasoned in a 
similar way.  Elliott Sober may be a ‘lumper,’ but he has not shown that science has a 
method if Darwin is being used to illustrate that method.  What method, if any, did 
Darwin use in arriving at this theory of evolution?  Statistical inference, coupled with 
Bayesian updating, is Sober’s method, but what was Darwin’s?  
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12.  What was Darwin’s scientific method? Was Darwin a methodological naturalist?   
 
 Central to the debate over the scientific method Darwin is said to have employed, 
is the debate over when Darwin became convinced of the truth of evolution.  Was it 
during his time on the voyage of the Beagle, or afterwards?  Why does this matter?  It 
matters because the answer helps determine Darwin’s methodology.  If he amassed a 
large collection of facts and then derived hypotheses from these facts, then he is 
following the Baconian method of induction.  If he was guided by one of two central 
hypotheses, evolution or special creation, in collecting and interpreting his facts, then he 
was following the hypothetico-deductive method.  In Baconian induction the facts come 
first, then the hypothesis (which is more like the conclusion).  In the H-D method, the 
hypothesis comes first, which then steers one towards the relevant data. 
Support for the position that Baconian induction was Darwin’s method comes 
from several statements he made in his writings, as well as the fact that on the voyage of 
the Beagle he was exposed to an inordinate amount of facts about species from all over 
the globe.  He states in the conclusion of The Voyage of the Beagle, “It appears that 
nothing can be more improving to a young naturalist, than a journey in distant country.”86   
In his Autobiography, he states, “My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for 
grinding general laws out of large collections of facts.”87  The question then becomes, 
does Darwin arrive at evolution by means of natural selection by induction?  If he left 
England a firm believer in fixity of species, when did he change his mind?  In Variation 
of Animals he begins by stating, “During the voyage of HMS Beagle…I found myself 
                                                 
86 Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle, (New York:  Penguin Classics, 1989), 508. 
87 Darwin, Autobiography, 139. 
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surrounded by peculiar species of birds, reptiles, and plants existing nowhere else in the 
world….I often asked myself how these many peculiar animals and plants had been 
produced:  the simplest answer…. [They] descended from each other, undergoing 
modification in the course of their descent.”88  Thus, it appears he begins to doubt fixity 
of species while on the Beagle, and begins to entertain the notion of evolution.  The 
Beagle returns in October, 1836.  Darwin states that he did not regard evolution as the 
‘simplest answer’ until he hit upon the mechanism of natural selection after reading 
Thomas Malthus’s 1798 “Essay on the Principle of Population,” in October of 1838. 
On the other hand, if Darwin formed the hypothesis of evolution while on the trip, 
then he would have been guided by this hypothesis in his collection of facts, focusing on 
those which were most pertinent.  Then his method would be hypothetico-deductive.  It is 
not Baconian in that he is being guided by theory, not facts.  It is no mystery that Darwin 
was exposed to evolutionary thought at Edinburgh, and Paley’s natural theology at 
Cambridge.  He was well aware of conflicting accounts of the origin of species before he 
left England.  At the time he left he was a firm believer in the fixity of species.  But he 
also left England in December, 1831, with the first volume of Lyell’s Principles of 
Geology, which he states in the Autobiography he “studied attentively; and this book was 
of the highest service to me in many ways.”89  The second volume of this work reached 
him in the city of Montevideo in Uruguay in 1832.  The importance of this book is that it 
argues that natural processes, like those evident today, rather than catastrophic events like 
Noah’s flood, are responsible for the earth’s current geological structure.  If this is true, 
                                                 
88 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, Vol. 1  (Baltimore:  John 
Hopkins Press, 1998), 10. 
89 Darwin., Autobiography, 77. 
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then the earth must be much older than anyone believed at the time.  Darwin comes to 
admit that he was guided by Lyell’s hypothesis while observing many geological features 
on his trip, and came to agree with him.  In addition, he came to adopt the same approach 
for explaining species, that over long periods of time, natural variations accumulate and 
can cause change in species.  Thus it is possible to argue that Lyell’s uniformitarian 
hypothesis guided Darwin’s early evolutionary thinking, fact collecting, and fossil 
gathering.  Support for this interpretation is found in one of the letters Darwin wrote, 
stating “How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or 
against some view if it is to be of any service!”90   
Following Hempel’s deductive-nomological model, natural selection is the law of 
nature that explains the variety of species Darwin witnessed in his travels, by showing 
how variations that are favored allow an organism to gain an adaptive advantage and 
more successfully reproduce and multiply, while unfavorable variations are washed 
away.  This model also pits competing hypotheses against one another.  Those 
hypotheses that have a greater explanatory scope, i.e., explain more facts, have a higher 
degree of likelihood or probability of being correct.  Darwin himself states that if a 
hypothesis “explains various large and independent classes of facts it rises to the rank of 
a well-grounded theory.”91  Darwin uses this method to justify his belief that natural 
selection is a superior theory over direct creation because it explains more facts than 
special creation.  He states, “How inexplicable [are these facts] on the doctrine of 
independent acts of creation!  How simply explained on the principle of natural 
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1903), 195.   
91 Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, 9. 
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selection...[which] gives a rational explanation of many apparently independent classes of 
facts.”92  For these reasons, Michael Ghiselin believes that Charles Darwin “emphasized 
the hypothetico-deductive approach.”93  Francisco J. Ayala not only argues that Darwin’s 
method was the hypothetico-deductive approach, but that this model is considered to be 
the method of science.  He rejects induction because he thinks “no scientist works 
without any preconceived plan.”94  The hypothetico-deductive model, on the other hand, 
acknowledges the “heuristic role of hypotheses, which guide empirical research by 
suggesting what is worth observing.”95    
It is also argued that Darwin frequently tested his hypotheses against his 
observations.  This would count him as a Popperian, although it is difficult to see how 
one could test the theory of natural selection in an experiment.  Natural selection and 
species origination are not something one can necessarily observe, so it is difficult to see 
how one could test his theory in an experiment.  Yet, Ayala claims this is what Darwin 
was doing in his multiple experiments with barnacles, orchids, fossils, and in his 
taxonomic writings, though few of Darwin’s studies on these topics are ever read.  
Ghiselin also provides a detailed examination of Darwin’s method as he developed and 
tested his hypotheses about the formation of coral reefs, common ancestry, taxonomy, 
variation, evolutionary psychology, and sexual selection.  When J.B.S. Haldane was 
asked what would count as evidence against evolution, or what evidence would falsify 
the theory, Haldane reputedly said “rabbit fossils in the Precambrian.”96  Mammals didn’t 
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94 Francisco J. Ayala, ‘Darwin and the Scientific Method,’ in PNAS, June 16, 2009, Vol 106.  10035. 
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exist in the Precambrian so these fossils would presumably show that the theory is false.  
But does the fact that none have ever been found confirm Darwin’s theory?  No, but it 
can be interpreted as a strong inference, or as lending support to his theory.  And would 
finding a Precambrian rabbit fossil falsify Darwin’s theory?  Not necessarily.  Duhem 
would argue that Precambrian rabbit fossils would just mean the theory needs some 
reworking.  Within a Kuhnian framework, Precambrian rabbit fossils would not 
necessarily spark a scientific revolution; the routine of normal science would continue to 
operate under paradigm of evolution.  A rabbit fossil would only suggest that were some 
bugs in the theory that still needed to be worked out. 
When it comes to explaining the diversity of plant and animal life, Darwin 
preferred natural explanation to supernatural speculation.  This suggests Darwin was a 
methodological naturalist.  However, Darwin’s methodological naturalism does have its 
limits.  Darwin does not remain ‘neutral’ about God.  He allows for supernatural 
explanations to compete alongside natural ones.  He also admits that he is not sure natural 
selection alone can account for complex organs.  He is open to a supernatural explanation 
for the origin of the universe, as well as the origin of life.  He states, “The first origin of 
life on this earth, as well as the continued life of each individual, is at present quite 
beyond the scope of science.”97   He sees God as the architect of the ‘general laws’ of 
nature, amongst them, the law of natural selection, which then give rise to the various 
species of life.  This is implied in the epigraph by Whewell in the sixth edition of The 
Origin of Species:  “But with regard to the material world, we can at least go so far as 
this— we can perceive that events are brought about not by insulated interpositions of 
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Divine power, exerted in each particular case, but by the establishment of general 
laws.”98  Though Darwin might have believed that species are not the product of design, 
he believed the laws of nature by which species have arisen are the product of design.  He 
states, “I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, whether good 
or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance.”99  He then ends the Origin 
by stating that these “laws [were] impressed on matter by the Creator.”100  So to 
conclude, one would have to argue that Darwin was not a strict methodological naturalist.  
He allowed for supernatural explanation of the universe and its laws, something a 
methodological naturalist would not, but once that universe was in place employed 
methodological naturalism in his investigation of it.  Some see his unreceptiveness to 
miracles and supernatural intervention as reflecting the religious influence of his 
mother’s side of the family, the Wedgewoods, who were Unitarian.  
 
13.  Conclusion:  Methodological Naturalism faces Several Problems 
 
To conclude:  Ask any scientist when they received explicit training in the 
scientific method and he/she will likely tell you that he/she never received any.  Nor 
could a scientist probably tell you the difference between Aristotle’s, Bacon’s, 
Descartes’, Mill’s, Whewell’s, Herschel’s, Bayes’s, Pierce’s, Popper’s, Hempel’s, 
Kuhn’s, Lakatos’s, Hacking’s, Dewey’s, Sober’s or Quine’s vision of the scientific 
method.  Nor is it apparent that there is a common denominator that runs through all of 
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them.  This plurality of views seems to suggest there is truth to Feyerabend’s claim that 
there is no consensus on what the scientific method is.  Although most scientists would 
not go so far as to say, ‘anything goes.’  If this is so, then how can there be consensus that 
methodological naturalism is and should be the method that governs science, and that 
science should not allow for non-natural explanations?  Or, that methodological 
naturalism should not only be normative for science, but for all fields of academic 
inquiry, including philosophy?  Even Sober agrees that when you look at science 
historically, there is no method.  While Sober argues that theoretically there is a 
normative practice for science, the law of statistical probability, he does not state that it 
should disallow supernatural explanations to compete with natural ones.  If he were a 
methodological naturalist, he would not attempt to calculate the likelihood of intelligent 
design as a hypothesis against that of strict naturalism.  If he were a methodological 
naturalist, he wouldn’t even bother.  Nowhere in the science textbooks is a normative 
method laid out in detail, explicitly specifying the exact method all scientists must follow 
in order to do ‘good’ science.  Nor is it stated anywhere that the method of science is, or 
ought to be, methodological naturalism.   
Finally, methodological naturalism does not entail metaphysical naturalism.  In 
claiming to study only ‘natural’ processes, these natural processes might simply be the 
secondary processes that God instilled in the nature of material entities in the primary act 
of creation.  But to the extent that God is the source of all being, and God somehow 
sustains the being of the universe and the ‘natural processes’ that scientists study, then 
what scientists do is not necessarily secular or something devoid of the supernatural, 
since all being is derived from God.  The Reformed tradition blurs the line between 
255 
 
 
 
primary and secondary causes such that secondary causes are primary causes, ‘natural 
processes’ are simply the manifestation of the divine will.  If this is possible, then the 
methodological naturalist cannot distinguish a natural from a supernatural cause.  Thus 
methodological naturalism is at best incomplete, as it cannot provide the necessary 
criteria for distinguishing ‘natural’ from ‘supernatural’ processes.  Hence science cannot 
maintain that it ought to adopt a ‘neutral’ attitude concerning God, or that science has no 
impact on theology or religion.  If God is in fact the designer, creator, and sustainer of the 
universe, then scientific knowledge is in fact a kind of mirror of the divine mind that 
designed the laws of nature.  Science itself is a kind of revelation, revealing the mind of 
the architect.     
 
 
  
256 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX – 
THE LOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EVOLUTION, 
THEISM AND NATURALISM 
 
  
 From a nontheistic point of view, the evolutionary hypothesis is the only 
game in town.1 – Alvin Plantinga 
 
  I see no good reasons why the views given in this volume should shock 
the religious views of anyone. 2 – Charles Darwin 
 
  Darwin’s dangerous idea is reductionism incarnate…a universal acid.3 – 
Dennett 
 
  I think all the great religions of the world – Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Christianity, Islam, and Communism – both untrue and harmful. It is 
evident as a matter of logic that, since they disagree, not more than one of 
them can be true….I am as firmly convinced that religions do harm as I 
am that they are untrue….A habit of basing convictions upon evidence, 
and of giving to them only that degree of certainty which the evidence 
warrants, would, if it became general, cure most of the ills from which the 
world is suffering.4 – Bertrand Russell 
 
  The Lord will guide you continually. – Isaiah 58:11 
 
  The horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, 
which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any 
value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a 
monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?5 – Darwin  
 
  Then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe 
been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest 
animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?6 – Darwin  
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1.  Logical Consistency and Inconsistency 
 
 
 
The title of this dissertation is ‘Evolution, Naturalism and Theism:  An 
Inconsistent Triad?’  The previous chapters have engaged in analysis of our three main 
concepts, evolution, naturalism, and theism.  This chapter will examine now what it 
means to be ‘consistent.’7  In examining the ways in which these three concepts logically 
relate to one another, our central concern will be to determine whether or not these 
positions are logically consistent or inconsistent with one another.  The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary defines ‘consistency’ as “possessing coherence…free from 
contradiction…marked by agreement.”8   If beliefs are ‘inconsistent,’ they are “not 
compatible with another,” and “incoherent.”9 
 What is good about consistency, and why should we strive to achieve it?  
Consistency is a requirement for a good argument, whereas bad arguments often contain 
inconsistencies.  One way to determine consistency amongst statements is by 
constructing a truth table.  Consistency can be determined, in some cases, by evaluating 
the values of the main operator of statements tested.  There are only four different ways 
statements may be said to relate to one another logically.  Consistent statements result if 
and only if it is possible that all of them can be true. (‘Robert is over thirty years of age’ 
and ‘Robert is over 40 years of age.’)10  Inconsistent statements necessarily result if at 
least one of them is false.  (‘Frances is over 30 years of age’ and ‘Frances is under 20 
                                                 
7 Michael Beaney, “What is Analytic Philosophy?” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic 
Philosophy  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2013), 8. 
8 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consistent 
9 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inconsistent 
10 Harry J. Gensler, Introduction to Logic (New York:  Routledge, 2010), 69. 
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years of age.’)  Two statements are contradictory if their truth values differ (Lincoln was 
the sixteenth president’ and ‘Lincoln was not the sixteenth president.’) 11  Logically 
equivalent statements, on the other hand, necessarily have the same truth value under 
their main operators (‘Mr. T is in Los Angeles’ and ‘Mr. T is an American’).12   
Any argument that has inconsistent premises is necessarily unsound, since at least 
one of its premises is false.  As a result, good reasoning avoids making inconsistent 
assertions.  Socrates was very adept at demonstrating that the people that he questioned 
made inconsistent assertions.13  Socrates would get an individual to declare he believes X 
is true, then that Y is true, and then demonstrate that X and Y are inconsistent.  For 
example, in the Apology, Socrates at his trial argues that his belief that his daimon is a 
spiritual being is inconsistent with the charge of atheism brought against him by Meletus.  
Similarly, opponents of theism attempt to argue that theism is false, by demonstrating 
that belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent, creator of the universe is 
inconsistent with the existence of evil.  Alternatively, opponents of scientism might 
demonstrate that quantum mechanics and general relativity are inconsistent with one 
another.  Buddhism may be said to be inconsistent with theism, in that it denies a creator 
god and the existence of a substantial self, but may still be compatible with a via negativa 
or apophatic approach to spirituality.  It is also said the idea of repentance is perhaps 
inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence and non-ego, since there does 
                                                 
11 Stan Baronett, Logic (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2016), 352-3. 
12 Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic  (Stamford, CT:  Cengage Learning, 2015), 346. 
13 Genzler., Introduction to Logic, 70. 
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not seem to be a self to which bad karma or wrongdoing can attach itself, and hence the 
‘self’ that is doing the repenting is not the ‘self’ that caused the harm.14   
In propositional logic entire statements or propositions are frequently tested for 
consistency.  Similarly, the individual propositions of evolution, theism, and naturalism 
represent multiple beliefs which can be tested for consistency.  But before we test each of 
these possibilities, let us stand back and look at a broader debate concerning these 
positions.  It is commonly claimed that the debate over evolution and its compatibility 
with theism is just one smaller event or battle within a larger conflict between science 
and religion, or reason and faith.  The larger claim is that religion and science are 
inherently incompatible, i.e., it is inconsistent to accept the findings of both, that they 
somehow contradict each other.  So before we discuss the consistency of claims about 
evolution, theism, and naturalism, let us first look at the larger issue regarding the 
compatibility of science and religion.  
  
2.  C.P. Snow’s Two Cultures:  Science and the Humanities 
 
 One of the famous discussions of this issue is the Rede Lecture given by C. P. 
Snow in 1959 at Cambridge University on the topic of “The Two Cultures.”  Snow’s 
thesis is that the most highly educated people of England at his time were divided into 
two groups and that they had ceased to communicate with one another.  Each thought the 
other “spoke nothing but Tibetan.”15  Ironically, Charles Darwin’s grandson delivered the 
                                                 
14 Steve Bein, “Repenting and Eliminating Bad Karma; Shushogi Paragraphs 7-10,” in Engaging Dogen’s 
Zen, ed. by Jason M. Wirth, Brian Schroeder and Bret W. Davis  (Somerville, MA;  Wisdom Publications, 
2016), 106-111. 
15 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures:  And a Second Look  (New York:  Mentor Books, 1963), 10. 
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lecture the year before him (discussing the problems of the world’s population).  As a 
result, Snow argued intellectuals appear to be “split into two polar groups…literary 
intellectuals at one pole – at the other, scientists…Between the two a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension, sometime hostility and dislike.”16  Snow, however, was a member of 
both camps, which suggests he did not see them as contradictory.  Snow held a Ph.D. in 
physics, along with expertise in chemistry, but was also a novelist, as was his wife.  As a 
result, he tried to bridge the gap between the two.    
Snow also held a position in government as technical director in the Ministry of 
Labor. That allowed him to hire people.  As a result he knew firsthand what scientists 
thought; he had interviewed thousands of them.  He found that most scientists hadn’t ever 
read a single novel of Dickens.  He stated:  “the whole literature of the traditional culture 
doesn’t seem to them relevant.”17  Those on the other side, the intellectuals of the 
humanities, “like to pretend that the traditional culture is the whole of culture.”18  They 
were equally tone deaf in the sciences and Snow could elicit no response when he asked 
some of them if they knew what the Second Law of Thermodynamics was.   Snow states 
that the snobbery of the scientists is based on their belief that they will be doing 
something useful, that their knowledge is practical, and they will get a job with a good 
salary, while their counterparts will be lucky to make sixty percent as much as them.  As 
for the literary intellectuals, their snobbery and disdain for science is based upon the 
Platonic contempt for the material and physical world, in favor of the spiritual.  As a 
result, the “exploration of the natural order is of no interest” to them.19 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 11-12. 
17 Ibid., 19. 
18 Ibid., 20. 
19 Ibid., 20. 
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 Snow blames the culture divide on England’s “fanatical belief in educational 
specialization.”20  He states that at Cambridge, his alma mater, incoming students are 
given the choice to study either mathematics and science, or the classics.  In the English 
university system, most students study their own field exclusively.  Snow argued that 
there needs to be more interdisciplinary learning.  Otherwise, the end result will be the 
breeding of either detached scientists, or intellectual Luddites who rebel against science 
and technology.  While intellectuals in the arts and humanities might not see anything 
wrong with the latter, Snow does.  Snow believes the agricultural, industrial, and 
scientific revolution improved the quality of life for everyone and helped to lift millions 
out of poverty.  It provided them with food, sanitation, clean drinking water, 
transportation, lighting, electricity, medicine, and education.  As a result, he argues that 
we must “close the gap between our cultures.”21  
 Snow believes the reigning model of the relation between Science and the 
Humanities (the humanities including religion), is either the Conflict Model, or the 
Independence Model.  The Conflict models sees the two fields as incompatible, and that 
the field other than one’s own, should be done away with and replaced with one’s own 
field.  In the Independence model one is either a member of one or a member of the other, 
but cannot be a member of both.  Here one recognizes the value of the other field, and 
allows it to exist in its own right, but thinks it addresses questions and issues different 
from one’s own field.  Snow rejects both models, arguing instead for compatibility, and 
that it is possible for the two cultures to talk together and pursue mutual interests.  In 
other words, there is the possibility that the two cultures could merge together into one 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 22. 
21 Ibid., 51. 
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culture, one in which at least dialogue and integration occur.  Snow calls this the ‘third 
culture.’  However, some scientists who are hostile to the humanities think scientists 
should replace the intellectual of the humanities, and address the public directly as the 
celebrity scientists of today do.  Thus science should triumph over religion and the 
humanities and this view alone should become the ‘third culture.’ 
 
3.  The Various Models for the Possible Relationships between Science and Religion  
 
 Snow’s essay leads us to question, what are the possible relationships science and 
religion can take?  Let us first begin by giving a brief definition of science and religion, 
then determine the various models that have been proposed to describe their relationship.  
Bertrand Russell defines science as  “the attempt to discover, by means of observation, 
and reasoning based upon it, first, particular facts about the world, and then laws 
connecting facts with one another and (in fortunate cases) making it possible to predict 
future occurrences.”22  Russell also gives a good overview of the method of science: 
  Scientific method (which influenced the positivists and verifiability 
theory of meaning):  Science starts, not from large assumptions, but from 
particular facts discovered by observation or experiment.  From a number 
of such facts a general rule is arrived at…a working hypothesis…If it is 
correct, certain hitherto unobserved phenomena will take place in certain 
circumstances.  If it is found that they do take place, that so far confirms 
the hypothesis. If they do not, the hypothesis must be discarded and a new 
one must be invented.  However many facts are found to fit the 
hypothesis, that does not make it certain, only highly probable; in that 
case, it is called a theory rather than a hypothesis.23 
 
                                                 
22 Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 8. 
23 Ibid., 13-4. 
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 A definition of religion that is compatible with theism is given by William James 
as, “the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in 
harmoniously adjusting ourselves” to it.24  These definitions clearly illustrate that the 
domains of science and religion have different objects of interest.  Science is concerned 
with that which we can observe, whereas religion is concerned with a reality that appears 
to transcend our senses. 
 
3.1  The Conflict Model 
 
How many ways can the two fields relate to one another?  How many models?  
Bertrand Russell offers the simplest view of their relationship, stating they can be seen as 
either compatible or incompatible.  Alistair McGrath uses the terms Confrontational and 
Non-confrontational, with Distinct and Convergent as separate non-confrontational 
models.25  John Haught lists three models as Conflict, Contrast (different domains) and 
Convergence.26  Alvin Plantinga’s labels for the relationship are Conflict, Deep Conflict, 
and Concord.27  Ian Barbour proposed four models for describing their relationship:  
Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration.28  Michael Ruse also lists four 
models.  Ian Barbour’s models appear to be the most developed and precise, so his 
template will be followed in what follows. 
                                                 
24 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York:  Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004), 57. 
25 Alistair McGrath, Science and Religion  (Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 44-54. 
26 John Haught, Science and Faith  (New York:  Paulist Press, 2012), 3-5. 
27 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies.  The four sections of the book are structured under each 
model. 
28 Barbour, Religion and Science, 77-105. 
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 The Conflict model holds that Religion and Science are incompatible.  Hence, 
there are two possible positions in this model:  that of Scientism, that science triumphs 
over religion, and that of Religious Fundamentalism, that religion triumphs over science.  
But basically the Conflict model sees each position as contradictory to the other, thus 
requiring an either/or choice between them, not a both/and.  Adherents of Scientism see 
the major challenge to religion as the success of the scientific method, which some see as 
the only reliable path to knowledge.  Science is “objective, universal, rational, and based 
on solid observational evidence.”  Religion, on the other hand, is “subjective, parochial, 
emotional, and based on traditions or authorities that disagree with one another.”29   
Adherents to scientism include Bertrand Russell, E.O. Wilson, Carl Sagan, the Logical 
positivists, various evolutionary naturalists, and the New Atheists.   Adherents to the 
belief that religion triumphs over science are Biblical and Scriptural literalists.  They 
believe that ‘scripture is inerrant.’  Among literalists are the Southern Baptists, 
Creationists, Scientific Creationists, and various Muslim and Jewish fundamentalists. 
 Lawrence Principe, a historian of science at Johns Hopkins, claims that no serious 
historian of science today would testify to a historical conflict between science and 
religion. Brooke makes a similar claim.  He believes that science grew out of religion, 
side by side, as an attempt to understand God’s creation.  Many scientists saw themselves 
as studying God’s second book, that of Nature.  To Kepler and others, “theological and 
scientific inquiry were not separate:  to study the physical world means to study God’s 
creation.”30  Newton believed that the gravitational attraction between bodies was due to 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 77. 
30 Lawrence M. Principe, The Scientific Revolution  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011), 57. 
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God’s continuous and direct action.31  He also believed that “space was constituted by 
God’s omnipotence.”  Like Aristotle, he needed God to account for setting matter in 
motion.32   
 Principe claims the rise of the Conflict thesis can be attributed to two people and 
two books in particular:  J. William Draper’s 1874 History of the Conflict between 
Religion and Science and Andrew D. White’s 1896 book, A History of the Warfare of 
Science and Theology in Christendom.  Although both books were very popular in their 
day, Principe thinks they were both bad history and bad science.  Principe sees Draper’s 
warfare model as based on his idiosyncratic deistic metaphysic rather than historical 
facts.  Draper believed all of nature was ruled by uniform law and governed by climatic 
determinism, which clashed with the theism of organized religions.  White’s hostility was 
based on personal grievances, especially the hostility his attempt to found Cornell 
University along non-sectarian lines provoked. 33  Unfortunately, they present the 
Conflict narrative as fact.  This in turn served as the basis of a foundation myth which 
was then accepted by the general public and passed on as folk history.  As a result, the 
metaphor of warfare, of two armies opposing each other on a battlefield, stuck in the 
public mind and came to characterize the relationship between science and religion. 
Bertrand Russell’s book, Religion and Science, also adheres to the conflict thesis, 
with the belief that science triumphs over religion.  He states, “Between religion and 
science there has been a prolonged conflict, in which…science has invariably proved 
victorious....The new method achieved such immense successes….that theology was 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 66. 
32 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion  (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-13. 
33 Lawrence Principe, “John William Draper, the 19th century Originator of the ‘Conflict Thesis,’ lecture 
given at the Cosmos & Creation Conference at Loyola Maryland University on Friday, June 19, 2017. 
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gradually forced to accommodate itself to science.”34  Not only does Russell maintain the 
warfare metaphor, but he sees religion as the aggressor and guilty party, citing “the 
history of the warfare waged by traditional religion against scientific knowledge.”35  In 
his essay “Why I Am Not a Christian,” Russell rejects the traditional arguments for 
God’s existence, claiming Kant “disposed” of them.  Russell rejects the logic upon which 
they are based as being of “an antiquated Aristotelian sort” which has been superseded.  
However, unlike Kant, he does not think the existence of God is needed in order to give 
morality its sanction.  He believes “the Christian religion, as organized in its churches, 
has been and still is the principle enemy of moral progress in the world.”36  He cites as 
evidence, the Inquisition, witch burning, slavery, the fear of the devil, eternal 
punishment, and the second coming.  According to Russell, they are tools used by 
preachers to intimidate believers into submission. 
The New Atheists continue in the same vein of argument as Russell.  Sam Harris 
wrote a 2006 article for the Huffington Post, entitled ‘Science must destroy Religion.’  
This is not neutral language or the language of toleration.  This is the language of 
warfare:  wanting to ‘destroy’ religion doesn’t even respect the individual freedom to 
believe.  Harris thinks religion is without evidence and therefore should not be tolerated.  
His argument is that since each tradition has its own scripture, and each tradition claims 
its scripture is divinely inspired, and since these books contradict each other in their 
claims, and it is not possible for all of them to be inspired, none of them is inspired.  
Hence none of them should be believed.  He argues:  “the conflict between religion and 
                                                 
34 Russell, Religion and Science, 7, 16. 
35 Ibid 7. 
36 Russell, Why I am not a Christian, 6-13, 21-2. 
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science is inherent and (very nearly) zero-sum.”37   He makes a more sustained argument 
in his book Letter to a Christian Nation.  There he states, “The success of science often 
comes at the expense of religious dogma; the maintenance of religious dogma always 
comes at the expense of science.”38  
Harris, like the other New Atheists, is an evidentialist, i.e., he thinks that one 
should only believe something if there is good evidence for it.  He states that “either a 
person has good reasons for what he believes, or he doesn’t.”  He classifies religious 
beliefs about God, the existence of the soul, sinfulness, and immortality as “iron age 
beliefs,” i.e., as prescientific, based on superstitious thinking and lacking the empirical 
evidence of science and reason.  Hence he argues we should reject them.  Only those 
beliefs which have evidence or rational support should be tolerated.  Only beliefs arrived 
at through the methods of science and empirical justification are reliable.  Hence faith 
and reason are incompatible.  Science, on the other hand, “represents our best efforts to 
know what is true about our world.”39 
Richard Dawkins is also an adherent of evidentialism.  In The God Delusion, he 
states “The true scientist…knows exactly what it would take to change his mind:  
Evidence.  As J.B.S. Haldane said when asked what evidence might contradict evolution, 
‘Fossil rabbits in the Precambrian….I argue for evolution with a passion.…My passion is 
based on evidence.  Theirs, flying in the face of evidence as it does, is truly 
fundamentalist.”40  Dawkins, in a debate with the Muslim Medhi Hasan, who stated he 
believed Muhammad traveled to heaven upon a winged steed, replied, “You believe this, 
                                                 
37 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-harris/science-must-destroy-reli_b_13153.html 
38 Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation  (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 63. 
39 Ibid., 64. 
40 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion  (New York:  Mariner Books, 2008), 19. 
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in the 21st century?!”41   For Dawkins, believing in God is like believing in Greek gods.  
Not only is it illogical, but there is no evidence for it.  All the evidence says horses do not 
fly.  Dawkins accounts for religion by claiming it is simply the result of indoctrination by 
one’s parents.  Russell too claims that “most people believe in God because they have 
been taught from early infancy to do it, and that is the main reason.”42  Dawkins thinks it 
is ridiculous to speak of a four year old as a Christian or Muslim, since they are too 
young to form beliefs of their own.  Beliefs should only be arrived at through a fully 
rational, scientific investigation into the nature of reality, and he thinks there is no 
scientific evidence for the existence of God or the soul. 
The New Atheists do not think that religion is independent of or immune from the 
methods of the science.  Daniel Dennett, in Breaking the Spell, claims religion both can 
and should be scientifically investigated because religion is a natural, rather than a 
supernatural, phenomenon, hence is not immune from the instruments of scientific study.  
He states:  “Yes, I want to put religion on the examination table.  If it is fundamentally 
benign…it should emerge just fine….If it is not, the sooner we identify the problems the 
better.”43  Victor Stenger, in his book, God, the Failed Hypothesis:  How Science Shows 
that God does not Exist, takes the same approach as Dennett and arrives at the same 
conclusion.  Just as “we have no evidence for Bigfoot, the Abominable Snowman, and 
the Loch Ness Monster,” there is no good scientific evidence for the existence of God.44  
Therefore, “Nirvana is not heaven.  Nirvana is nothingness.”45 
                                                 
41 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWfHkLbMm6w 
42 Russell, Why I am not a Christian, 14. 
43 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell (New York:  Viking, 2006), 39. 
44 Victor Stenger, God, the Failed Hypothesis:  How Science Shows that God does not Exist  (Amherst, 
NY:  Prometheus Books, 2007), 18. 
45 Ibid., 258.   
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The flip side of the Conflict model is that Science does not triumph over Religion, 
but rather Religion triumphs over Science.  Adherents of this model are often your 
Fundamentalists of all religious traditions, be they Christian evangelicals, Muslim or 
Jewish extremists, or Hindus.  Fundamentalists believe that every word of their Scripture 
is the Word of God.  So if the account in Genesis says this is how the universe came into 
existence, then this is how it happened.  Thus fundamentalists in the evolutionary debate 
are called Creationists, or adherents to what is called Creation Science.  They see the 
Bible as a guide or corrective to science.  By interpreting Scripture literally rather than 
figuratively or allegorically, they believe that if the Bible says the world was created in 
six days, then that is how God created the world.  If the Bible says the Jews are the 
chosen people, or that God gave Palestine to the Jews, then so it is.   
The Creationist position was adopted by the Southern Baptist Convention when it 
unanimously voted in 1926 that “this Convention accepts Genesis as teaching that man 
was the special creation of God, and reject every theory, evolution or other, which 
teaches that man originated in, or came by way of, a lower animal ancestry.”46  However, 
the New Atheists portray all religious believers as basically fundamentalists.  Russell 
states that most Christians believed “every word of the Bible is divinely inspired” until 
science forced them to believe otherwise.47  Harris too says that you either believe 
Scripture is inspired, or it’s not; there is no middle ground.  You can’t pick and choose 
which parts of Scripture are divinely inspired and which are not, for doing so is a human 
judgment.  Needless to say, this is a caricature.  It erects the straw man that all religious 
                                                 
46 Ronald Numbers, “The Creationists,” in But is it Science?  The Philosophical Question in the 
Creation/Evolution Controversy, ed. by Michael Ruse  (Buffalo, NY:  Prometheus Books, 1988), 233. 
47 Russell, Religion and Science, 10. 
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people are ignorant fundamentalists, ones whose beliefs are easily knocked down by the 
modern-day scientifically-informed worldview.  Most people today recognize that many 
of the stories in found in religious Scripture must be interpreted figuratively rather than 
literally, and that Scripture represents human accounts of revelation, but is not the 
revelation itself.    
 
3.2  The Independence Model 
 
 The Independence model argues that Religion and Science are autonomous fields; 
each has its own distinct domain and methods.  Science gives accounts of secondary 
causes.  Religion gives accounts of primary causes or metaphysical first principles.  But 
the two remain different realms, and as a result a scientist can only issue authoritative 
statements concerning science, but not on religion.  Similarly, religious authority figures 
must defer to the scientist concerning matters of science, but not on religion.  Examples 
of adherents of the Independence model include non-literalist evangelical, conservative 
Christians, neo-orthodox Protestants, some existentialists, and various linguistic analysts 
who might argue that the two fields represent different language games.  
 Stephen Jay Gould is perhaps the most famous scientist to adhere to this model.  
In his article “Nonoverlapping Magisteria” (NOMA) he responds to Pope John Paul II’s 
1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences entitled “Truth Cannot Contradict 
Truth,” which argued that evolution and Catholic doctrine are compatible.   Gould sees 
both science and religion as having separate realms of expertise, the church presiding 
over matters of faith, morals, and values, whereas the realm of science is concerned with 
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the empirical investigation of the constitution of the universe.  Each realm has its own 
professional or teaching authority (magisteria) and the realms do no overlap.  Scientists 
should not be issuing authoritative proclamations concerning religion, and religious 
leaders should not decide scientific doctrine.  In other words, Gould’s NOMA principle 
affirms methodological naturalism, but not metaphysical naturalism, and argues scientists 
should remain neutral concerning religious matters.  He quips that scientists study how 
the heavens go and theologians determine how to go to heaven.48 
 Gould argues that the NOMA principle is in fact the official doctrine of the 
Catholic Church concerning the relationship between faith and science, and is found in 
Pope Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani Generis.  However, though the two realms are 
distinct, there are certain subjects and areas where these two “domains press hard against 
each other.”49  Evolution is one of these areas, and this issue is addressed in Humani 
Generis.  In it, Pius states that Catholics should believe whatever science determines 
concerning the evolution of the body as long as they accept two things, that the world is 
the divine creation of God, and that souls are created by God and infused into human 
beings.50  Gould, however, claims Pius trespasses the NOMA principle in the encyclical 
when he argues two further points, that evolution is still just a theory and not yet proven, 
and holds that polygenism, or ancestry from multiple human parents rather than just one 
pair, is incompatible with original sin.  Gould states:  “I would declare him out of line for 
letting the magisterium of religion dictate a conclusion within the magisterium of 
science.”51  On the other hand, Gould acknowledges that the existence of souls is beyond 
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his magisterium of science, which can neither prove nor disprove their existence. Thus 
Gould draws the boundaries of science and recognizes that there are issues about which 
science must remain neutral.  As such, he sees his dialogue with the Church as a 
‘rapprochement’ between the fields of science and religion.  There should not be 
hostility, and each should respect the autonomy of the other and try to gain a mutual 
understanding.   
Needless to say, adherents to the Conflict Model reject Gould’s NOMA argument.  
Richard Dawkins rejects the idea that theology or religion is “a subject at all.” 52   In other 
words, religion studies nonsense, and as a result doesn’t even deserve to be called a field 
with its own magisterium.  Daniel Dennett not only rejects NOMA, but, he claims, so 
does any theist whose arguments are based on natural theology.  He states:  “I don’t buy 
it, and neither does Plantinga.  He certainly sees the science of evolutionary biology as 
‘overlapping’ with his religious beliefs.”53  Sam Harris also rejects NOMA, saying “every 
religion makes specific claims about the way the world is…about facts.…Such claims are 
intrinsically in conflict with the claims of science, because they are claims made on 
terrible evidence.”54  
  
3.3  The Dialogue Model 
 
Rather than seeing science and religion as separate, independent domains, the 
Dialogue model sees compatibility between the two fields so that each may inform the 
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other on some, but not all, issues.  Thomas Torrance thinks theology is quite distinct from 
science in that its subject matter is not an object, but a subject, namely God.  In addition, 
“science raises fundamental questions that it cannot answer.”55  Science studies the 
universe, but cannot tell us why it exists or whether it has a purpose.  Theology can 
answer these questions because it is all-encompassing and “is the study of reality as a 
whole.”  It sees God as the necessary ground of a contingent universe.  In addition to the 
Protestant Torrance, three Roman Catholic theologians who are advocates of the 
Dialogue model are Ernan McMullin, Karl Rahner, and David Tracy.  They believe that 
scientists study secondary causes, while the theologian posits God as the primary cause of 
secondary causes.   
Adherents to the Dialogue model believe science is not as objective as the 
positivists believed, nor is religion as subjective as certain existentialists claim.  Barbour 
states:  “the scientific criteria of coherence, comprehensiveness, and fruitfulness have 
their parallels in religious thought.”56  Since quantum physics has demonstrated the 
object of observation is not inseparable from the subjectivity of the observer, Michael 
Polanyi believes all evidence involves personal assessment and judgment.  John 
Polkinghorne, like Kuhn and other post-modern philosophers of science, believes that all 
data is theory-laden.  As a result, the religious views of the scientist influences how he 
interprets what he or she sees.  Barbour thus argues that theology, as a reflective 
enterprise, should “be open to new insights, including those derived from the theories of 
science,” just as science should be open to theological interpretations as well.57  Other 
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adherents to the Dialogue model include those who see Nature as sacred, i.e., who believe 
that there is a religious dimension to nature that a strictly naturalistic science misses.   
 
3.4  The Integration Model 
 
The Integration or Complementary model argues that since both science and 
religion seek Truth, and If God is the author of creation, and science studies the created 
world, then the Book of Nature is a separate type of revelation which reveals the laws of 
nature.  The laws of nature are simply constants in God’s mind.  This parallels Einstein 
desire to know God’s thoughts.  The naturalist thinks he knows a great deal more than the 
layperson by studying science.  But if theism is true, the religious person can not only 
study science and know what the naturalist knows, but he/she can also study higher-order 
truths, the truths of first philosophy as well.  The theist’s range of possible knowledge is 
larger than that of the naturalist due to the latter’s narrower metaphysics.  Isaac Asimov 
defines science as the desire to know.  Aristotle stated that that all men by nature desire to 
know.  If science is curiosity about the world, and theology is curiosity about the creator 
of the world, the highest order of ‘those that know’ would be the religious scientist.  To 
study nature is to study God, since the created order of the world bears some resemblance 
to the mind that created it. 
 This is the central insight of the tradition of natural theology formulated by 
Thomas Aquinas and his successors.  In Roman Catholic theology, “natural theology has 
traditionally held a respected place as a preparation for the truths of revealed theology.”58  
                                                 
58 Ibid., 99. 
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Natural theology begins with observations about the physical world which are available 
to anyone, and from these attempts to formulate an explanation of them.  Thus the 
findings of science can tell us something about God.  Richard Swinburne goes a step 
further, arguing that “something outside the web of physical laws is needed to explain the 
rise of consciousness….Religious experience provides additional crucial evidence….On 
our total evidence, theism is more probable than not.”   
In the Integration model there is more of a systematic synthesis of science and 
religion than in the Dialogue model.  The Integration model sees the universe as an 
emanation of God’s being, whereas the Dialogue model sees the universe more as a 
creation.  The Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau, and various religious ecologists, 
Muir, and Leopold, might be interpreted along this vein.  Teilhard de Chardin thought a 
synthesis of religion and science was possible.  Yet unless one is a mystic it is difficult to 
assess his claim that:  “Everywhere in the stuff of the Universe there necessarily exists an 
internal conscious face lining the external ‘material’ face habitually the only one seen by 
science.”59  Alfred White Northhead’s process theology also tends to follow this line of 
thought, namely, that to study nature is to study God.  To this extent, however, the 
Integration Model goes beyond traditional theistic orthodoxy.  Traditional theistic 
orthodoxy sees creation as separate from God, and creation may bear a resemblance to 
God and offer some insight into God’s mind, but then again it might not.   
  
4.  The Implications of Evolution for Naturalism and Theism 
                                                 
59 Kathleen Duffy, Teilhard’s Mysticism, Seeing the Inner Face of Evolution  (Maryknoll, NY:  Orbis 
Books, 2014), 3. 
276 
 
 
 
 Many of the models that examine the relationship between science and religion 
also apply to the debate over the compatibility of evolutionary theory and theism.  To 
borrow from the Conflict model, evolution just seems to be one of the latest battles 
between science and religion.  But, as noted previously, what the term ‘evolution’ 
denotes, has developed since Darwin’s time.  The synthesis between Darwinism and 
Mendelian genetics into population genetics that occurred in the 1920s and 30s did not 
resolve all issues.  The field of evolutionary biology is of fairly recent origin, involving 
the fields of genetics, molecular biology, zoology, paleontology, paleoanthropology, and 
even sociology.  Some even try to extend the reach of evolution to ethics.  The question 
then becomes, what implication does evolution have for the relationships of science and 
religion?  Does evolution tip the scale towards one or the other?  What does evolution 
bring to the table that could affect either?  The answer is, a lot. 
However, it should be noted that theism should not be equated with religion, as 
theism is just one type of many different religious outlooks. Nor should science be 
equated with metaphysical naturalism, although it is intimately connected to 
methodological naturalism.  Evolutionary theory, while a scientific theory, can also be 
open to theistic guidance.  In addition, some question whether evolutionary theory is 
more of a philosophy or an ideology than a science.  Some aspects of evolutionary theory 
are not subject to experimentation in the way that traditional scientific theories are.  The 
origination or birth of a new species has never been observed.   In addition, it is possible 
that there are two kinds of evolution:  guided, and unguided.  Even if it turns out that God 
exists, it does not follow that evolution is or has been guided by a divine being.  It is still 
possible to assert theism and unguided evolution (evolution by means of natural 
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processes).  But since in traditional theism a transcendent God is involved in creation, 
unguided evolution and theism do seem an unlikely combination.   
Further complicating an investigation of the logical compatibility of evolutionary 
theory, theism, and naturalism is the fact that these views can be related in different ways.  
Here, we shall confine the relations to deduction, induction, abduction, and Bayesian 
probability theory.  A deductive analysis of our triad begins by defining the key terms.  
Then, depending upon which proposition is taken as the starting point or ‘given,’ one 
determines what inferences one can deduce as a result of accepting our initial proposition 
as true.  Inductive arguments result in degrees of strength and weakness depending upon 
the nature of the evidence.  Abductive reasoning aims for the best explanation of the 
information at hand.  All inductive and abductive arguments are recognized as fallible.  
Bayesian theory attempts to assess the degree of probability of a theory, given a prior 
probability and an evidence ‘update.’   It is capable of gauging the probability of rival 
theories, such as unguided vs. guided evolution.60 
 Let us first examine the deductive relations of evolution, theism and naturalism.  
Deduction derives consequences based upon syntax and the definition of terms.  For our 
purposes, we will limit ourselves to five terms:  metaphysical and methodological 
naturalism, guided and unguided evolution, and theism.  By determining the truth value 
of any one of these propositions, we can then examine the truth value of the other 
propositions.  If it is possible that they both can be true, then they are consistent with one 
another.  In asserting the truth of each proposition, a claim about the objective truth of the 
                                                 
60 Elliott Sober, Evidence and Evolution:  The Logic behind the Science  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 3. 
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proposition is not being made.  Truth values are only assumptions about a possible state 
of affairs, and not objective reality.   
Let us begin by assuming that naturalism is true.   If naturalism is true, then 
unguided rather than guided evolution is true, and theism is necessarily false, since 
theism asserts that there is a supreme being as well as spiritual beings that transcend the 
natural physical world and guides its processes.  However, as noted earlier, naturalism 
takes two forms, metaphysical and methodological.  The inference just made governs 
only metaphysical naturalism.  The claim is:  If metaphysical naturalism is true, then 
unguided evolution is true, and theism false.  Metaphysical naturalism contradicts theism 
and guided evolution because it rules out the possibility of non-natural causes and events.  
However, this argument does not state whether we should accept metaphysical naturalism 
as true.  Blankly asserted, metaphysical naturalism is sheer dogmatism.  Dennett and 
Dawkins claim that, unlike the theist (who, they argue, has no evidence to support his/her 
beliefs), their position is not dogmatic, but based upon the evidence supplied by 
methodological naturalism.   This would mean that methodological naturalism, and not 
metaphysical naturalism, is their given.  Methodological naturalism, being a method, can 
be neither true nor false.  Truth and falsity are determined by the evidence obtained 
through this and perhaps other methods.  This raises the question whether methodological 
naturalism should be the only method for determining the truth value of metaphysical 
positions.  Stephen J. Gould says no, while adherents of scientism say yes.  Gould argues 
that methodological naturalism should be restricted to making judgments only within its 
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own magisterium, but theism, being outside its jurisdiction, cannot be determined as true 
or false by the method of science.61    
 Is Gould right, or does taking methodological naturalism as our starting point 
entail metaphysical naturalism, as the New Atheists claim?  The answer is no.  
Methodological naturalism does not logically entail metaphysical naturalism, evolution, 
or theism.  It is possible it might provide evidence for or against any of them.  Using the 
method of science to inquire into the origin of species may support the argument that life 
evolved by means of unguided evolutionary processes without the need for theism.  This 
position appears to endorse metaphysical naturalism and is the one held by Daniel 
Dennett and Richard Dawkins.  But methodological naturalism could also provide 
evidence for both guided evolution and theism by demonstrating that some organisms or 
their organs might be too complex to have evolved through strictly unguided natural 
processes.  This is the position of Michael Behe, Stephen Meyer, and others who adhere 
to intelligent design. 
 To use methodological naturalism to justify metaphysical naturalism is 
unwarranted because the method that is used to allegedly prove metaphysical naturalism 
begins with parameters that restrict its investigations to the merely physical.  To make the 
inference warranted requires an extra premise:  methodological naturalism reveals the 
whole of reality.  But adding that premise makes the argument question begging.  Just as 
it is circular to use induction to justify induction (why should the future continue to 
resemble the past?  Because in the past the future has resembled the past), so it is circular 
to argue that a method which allows for only natural causes, plus the needed additional 
                                                 
61 Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magisteria,”18. 
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premise, results in the conclusion that only natural causes exist.  This is the insight that is 
fundamental to Stephen Jay Gould’s NOMA argument and the Independence Model, that 
the parameters placed on science disallow scientists from making assertions about 
anything beyond the non-physical, since it is beyond the scope of their magisterium, or 
domain of expertise.  As a strict deductive proof, the claim that metaphysical naturalism 
follows from methodological naturalism, is, properly understood, circular.   
 As a result, those who employ methodological naturalism as a method cannot 
make judgments about theism.  Richard Dawkins, however, attempts to circumvent 
Gould’s argument by claiming that science can provide evidence for just about anything, 
including the existence of God, the soul, and even ethical values.62  Dennett too does not 
buy into the idea that the scientific method must limit itself to judgments about the 
natural world and refrain from consideration of supernatural.63   He argues in Breaking 
the Spell that a scientific study of religion reveals it is of natural rather than supernatural 
origin, that religion is strictly a “human phenomenon.”64  Dennett and Dawkins believe 
the evidence gleaned from science provides overwhelming proof both for unguided 
evolution and metaphysical naturalism, and against theism.   While their assertions are 
not that different from other naturalists, such as David Hume, what is different is that 
they believe they have new evidence in their favor, viz., a mechanism to explain how life 
arose.  That mechanism is natural selection.  In other words, they believe evolution 
provides conclusive evidence against any kind of intelligent designer who transcends the 
universe and guides the evolutionary process.   
                                                 
62 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 70, 72, 80.  Dawkins goes so far as to state that he does not even see 
theology as a proper subject of study. To him, it is the study of nothing. 
63 Dennett and Plantinga, Science and Religion, 49. 
64 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 25. 
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 Since their conclusion is based upon the methods of science, the inferential claim 
made here is not deductive, but inductive.  So their arguments cannot be said to constitute 
certain proof.  The best that inductive reasoning can achieve is probability.  So if they 
claim evolution is supported through science and methodological naturalism, and 
evolution occurs through strictly natural processes in an unguided way, this means they 
can only conclude there is strong evidence to accept metaphysical naturalism, but not 
certainty.  They are claiming that nothing outside of nature is needed to explain unguided 
evolution.  If evolution is taken as evidence for God’s existence, that argument fails.  God 
isn’t needed.  If, on the other hand, the empirical evidence makes theism more likely than 
metaphysical naturalism, then Dawkins and Dennett’s arguments are much weaker than 
they claim.  This lends support to the opponents of Dennett and Dawkins, who argue their 
naturalism is an ideology and a dogmatic assumption, rather than based upon evidence. 
 Thus metaphysical naturalism does not follow logically from the adoption of 
methodological naturalism, and since it is, at best, based upon finite empirical evidence, 
the evidence for it – empirical success – cannot establish its unequivocal truth.  The 
empirical methods of Thomas Aquinas, in fact, are similar to that of methodological 
naturalism, but unlike Gould or Sober, Aquinas believed the study of the natural world 
did not have to remain neutral concerning theism, but could provide strong evidence for it 
(suggesting his followed the Dialogue model, not the Independence model).  The Fine-
Tuning argument for God’s existence constitutes a more contemporary, updated version 
of the Design Argument.  Martin Rees and Alistair McGrath argue that certain constants 
of the universe (like the force of gravity, or the strong nuclear force) appear to be fine-
tuned for the development of life, thus provide scientific support for theism.  As a result, 
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for some philosophers methodological naturalism provides good evidence for theism, and 
against metaphysical naturalism.  In any case, only adherents of scientism believe that 
methodological naturalism is our only means of obtaining reliable information about 
reality.  Many theists argue that methods other than those of science play a role in 
obtaining knowledge.  Intuition, revelation (historical and personal), pure reason, 
mystical insight, religious experience, and innate knowledge, have been proposed as such 
methods.  Again, the method of science, if there is one, only holds for science, and is not 
necessarily authoritative for other fields. 
 It has been shown that it is possible to arrive at a theistic position from both inside 
and outside methodological naturalism.  So assuming theism to be true (leaving open the 
method by which this position is reached), what logical implications follow concerning 
our other positions?  If theism is true, then metaphysical naturalism must be false, as the 
two metaphysical positions contradict each other.  Theism occludes metaphysical 
naturalism since theism asserts the existence of non-natural beings and events.  Given 
theism, evolution can be either true or false, or partially true and partially false, as it is 
possible God created all or some beings directly rather than through evolutionary 
processes, or instilled some with supernatural souls and not others.  If evolution is 
accepted as true, it can also be either guided or unguided without pain of contradiction.  
Theism does not rule out unguided evolution because this may have been the way that 
God chose to create life.  So concerning evolution, accepting theism neither rules out 
evolution nor makes it guided.  However, unguided evolution is less likely in a theistic 
context than guided evolution, given that according to traditional theism God is actively 
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involved in creation.  Guided evolution is at least more compatible with the type of 
godhead presented in the Judeo-Christian tradition of theism. 
 However, the central claim of the New Atheists and sociobiologists is that 
evolutionary theory itself provides substantial evidence in favor of metaphysical 
naturalism and against theism.  In other words, Dennett and Dawkins claim that evolution 
has metaphysical implications, that if we fully understood evolution, we would rule out 
theism and endorse a naturalistic worldview.  But as we have shown, this conclusion 
cannot be derived from evolutionary theory because it is a scientific theory that 
purportedly is governed by the methods of science and methodological naturalism.  Some 
intelligent design proponents argue that metaphysical naturalism and unguided evolution 
are physically incompatible (not logically), since some living systems are too complex to 
have arisen by themselves.  Michael Behe asserts that eukaryotic cells are so complex 
they couldn’t have developed by strictly natural means.  Plantinga’s evolutionary 
argument against naturalism (EAAN) states that the probability our cognitive faculties 
are reliable is low given naturalism and evolution [P(R/N&E)].65  Thus he sees evolution 
as supporting, rather than refuting, theism.  Plantinga does not begin with methodological 
naturalism nor is constrained by it.  He appeals to faculties and methods beyond those of 
the empirical sciences to justify theism, such as Calvin’s sensus divinitatis.  However, to 
the extent that his argument invokes the probability calculus, he may be said to be using 
the inductive method.66 
Another logical possibility is that one may accept the truth of evolutionary theory, 
but believe that it has no logical bearing on either metaphysical naturalism or theism.  
                                                 
65 Dennett and Plantinga, Science and Religion, 17. 
66 Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 311-346. 
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This is Thomas Nagel’s position in Mind and Cosmos.  Nagel believes the 
sociobiologists’ inference from evolutionary theory to naturalism is unwarranted, since 
many phenomena defy naturalistic reduction.67  However, he does not believe taking this 
position forces him into the theistic camp.  In Mind and Cosmos, Nagel offers a similar 
but different argument against naturalism by asserting that there are various phenomena 
that defy a purely reductionist explanation.  Nagel agrees with Plantinga’s EAAN.  He 
sees evolutionary theory as playing the same epistemic role in metaphysical naturalism 
that divine benevolence played in Descartes’ attempt to overcome doubt.68   But just as 
divine benevolence failed to secure an epistemic foundation for Descartes, so may 
evolution fail to secure reliability for the naturalist’s cognitive faculties.   
Nagel, however, differs from Plantinga in that he stops short of embracing theism, 
claiming both theism and naturalism surpass the limits of contemporary human 
knowledge.  Nagel preaches the virtue of intellectual humility and seeks to scale back 
philosophical claims and confine them to addressing that which we can know, which is 
ourselves, our own minds, and the fact that our mind perceives an intelligible order in the 
universe.  We are confronted with an ordered universe which presents us with a problem 
– why are there laws of nature?  To simply say ‘this is just how things are, deal with it,’ is 
not good enough.69  But this is precisely the answer we are left with if naturalism is true, 
and its dissatisfaction in answering the question leads Nagel to reject it.  The interest in 
solving the mystery of the intelligible order of the universe is enough that it should make 
theism at least attractive to any atheist.  But even the theistic answer, that there is a divine 
                                                 
67 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is almost 
Certainly False  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10. 
68 Ibid., 27. 
69 Ibid., 20. 
285 
 
 
 
mind that is responsible for the physical and mental characteristics of the universe, still 
leaves the account incomplete. To say that God is the source of this order, as theists do, is 
an unjustified inference since we do not have access to the supernatural God of theism.  
Thus neither theism nor naturalism is sufficiently comprehensible to satisfy our 
understanding.  Since both are inadequate, Nagel is unable to affirm either. 
 
5.  Evolution Defeats Theism 
 
In the conflict between evolution, naturalism, and theism, the New Atheists see 
theism as the weakest link.  Dennett sees Darwin as a ‘universal acid,’ discrediting theism 
to such an extent so as to render it false.  Evolution, they claim, undermines not only 
natural theology, but revealed theology as well.  In natural theology, evolution casts 
doubt on the design argument by claiming that natural processes can account for the 
origin of complex organisms rather than an intelligent designer (Dawkins’ ‘blind 
watchmaker’).  It also lends support to the problem of evil, which is used as a 
counterargument to theist claims.  It is these implications which were most detrimental to 
the erosion of Darwin’s faith.  Towards the end of his life Darwin felt that a God who 
created by means of natural selection, through ‘warfare’ in which the strong struggle with 
and outcompete the weak, produces too much suffering.  A God who would create life in 
this fashion is incompatible with the traditional loving, benevolent God of theism.  In a 
letter to Asa Gray, Darwin states this point very concisely: 
  I cannot see, as plainly as others do, & as I should wish to do, evidence 
of design & beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much 
misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent & 
omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with 
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the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of 
caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice.70 
   
In addition, some contemporary philosophers argue that evolution is incompatible 
with the Catholic tradition of Scholasticism.  Aristotle noticed that seeds always grew to 
the same form:  acorns became oaks, not elms.  The goal of an acorn is to become an oak.  
Aristotle saw in nature an order, a principle that directs things toward their own goal or 
telos (end).  At the heart of Aquinas’s synthesis of Christian theology with Aristotle, is 
the idea of a substantial nature.  Aquinas appropriates God in fixing these essential 
natures.  But evolution discredits teleological final causes, as well as immaterial formal 
causes which organisms seek to actualize.  Darwin casts doubt upon the idea of a fixed 
species’ essence, a universal nature which all individuals of that species share.  Darwin 
argued instead that they change over time in response to the pressures of natural selection 
acting upon variations within a population.   The modern evolutionary synthesis rejects 
all typological and essentialist thought in favor of anti-essentialism.  As a result, 
Darwin’s nominalism discredits the Scholastic tradition built upon the assumption of 
essences.71     
The New Atheists also claim that evolution undermines revelation as recorded in 
scripture by demonstrating that the human creation story as told in the Bible is false.  
This has the effect of diminishing the authority of the Bible as the inerrant word of God.  
If God were truly the author of Genesis, then you would have expect the Creation story to 
reflect the scientific understanding that humans were created by evolutionary processes.  
                                                 
70 Charles Darwin, letter to Asa Gray, May 22,1860.  Quote found in Nick Spencer, Darwin and God  
(London:  SPCK, 2009), 85. 
71 Logan Paul Gage, “Can a Thomist Be a Darwinist?” in God and Evolution, ed. by Jay Richards  (Seattle:  
Discovery Institute Press, 2010), 188-196. 
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Since it does not, this implies the Bible is of human origin, and hence a natural rather 
than supernatural phenomenon.  The New Atheists are obviously not the first to recognize 
that Darwin presents a problem for a literal interpretation of Genesis.  Theologians are 
well aware of the issue, but few have offered up a satisfactory attempt to resolve the 
issue.  The Catholic Church has made some attempts to reconcile its teachings with the 
evolutionary claim that human ancestry can no longer be traced back to a single couple, 
Adam and Eve.  While the actual historical existence of Adam and Eve may not be much 
of an issue for most people, many theological doctrines are intimately connected to the 
story of Adam and Eve’s creation and subsequent fall.  To deny Adam and Eve’s actual 
existence undermines much Christian theology, which builds upon the supposition that 
there was a historical couple that disobeyed God and fell.   
In his 1950 encyclical Humani Generis, Pope Pius XII affirmed the evolution of 
the body, while allowing for the creation of the individual soul by God.  However, the 
encyclical rejects polygenism in favor of monogenism, or the idea that all modern 
humans can be traced back to a single pair of humans.  But it is unclear whether the 
encyclical is affirming theological monogenism (an actual couple, who disobeyed God), 
or scientific monogenism (Y-chromosome Adam and mitochondrial Eve).  Scientific 
monogenism as a theory arose from a 1987 Nature article by Cann, Stoneking, and 
Wilson, arguing that all females can trace their descent from a single woman, 
‘Mitochondrial Eve, who lived around 170,000 years ago.72  Similarly, in a 2000 paper 
published in Nature Genetics, geneticists were able to determine that all modern males 
                                                 
72 Spencer Wells, Deep Ancestry  (Washington D.C.:  National Geographic Society, 2007), 157-9.  Also, 
Cavalli-Sforza, The Great Human Diaspora, pgs 65-73.  The actual article argues for around 140,000 to 
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alive today derive their Y chromosome from a single man who lived around 59,000 years 
ago in Africa.73  For this reason, Daniel Dennett states that “Mitochondrial Eve is the 
woman who is the most recent direct ancestor, in the female line, of every human being 
alive today…The same logical argument establishes that there is an Adam as well, call 
him Y-Chromosome Adam.” 74  Thus scientific monogenism offers up a naturalist version 
of Adam and Eve.  While the 1950 encyclical argued for monogenism, it is doubtful that 
scientific monogenism is the kind of parental lineage it meant, as this theory was not 
developed until after the encyclical was written. 
Perhaps the reason the encyclical does not deny human descent from an original 
couple is that doing so would undermine the story of the fall and the doctrine of original 
sin.  Without original sin, there is no need for baptism other than as an initiatory ritual, 
because the purpose of baptism is to wash original sin away.  More importantly, as some 
have noticed, without the doctrine of “Original Sin, the entire rationale for a savior” is 
eroded.75  If so, then evolution does have the effect of discrediting much of the Western 
theistic tradition.  Evolution thus presents an overwhelming problem for traditional 
theism.  For much of Western history, the creation story told in the Bible and interpreted 
by Augustine, is the principle account of human origins.  As a result, much of Christian 
theology was based on a literal understanding of our first parents, whom God placed in 
the order of things “a little lower than the angels,” but who disobeyed God’s decrees, 
resulting in a depraved human condition in need of atonement and redemption.76  Darwin 
threatens to unravel this entire narrative.  Thus Dennett states that “Darwin rendered 
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obsolete” this entire worldview.  If so, let us examine the medieval world view, the view 
of “how the world looked before he [Darwin] inverted it.”77   
In Genesis, God creates Adam’s body out of the dust, but his physical body came 
to life only after God breathed on it.  Augustine believes God literally “breathed into his 
face the breath (spiritus) of life, and man was made into a living soul…the breath of God 
is to be taken as having issued from God’s mouth…and he is immaterial, as was the 
breath.”78  In Adam’s prefallen condition he had an animal body, a body taken from the 
dust of the earth, which was sustained by all the various fruits of the trees found in the 
garden.  However, Adam’s body was not corruptible, not subject to either aging or dying, 
due to his sustenance from the tree of life.79  In the garden, Adam’s interaction with God 
was direct, and, though he was naked, Adam was not ashamed.  “He lived in the 
enjoyment of God…without any want….True joy flowed perpetually.”80 
 God tells them they can eat of any tree in the garden, but warns them not to eat 
from the Tree of Knowledge, for “on whatever day you eat of it, you will surely die.”  
When they do, they are driven from Paradise and sentenced to die.  Augustine sees this 
punishment as consisting of not one but two deaths:  “the death of the soul and the death 
of the body.”81  The first consists of the death of the body and separation of the soul.  But 
the second death consists of the “death of the soul,” in that the soul is eternally deprived 
of its source of life, which is God, and hence damned.  Human nature has been radically 
affected by concupiscence, “the universal human inclination to sin,” in which the flesh no 
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78 Augustine, City of God, 540, 544-5.  
79 Ibid., 533-4. 
80 Ibid., 590. 
81 Ibid., 522. 
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longer obeys the spirit.82  Adam and Eve were “embarrassed by the nakedness of their 
bodies” because the “seminal nature from which we were begotten” has now been 
perverted so that “the flesh began to lust in opposition to the spirit.”83  For Augustine, this 
disordered love of things and self, of the flesh over God, is the mark of an evil will.  
Human nature is now “vitiated and altered,” i.e., made imperfect, faulty, impaired.84  This 
impairment is caused by “the rebellion and disobedience of desire in [the] body.”85  
“Man’s nature suffered a change for the worse; bondage to sin and inevitable death.”86  
This nature is passed on to Adam’s offspring, since “the whole human race was in the 
first man…and so it is that everyone, since he takes his origin from a condemned stock, is 
inevitably evil and carnal to begin with, by derivation from Adam.”87  As a result, 
Augustine states in the Confessions that “no man is clean of sin, not even the infant who 
has lived but a day upon the earth.”88  This statement is aimed at the Pelagians, who 
denied that infants were born with hereditary sin.   
Thus Augustine coins the term ‘original sin’ to describe the altered condition of 
human nature that all the offspring of Adam, save Jesus and Mary, have inherited.  Since 
all humans fell through Adam and inherited his corrupt nature, it is through the second 
Adam, Jesus, that the healing of this broken relationship is made possible.  Even the 
original face-to-face relationship between Adam and God is momentarily restored 
through the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, “for in him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead 
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corporeally.”89  The concept of the Fall also has consequences for how science is 
conducted.  Bacon believed that prior to the Fall, Adam possessed pure natural 
knowledge, but that after the Fall, “the senses of human beings…were corrupt, 
and…reliable knowledge was not to be had by trusting such debased sources.”90  Calvin 
and Barth saw the Fall as not only resulting a morally depraved condition, but as 
stripping humans of their “sound intelligence” as well.91    
Pascal, too, saw in Adam’s choice, disastrous consequences for all his offspring.  
Adam’s disobedience resulted in human estrangement from God.  This is the rationale 
behind Christianity’s claim that God sent his son to try to restore that relationship.  St. 
Paul states:  “it is in Adam that all die, so also it is in Christ that all will be brought to 
life.”92  The hope for resurrection promised to those who believe in Christ takes the sting 
out of Adam’s punishment, death.  On the other hand, the wicked who fail to 
acknowledge Jesus before others, are merely carnal animals and only have concern for 
the flesh and sensual pleasures.  Citing St. Paul in 1 Cor 2:11 Augustine states:  “The 
‘animal’ man does not grasp what belongs to the Spirit of God; it is all folly to him.”93  
Thus Christ atones for Adam’s sin and restores the breech caused by the fall, but only 
partially, since death still remains. 
A fictitious Adam, as evolution infers he is, necessitates the rethinking of the 
doctrine of original sin and much of the theology which rests upon it.  Evolutionary 
theory proposed a very different story of man’s origin and the nature of his being.  That 
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man is an animal and not made in the image of God is at the heart of evolutionary theory.  
Rather, humans and apes descended from a common ancestor close to 8 million years 
ago.  As a result, chimps and humans share up to 99.5% of their evolutionary history and 
between 96-98% of their DNA.94  In addition to having larger brains, humans differ from 
the other 192 species of monkeys and apes in that they are not covered with hair.95  It is 
ironic that Genesis actually mentions this, that Adam experiences a sense of shame over 
his nakedness, which might be interpreted as not only the absence of clothes, but a lack of 
hair.  To an evolutionary biologist this lack of hair might be an evolutionary strategy to 
make sexual contact amongst humans more stimulating, hence increasing their chances of 
successful reproduction.96  Or, it could be seen as the result of sexual selection, of 
females expressing a preference for males with less hair.  But from a genetic viewpoint, 
with such a little genetic difference separating apes from humans, the question is:  why 
do humans alone consider themselves the only being with a soul?  Is a 2-4% difference in 
our genetic makeup really enough to justify our anthropocentrism and our placement of 
ourselves at the top in the Great Chain of Being?  
 Rather than taking the biblical story of the Fall literally, as postulating a historical 
Adam, maybe it represents an allegorical attempt to explain why God and human beings 
are no longer on speaking terms.  The Fall states that “men are separated from God by an 
awesome sentence…worse, the separation is entirely of their own doing.”97  St. 
Augustine states that one of the chief characteristics of fallen human beings is that they 
are “deprived of God’s favour,” alienated and no longer in direct communication with 
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God.98  This could simply be interpreted as claiming God has withdrawn from the 
physical universe.  Because of Adam, God is not found in our garden.  Thus the notion of 
original sin as privation and deprivation, as the absence of God’s sanctifying grace or 
presence, an interpretation central to medieval theologians such as Anselm and Aquinas, 
could be a possible interpretation of original sin to a modern theist who accepts evolution 
and rejects a literal Fall.99  
 Another option to modern theists is to deny the existence of original sin 
altogether.  This train of thought would accept the line of thinking that ‘Darwin has 
refuted the Bible,’ at least regarding a literal reading of the first three chapters of Genesis.  
William Hordern argues that there are two scientific discoveries that have particularly 
troubled orthodox religion, those of Copernicus and Darwin.  He claims that Darwin’s 
theory of evolution made the orthodox picture of man’s fall appear ridiculous.  “Man had 
not fallen; he had started out as a mere beast and, over a relatively short time, considering 
the age of the universe, had risen to unbelievable heights.”100  By undermining the notion 
of human depravity, Darwin and the Enlightenment rationalists prepared the way for the 
rise of theological liberalism with its creed of the goodness of man.  Hordern states:  
“Liberals, as a whole, have usually denied the doctrine of original sin….Liberals have 
insisted that there is nothing radically wrong with human nature as such.”101 
Another point of disagreement between the Biblical and the scientific explanation 
concerns the nature of death.  Augustine sees this world as akin to a penal colony, 
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punishing us for the sin of the original man.  For Augustine, our mortality has a 
supernatural explanation, since it part of the punishment inflicted on Adam.  Post-
Darwin, death is no longer regarded as penal, but merely a natural phenomenon.  Human 
nature is neither a mean between angels and beasts; it is mainly if not wholly beast. That 
man is an animal is a fact, and that he dies likewise is just a fact.  The Bible claims that 
Adam lived 930 years.  Such a statement contradicts much of what science tells us about 
human longevity and why people die.  Science seems to refute the notion that death is a 
punishment inflicted by God upon Adam and Eve and their offspring for their 
disobedience.  Rather, science tells us that death is a natural occurrence based upon 
cellular senescence due to telomere shortening.  Telomeres act like the plastic covering 
on the end of shoe strings that keep them from unraveling.   The Hayflick limit states that 
human somatic cells are not immortal, but can divide only 40-60 times before their 
telomeres are too short to replicate again.102  Hence death is a natural event, not the result 
of Adam’s being driven out of the garden and being denied access to the tree of life.  By 
casting doubt on the actual existence of our first parents and the need to atone for an 
inherited congenital sinful nature, evolution thus undermines a great deal of Christian 
theology.  
 Yet another option available is to recast the doctrine of original sin into the terms 
of evolutionary biology.  Here the inherent sinful behavior of human beings is seen as a 
sign not of Adam’s fall, but of human beings’ genetic makeup.  In The Selfish Gene 
Dawkins attempts to examine the implications evolutionary theory has for human 
behavior, particularly whether we are genetically programmed to be selfish or 
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cooperative.  Dawkins notes that since he did not entitle the book The Cooperative Gene, 
it is easy to guess his view.  He states that his basic point is that human beings are 
survival machines programmed by their genes for “ruthless selfishness” for if genes were 
designed to construct altruistic organisms, they would by their very nature likely die 
off.103  If an animal behaves to preserve or advance another animal’s welfare at its own 
expense, its own chances of survival are considerably weakened.104  Thus Dawkins 
concludes: “What makes a gene good is the ability to build efficient survival machines – 
bodies….Genes are selected on ‘merit.’ ‘Good’ genes are blindly selected as those that 
survive in the gene pool.”105    
 For Augustine, selfishness is a sign of original sin and concupiscence, the 
disordered lusting after the things of the world, a condition which ensues when “God 
ceases to be the center of the life.”   Concupiscence leads man to commit other sins:  
“greed, lust, robbery, murder, selfishness.”106  Augustine sees the fertility of the human 
race as a result of the lust that arose in human beings as a result of Adam’s sin.107  From 
an evolutionary biologist’s standpoint, lust is just the natural result of hormones in our 
bodies.  Evolution dictates that those who are sexually active tend to be more successful 
in reproducing.  Thus it is only natural that genes which harbor aggressive sex drives tend 
to be more abundant than those without them.  Similarly, Augustine sees the selfish 
behavior of children as evidence for the congenital nature of original sin.  He states that 
as a child, when he “was frustrated…I threw a tantrum because adults did not obey a 
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child, free people were not my slaves.  So I inflicted on them my revenge of wailing.”108  
His point is that if adults acted as selfishly as children do, they would be considered 
morally reprehensible.  Dawkins argues, on the other hand, that not only do adults act like 
selfish children, but they do so because they are programmed by their genes to act this 
way.  For Dawkins, selfish behavior is not evidence of either sin or divine punishment for 
it, but simply a requirement for survival.  He states:  “the logical policy for a survival 
machine might therefore seem to be to murder its rivals.”109   
There are several conclusions we can draw about the implications evolution has 
for theology.  First, evolution clearly claims Adam and Eve are fictitious beings. They 
did not live, other than as Y-chromosome Adam and mitochondrial Eve.  Denying their 
actual existence undermines much of Christian theology.  Secondly, if evolution is 
correct, the Fall as represented in Genesis did not literally occur.  The denial of a 
historical fall has numerous theological ramifications.  Third, humans evolved not from 
direct creation by God of an original pair of humans, but from animals, in a process that 
took millions of years to occur.  Fourth, despite all this, evolutionary theory is not fatal to 
God.  Evolution may prove fatal to Adam and Eve as historical beings, but that does not 
mean that all of Scripture should be discarded and we should stroll down the secular path 
of naturalism.  Evolution is not fatal to a contingent universe or one that needs God to 
explain its existence or its laws.   
As a result of these points, it is necessary to reinterpret the doctrine of original 
sin, to the extent that this doctrine is based upon a literal interpretation of the fall.  Early 
19th century Protestant theological liberalism attempted to solve this problem by doing 
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away with the concept of original sin.  Neo-orthodox theologians after WWII sought to 
reassert the sinfulness of man by reinterpreting what it meant to be fallen.  Because we 
are deprived of God, the human condition is one of ignorance, mortality, and selfishness.  
Augustine may be right in claiming there is an original selfish condition in which all 
human beings find themselves.  But did it come from Adam?  No.  It could have come 
from apes and be based in genes.  Or it could simply reflect the understanding that human 
beings are deprived of God’s immediate presence, hence often act in error.  The story of 
the garden might simply be a myth told to account for the empirical fact that humans are 
capable of moral evil and wrongdoing, and was never intended to be taken literally.  To 
some, viewing the Fall as a myth suggests it is simply a literary invention of human 
authorship, and as a result opens the door to the suggestion that God is not really the 
author of or the inspiration behind Scripture.  Seeing the story as a myth of human origin 
suggests that the Bible is really just a human document, not the infallible Word of God.   
John Locke built his case for Christianity on the assumption that the sin of Adam 
necessitated the Incarnation.  He states in The Reasonableness of Christianity, “It is 
obvious to any one, who reads the New Testament, that the doctrine of redemption, and 
consequently of the gospel, is founded upon the supposition of Adam’s fall….What we 
are restored to by Jesus Christ…we lost by Adam.”110  Charles Taylor states it in this 
way:  “In sinning, we deserved punishment and hence were lost to God.  A big debt had 
to be paid.  God had this debt paid for us by his own son, and thus opened the way for 
many of us to return.”111   The denial of original sin appears to make unnecessary the 
need for atonement by Jesus for the sin of Adam.  There is no longer any need for a 
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second Adam to expiate the sin of the first Adam, because the first Adam didn’t exist.  If 
there was no Adam and Eve, there was no disobedience; no disobedience means no 
inherited sin; no sin means there was no punishment placed on our first parents; no first 
parents and no punishment means we are not born into any type of congenital depravity; 
no inherited depravity means no debt to be paid; no debt to be paid means no need for 
God to send his son to pay it.  In essence, the denial of original sin does seems to 
discredit the need or reason for the Incarnation.  Following this line of reasoning we can 
see why Dennett might claim that Darwin is a universal acid, that evolution not only 
refutes a literal interpretation of Genesis, but in doing so has undermined the foundation 
of much of the theology of the Western theistic tradition.  As a result, evolution does pose 
problems for a theology based upon essential claims in Scripture.112  
 
6.  Evolution Defeats Naturalism 
 
 One notable philosophical attempt to answer the charge that evolution defeats 
theism has been made by Alvin Plantinga.  In his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, 
Plantinga argues that there is only a ‘superficial’ conflict between evolution and 
Scripture.  Whereas the New Atheists see concord between naturalism and science, this 
concord is only superficial.  In fact, the real conflict, which he calls deep conflict, is 
between evolution and naturalism.113  He argues the New Atheists act as if science 
advances the worldview of metaphysical naturalism, when in fact it is an overlay that 
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atheists place on science, and as a result offers up the interpretation of evolution as a 
blind, unguided process.  As noted, theism endorses direct action in history by God, 
including the direct creation and infusion of souls into humans, who are made in the 
image of God. These points are inconsistent with the naturalist picture of a causally 
closed physical universe in which the laws of nature are inviolable and preclude 
intervention from any supernatural being.  From a naturalist perspective, evolution rules 
out guidance by an intelligent designer, asserting instead that all life evolved from strictly 
natural, random processes.  Life began in a primordial chemical soup roughly 3.8 billion 
years ago, when single-celled prokaryotic cells first appeared.  Plantinga’s argument 
against the naturalist narrative is that beings such as ourselves could only be the result of 
a guided process.   
 His argument is aimed at those who endorse the project of naturalizing 
epistemology based upon the belief that evolution has proven that human beings have not 
been designed.  He believes theists are afraid to embrace evolution because of the way it 
is being packaged and marketed, as constituting proof of naturalism.  However, 
naturalism is not a part of scientific theory but a metaphysical add-on, an overlay or gloss 
which naturalists weld to evolution so as to deceive others into thinking that it disproves 
theism.  He argues that naturalism and evolution may result in the denial of divine design, 
but by itself evolution does not.  On the contrary, he argues, it is evolution and naturalism 
that conflict, not evolution and theism.  Why?  Because given naturalism and evolution, 
the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, or P(R/N&E), is low.114  This is 
because evolution winnows out only behavior that is non-adaptive, not views that are 
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false, or mechanisms that deliver false beliefs.  Given naturalism and evolution, cognitive 
faculties evolved not to determine what is true or false, but simply to aid types of 
behavior that improve one’s overall chances of survival.   
 What Plantinga is saying is that if human beings are simply the result of unguided 
natural selection (evolution and naturalism), we have no reason to think that our 
judgment-making capacities are reliable.  How do we know that naturalism is true and 
that evolution occurred?  By the use of cognitive faculties that were produced by purely 
natural, unguided, random processes, those described by evolutionary theory.  Hence we 
face the same dilemma as Hume’s problem of induction.  How do we know induction is 
epistemically justified?  By induction.  How do we know naturalism and evolution are 
true?  By wholly natural, unguided evolutionary processes which are designed to aid in 
our survival rather than produce true beliefs.  If so, we have no more reason to think we 
have true beliefs than to think that a ‘camera’ produced by unguided, purely natural 
processes takes accurate pictures of the world.   
As a result, Plantinga believes it more likely that human evolution was guided to 
produce beings with reliable cognitive faculties – beings presumably, like ourselves.  
Plantinga also follows the medieval line of thought that human reason participates in 
divine reason, since humans are made in God’s image.  This line of thought sees God as 
the source of moral values, the architect of scientific laws governing the natural world, 
and the divine rationality that is the basis of logical and mathematical laws.  As a result, 
scientific knowledge about the order of nature is not just human knowledge but 
knowledge of the mind behind nature. 
  It is an important part of Christian, Jewish and some Islamic thought to 
see human beings as created in God’s image…This is the thought that God 
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is a knower, and indeed the supreme knower.  God is omniscient, that is, 
such that he knows everything…Aquinas says the ability to know is the 
chief part of the image of God…God created both us and our world in 
such a way that there is a certain fit or match between the world and our 
cognitive faculties.  The medievals had a phrase for it:  adequatio 
intellectus ad rem (the adequation of the intellect to reality).  The basic 
idea, here, is simply that there is a match between our cognitive or 
intellectual faculties and reality, thought of as including whatever exists, 
and a match that enables us to know something, indeed a great deal, about 
the world – and also about ourselves and God himself.115 
 
Thus Plantinga thinks it is more likely that we are the product of God’s conscious 
intention than a random natural process.  The key insight Plantinga is building upon here 
is that being made in the image of God, which is a fundamental tenet of theism, includes 
divine ways of knowing.  God intervened in the process of evolution in order to ensure 
beings like us would be its product.  The fact that human beings do have reliable 
cognitive faculties demonstrates, for Plantinga, that God has managed the process.  Just 
as complex cars or watches don’t randomly put themselves together through strictly 
natural processes, complex cognitive faculties don’t either.  They need an intelligent 
designer to guide the process.   Given the complexity of the eukaryotic cell or our eyes or 
the reliability of our cognitive faculties, and without science able to replicate these 
results, it appears they could not come about by chance alone. Their degree of complexity 
is due to a divine designer.  Plantinga, Michael Behe, and William Paley believe that 
these processes are too complex to arise through unguided natural evolution.   
The credibility of Plantinga’s argument rests upon whether or not his design 
argument is sound.  Plantinga cites several notable nontheists who all believe there is 
reason to doubt our cognitive faculties are capable of producing mostly true beliefs, 
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among them Nietzsche, Nagel, Stroud, Patricia Churchland, and even Darwin himself.116  
However, there are also many epistemologists and biologists who disagree with 
Plantinga’s conclusion, among them Jerry Fodor, William Ramsey, Trenton Merricks and 
William Alston.117  Elliot Sober contends that Plantinga skewed his probability numbers 
in order to achieve a successful outcome in favor of theism.118  Daniel Dennett’s response 
is two-fold.  Yes, it is possible God interfered in the evolutionary process, but it’s also 
possible Superman did as well, or that aliens salted the earth with human DNA millions 
of years ago.  Just as Supermanism is perfectly consistent with evolutionary theory, so is 
intelligent design.  Just as people find Supermanism ridiculous, so should people find 
Plantinga’s intelligent design ridiculous.  As to whether or not the P(R/N&E) is low, 
Dennett argues it is not.  He states “Evolution by natural selection explains why hearts 
are highly reliable pumps, lungs are highly reliable blood oxygenators, eyes are highly 
reliable distal-information acquirers, and the beliefs that are provoked by those eyes (and 
other senses) are highly reliable truth trackers.”119   
In response to Dennett, some evolutionary psychologists might disagree.  Their 
findings substantiate the position that our sense organs are geared not toward truth, but 
survival.  Doug Kenrick and Vladas Griskevicius, in their book The Rational Animal, 
liken human cognitive processes to a smoke detector.  A smoke detector gives off so 
many false alarms (from dust, cigarette smoke, candles, fire places, and cooking mishaps, 
rather than an actual fire) that one is tempted to disable it.  Why do we not?  Just in case 
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one of those alarms is genuine.  Similarly, they argue that our brains are wired like smoke 
detectors, “designed to make judgment calls despite having incomplete 
information….Natural selection creates systems, like the brain, that are biased to 
minimize the costlier error.”120  Kenrick and Griskevicius provide example after example 
of behaviors based on false judgments, which nevertheless enhance survival value.  For 
example, they cite flinching (as biased on a misjudgment of the threat or speed of an 
approaching object), wearing a seatbelt (if you’re lucky, you’ll never need it, yet it’s an 
inconvenience to put on every time you get in a car), sneezing (a disease avoidant 
response), overconfidence (less confident men will not take as many risks sexually), as 
well as men judging their own sexual attractiveness to women.121  All of these behaviors, 
they argue, involve misjudgments, but we are genetically hardwired to make them 
because they further our survival chances.  If evolution is true, and many of our decisions 
are based on pragmatic calculations aimed at survival, not truth, then contrary to Dennett, 
our senses are not ‘highly reliable truth trackers,’ but rather ‘highly reliable survival 
machines.’  Invoking divine intervention in evolution may ensure our cognitive faculties 
have a higher degree of reliability than without.   
 
7.  Conclusion:  Evolution defeats Neither Theism nor Naturalism 
  
 So who is right and who is wrong?  Are the New Atheists right?  Has evolution 
defeated theism?  Or evolution defeated naturalism?  The answer is neither.  It is the 
Conflict model that is wrong.  Evolution is only fatal to a literal interpretation of the first 
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three chapters of Genesis.  But not all Christians interpret these chapters literally.  
Christian fundamentalism may be at odd with evolutionary theory, but not all Christians 
or theists are fundamentalists.  It is very easy to simply interpret the meaning of Genesis 
as metaphorically saying that God created the universe and all the creatures in it through 
either guided or unguided evolution.  It didn’t have to happen in a six days or six billion 
years.  Genesis simply cites God is the only efficient first cause of the universe.  As for 
the garden story and the fall, this, too, could be interpreted metaphorically, as simply 
saying we are living in a garden made by God, and while here we are expected to enter 
into a loving relationship with God, others, and creation.  To the extent that we do, we 
avoid eating the forbidden fruit of the knowledge of evil, of not living as God intended 
for us to live.  It is possible to even do this without denying the historicity of Adam and 
Eve, as the The Catechism of the Catholic Church does.  Section 390 of the Catechism, 
entitled ‘How to read the account of the fall,’ states “The account of the fall in Genesis 3 
uses figurative language, but affirms a primeval event, a deed that took place at the 
beginning of the history of man.  Revelation gives us the certainty of faith that the whole 
of human history is marked by the original fault freely committed by our first parents.”122  
This position allows for pre-Adamism (or the descent of humans from animals), affirms 
monogenism, as well as the dogma of original sin, by claiming that the story of the fall 
perhaps refers to an original couple who God entered into relationship with and whose 
disobedience still falls upon their descendants.  Pope Pius XII, in the encyclical Humani 
generis, rejected polygenism as being incompatible with the doctrine of Original Sin.  
This interpretation is not wholly incompatible with evolution, unless of course evolution 
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is read in a strictly natural way, and it allows for belief in evolution without undermining 
the doctrine of Original Sin and all the other various doctrines that are dependent upon it.  
However, it needs further development, which is beyond the scope of this project. 
So does that mean Plantinga is right, that the conflict is really between evolution 
and naturalism?  Would our cognitive faculties be unreliable if left to unguided 
evolution?  If natural selection has built our bodies for survival, to hunt down rabbits, and 
not truth, and our senses occasionally deceive us, does this mean that we cannot trust our 
beliefs to be true?  Not necessarily.  Adopting a metaphysical worldview involves making 
a rational bet about the way the world is based upon the evidence of our senses.  The 
majority of the time those bets pay off.  Thus it appears Dennett is correct in responding 
to Plantinga that our senses are highly reliable truth trackers.  They may not provide 
Cartesian certainty, but statistical probability is probability enough to persuade most 
people to trust their senses. 
 But is the reliability of our cognitive processes really enough evidence to 
determine whether or not God guided the process of forming them?  It doesn’t appear the 
argument is conclusive enough to give a firm answer one way or the other.  Plantinga’s 
argument appears to be inconclusive.  As Sober notes, the probability one assigns to his 
argument might rest upon subjective worldviews, whether or not one is a naturalist or a 
theist.  Hence the argument could go either way.  Nevertheless, even if Plantinga’s 
EAAN fails to defeat naturalism, his argument is not entirely unsuccessful.  He has 
demonstrated that evolution does not entail naturalism.  Rather metaphysical naturalism 
is an unwarranted add-on to evolution, an overlay tacked on by people like Dennett.  It is 
not science and/or evolution that conflicts with theism, but naturalism and theism that 
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conflict, and science is only seen to conflict with theism when it is performed with the 
overlay of naturalism.  It is possible to do good science without the overlay and believe 
that one is studying God’s creation, thereby gaining insight into God’s mind as the 
architect behind Nature.  Plantinga shows that evolution is not equivalent to metaphysical 
naturalism.  It is the New Atheists who place the overlay of metaphysical naturalism on 
evolution, but in doing so they create a straw man.  But whether humans could have 
arisen through strictly naturalistic processes to have reliable cognitive faculties remains 
unknown.   Humans weren’t around to witness the millions of years in which the process 
occurred.  The problem is we are betting on worldviews with incomplete information, 
and as a result no conclusion appears justified.  Was the process of evolution strictly 
naturalistic or was it guided?  The only correct answer is, Who knows?  The only 
justified logical conclusion one can draw from evolution is that one cannot say for sure 
whether it occurred through strictly natural and unguided processes, or was guided by a 
theistic god.  No theologians or scientists have been around to witness the billions of 
years in which life evolved to observe the process.  Therefore the only correct 
metaphysical inference one can draw on this issue is ¿ or indeterminate.  This is the 
conclusion that the last chapter will seek to demonstrate. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – 
JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF, SKEPTICISM, AND THE LIMISTS OF KNOWLEGE 
 
 
   It is always advisable to perceive clearly our ignorance. 1 – Darwin 
 
  The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must 
be content to remain an agnostic.2 – Darwin 
 
  I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human 
intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.3 – Darwin  
 
  I am aware that if we admit a first cause, the mind still craves to know 
whence it came and how it arose.  Nor can I overlook the difficulty from the 
immense amount of suffering through the world….The safest conclusion to me 
seems that the whole subject is beyond the scope of man’s intellect.4 – Darwin  
  Whether a man deserves to be called a theist depends on the definition of 
the term: which is much too large a subject for a note. In my most extreme 
fluctuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of denying the 
existence of a God.  I think that generally (& more and more so as I grow 
older) but not always, that an agnostic would be the most correct 
description of my state of mind.5 – Darwin 
  I am actually wiser than this person; likely enough neither of us knows 
anything of importance, but he thinks he knows something when he doesn’t, 
whereas just as I don’t know anything, so I don’t think I do either.”6 – Socrates  
  
  It is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations.7 – Nietzsche  
 
   We must regard all laws and theories as guesses.8 – Karl Popper  
 
   Science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared 
to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed 
by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, and 
impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already 
decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted it without 
ever having examined its advantages and its limits.9  – Paul Feyerabend 
                                                 
1 Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (New York:  Appleton & Co., 1915), 67. 
2 Charles Darwin, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin (New York:  Appleton & Co., 1886), Vol I, 282. 
3 Charles Darwin, in a letter to Asa Gray, May 22, 1860. 
4 Charles Darwin, in a letter to Nicolass D. Doedes, April 2, 1873. 
5 Charles Darwin, letter to John Fordyce, May 7, 1879. 
6 Plato, Apology, trans. by Christopher Rowe  (New York:  Penguin Books, 2010), 37 (21d). 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York:  Penguin Books, 1954), 458. 
8 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1972), 9. 
9 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method  (London:  New Left Books, 1975), 295. 
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1.  Knowledge as Justified True Belief   
 
The debates about whether science conflicts with religion and whether evolution 
disproves the existence of God are really epistemological debates.  Theists claim to 
‘know’ that God exists, and that the existence of the universe and complex beings such as 
us are dependent upon God.  The New Atheists claim to ‘know’ that God does not exist 
and that humans evolved through strictly natural processes.  But the New Atheism is 
really not that new.  Roy Abraham Varghesee states: “It would be fair to say the ‘new 
atheism’ is nothing less than a regression to the logical positivist philosophy that was 
renounced by even its most ardent proponents.”10  If this is true, that the New Atheists are 
merely warmed-over positivists, then it is necessary to revisit what logical positivism 
was, and whether its resurgence by contemporary atheists has overcome the flaws that led 
to its earlier abandonment.  It will also require examining how its demand that empirical 
verification justify knowledge claims is related to the New Atheists’ evidentialism.          
 What is ‘new’ to the New Atheists that is explicitly absent in the claims of the 
positivists, is their claim that evolutionary theory provides support for metaphysical 
naturalism and is fatal to theism.  Alvin Plantinga and Michael Behe argue the opposite.  
As a result, this final chapter will examine each camp’s claims to knowledge in order to 
determine if either side has sufficient epistemic justification for their claims.  Traditional 
theories of knowledge state in order to achieve knowledge three individually necessary 
                                                 
10 Roy Abraham Varghese, in Preface to Anthony Flew, There Is A God, How the world’s most notorious 
atheist changed his mind  (New York:  HarperOne, 2007).   
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and jointly sufficient conditions must be satisfied, these being justification, truth, and 
belief.  These conditions trace back to Plato’s Theaetetus, in which knowledge is defined 
as “true belief with the addition of an account (logos).”11  Edmund Gettier cites Roderick 
Chisholm’s traditional account of knowledge: 
S knows that P, IFF   (i) S accepts P 
(ii) S has adequate evidence for P, and  
     (iii) P is true.12 
 
One must believe something (for example, that the moon is made of three kinds of 
igneous rock), one must be able to provide evidence for it (for example, that there are 
spectrograph results of the moon rock samples), and it must be true (i.e., it is a scientific 
fact).   Unless one can provide epistemic justification for why one believes something, 
one cannot claim to say they know it, nor can they claim to know something if it is in fact 
false.  Although ultimately Plato ends up rejecting this definition in the Theaetetus (true 
belief with an account), its failure seems a designed move by Plato to show that there can 
be no knowledge unless there is knowledge of the Forms.  In the Meno, Socrates states 
that the difference between opinion and knowledge is that the latter is “tied down” to the 
Forms through the process of recollection.13  Nevertheless, these three conditions served 
as the traditional account of knowledge until Gettier demonstrated that they, while 
necessary, are not sufficient to obtain knowledge, and that a fourth condition was needed.  
While acknowledging the existence of Gettier counterexamples that satisfy these 
                                                 
11 Plato, “Theaetetus,” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns  
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1989), 908 (or 201:d).  Plato, however, ultimately rejects this 
definition of knowledge, as will be discussed later. 
12 Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”  Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6.  (June, 1963), 121. 
13 Plato, “Meno,” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns  
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1989), 381-2, (or 98a). 
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conditions yet fail to constitute knowledge, let us adopt the traditional account of 
knowledge as satisfactory for our purposes. 
Pascal, in his famous wager, argues that every individual faces a choice, a choice 
in response to what he considers the ultimate question, Does God exist?  He lays out our 
options for us and considers the potential outcome for each choice: 
       Subjective Belief               Objective Truth 
 
1. Belief in God  God exists 
2. Belief in God  God does not exist 
3. Disbelief in God  God does not exist 
4. Disbelief in God  God exists  
 
Now, which do you choose?  Pascal argues that both our present life and possible 
future life may greatly be affected by one’s choice.  If one chooses to believe in God and 
God exists, eternal bliss.  If one chooses to believe in God and God does not exist, then 
you have sacrificed some earthly goods for a non-existent salvation.  If one chooses not 
to believe in God and God does not exist, then try and enjoy the short stay you have 
while alive on planet earth.  But if one does not believe in God and God exists, well, your 
future rests with the sympathy of God.  What if you refuse to make any of the choices 
above, to not wager at all?  “Yes, but you must wager.  It is not optional.  Which then will 
you choose?”14 
How do we go about deciding how to answer the question?  Pascal notes that it 
could be the most important decision we ever make, as it could have eternal 
repercussions.   Well, if one has to make a choice, then one will want evidence.  But 
Pascal argues that evidence will not settle the issue.  He states:  “Reason cannot decide 
                                                 
14 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, and Other Writings, trans. by Honor Levi  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1995), 154. 
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anything….Reason cannot make you choose one way or the other….If there is a God, he 
is infinitely beyond our comprehension….Who will then blame the Christians for being 
unable to provide a rational basis for their belief?”15  In other words, to Pascal one might 
not be able to justify one’s belief with evidence.   
 But does Pascal really believe that there is no evidence, that faith lacks any 
justification?  No.  His argument is that there is no evidence, but there is reason 
nonetheless to believe.  The wager itself is a rational argument, a pragmatic one that 
purports to demonstrate that there are grounds for choosing belief over disbelief.  A 
gambler gauges his actions against the odds, to determine whether they are in his favor.  
Pascal’s argument could thus be said to be a rational one.  It is an argument that one 
should, from the point of view of self-interest, believe in God.  In addition, the majority 
of the Pensees discusses Pascal’s personal reasons for his own belief, which are based 
primarily on revelation.  What criteria does he use to accept revelation as being true?  He 
states:  “It is in the heart that feels God, not reason; that is what faith is.  God is felt by 
the heart, not by reason.  The heart has its reasons which reason itself does not know.”16  
By ‘heart,’ Pascal means intuition.  It could also be argued that the decision to believe in 
the Christian revelation cannot be based on rational evidence.  However, if the infinitely 
good God were to appear on earth, one could intuitively perceive that he would behave in 
a manner that is consistent with the person of Jesus.  The heart knows this, if reason does 
not, that Jesus personifies divine goodness.  But when he says, “the heart has its reasons,” 
he is making epistemic attempts to justify belief.  Finally, Pascal bases his faith on a 
religious experience he claims to have had which confirmed his faith in the God of 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 153-4. 
16 Ibid., 157-8.  
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revelation over the type of God established through reason and natural philosophy.  After 
this experience, he wrote:  “From about half past ten in the evening until half past 
midnight.  Fire.  God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of philosophers and 
scholars.  Absolute certainty – beyond reason.”17 
One of the problems with Pascal’s wager is that it may be impossible to make 
yourself believe something on the basis of no rational evidence other than prudential 
ones.  Pascal’s recommendation for those who are skeptical is to  “Follow the way by 
which (believers) began; by acting as if they believe, taking the holy water, having 
masses said, etc….What harm will befall you?  You will be faithful, honest, humble, 
grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful.”18  Pascal thinks that faith is contagious, that 
you catch it the same way that you catch a cold, by associating with those who have 
already come down with it.  The problem is that most people cannot force themselves to 
believe something unless there is some evidence for it.  While Pascal would disagree that 
all evidence must be empirical, the only kind of justification that counts for the New 
Atheists is scientific evidence that is both rational and empirical.  While Pascal may be 
able to cite the reasons of the heart, intuition, revelation, and personal religious 
experience as evidence to support his beliefs, it is central to the New Atheists that this 
type of evidence is not scientific and hence is no evidence at all.  Only evidence that is 
based upon facts which can be empirically verified, that produce hypotheses which can 
make predictions, which can then be tested experimentally, constitute acceptable 
                                                 
17 David Simpson, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. ‘Pascal.’  http://www.iep.utm.edu/pascal-b/ 
18 Blaise Pascal, “Faith is a Logical Bet,” in Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, ed. by Louis P. Pojman and 
Lewis Vaughn  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 142. 
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evidence.  Pascal’s reasons do not constitute scientific evidence, and hence should be 
dismissed.  
Pascal’s four logical possibilities concerning belief in God align nicely with the 
naturalist and theist positions.  His belief in God aligns with theism, and the naturalist 
rejects this belief.  One of the central claims of the New Atheists is that religion is 
without any justification, that it is held on faith alone, independent of any evidence.  They 
all cite lack of evidence for theistic belief as contributing to the irrationality of faith.  
Richard Dawkins cites Bertrand Russell response, who when asked what he would do 
when he died and was held accountable before God for his disbelief, replied, “Not 
enough evidence, God, not enough evidence.”19  In addition, they believe there is good 
evidence against God’s existence, scientific evidence, most notably, evolutionary theory.  
Dawkins says science provides the closest epistemic claims to certainty we can get.  To 
support this claim he argues science works, as evidenced by the fact that “planes fly, cars 
drive, computers work.”  The New Atheists claim the medieval tradition which Pascal is 
espousing was overthrown by the scientific revolution.  It was revolutionary in that it 
overthrew the medieval worldview, which was faith centered.  They believe the scientific 
revolution not only provided a better method for achieving knowledge, but supported a 
new metaphysics, one that replaced the old theistic worldview, and replaced it with a 
scientific worldview with a metaphysic of naturalism. 
 
2.  Enlightenment Foundationalism and Evidentialism 
 
                                                 
19 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 130-1. 
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 The demand that we only believe something if and only if it is arrived at through a 
rational process reflects the influence of the Enlightenment, but has its basis in the 
foundationalism of Plato and Aristotle.20  Classical Foundationalism asserts that all 
beliefs must ultimately be anchored in basic or foundational beliefs which are not in need 
of further justification.  These core beliefs thereby avoid the danger of an infinite regress.  
In modern foundationalism, foundational beliefs serve the same role as axioms do in 
geometry and are either self-evident (for example, “a triangle has three sides,” or 
Descartes’ cogito), or incorrigible (“I have a headache”).  For the empiricists, the 
testimony of the senses can also provide foundational beliefs, although Descartes rejects 
sense-based beliefs as fallible.  All justification must be able to be traced back to basic 
beliefs and rationally derive from them.  If it can be shown that one’s supposed basic 
beliefs are not basic, or that the superstructure built upon them is based upon weak or 
invalid reasoning, then one’s beliefs may be characterized as not fully justified.   
The demand that we not believe anything without proper evidence is called 
Evidentialism.  While this position is commonly associated with naturalists like Bertrand 
Russell, Michael Scriven, and Anthony Flew, it was also held by John Locke.   W.K. 
Clifford in his essay, “The Ethics of Belief,” nicely captures the epistemological demands 
evidentialism makes.  Clifford tells the story of a ship-owner who is about to send an old 
ship to sea full of emigrants, but has doubts over its seaworthiness.  So does he go and 
inspect the ship in order to investigate the seaworthiness of the ship?  No, he reassures 
himself that she has gone safely to sea many times before, so he does nothing.  The ship 
sinks and he collects his insurance money.  To Clifford the ship-owner is guilty of 
                                                 
20 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Introduction,” in Faith and Rationality, Reason and Belief in God, ed. by Alvin 
Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff  (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 6. 
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causing the deaths of the passengers because he let it sail without proper evidence that it 
was seaworthy.  He thus concludes:  “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”21   
Evidence in this case is considered synonymous with empirical evidence, and 
only conclusions that are drawn on the basis of an empirical investigation count as 
justification.  Clifford argues that what we believe has ethical consequences, that people’s 
lives are at stake on the basis of our beliefs, so how they are formed is a public matter.  
We have a duty to form beliefs on the basis of the evidence.  The insinuation is that any 
belief taken on faith, rather than reason, is irrational and morally unjustified.  Clifford is 
clearly trying to draw a parallel here between the ship-owner and religion, as he also tells 
a story about a religious sect on an island that holds unfounded beliefs and persecutes 
others on the basis of these beliefs.  Similarly, as a theory of epistemic justification, the 
New Atheists’ version of evidentialism sees only methodological naturalism and 
scientific evidence as providing a sufficient basis for one’s beliefs.  However, 
evidentialism does not necessarily entail methodological naturalism or that all evidence is 
empirical.  It just insists on evidence. 
 
2.1  Fideism 
 
 The New Atheists’ evidentialism argues that theism is irrational, because there is 
no good evidence for the existence of God.  This position, however, is itself not 
sufficiently warranted.  Fideists believe the evidentialist challenge cannot be met, that 
                                                 
21 W.K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, ed. by Louis P. Pojman and 
Lewis Vaughn (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 147. 
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Faith is basic, unchallengeable, and can’t be made rational.  They don’t see this, however, 
as an epistemological vice.  To give reasons is harmful to the faith, as Barth would argue, 
since divine revelation is not subject to human reason.  To give reasons is to attempt to 
make the Word of God subject to human reason and the word of man.  God’s self-
revelation and inherently incomprehensible incarnation as man always trumps the 
attempts of natural theology to construct ladders into heaven.  The Anglican theologian 
John Macquarrie states:  “Barthian fideism starts from the givenness of a particular 
revelation and refuses to inquire into the grounds for accepting that revelation.”22  While 
this might appear to make Fideism irrational, fideists would argue that faith is a higher 
category than reason.  As the fideist Montaigne stated:  “Christians do themselves wrong 
by wishing to support their belief with human reasons:  belief is grasped by faith and by 
private inspiration from God’s grace.”23  Fideism turns the tables on Evidentialism by 
seeing it as a sign of a lack of faith, for it is asking for reasons and even knowledge to 
sustain belief, which is something faith cannot provide and should not attempt to provide.  
Nor can the divine be brought down to the level of human understanding, as an infinite 
God cannot be comprehended by a finite being.  But this is no reason to reject faith.  
Fideism adheres to the Independence model.  Revelation is its own sui generis source of 
knowledge and has its own pre-eminent authority.  While reason may govern secular 
beliefs, religious beliefs are immune to its epistemic demands. 
Kierkegaard’s particular brand of fideism rejects the whole tradition of natural 
theology, and argues, in agreement with Kant, that God’s existence cannot be established, 
since it is a concept that lacks a sensible intuition.  The whole Scholastic tradition of faith 
                                                 
22 John Macquarrie, In Search of Deity  (London:  Xpress Reprints, 1993), 4, 13. 
23 Paul Richard Blum, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate, 2010), 18. 
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seeking understanding presupposes a harmony between faith and reason, one which 
Kierkegaard rejects.  In the Philosophical Fragments, he argues that the decision to 
become a Christian cannot be made through reason, as faith transcends understanding.  
Kierkegaard argues that the belief that an infinite sinless God took on finite form and 
suffered a sinner’s death, is a step beyond the Socratic, beyond the Hegelian, beyond 
reason.  In other words, rational justification is not possible here.  Yet, like Pascal, is it 
possible to believe something without fully understanding it, or to believe something that 
seems absurd?  Kierkegaard argues it is, that other mechanisms than reason, such as 
despair, guilt, anxiety, dread, and sin can function as the motor driving one to make the 
‘leap of faith’ and become religious.  What Kierkegaard calls the ‘antecedent state’ prior 
to faith is sin and ignorance, in that the seeker is ignorant of the Truth and does not even 
know he is ignorant.24  Sin takes on an epistemological function in Kierkegaard, in that it 
blocks us from knowing the truth.  The sinner doesn’t even know that he or she doesn’t 
know the truth.25  Sin, therefore, has something to do with the ability to know the truth.  
If a person is to acquire the Truth, and the Truth is not within him, and he doesn’t even 
know he is without it, and can’t acquire it themselves due to their limited sinful nature, 
then a Teacher must provide it.  The Teacher in this case is God, who is the only one 
capable of providing the Truth.  Though humans can come to know and love God, they 
cannot understand God.26   
                                                 
24 Compare to the Meno Paradox. 
25 The epigraph to Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments states “The question is asked in ignorance, by 
one who does not even know what can have led him to ask it.” 
26 Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David Swenson and Howard V. Hong  
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1967), 48-9. 
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Kierkegaard tells the parable of the humble maiden as a way to convince the 
reader of the truth of Christianity.27  Like the king in the parable, God chose the method 
of self-disclosure by incarnating as a humble servant because it is the nature of love to 
serve others, and God is love.  Though Kierkegaard claims to be distancing himself from 
natural theology, the parable of the humble maiden can be seen as an argument by 
analogy, one that is designed to demonstrate why God might have chosen the method of 
revelation that Christians believe God did.   
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard states that truth is 
subjectivity, or “an objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most 
passionate inwardness.”28  What has truth to do with passion?  Kierkegaard argues that in 
the Parable of the Ten Virgins, the five foolish bridesmaids “lost the infinite passion of 
expectation,” and forgot to bring enough oil to the wedding feast, and as a result missed 
it.  Truth is an objective uncertainty for Kierkegaard because he sides with Kant’s 
critique of rational arguments for God’s existence, and rejects the ability of reason to 
establish knowledge claims for or against God’s existence.  One cannot know whether 
God exists with the type of certainty that Locke or Aquinas claim.  God can never be 
found objectively in nature.  God is not a thing to be found in the world.  In seeking God 
through nature one finds design and wisdom, but one also finds chaos and calamity.   
Since truth cannot be found objectively, scientifically, truth must be found inwardly in 
subjectivity, and is measured by the degree of passion we hold to it.  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 32-8. 
28 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David Swenson and Walter Lowrie  
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1968), 117. 
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2.2  Theist Evidentialism 
 
In contrast to fideism, Theist evidentialism holds the evidentialist challenge can 
and should be met.  This is the tradition of natural theology, of using reason, reflection, 
and sense experience to attempt to achieve knowledge of God’s existence.  Theist 
evidentialism is compatible with open science, i.e., science that allows for supernatural 
explanations, not just natural ones.  Clifford’s claim that there is no evidence to support 
religion either overlooks or rejects all the arguments provided for theism in Chapter Four.  
Natural theology could be described as an attempt to satisfy Clifford’s demand that the 
ship-owner inspect his ship.  Its conclusions could be said to constitute the results of the 
inspection of the ship.  The analogy here is that Clifford’s ship is a human artifact, 
whereas the universe appears to be a divine artifact.   
The problem with this, as Hume (Philo) states in Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion, is that we have sense experience of humans designing and creating artifacts.  
We have seen ships get built and know how to determine if they are seaworthy or not.  
But we have never witnessed a universe being created.  The creation of the universe is a 
singular event.  So the inference to a designer based upon the order found in a ship, 
cannot be similarly made when the universe is considered.   
But consider this.  If one came across a cyborg, or an aircraft with a level of 
design far beyond the ability of humans to create (for example, an aircraft with 
antigravity propulsion), perhaps the best explanation for these artifacts is that they are 
extraterrestrial creations.  Similarly, if the universe itself resembles an artifact, one that it 
is intricately designed (as the Fine tuning argument has it), perhaps the best explanation 
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for its existence is a supremely intelligent artificer.  Michael Behe goes a step further and 
sees the biological complexity of living organisms as better explained by considering 
them artifacts rather than the results of purely natural processes.  John Locke’s position 
agrees with Behe’s.  He accepted the evidentialist challenge and argued that it is perfectly 
rational to infer that God exists as the designer and source of the universe.  He even 
claims that this is known with certainty.29   
Design arguments are part of theist science, or what one might call ‘open 
science.’  Open science does not subscribe to methodological naturalism, but allows for 
the best explanation possible, even if it is a supernatural one.  However, the New Atheists 
form of evidentialism only allows for methodological naturalism, which rules out 
supernatural explanations.  But why rule out, a priori, other methods for obtaining 
knowledge?  Not only might there be good scientific evidence for theism, but there might 
be alternative methods of justifying beliefs.  If we obey the dictum that methodological 
naturalism be our only procedure for obtaining knowledge, intractable anomalies might 
be impossible to explain.  The ‘God of the gaps’ argument is still an argument, one that 
might well provide evidence for theism.  If there are mysteries that science cannot 
explain, which theism can, then naturalism as a worldview might well be concluded to be 
an incomplete and insufficient explanation of reality as a whole. 
Nevertheless, to the degree that Evidentialism makes reason normative, theistic 
evidentialism agrees to comply with that demand and tries to live up to it by 
demonstrating that faith and reason are compatible and that reason can be employed to 
support faith.  Fideism on the other hand, rejects reason as an absolute demand upon 
                                                 
29 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1969), 310 (Bk 
IV, Ch. 10).    
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belief, and instead argues that there are other methods than reason for arriving at 
knowledge of reality.  However, it should be noted that the demand for evidence is not a 
demand for proof or certainty.  If one can simply provide reasons why one believes, or 
evidence in favor of theism, then one has satisfied the evidentialist demand.  As a result, 
the claim made by Clifford, Russell, Dawkins, and the New Atheists that theism is 
irrational and without any justification whatsoever, is unfounded.  
 
2.3  Rationalism 
 
The Rationalist approach in favor of theism is usually associated with Descartes 
via his Ontological argument, which was considered in Chapter 4, and so will not be 
discussed here.  Descartes tries to rebut Skeptical arguments by constructing an entire 
epistemology independently of revelation, based upon the sole fact that he exists as a 
thinking subject.  Thus the foundation of his arguments for the existence of God rest upon 
the one thing he is certain of, his subjectivity as a thinker.  In the Second Meditation he 
argues that the one thing he knows for sure, even if he is dreaming or being deceived by 
an evil demon, is that he exists as a thinking subject.  While a naturalist would argue that 
this entails having a body, based upon mind/brain dependence, Descartes reasons that 
knowledge of his consciousness only entails that he as a thinking thing exists.  The reason 
for this is that he could be deceived into thinking he has a body, when in fact he does not.  
Or in the updated version of his argument, he could just be a brain in a vat being fed 
sensory stimuli that trick him into thinking he has a body which is experiencing a world, 
when in fact he does not.  Descartes reasons that thought is radically different from 
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matter, enough to warrant their being separate.  A body has the characteristics of having 
“a determinable shape and a definable location and can occupy a space in such a way as 
to exclude any other body; it can be perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell, and 
can be moved in various ways, not by itself but by whatever else comes into contact with 
it.”30  Consciousness, on the other hand, has no shape, can’t be located in space, nor can it 
be perceived, and appears to have the power of self-movement or the ability to move the 
body.  Therefore he concludes it must be a different type of substance than the physical 
body. 
Descartes’ argument is not really new, as it is just a form of the Argument from 
Introspection, and builds upon a basic intuition that several of the world’s religions 
similarly build upon, the notion of a soul.  In the Judeo-Christian tradition, humans are 
made in the image of God.  When we think of God, we identify God with that part of us 
which is spiritual, not physical.  God transcends creation, which is physical, and is said to 
be spiritual.  As a result, God is identified with our mental qualities, and not our physical 
ones.  Thus by turning inward, one comes to know God through oneself, that atman is 
Brahman.  Hindus take this insight a step further than either Descartes or Christians, and 
argue that our soul is not created in God’s likeness, but is a ‘drop’ of God.  Patanjali’s 
form of raha yoga (the ‘king’ of yogas) seeks to turn our attention inward in order to 
reach this realization, that our conscious mind is itself divine.31    
 
2.4  Plantinga’s alternative – antievidentialism: 
                                                 
30 Rene Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, trans. and ed. by John Cottingham  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17. 
31 Fred W. Clothey, Religion in India  (New York:  Routledge, 2006), 68. 
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Are there methods of justification other than reason?  Foundationalism assumes 
that the only criteria by which a belief can be considered foundational is if it is satisfies 
internal criteria such as self-evidence or incorrigibility.  Alvin Plantinga argues that 
properly basic beliefs can be arrived at through other criteria, previously neglected, such 
as Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, or sense of deity.  Calvin considers this a “natural instinct” 
God “has endued all men with…of which he constantly renews and occasionally 
enlarges” so that no human can pretend ignorance of God.32  Although all humans have 
it, it can be obscured through sin.33  Plantinga considers this sense to make belief in God 
a basic belief, similar to other beliefs we consider basic, but that also fail to meet the 
traditional criteria of foundationalism.  Such beliefs concern the existence of other minds, 
memories of the past, and moral propositions.34    
Plantinga’s position differs from Fideism because knowledge of God is not taken 
on faith alone, but is provided through the sensus divinitatis.  But neither does this make 
Plantinga an evidentialist.  Evidentialism makes theism subordinate to reason.  To 
Plantinga, following Calvin, knowledge of God is not a belief achieved on the basis of 
rational inference.  In theistic evidentialism, knowledge of God must be inferred from 
beliefs that are basic, what Locke calls ‘demonstration.’35  For Plantinga, knowledge of 
God is posited as a basic belief, and is not part of the superstructure that is inferred; 
hence, theism requires no rational justification.  As a result, Plantinga avoids the 
                                                 
32 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. and trans. by Henry Beveridge  (Seattle,  
WA:  Pacific Publishing Studio, 2011), 7.  
33 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 167-184. 
34 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Alvin Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff  (Notre Dame, IN:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 89. 
35 Ibid., 48. 
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evidentialist demand for justification because belief in God is not inferred, but is a basic 
belief similar to Descartes’ “I am.”  Basic beliefs don’t require justification.  One just 
sees them as being true in the same way that one see modus ponens as being true.36 
Theism as a basic foundational belief is achieved in a way similar to foundational 
sensory beliefs, but is different in not being derived via the five traditional senses.  The 
skeptical reply to this is that there is no evidence for the existence of a universal sixth 
sense, a sensus divinitatis.  As a result, ‘God exists’ is not on a par with the basic belief 
that ‘something is red.’  It might be possible that one’s awareness of God is derived from 
evidence using reason and sense experience, i.e., by means of natural theology.  But this 
means God’s existence is inferred using the traditional materials (self-evident, the 
senses), and hence is part of the superstructure that needs justification.  In response, 
Plantinga raises the question whether it is possible to accept the evidentialist’s demand 
that one give up those beliefs that are based on insufficient evidence.37  Often we are not 
in a position to choose our beliefs.  Plantinga sees the sensus divinitatis as a ‘sense’ that 
allows us to sense God in the same way that one may sense a tree.  So when we are 
confronted by God, all we can do is acknowledge there is God, in the same way that we 
acknowledge there is a tree.  No further justification is needed.  Both are basic beliefs.  
However, this would only apply to those who have actually been confronted by God, i.e., 
the elect, such as Paul on the road to Damascus. 
However, as it stands, Plantinga’s position is still problematic.  The Reformed 
tradition begins with revelation and truths revealed by Scripture.  Calvin states:  “For 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 36. 
37 Ibid., 34. 
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anyone to arrive at God the Creator he needs Scripture as his Guide and Teacher.”38  But 
if one has a direct line to God via the sensus divinitatis, then this seems to provide the 
primary means of achieving knowledge of God, and makes Scripture, if not superfluous, 
secondary.  Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, as interpreted by Plantinga, makes more sense if it 
is seen either as an awareness of divinity achieved by all of one’s cognitive faculties, or 
as the result of a gift bestowed by God individually upon the elect (God opening the eyes 
of the spiritually blind).  But to claim it is a universal, natural faculty innate to all but 
obscured by sin, remains a subject of debate.  It is not universal to the extent that belief in 
other minds is universal.  The sensus divinitatis seems more likely a faculty that Calvin 
appealed to as a source of authority independent of Rome.  This is not to deny that some 
people might have a basic knowledge of God.  What seems uncertain here is that there is 
some kind of universal faculty or ‘natural instinct’ which allows all access to God.   
 
3.  William James’ response to evidentialism: 
 
William James responds to Clifford’s Evidentialism in his essay, “The Will to 
Believe,” seeing it as a Scrooge-like epistemology.  He argues that Clifford asks for too 
much epistemic justification, and sets the bar too high, requiring more evidence than is 
often available when we act.  He argues in everyday life the evidence is often unclear, so 
we must live by faith or cease to act.  Often the outcomes of a surgical operation, or 
simply a car trip, or even a sea voyage, cannot be known with absolute certainty.  If one 
were to abide by Clifford’s form of Evidentialism, one would suffer from paralysis of the 
                                                 
38 T.H.L Parker, Calvin: An Introduction to His Thought  (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1995), 21. 
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will.  As a result, James rejects evidentialism, arguing instead that, “Our passional nature 
not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a 
genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”39   
James argues that “our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions.”  
As an example of this, James cites friendship.  You wonder about someone, “Do you like 
me or not?”  James response is, “Whether you do or not depends on whether I meet you 
halfway.”  If I am willing to believe that you do like me I will act towards you as if you 
do.  “But if I stand aloof, waiting for objective evidence,” chances are our friendship will 
never occur as a result of a failure to act.  As a result, James famously states that “Faith in 
a fact can help create that fact.”40  If I believe it is impossible to win the lottery, I’ll never 
buy a ticket.  Only if I believe that it is possible I could win it, will I ever buy a ticket, 
thereby allowing for that possibility.  While these are examples of action based on faith, 
James, although not an orthodox believer, is still willing to defend religious faith as 
justified on pragmatic and non-intellectual grounds.  He asks, “What difference does it 
make if I am religious or not?”  A big difference.  If we are religious, “The universe is no 
longer a mere It to us, but a Thou.”41  While the intellect cannot resolve this issue by 
itself, if we fail to act as if religion were true, or treat it as a dead hypothesis, chances are 
we will never come to have faith.   
Antony Flew is also an evidentialist.  Flew tells a story similar to Clifford’s story 
concerning a ship owner in order to support his position.  In the article, “Debate on the 
                                                 
39 William James, “The Will to Believe,” in Pragmatism and Other Writings, 205. 
40 Ibid., 213-4. 
41 Ibid. 216. 
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Rationality of Religious Belief,” Flew tells the tale of the Invisible Gardener.42  He asks 
us to imagine there are two explorers in a jungle who find a clearing that looks like a 
garden.  The first explorer believes that there is a gardener who has turned the jungle into 
a garden.  The second explorer is skeptical, and devises tests in order to detect the 
presence of a gardener.  The tests detect nothing.  Nevertheless, the first explorer persists 
in his belief that there’s an invisible gardener.  The second explorer argues that if no test 
would ever prove to you there is no gardener, the belief is unfalsifiable and therefore 
meaningless.  The obvious conclusion that Flew is trying to make is that “God exists” has 
no factual meaning because it is not falsifiable. 
Is Flew’s conclusion justified?  No.  The fact remains there is evidence for the 
existence of the gardener.  The garden displays evidence of design.  Gardens don’t appear 
out of jungles.  The naturalist has no explanation for the garden, yet the theist does.  
Gardens are a human artifact, just like Paley’s watch.  If you find a watch on the beach or 
in the heath, its intricate order is evidence of design.  Although you never witnessed the 
watchmaker make it, it is rational to infer that there is a watchmaker who made it.  The 
obvious question now is, Does the universe resemble an artifact?  The universe does 
display order; to that extent it resembles an artifact, which means it is rational to posit an 
artificer (or gardener) to account for its existence.  The fine-tuning of the constants in 
physics, the fact that there are orderly laws of nature, the fact that there is simply a 
universe, all provide grounds for belief in an orderer, a gardener.43   
                                                 
42 Antony Flew, R.M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell, “A Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief,” in 
Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, ed. by Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn  (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 157. 
43 As discussed in Ch. 4, the Fine tuning Argument argues the following constants were fine-tuned: 
1.  If the force of the Big Bang had differed by one in 1060th, the universe would have collapsed or 
expanded too fast.  
2.  If the strong nuclear force had been stronger or weaker by 5%, life could not exist. 
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Daniel Dennett states:  “The Argument from Design depends upon an inductive 
inference:  where there’s smoke there’s fire; and where there’s design, there’s mind.”44  
This is correct.  There is a very high probability that where there is smoke, there is fire, 
and if one finds a watch on a beach, that it is a human artifact.  Nevertheless, Dennett 
thinks “Darwin rendered obsolete” a ‘Mind-first’ view of the universe based upon the 
argument from design by showing how complex organisms can be accounted for by 
strictly natural processes.45  Thus Dennett concludes that Darwin provides evidence to 
invert metaphysics, from a Mind-first to a Nature-first ontology.  Minds arose from 
nature, following strictly natural processes, not the other way around.  However, while 
Darwinism may be fatal to biological complexity by allowing for natural processes to 
give rise to life (Michael Behe would disagree), Darwinism is not necessarily fatal to the 
argument from design.   The complexity of the universe similarly appears to be ordered 
like a watch, suggesting it too is an artifact that reflects the design of its designer.  The 
argument to design is also an a posteriori argument, which means that it is compatible 
with scientific methodology.  It is also an abductive argument in that it argues theism 
offers a better explanation for the order of the universe than naturalism, although this is 
reasoning from effect to cause. 
 
4.  Does Science provide the Justification Evidentialism demands? 
 
                                                 
3.  If the force of gravity were stronger or weaker by one part in 1040th life could not exist. 
4.  If a neutron was not 1.001 times the mass of a proton, life could not exist. 
5.  If the electromagnetic force differed slightly, life could not exist. 
44 Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 30. 
45 Ibid., 25. 
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 The New Atheists argue that theism does not have any evidence supporting it, and 
hence is irrational.  Let us examine their counterclaim, that science does satisfy the 
evidentialist demand for epistemic justification.  Can science provide evidence for or 
against metaphysical claims?  Or, are metaphysical claims beyond its ability to know?  
Adherents of scientism argue that metaphysical beliefs, like all other beliefs, are subject 
to the scientific method, and science and science alone provides the only kind of 
epistemic justification that is acceptable.   
Antony Flew’s example of the explorer wanting to conduct a test to determine if 
there is an invisible gardener is indicative of scientism.  But it also presents a problem.  
What kind of experiment or test could establish that there is no gardener at all?  Flew’s 
assumption, that if no empirical test would falsify ‘there is a gardener,’ then the 
proposition is devoid of content, is a good example of using the results of a test that 
assume methodological naturalism to provide evidence for metaphysical naturalism.  As 
noted previously, to do so is to reason circularly, by assuming metaphysical naturalism.  
If science adopts as a rule that only natural processes count as causal explanations, then 
this limits the conclusion one arrives at to only those that involve natural processes.  
Methodological naturalism assumes from the start that a non-empircally detectable 
gardener could not be the cause of the garden, as such a gardener is supernatural rather 
than natural.  It does not follow from this that there is no supernatural gardener.  Flew’s 
claim there is no evidence of an ‘invisible gardener’ is also ironic given that Christianity 
claims the invisible gardener made an appearance on earth in the person of Jesus.46    
                                                 
46 Although Jesus states the Father is the gardener in John 15:1:  “I am the true vine, and my Father is the 
gardener.” 
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This does not keep Michael Ruse from making the claim that methodological 
naturalism can be used to justify metaphysical naturalism.  Ruse is an adherent of 
scientism and thinks the methods of science can be used to adjudicate theological claims.  
Ruse does not think using methodological Naturalism to justify metaphysical Naturalism 
is circular.  He believes Methodological naturalism is not neutral, and that it helps make 
the case for metaphysical naturalism.  He thinks methodological naturalism embodies the 
proper procedure for acquiring all knowledge.  To support this claim he argues that after 
400 years of scientific thought, we know, in general, what the laws of nature are and can 
use this knowledge to our advantage.  The effectiveness of methodological naturalism is 
so great that even religion should be included in its sphere.  Obviously, he rejects Gould’s 
NOMA argument, and does not see the domains of science and religion as separate.  The 
two realms interact.  Some scientists use intelligent design theory to account for 
biological complexity, and if it’s ok for religious scientists to use theism to provide 
scientific explanations, then the flipside should also hold:  scientists should be able to 
provide “a naturalistic account of religion….Methodological Naturalism tightens the 
screw on the problem of evil to where belief in god is unreasonable….Isn’t it then more 
reasonable to say that Mormonism has nothing to do with Jesus Christ and everything to 
do with a less-than-rational but obviously charismatic person, one who was clearly 
willing to bend the truth to burnish his own claims and status?  One of the Bernie 
Madoffs of the religious world?”47  While it is questionable whether his argument 
overcomes the problem of circularity, the latter statement is clearly an ad hominem. 
                                                 
47 Michael Ruse, “The Naturalist Challenge to Religion,” in Philosophy of Religion, Selected Readings, ed. 
by Michael Peterson  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 434-5. 
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If Michael Ruse is optimistic about the ability of science to resolve 
epistemological and metaphysical debates, Richard Rorty is pessimistic.  He thinks that 
science fails to deliver on the epistemological goods that Ruse thinks science provides.  
Rorty claims science does not deliver objective truth, truth with a capital T, but merely 
provisional truths that are based on the unstable consensus that emerges among scientists.  
Even that is questionable, as science does not speak with a single voice.  He states that 
science thinks it adheres to the correspondence theory of truth.  Truth corresponds to 
what is out there.  Good scientific theories are supposed to mirror nature.  So what is out 
there is what science tells you there is.  But this appears circular if the method of science 
is methodological naturalism, as it appears to be.  If a scientist were to submit a paper 
arguing for a supernatural cause of an event, it is doubtful the paper would ever get 
published.  Instead of science delivering objective truth, Rorty proposes ‘solidarity,’ or 
unforced agreement as an aim.48  If science promises to deliver the epistemological 
goods, why can’t it even cure a headache, let alone tell you what causes it.49  If science 
has come as far as it has the last 400 years, as Ruse claims, why can’t it cure the common 
cold?  The point is, is that science is not as successful in meeting the evidentialist 
challenge as the New Atheists think it is.  
 
5.  Kuhnian Anomalies to Scientific Naturalism 
 
                                                 
48 Richard Rorty, “Dismantling Truth:  Solidarity versus Objectivity,” in Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, 
ed. by Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn  (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 247-255. 
49 Physicians have lots of theories and treatments, but do they actually ‘know’ the causal mechanisms of 
migraines?  I’ve been to many neurologists, heard all the theories, and tried a wide variety of treatments.  
Neurology is hardly an exact science, and there is not even consensus on the underlying pathology of 
migraines. 
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Thomas Kuhn is more like Rorty than Ruse in his assessment of science.  
Objective truth is never reached, and even the most firmly entrenched paradigm is at risk 
of being overthrown.  As discussed in Ch. 5, Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions distinguishes between three kinds of science:  pre-paradigmatic, normal, and 
revolutionary science.  In normal science, any phenomenon that is unable to be accounted 
for by the current paradigm, counts as an anomaly.  An anomaly, as defined by Kuhn, is 
an event or occurrence that defies the current paradigm by violating the paradigm-
induced expectations.50  If serious and persistent enough, anomalies may threaten the 
overthrow of a paradigm that is unable to resolve them.  Revolutionary science for Kuhn 
occurs when stubborn anomalies that defy explanation build up and threaten the tenability 
of the current operating paradigm, thereby inviting the construction of a new paradigm 
that can resolve them.  It is possible to argue that metaphysical beliefs are subject to a 
similar analysis.  If naturalism faces a whole host of anomalies that defy scientific 
explanation, then naturalism as a worldview might be called into question.  The list of 
these problems has been discussed in previous chapters.  They include near-death 
experiences, mystical states, the hard problem of consciousness, qualia, the existence of 
religion, the existence of the world, the existence of order in the universe, logical and 
mathematical laws, paranormal phenomenon such as precognition, moral and aesthetic 
values, religious experience, free will, miracles, or supernatural phenomenon like St. 
Francis’s or Padro Pio’s stigmata wounds.   
Now suppose that theism is able to provide satisfactory explanations for the 
persistent anomalies listed above, explanations naturalism cannot provide.  If this is the 
                                                 
50 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 
1970), 52-3. 
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case, then it would be rational to conclude that scientific naturalism is inadequate as a 
worldview.  If the list of anomalies grows, naturalism might well be rejected as a 
metaphysic and replaced by theism.  Thus a ‘revolution’ in metaphysics might well 
occur.  The inability of naturalism to explain numerous persistent anomalies ends up 
‘falsifying’ naturalism. 
 
6.  Extending Hempel’s hypothetico-deductive model to include Metaphysics 
 
Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of explanation is also referred to as “the 
covering-law model” of explanation.51   A phenomenon is explained if it can be ‘covered’ 
by some general law of nature (hypothetical, proposed, or generally accepted).52  For 
example, the fact that Mar’s orbit is elliptical can be explained or covered by Kepler’s 
three laws of planetary motion (the first one being that all planets’ orbits are elliptical), 
and the fact that Mars is a planet.53  For our purposes, let us suppose that it is possible to 
extend Hempel’s model from science to philosophy.  A Model of Philosophical 
Explanation would then allow for metaphysical positions to provide explanations for 
various phenomena.  Thus in principle theism could figure as a hypothesis to ‘cover’ the 
data current scientific laws cannot.  If naturalism and the laws of nature fail to ‘cover’ 
certain phenomenon, they may be considered anomalous to scientific naturalism.  If a 
phenomenon cannot be ‘covered’ or explained by a naturalist metaphysic and its laws, 
                                                 
51 Carl G. Hempel, “Laws and Their Role in Scientific Explanations,” in Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science, ed. by Theodore Schick Jr. (Mountain View, CA:  Mayfield Publishing Co., 2000), 72-79. 
52 Carl G. Hempel, “Explanation in Science and History,” in Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, ed. by 
R.G. Colodny (Pittsburgh:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 9-19. 
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but can be by a theist metaphysic, then this lends credibility to the theist metaphysic.  In 
addition, the larger the number of anomalies not covered by scientific naturalism that can 
be covered by theism, the greater the likelihood of the truth of the latter and the falsehood 
of the former.   
Any type of phenomena that cannot be accounted for by an established scientific 
law, or that appears ‘supernatural,’ such as paranormal phenomena, may count as an 
anomaly against the paradigm of metaphysical naturalism.  In the traditional DN model, 
the current scientific laws would fail to cover them.  Any of the miracles Jesus is said to 
have performed, assuming they occurred, would fit into this category, as they defy 
current scientific laws.  Scientific laws limit what is and what is not possible within the 
physical universe.  Miracles, if credible, fall outside that which is scientifically possible, 
and thus may be considered anomalous not only to the laws, but to metaphysical 
naturalism.  Metaphysical naturalists have only two choices when presented with 
miracles: they are either an illusion, hence not real, or our current understanding of the 
scientific laws of nature is wrong (in which case they can’t be considered laws).  But in 
the face of such phenomena, the metaphysical presupposition that nothing exists outside 
the physical world, can be called into question.  As a result any type of phenomenon 
unable to be accounted for by known laws of nature, may serve not only as an anomaly to 
current scientific laws, but to metaphysical naturalism as well.  
However, it is possible for the metaphysical naturalist to escape this conclusion, 
that an alleged supernatural event is potentially anomalous to both the current scientific 
paradigm and metaphysical naturalism.  While the theist may ‘cover’ the phenomena by 
attributing it to supernatural causation, a naturalist might merely say that the event has a 
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natural cause, although the event cannot currently be explained by science.  Science has 
simply not yet achieved a sufficient understanding of natural phenomena or the laws that 
govern them.  But sooner or later, the metaphysical naturalist holds, all events will be 
able to be explained by recourse to the laws of physics and the other natural sciences.  So 
rather than giving in to the theist, and filling the gaps in knowledge (anomalies which 
defy explanation by natural processes) with God or supernatural explanations, the 
naturalist simply issues a promissory note and argues that science will eventually figure it 
and the anomaly will prove illusory.  Dennett and Dawkins frequently adopt this strategy.  
However, it is doubtful science will ever be able to explain such events as Jesus walking 
on water.  The naturalists only recourse to such events is to deny they ever happened.   
 
7.  All facts are Theory laden 
 
The view that all facts are theory laden opens up possibilities.  Adopting it makes 
it possible for theists and naturalists to offer alternative interpretations of exactly the 
same ‘facts’ based upon their different metaphysical assumptions.  What the facts ‘are,’ 
often depends not on the facts but upon the theories they adhere to.  A theist may see an 
anomaly which defies science, and calls for a supernatural explanation, whereas the strict 
naturalist sees only a natural event that sooner or later the methods of science will 
provide a sufficient causal explanation for.  But the point is, how one sees or interprets 
the ‘facts’ depends upon one’s previous metaphysical assumptions.  Alan Chalmers 
attempts to debunk the scientific realist’s ‘camera analogy’ approach that believes the 
‘facts’ are neutral and passively given to the senses.  The logical positivists believed that 
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observation and theory are separate.  Chalmers argues they are not.  What constitutes the 
‘facts’ about the observable world are not statements fed us by our senses, or neutrally 
read off our sense data.  Rather, the statements of facts are due, in large part, to our 
interpretation of them based upon our pre-existing conceptual framework. 
The logical positivists built off of the empiricism of Locke and Hume, who 
argued ideas can be traced to either sense impressions, reflection upon them, or internal 
mental data.  The positivists conceived of sense data as the atoms of experience, and all 
meaningful propositions must in theory be reducible to them.  They held to a 
correspondence theory of truth, with foundational beliefs resting on sense data.  A 
statement is true if it corresponds to the atomistic facts, or compounds thereof, which can 
be captured by the ‘camera’ of sense perception.  The camera takes a snapshot of the 
objective facts.  Thus, when shed of their initial tendencies toward idealism, the 
positivists were, in essence, scientific realists and externalists.  A truth directly 
corresponds to something ‘out there’ that exists independently of the subject.  It is 
something which one uncovers or ‘unearths.’  Perception is a source of neutral data and 
facts are directly given to experience.  Theoretical sentences build upon and depend upon 
observational (or protocol) sentences.  The aim of scientific theories is to describe an 
objective reality that is ‘out there’ independent of us.  A scientific theory is ‘true’ to the 
extent that it correctly mirrors or corresponds to this objective reality.  This position is 
captured by Wittgenstein’s ‘picture theory’ in the Tractatus. 
W.V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars helped undermine the realism of the positivists 
and in the process undermined traditional foundationalism which saw sense perception as 
a source of our foundational beliefs. Loosely stated, the Verifiability Principle of the 
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positivists stated that “A sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it 
expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.”54  In Quine’s 1951 article, “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine undermines the first dogma of empiricism, the distinction 
between analytic (logical) and synthetic (factual) truths.  Quine’s radical empiricism 
holds that Hume did not go far enough in acknowledging the debt that all beliefs, even 
‘relations of ideas,’ must pay to sense experience.  As a result, Quine rejects the Kantian 
division of statements into analytic and synthetic ones.   
The second dogma is equivalent to the verifiability principle, claiming that the 
meaning of a statement is its method of verification.  Quine argues against this by saying 
that “statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not 
individually but only as a corporate body.”55  The meaning given to a single empirical 
concept or proposition cannot be reduced to atomic components, nor can statements be 
verified or falsified in isolation from the web of our interconnected beliefs, as the logical 
positivists assert they can be.  The rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the 
adoption of meaning-holism, results in philosophy being an empirical enterprise.  This 
position even denies the possibility of Kantian a priori categories.  Quine believes there 
are no a priori truths or statements that are “immune to revision.”56  Even the statements 
of math and logic are not infallible but may fall by the wayside, although Quine thinks 
1+1=2 and many other truths are probably safe from revision.  Thus Quine is a fallibilist 
(a doctrine associated with the founder of pragmatism C.S. Peirce) in that he maintains 
                                                 
54 A.J. Ayer, “The Principle of Verification,” in Classics of Analytic Philosophy, ed. by Robert Ammerman 
(Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing Co., 1990), 121.  
55 W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in Classics of Analytic Philosophy, ed. by Robert 
Ammerman (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing Co., 1990), 210. 
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that our claims to knowledge are always vulnerable and subject to revision.  Quine thinks 
the “foundationalist project is unfeasible” and abandons any type of quest for Cartesian 
certainty or final, definitive truth.    
The alternative to realism is some form of anti-realism.  One form of anti-realism 
claims that the unobserved entities that scientific theories postulate (for example, 
electrons, or quarks) are merely convenient ‘fictions’ posited for their instrumental value 
in making predictions.  This view is Instrumentalism.  Van Fraassen offers as a different 
alternative to realism, a different form of anti-realism called constructive empiricism.  Its 
goal is empirical adequacy, not metaphysical truth.  Instead of claiming that an accepted 
scientific theory mirrors objective reality, if it has predictive accuracy, then it is 
empirically adequate.  He states:  “Science aims to give us theories which are empirically 
adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically 
adequate.  This is the statement of the anti-realist position I advocate; I shall call it 
constructive empiricism.”57  Constructive empiricism does not preclude theism and in 
fact van Fraassen is a theist. 
N.R. Hanson, in his 1958 article ‘Observation,’ argues that what one observes 
depends upon the theories that one upholds.  In other words, perception is not neutral, nor 
does it deliver ‘facts.’  All facts are theory laden and there are no theory-independent 
facts.  He states:  “Observation of x is shaped by prior knowledge of x.”58   Imagine 
Kepler, Brahe, Ptolemy and Aristotle watching the sun at dawn.  Does each see the same 
thing?  No, so what are the ‘facts’?  Suppose you show an x-ray tube to an Eskimo child 
                                                 
57 Bas C. van Fraassen, “Constructive Empiricism,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by 
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and a trained physicist.  Though they both have the same perceptual experience (the same 
sensations), it is very likely they ‘see’ two different things.  Each is aware of something 
different due to the theories they hold.  The physicist ‘sees’ “the instrument in terms of 
electrical circuit theory, thermodynamic theory, the theories of metal and glass structure, 
thermionic emission, optical transmission, refraction, diffraction, atomic theory, quantum 
theory and special relativity.”59  The child sees none of this.  Thus we don’t just see 
neutral facts.  Rather, all facts are interpreted and theory laden.  As Hanson states: “there 
is more to seeing than meets the eyeball.”60  Michael Polanyi makes the point that what a 
medical student sees in an X-ray of a pulmonary disease is not what an expert in 
pulmonology sees.61  As a result, whether you are a metaphysical naturalist or a theist can 
determine what you ‘see,’ or what counts as an empirical possibility.  A naturalist sees an 
alleged supernatural event not as an anomaly which discredits scientific naturalism, but 
as an event unable to be explained by science just yet.  A theist sees an anomaly which 
discredits naturalism and provides evidence for theism.  
 
8.  Underdetermination of Theory and its Consequences for Metaphysics 
  
Quine argues that our epistemic claims outrun our sensory input.  Our claims to 
knowledge are underdetermined by the evidence.  When I see the front of a coffee cup I 
do not see its back side, but I infer that it must have one based upon previous experience 
of coffee cups.  As a result, Quine states that “the relation between the meager input and 
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61 Ibid., 7-8. 
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the torrential output” of theory, is underdetermined.62   Quine is following Pierre Duhem, 
who recognized that many propositions have to be in place in order to verify or falsify a 
proposition, and if an experiment fails the fault could be anywhere.63  Quine takes 
Duhem’s thesis and extends it beyond scientific beliefs to include all our beliefs.  In 
doing so, Quine is attacking the positivists’ assertion that the meaning of a proposition is 
the sense experiences that count in favor of it.  The logical positivists believed that 
immediate experience provides the foundation for beliefs, if beliefs cannot be reduced to 
or deduced from sense data, then what justifies them?   
In Two Dogmas, he states:  “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs…is 
a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges….A conflict with 
experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the 
field….Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their 
logical interconnections….  But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to 
reevaluate in the light of a single contrary experience.”64  In other words, the inner ‘man-
made fabric’ of our theories and metaphysical beliefs are underdetermined by the 
empirical data on the peripheral fringe.  In addition, the fringe empirical beliefs are 
interpreted by the inner core.  Available evidence is always compatible with a plurality of 
competing theories.  Thus Quine argues that underdetermination allows for multiple ways 
to explain the facts.    
                                                 
62 W.V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Knowledge:  Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. 
by Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 274. 
63 Pierre Duhem, “Physical Theory and Experiment,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by 
Theodore Schick, Jr. (Mountain View, CA:  Mayfield Publishing Co., 2000), 55.  Duhem states “In sum, 
the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of 
hypotheses.” 
64 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in Classis of Analytic Philosophy, 211. 
341 
 
 
 
The history of philosophy bears witness to the claim that there are innumerable 
ways to account for our sensory experience.  Locke and Berkeley are a good example of 
this.  Locke reasoned that even though we have no sense impression for ‘matter,’ it is 
rational to infer that material substances exist as the basis of our primary and secondary 
qualities.  Just as clothes don’t hang by themselves in storefront windows, it is rational to 
infer there is a mannequin supporting them, even if one has no sense impression for it.  
However, while they can be inferred, Locke admits material substances can’t be known 
directly, stating they are something “to support those ideas we call accidents,” but beyond 
that, Locke states “I know not what.”65   
Berkeley responds, Well if they can’t be known, then how do you know they 
exist, or are material?  Maybe God is the cause of primary and secondary qualities.  In 
other words, both God and matter are sufficient explanations of the same sense data.  
Fichte’s idealism similarly argues that there is no one correct way to interpret the facts.  
He believed that “if we choose to approach nature scientifically, it is because we believe 
this method serves our interests and makes our world meaningful.  In the final analysis, 
even science is based on subjective commitments…for the world I live in is always a 
world structured by the way I approach it.”66   
Scientific theories are supposed to be descriptive of nature, to offer a picture of 
the facts.  But just because scientific theories work does not mean they correspond to 
reality ‘out there.’  Underdetermination of theory means that there are multiple 
interpretations of the same experienced world, and this yields an indeterminacy of just 
                                                 
65 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by A.S. Pringle-Pattison  (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1969), 165 (Bk II, Ch. 23:15). 
66 William F. Lawhead, The Voyage of Discovery, A History of Western Philosophy  (Belmont, CA:  
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996), 367. 
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what the ‘facts’ are.  As a result, it is “impossible to float a reductionist program on this 
sea of indeterminacy.”67  Quine undermines the idea that sense data can serve as a single, 
secure foundation in verifying propositions and theory, and in doing so, casts doubt on 
the idea that scientific theories mirror an independent nature.  He notes that one “effect of 
abandoning [the two dogmas of empiricism] is, as we shall see, a blurring of the 
supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science.”68  Electrons 
may be just as much a human posit as the Greek gods, but the conceptual use of electron 
is nevertheless justified for its pragmatic value in making predictions.  This does not 
mean, however, that science delivers unvarnished truth.  Newton’s theory of gravity 
allows us to make successful predictions, but it was wrong.  In addition, Newton only 
described how gravity behaved, he did not explain what it is.  Newton actually thought 
gravity was result of the finger of God acting on the universe in order to hold it together.  
The point is, as a result of underdetermination of theory it is possible that both the 
metaphysical positions of theism and naturalism might offer up ‘epistemologically 
adequate’ (similar to van Fraassen’s ‘empirically adequate’) theories to explain the data.  
But this is no indication of which theory is actually true in an independent-of-human-
conceptualization sense. 
Quine argues that we interpret and explain new experiences through the lens of 
old concepts and laws that are familiar to us.  He states:  “Inculcating a belief is like 
charging a battery.  The battery is thenceforward disposed to give a spark or shock, when 
suitably approached, as long as the charge lasts.”69  Similarly, Dr. V.S. Ramachandran, a 
                                                 
67 Robert J. Fogelin, “Aspects of Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Quine, ed. by Roger F. Gibson, Jr.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 26. 
68 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in Classis of Analytic Philosophy, 197. 
69 W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief  (New York:  Random House, 1978), 10. 
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neuroscientist, demonstrates that our mind is hardwired to fill in blank spots in our 
sensory data with information that is similar to it.  In his book, Phantoms in the Brain, 
Ramachandran examines the phenomenon of phantom limbs that many amputees report 
having, of continuing to perceive the missing limb as still being there.  He also examines 
the blind spot in our visual field, the spot where the optic nerve is attached to the eyeball.  
He notes that we don’t perceive the blind spot as an empty ‘hole’ in our vision, which one 
would think would occur because there are no light detecting photoreceptor cells there.  
This is because our brains ‘fill in’ the missing information with data that is consistent 
with what is around it.  He provides several diagrams which demonstrate as much, 
including one which allows the reader to perceive the gap in vision caused by the blind 
spot, and others which show how it is filled in.  If one is looking at a vertical line, instead 
of seeing a hole in the middle where ones’ blind spot is, one sees a continuous line 
because the brain fills the hole in with similar black pixels.  Ramachandran also provides 
an explanation for this: 
  The answer lies in a Darwinian explanation of how the visual system 
evolved.  One of the most important principles in vision is that it tries to 
get away with as little processing as it can to get the job done.  To 
economize on visual processing, the brain takes advantage of statistical 
regularities in the world…The visual system might then apply surface 
interpolation to ‘fill in’ the [missing data].70 
 
This phenomenon might also serve as an example of a “covering theory,” of our mind 
filling in gaps in information with information that is consistent with it, so as to cause us 
to think we know something (for example, a generalization), when in actuality we do not.  
It is possible to argue that just as Ramachandran demonstrates how our brain fills in our 
                                                 
70 V.S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, Probing the Mysteries of the Human 
Mind  (New York:  William Morrow and Co., 1998), 103-4. 
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blind spot, gaps in knowledge are filled in or ‘covered’ by the theories we adhere to.  A 
theist fills gaps in knowledge, or events with no known natural cause, to God.  A 
naturalist fills in the same gaps with as yet unknown, but possibly one day known, natural 
processes. 
Hanson and others have argued that even the most basic observation is theory 
laden, that there are no ‘facts’ independent of theory.  Nietzsche said:  “it is precisely 
facts that do not exist, only interpretations.”71  Kuhn similarly stated:  “there is no theory-
independent way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a match between 
the ontology of a theory and its ‘real’ counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in 
principle.”72  Thus, what one sees is a reflection of what’s in one’s head; one’s theories 
read the evidence in such a way so as to confirm the theory that one upholds, as well as 
cover unexplained phenomena.  What implications does this have for our discussion of 
the relationships between evolution, theism, and naturalism?  When pondering the events 
of the world, a naturalist sees only natural processes, while a theist sees God’s design and 
providence.  The New Atheists read the evidence in such a way that scientific naturalism 
provides evidence entirely for metaphysical naturalism and none for theism, thus 
substantiating the evidentialist objection to theism.  Theists on the other hand, read all the 
data in such a way that all the evidence points to theism, and against metaphysical 
naturalism.  Naturalists see only unguided, natural processes in evolution.  Theists see 
guidance and divine intelligence at work. 
                                                 
71 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York:  Penguin Books, 
1954), 458. 
72 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition, 206. 
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Does this underdetermination of theory mean that theism and naturalism are both 
equally good, as both are sufficient to explain the facts?  Is there no way to judge 
between them?  As we cannot obtain the third condition (objective truth) needed for 
definitive knowledge, such knowledge regarding metaphysical beliefs is impossible.  
Thus neither a theist nor a metaphysical naturalist can claim to ‘know’ their position is 
correct, and the other false.  In addition, it has been shown that each side reads the 
evidence in such a way that it justifies its position and refutes the other.  Quine uses the 
metaphor of Neurath’s boat to illustrate that we are adrift with no foundation under us 
other than the peripheral sensory contact we need to stay afloat, and must interpret 
sensory stimulations from the vantage point of the conceptual structure of the boat within 
which we find ourselves.  Just as there is no way of constructing a new boat from outside 
the boat, from suspension above open water, so there is no way to gain an objective view 
of the world apart from the methods of science and the evidence of one’s senses.73  There 
is no way of asking whether the entire boat or web of beliefs one has is justified; it is all 
we have and without it we are sunk.   
Quine believes the ‘torrential output’ of our theories outstrip or are 
underdetermined by the ‘meager input’ of sensory stimulations.  In other words, positing 
the existence of gravity may outstrip the empirical data, but this is allowed for pragmatic 
reasons because doing so allows for all sorts of useful predictions to be made.  But what 
metaphysical reality actually corresponds to the concept of gravity?  We may never 
know.  In “Posits and Reality,” Quine argues that claiming a desk is made up of 
molecules which are “swarms of subvisible particles in vibration” is in the same 
                                                 
73 W.V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Knowledge:  Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. 
by Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 274. 
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Neurathian boat.  While “posits are not ipso facto unreal,” what kind of metaphysical 
reality they ultimately have cannot be known, and is only pragmatically justified.74 
Although Quine seeks to naturalize epistemology, thus leaving us, according to 
Jaeqwon Kim, without a normative element guiding justification, Quine does offer some 
pragmatic criteria which govern how one constructs a web of belief.75  In “Epistemology 
Naturalized” and elsewhere in his writings Quine argues that the theories which should 
be adopted are those which have a higher rather than lower explanatory power, while 
causing as little disturbance as possible to the coherence of background knowledge.  
While Kim claims Quine offers no guidance on what distinguishes a ‘good’ theory from a 
‘bad’ theory, Quine does suggest that explanatory power serves a normative function.  
Explanatory power dictates that some posits are “epistemologically superior” to others.76  
In the chapter on ‘Evidence’ in Word and Object, Quine lists further criteria that should 
govern belief revision:  predictive power, simplicity, familiarity of principle, and 
conservatism.77  A pragmatist suspends judgment concerning the reality of a theory’s 
posits, and is willing to live with metaphysical indeterminacy.  The only concern for a 
pragmatist is whether or not the practice of positing these concepts pays.   
 
9.  Anomalies that are better ‘covered’ by theism than naturalism 
 
                                                 
74 W.V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, (New York:  Random House, 1966), 238. 
75 Jaegwon Kim, “What is Naturalized Epistemology?” in Knowledge:  Readings in Contemporary 
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76 W.V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1953), 44-45. 
77 W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge:  M.I.T. Press, 1960), 18-20. 
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Since adherents to each metaphysical system often find the views of the opposing 
camp dissatisfactory, since naturalism and theism are contradictory, is there any way to 
judge between them, to determine who’s right and who’s wrong?   As noted, the 
Correspondence theory of truth is unable to, as we can’t get outside the natural world to 
know whether religious beliefs correspond to a transcendent reality, or whether all that 
exists are natural processes.  Quine has suggested another normative guide in 
epistemology, the overall coherence of the web of belief, a web that must be squared with 
empirical input.  The standard of coherence therefore offers some guidance as to which 
metaphysical system might be more satisfactory.  Wilfrid Sellars, in his essay 
“Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” states that “The aim of philosophy, 
abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest sense of the term hang 
together.”78  We might call the ability to hang together ‘coherence.’  The system which is 
the most comprehensive in explaining how the universe hangs together is the most 
coherent.  The system which leaves us with more unexplained events, more gaps in 
knowledge, more anomalous events which defy reduction, is less coherent.  For the 
purposes of this study, we can apply Quine’s standards to metaphysics and argue that if 
theism is ‘epistemologically superior’ to naturalism, then it should have greater overall 
coherence and explanatory power.  In order to do so, let us examine how each handles 
some current scientific anomalies. 
As stated earlier, there is a vast literature of phenomena that defy being ‘covered’ 
under the scientific naturalist paradigm.  Hence they can be said to be anomalous, or 
recalcitrant phenomena in that they defy explanation by the paradigm of naturalism.  
                                                 
78 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1963), 
1.  
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These included:  near-death experiences, the hard problem of consciousness, paranormal 
phenomena, the existence of the world, and free will.  These are the main ones.  If God 
didn’t exist, you wouldn’t expect there to be religious and mystical experience, or for 
religions based upon revelation to exist.  If only physical processes exist, then you would 
not expect anybody to be able to perform miracles, as it is claimed Jesus did.  Why are 
there laws of nature?  How can we account for the existence of order in the universe, 
including biological complexity?  Can a physicalist account for the laws of logic?  Do we 
discover or invent Modus Ponens?  What about mathematics?  A mathematical realist 
claims numbers are abstract, non-physical entities, and are independent of human minds, 
thus enabling us to know mathematical truths such as ‘3 is a prime number.’  Yet 
nowhere can you point to the number three’s physical counterpart.  Similarly, what about 
intentional states, or beliefs, desires, wishes, and hopes?  Where are they if they are 
physical, and can they be accounted for by a strictly natural order of the world?  What 
about semantic understanding, something human minds have but artificial intelligence 
lacks?  What about moral and aesthetic values such as goodness, justice, and beauty?  
These seem to exist, but not as physical entities.  Theism can cover miracles by arguing 
that God is the author of the laws of nature and can override them at any time.  The only 
recourse naturalism has is to deny them.  What about love?  If love is reducible to the 
hormones oxytocin, testosterone, vasopressin and others that stimulate the release of 
dopamine and serotonin in the brain, if you inject these drugs into your blood system 
does one feel love?  If so, to whom is the love directed?     
If one believes that these many phenomena are indeed anomalous as far as 
scientific naturalism is concerned, and one also believes that theism can provide a better 
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explanation of them, then theism might well be a better metaphysic than naturalism.  In 
order to determine if this is possible, let us examine in greater detail five of the major 
beliefs considered anomalous, and then consider how evolution relates to them.  In 
examining these phenomena, we will use Hempel’s hypothetico-deductive, or  ‘covering’ 
model to determine which of the two alternative metaphysical positions ‘cover’ the 
recalcitrant phenomena in question better.  We will begin by assuming either theism or 
naturalism as a hypothesis, and then determine if it can cover the data.  We will then 
hopefully be able to decide which worldview offers a more satisfactory explanation of the 
phenomena, and hence which metaphysic is epistemically preferable. 
 
9.1  Near-Death Experiences 
 
Dr. Michael Sabom, a cardiologist, interviewed a man who had been comatose 
and on life support following a bout of pneumonia.  He states the man claims he left his 
body and “‘observed’ a medical team working over his unconscious body.  In this 
encounter, he felt he had been let in on ‘the big secret’ to life and death.”79  In this case, 
the patient felt that the ‘Big Secret’ is that death is not the end of consciousness, that 
consciousness can exist independent of the body and survives the death of the body.  In 
terms of trying to resolve the metaphysical debate between naturalism and theism, near 
death experiences are perhaps one of our most valuable tools.  The biggest problem 
confronting the debate between the two worldviews is that there is no objective way to 
decide between them, to get outside of our minds in order to determine if in fact there is 
                                                 
79 Michael B. Sabom, M.D., Recollections of Death, A Medical Investigation (New York:  Simon & 
Schuster, 1982), 15. 
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any type of transcendent reality apart from natural processes.  The debate amounts to 
asking this question:  if someone lops off your head with an ax, do you still have a 
mind?80  Although survival of bodily death is a logically independent issue of the truth or 
falsity of theism, naturalists would generally say no, and theists would generally say yes.  
Is there a soul that survives death?  Most people might answer, ‘I don’t know, I haven’t 
died yet.’  But there are people who have died, but are then resuscitated.  If naturalism is 
true, you would expect them to have experienced nothing.  But if theism is true, their 
claims to have experienced the afterlife, of having continued to live on despite the death 
(or near-death) of the body, are more credible.  What is also interesting about people who 
have had near-death experiences, is that their epistemic claims about transcendent 
metaphysical realities shift from one of belief, to one of knowledge.  One survivor stated, 
“I no longer ‘believe’ in God; I’m absolutely certain.”81  Another survivor states, “Now I 
know there’s more after death.”82   
Perhaps more than any other kind of medical specialist, cardiologists are prepared 
to ask these questions, because they have had the most patients who have ‘died’ due to 
cardiac arrest and been resuscitated by means of defibrillators and drugs.  Pim van 
Lommel is a cardiologist who himself states in his book, Consciousness Beyond Life, that 
near death experiences are “anomalies because their cause and content cannot be 
accounted for with current medical and scientific ideas about the various aspects of 
human consciousness and the mind-brain relationship.”83   
                                                 
80 Or, similarly, if a human was genetically engineered, i.e., a human artifact, would they have a soul? 
81 Pim van Lommel, M.D., Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience (New 
York:  HarperCollins Publishers, 2011), 56. 
82 Ibid., 54. 
83 Ibid., 247. 
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Near-death experiences have already been discussed in Chapter Four, so we will 
limit our discussion of them to the metaphysical implications they may or may not have.  
Patricia Churchland typifies the naturalist’s response to near-death experiences.  She 
asks, Were the people actually dead, or just near to death?  She argues that if they were 
actually dead, then they would be brain dead, and not be having any experiences 
whatsoever.  But if they were only near to death, as the term for these experiences 
implies, then their brains were still functioning, and they were still capable of having 
experiences.  As a naturalist must, she attempts to provide a possible neurobiological 
account for them, such as loss of oxygen to the brain (anoxia and hypoxia), the release of 
endogenous opioids, hallucinations, self-deception, fraud, and “neuro-oddities for which 
we do not – not yet, anyhow – have complete explanations.”84  This last possibility is 
strange in that Churchland allows for the possibility that science may not yet know what 
causes them, but at the same time she claims that this is a “neuro-oddity.”  So we can’t be 
sure what causes them, but nevertheless for her it must be some kind of neural 
malfunction.   
It seems clear that the naturalists have not read much of the near-death literature.  
First of all, what is striking is the similarity of all the accounts.  Raymond Moody gave an 
account of these which is stated in Chapter 4.  This uniformity of experience suggests that 
the experience has an objective, uniform basis, which one would not expect if they were 
just subjective, variable hallucinations, as Churchland claims.  Second, most people who 
experience them do not regard them as hallucinations.  Many recount meeting long 
deceased friends and relatives whom they are shocked to find out are still alive.  Some 
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recount meeting siblings they never knew they had.85  Third, many experience an 
‘autoscopic’ element in which they experience their consciousness literally outside their 
body, looking down at it, as a spectator.  To confirm this, several people are able to give 
accounts of what took place around them while they were ‘dead.’  Fourth, some can give 
empirical evidence of this, such as the woman who saw the red shoe on the roof, as cited 
in Chapter Four.  Fifth, many of them report experiencing an immense love radiating 
from a divine being and describe a personal encounter with God.  Sixth, many no longer 
have a fear of death as a result of their experience and feel at home in any place of 
worship.  
Last, what is striking about such experiences, is that much of the data concerning 
them has been compiled by physicians who were hardened naturalists and then gradually 
changed their worldview as a result of hearing their patients’ stories.  Michael Sabom, a 
cardiologist, was not only a naturalist but a religious skeptic when he first heard his 
patients describe their near-death experiences.  Slowly, over time, as he accumulated one 
story after another, he gradually changed his mind.86  Eben Alexander was a 
neurosurgeon who was a complete naturalist until he had a NDE as a result of meningitis.  
He considered his experience “Proof of Heaven,” and that is what he entitled his book 
describing it.87  There are even accounts of skeptical nurses who changed their beliefs 
after hearing their patients describe what they were seeing in the moments before death.  
                                                 
85 Eben Alexander believes he met a sister he never knew.  Todd Burpey’s son states he met a sister who 
unknown to him had miscarried in his mother’s womb. 
86 Sabom, Recollections of Death, 3. 
87 Eben Alexander, M.D., Proof of Heaven:  A Neurosurgeon’s Experience into the Afterlife  (New York:  
Simon & Schuster, 2012). 
353 
 
 
 
All of these reasons suggest that near-death experiences are not illusory but veridical, and 
argue strongly that there is a real possibility the soul survives death.   
 Perhaps one of the most famous near-death experiences was that of A.J. Ayer, one 
of the founders of Logical Positivism, a proponent of the Verifiability Principle, and a 
hardened atheist.  After battling pneumonia, Ayer’s heart stopped beating for four 
minutes.  He entitled his account of what happened, “That Undiscovered Country, What I 
saw When I Was Dead.”  Ayer describes coming upon a river which he successfully 
crossed on his second attempt.  He then describes being “confronted by a red light....I was 
aware that this light was responsible for the government of the universe.”88  Ayer’s 
doctor, Dr. Jeremy George, later made it public that upon awakening from his ordeal, 
Ayer claimed to have met the supreme Divine Being.89  While Ayer does not say as much 
in his initial account, he did state that his experience constituted “strong evidence that 
death does not put an end to consciousness.”  However, he also stated that “the most 
probable hypothesis is that my brain continued to function although my heart had 
stopped.”  In any event, he concluded that the experience was enough to “slightly weaken 
my conviction that my genuine death…will be the end of me.”  Later, in a 1988 
postscript, he seems to regain his skepticism once again.  But the fact that Ayer would 
call into question his metaphysical naturalism on account of a near-death experience, and 
even admit in the Postscript that he is at least willing to entertain the possibility of 
theism, demonstrates that near-death experiences are a potential game changer in the 
naturalism vs. theism debate.  Ayer’s near-death experience can be given either a theist or 
naturalist explanation.  Although his story is singular and ambiguous and is by no means 
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indicative of the near-death experience in general, when the entire corpus of the near-
death literature is considered, it is arguably more easily ‘covered’ under a theist 
metaphysic than a naturalist one. 
 
9.2  Subjectivity and the Hard Problem of Consciousness 
  
A naturalist approach to the philosophy of mind usually takes the position of 
reductive materialism, which says that all mental states can be identified with brain 
states.  For that reason it is sometimes called identity theory, since it identifies mental 
states with brain states.  Reductive materialism admits there are mental states, though 
they are not other than physical states.  Eliminative materialism goes a step further and 
says we should just reject the existence of mental states altogether.  Patricia and Paul 
Churchland, as well as Richard Rorty, are adherents of this position.  Just as science has 
gotten rid of phlogiston, ether, and vital force, so must it get rid of belief, desire, and even 
hope. 
 The major problem with eliminative materialism is that it is obvious that we do 
have mental events.  The fact naturalists must explain is how material neurons give rise to 
consciousness.  David Chalmers refers to this in his book, The Conscious Mind, as the 
hard problem of consciousness.   Chalmers finds a reductionist account of consciousness 
unsatisfactory.  The hard problem of consciousness is that subjective awareness is so 
unlike matter it is hard to see how one can be identified with the other.  He states:  
  Even if we knew every last detail about the physics of the universe – the 
configuration, causation, and evolution among all the fields and particles 
in the spatiotemporal manifold – that information would not lead us to 
postulate the existence of conscious experience.  My knowledge of 
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consciousness, in the first instance, comes from my own case, not from 
any external observation.  It is my first-person experience of 
consciousness that forces the problem on me.90 
 
  Chalmers states that there is an “epistemic asymmetry” between our knowledge of 
consciousness and our knowledge of other phenomena, and as a result, mental states 
cannot be said to be identical to brain states, or said to be eliminated by them.  Chalmers 
conducts a thought experiment in which one imagines a zombie who looks just like us, 
performs the same actions as us, but lacks any type of consciousness.  The fact that we 
can imagine this, he claims, entails that consciousness is not the same thing as material 
processes – mental states are not physical states.  It also states why ‘the problem of other 
minds’ is a problem, for we cannot be certain other people are conscious or what their 
experiences are as we do not have access to their mental states.  For these reasons 
Chalmers thinks identity theory is wrong.  
Given the failure of materialism to account for the mind-body problem, Chalmers 
states that we have three alternatives:  interactionism, epiphenomenalism, and 
panprotopsychism.91  At the beginning of The Conscious Mind, he states “this work is 
perhaps unusual in largely eschewing the philosophical notion of identity (between 
mental and physical states, say) in favor of the notion of supervenience.”92  Chalmers 
argues that his form of supervenience is not classical dualistic epiphenomenalism, which 
sees the mind as different from the body but nevertheless dependent upon and arising 
from it, in the same way that one’s shadow is different from, but causally dependent 
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upon, one’s body.  The main problem with epiphenomenalism is that it makes the mind 
causally inert.  As a result, this position resists a strong intuition almost all of us have, 
that the mind is causally active and produces changes in the body.  Chalmers wants to 
maintain a type of property supervenience in which mental causation “remains open.”  He 
admits that epiphenomenalism plus free will, which seems to require mental causation of 
the physical, is a paradox, but he thinks that it is in a better position than the alternatives, 
which are far worse.93  Chalmers holds that substance dualism might be correct, but he is 
unwilling to opt for it outright.  In effect, he is left holding that the mind is causally inert, 
while at the same time wanting to say that this is not his position, and the mind is 
causally active.  But which is it, and why?   
Similarly, Thomas Nagel considers the biggest obstacle to naturalism to be 
consciousness itself, which “threatens to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture.”94  
Nagel believes that science does not capture the common sense essence of human beings, 
which is consciousness and free will.  Nagel’s position is a continuation of his earlier 
project in the philosophy of mind put forth in The View from Nowhere, in which he 
argues that the objective method of science does not adequately address issues of first-
person subjectivity.  He argues that an objective viewpoint, though claiming to be 
complete, is not because it leaves no room for human subjectivity.  “An objective 
standpoint is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just human 
perspective behind….Physics is bound to leave undescribed the irreducibly subjective 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 158-160. 
94 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost 
Certainly False (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2012), 35. 
357 
 
 
 
character of conscious mental processes….The subjectivity of consciousness is an 
irreducible feature of reality – without which we couldn’t do physics or anything else.”95 
In Mind and Cosmos he retools his argument into an “argument from the failure 
of psychophysical reduction” which asserts there are innumerable qualities of the mind 
that defy reduction, such as qualia, intentions, beliefs, desires, understanding, and moral 
values.96  In this regard, theism is more attractive than naturalism because it at least 
admits the reality of these events.97  However, this does not make him a Cartesian; it only 
forces him to side with the anti-reductionists.   He deems as unacceptable the naturalist’s 
attempt to overcome these problems by offering a promissory note to science in the hope 
that one day it will adequately explain them.  He jokingly refers to the tendency to do so 
as the “Darwinism of the gaps.”98  This is a play on a phrase made famous by Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, who argued it was wrong to use God simply as a stop-gap for questions 
science is unable to answer.  Naturalism, on the other hand, believes science will 
eventually explain everything.  There are questions science has not resolved, such as the 
mystery of consciousness and the origin of the universe, but eventually the current faith 
in science and naturalism holds that they will be solved, not by God, but by Darwinism 
and science.   
The shortcoming of Nagel’s position is that he doesn’t really have anything to 
offer other than a negative critique of naturalism.  He states:  “all that can be done in this 
stage in the history of science is to argue for recognition of the problem,” that is, that 
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various phenomena defy materialist reduction.99   Yet he offers no positive alternative to 
either naturalism or theism except a vague neutral monism which somehow asserts the 
primary role of the mind.  The starting point for this monism must be ourselves and our 
experiences and not an external natural world or transcendent mind.  All knowledge is 
ultimately self-knowledge, and hence must always defer to the self that is doing the 
knowing.  While Nagel concludes his book with the hope that the secular establishment 
will accept his critique and learn to wean itself off of materialism, without offering a 
plausible alternative (as theists do) it is highly unlikely that materialists will take note.  
As Nagel notes, his attempt is to disprove naturalism by showing it cannot account for 
certain phenomena.  Naturalists might counter this by just claiming that science will 
eventually explain any missing gaps or alleged anomalies.  But if Nagel is right, scientific 
materialism cannot, in principle, account for mental phenomena.  Nagel’s negative 
critique demonstrates that the New Atheists’ claims that evolution disproves theism is 
unwarranted, and that the Conflict narrative in which Science slays Theism is a false 
narrative.   
 J.P. Moreland, on the other hand, argues for a much more positive conclusion, and 
thus leaves us in a less skeptical position than Nagel.  He claims that all naturalist 
accounts of the mind, reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and 
epiphenomenalism (which he calls the emergent property view) have problems that 
cannot be resolved.  By default, this leaves us with substance dualism.  Traditional 
dualism asserts there are two types of substances.  Matter has the qualities of being solid, 
extended in three dimensional space, publically observable, measurable, and determined 
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by the laws of nature.  Mind, on the other hand, has the properties of not being solid, not 
being extended in space, of not being publically observable but only observable to 
oneself, not measurable, and immune from the laws of nature.  The Law of identity states:  
“If two things are the same, then their properties must be the same.”  So if x and y are 
identical, x should have the same properties as y.  If, as the naturalists claim, mind can be 
reduced to brain physiology, that mental states should be identical to brain states.  But it 
has just been shown that consciousness has radically different properties from matter.  
Therefore, the mind ≠ brain.  Consciousness cannot arise from inanimate matter.  In fact, 
Moreland argues, even if mental states could emerge from natural, material processes, 
such properties could not be causal agents, because only substances are.  Moreland 
concludes:  “the simple fact is that the existence of mind has always been a problem for 
the physicalists….Physicalism is false because it fails to adequately handle several 
general arguments raised against it….the endowments which we possess cannot possibly 
be from ourselves.  They point to the ultimate Mind and ground of rationality himself.”100   
 
9.3  Paranormal Phenomena  
 
Parapsychology is the scientific study of ESP, or extrasensory perception, often 
considered to be a sixth sense or an alleged power of the mind to attain knowledge in a 
way similar to but independent of the other five senses. Some of the more common 
examples of ESP are telepathy (reading others’ minds), clairvoyance (‘seeing’ events not 
physically present), precognition (foreknowing events before they occur), psychokinesis 
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(producing effects, usually motion, of objects without physical causation), out-of-body 
experiences (NDEs, or astral projection) and spiritualism (the ability to communicate 
with the dead).101  David Ray Griffin argues that paranormal experiences are anomalies 
for scientific materialism because it cannot explain such events.   
James Alcock agrees that paranormal phenomena pose a problem.  He believes 
they “cannot be explained in terms of presently accepted theories of nature because they 
violate one or more of the basic assumptions, or axioms, of the current scientific 
worldview.”102  In other words, such phenomena cannot be deduced from the laws of 
physics; hence naturalism cannot cover them.  These scientific laws limit what the 
physical universe can and cannot do, and paranormal activity somehow falls outside these 
limits.    
C.D. Broad lists the following four limiting principles of science: 
      1.  General principles of causation (scientific determinism, for  
every event there is a cause)  
   2.  Limitations on the Action of Mind on Matter  (“it is impossible for an 
event in a person’s mind to produce directly any change in the material 
world except certain changes in his own brain” – you can move your toes 
through the workings of your mind but you cannot move the sun)             
  3.  Dependence of Mind on Brain (no body or brain, no mind) 
  4.  Limitations on Ways of acquiring Knowledge (“it is impossible for a 
person to perceive a physical event or a material thing except by means of 
sensations which that event or thing produces in his mind”)103  
 
 In addition to these, there are the limits imposed on our sense data by space and 
time.  Whereas telepathy and clairvoyance transcend limits imposed by space, 
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precognition transcends limits imposed by time.104  The dilemma, then, is if paranormal 
phenomena do not exist, they must either be illusions or the limiting laws are wrong (in 
which case they can’t be considered laws).  In other words, either paranormal phenomena 
are fictitious, since they violate the limiting laws, or they count as anomalies, which serve 
to undermine those laws.  The ‘covering laws’ Broad identifies may be seen as 
predetermining what is considered possible or impossible in the world we inhabit.  “Any 
event that is said to cause another event must be related to the causal chain.  This 
principle appears to be violated…by telepathy, clairvoyance, and psychokinesis.”105  If 
certain paranormal events are unable to be accounted for by known laws of nature, 
paranormal events are anomalous to current scientific laws.  Most naturalistic scientists 
would not recognize paranormal phenomena as anomalies.  Instead, naturalists would be 
prone to look for evidence of fraud, incompetence, or trickery rather than admit the laws 
of physics have been broken.   
Griffin, like Quine (who extended Duhem’s principle beyond scientific beliefs to 
all beliefs), extends Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ beyond scientific theories to include 
metaphysical theories as well.  He distinguishes two fundamental approaches to the study 
of science:  paradigmatic thinkers (rationalists), who are theory led, and data led theorists 
(empiricists), who, as the name implies, are led by data.106  Theists and naturalists could 
fall into either category, but are probably paradigmatic thinkers.  Paradigmatic thinkers 
determine a priori, on the basis of their paradigm, what is possible and what is 
impossible, and this in turn determines the evidence which they consider.  If the 
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paradigmatic thinker in this case is a theist or a naturalist, each will regard paranormal 
events differently.  The naturalist presupposes a causally closed universe that is governed 
by the laws of nature and natural processes, and thus will be suspicious of any alleged 
paranormal phenomena which seem to defy them.  The theist, on the other hand, will 
generally be more open to supernatural events, such as the existence of mental telepathy 
or other psychic phenomena.  While such phenomena are regarded as ‘anomalies’ to the 
naturalist, they may not be anomalies to the theist.   
  Suppose, for example, we are confronted with a paranormal phenomenon which 
is clearly visible to all present, such as the Mystery Light of the Upper Peninsula of 
Michigan, sometimes called the Watersmeet light, which is basically lights in the woods 
with no known source of illumination that comes and goes every ten minutes.  It has no 
recognized natural explanation.107  Paradigmatic naturalists such as Quine or Sagan 
would judge this event by a web of beliefs which are governed by scientific naturalism, 
and thus attribute these fringe experiences to unknown natural causes at work, such as car 
headlamps on a nearby highway.  A theist, on the other hand, might see the ghost of a 
railroad brakeman who got drunk and failed to issue a signal that let a train through and 
ended up killing a number of people.108  Paradigmatic thinkers give an answer that is 
consistent with the worldview under which they operate, even if doing so involves 
pleading ignorance. 
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 Data-led thinkers, on the other hand, “wear their paradigms lightly” and are not 
bound by any pre-conceived notion of what is or is not possible.  Rather, “what is 
possible is settled by what is actual, and not vice versa.”109  An empiricist approach must 
take recalcitrant phenomena such as near-death experiences and the paranormal into 
account (as long as they are genuine and can be determined not to be a hoax).  The 
empiricist approach tends to be more open-minded in examining the evidence because it 
tries to do so without any pre-conceived notions or assumptions.  Nagel is a good 
example of a data-led thinker.  The virtue of the data-led approach is that it is guided not 
by a paradigm, but by the evidence, and thus tends to consider the evidence more 
objectively than a paradigmatic thinker.110  However, the idea of paradigm-free data may 
not be possible, as Quine, Sellars, and Hanson have all demonstrated that data need to be 
interpreted, that all facts are theory laden and interpreted through paradigms. 
 The thrust of Griffin’s arguments are against paradigmatic thinkers in favor of 
data-led thinkers because the latter are more open to the evidence and less closed-minded.  
The virtue of this approach is that it recognizes that scientists tend to have a built-in bias 
against the paranormal.  Hence, much of Griffin’s book is a careful analysis of the 
evidence for life after death, demon possession, reincarnation and apparition sightings 
(which is much too lengthy to summarize here).  Rupert Sheldrake agrees.  He thinks that 
many scientists dismiss paranormal phenomena not on the basis of the evidence, but on 
the basis of their scientific bias against it, which says it is impossible.  Sheldrake says he 
himself expressed this attitude until he examined the research, which then convinced him 
otherwise.  He cites numerous instances of psychic abilities:  of a blind boy who could 
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read the mind of his mother after she looked at something, of a soldier who felt 
something was wrong and stopped his Jeep just before it would have fallen off a missing 
bridge, of animals that seem to know when their owner is about to arrive home.111  
Sheldrake and Griffin try to show that the data supporting parapsychology cannot be 
dismissed as easily as a thinker under the spell of scientism thinks it can.  In cases in 
which there is no satisfactory explanation for a perceived phenomenon, sometimes the 
paranormal explanation is the best explanation, ‘scientifically’ inadequate though it may 
be.  The conclusion that Griffin draws from paranormal events is that they provide 
substantial evidence for the existence of the soul.  He states:  “the fact that extrasensory 
perception occurs and cannot be understood in terms of physical fields suggests that we 
have a receptive center other than the brain and its sensory organs.”112  Once again, we 
have anomalous phenomena which theism can ‘cover’ while naturalism cannot.  
 
9.4  Why does the world exist?   
  
William Lane Craig attempts to update the Cosmological Argument by supporting 
it with recent scientific discoveries.  Craig argues science has confirmed one of the basic 
assertions in Genesis, that the universe was created by a singular event, the Big Bang.  In 
addition, the universe is speeding up, not slowing down, which seems to disprove an 
oscillating universe that undergoes a series of bangs, expansions, and contractions.  
Background radiation from the Big Bang discounts the notion of a static, steady state, 
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universe that has always existed.  Similarly, the Second law of Thermodynamics suggests 
that the energy of an eternal universe will eventually dissipate and become uniform (the 
Big Chill).  In advancing the Cosmological argument, Craig argues that whatever comes 
into existence must have a cause to explain its coming into existence.  Therefore, the 
universe must have a cause.  Theism has an explanation of this cause, whereas naturalism 
does not.   
The Big Bang suggests the universe was created out of nothing, yet how can one 
get something from nothing?  The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that for 
everything that happens, there must be a sufficient reason for its happening.  Since there 
is a universe, there must be a sufficient reason for it.  Naturalists lack a sufficient reason. 
Theists can at least give one – God.  God is the first cause.113  Furthermore, the fine-
tuning of the constants of physics so as to allow for stars, planets, and life to exist, 
suggests a designed universe, hence a designer.  As a result, Craig concludes, “the most 
plausible answer to the question of why something exists rather than nothing is that God 
exists.”114  In addition, Craig believes this conclusion is justified by scientific evidence. 
 John Locke agrees that even though we lack a sense impression of God, we can 
infer God’s existence.115  The evidence of God’s existence is found in creation.  Any 
rational creature reflecting upon this may arrive at the idea of God.  Just as it is rational to 
infer an underlying substance supporting primary and secondary qualities, it is rational to 
infer God as the cause of the world.  This inference is justified because of the principle of 
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ex nihilo nihil fit, ‘from nothing comes nothing.’  Locke states:  “nothing cannot produce 
a being; therefore something must have existed from eternity….From what has been said, 
it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of 
anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us.”116  As a result, a theist has a 
good answer to Heidegger’s famous question, Why is there something rather than 
nothing.  A naturalist is left with a mystery. 
Dawkins responds to this by arguing that the theist only further complicates the 
issue, since positing God as the first cause only raises the question, What caused God?   
He states:  “as ever, the theist’s answer is deeply unsatisfying, because it leaves the 
existence of God unexplained….Any God capable of designing a universe…needs an 
even bigger explanation than the one he is supposed to provide….the designer hypothesis 
immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.”117  Aquinas’s third 
argument, the standard theist response, is that the existence of the universe is contingent; 
it does not have to exist.  But given its existence, a being whose existence is necessary is 
needed to account for the being of something contingent.118  If nature does not exist in 
virtue of itself, but contingently, then there are “no causal principles…that God cannot 
interrupt.”119  This explanation is at least consistent with Jesus’s alleged ability to work 
miracles, whereas the naturalist’s only explanation is:  There are no miracles.  If you 
think they did happen, you’re delusional.   
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While this argument may not appease Dawkins, it nevertheless is an answer to the 
question, Why does the world exist?  The fact remains that the theist has a plausible 
explanation.  The naturalist may posit a multiverse in response, as Hugh Everett did.  But 
again, that only raises the question, What caused the multiverse (unless of course you 
want to argue ‘it’s turtles all the way down’)?  Other naturalist attempts to explain the 
existence of the world include string theory, a Final theory of everything, and a quantum 
vacuum in which particles pop into existence by creating a paired particle of anti-matter 
at the same time, just as digging a hole creates both a pile and a hole.120  However, not 
only are these theories mere conjectures – there is no strong evidence to support any of 
them – and not only is there no scientific consensus concerning them, but the fact remains 
that science cannot answer the question why the world exists.  The domain of science is 
the physical world, and the question at issue is, Why is there a physical world at all?  The 
moment before the Big Bang the physical world did not exist, and hence science cannot 
address this issue, as it is only concerned with studying the physical universe.  Theism on 
the other hand, is able to speak on the matter.  It can offer an answer.  For Christians, the 
answer is given in Genesis.   In the beginning, God created. 
 
9.5  Free will 
 
Peter van Inwagen arrives at a conclusion about free will similar to the one Kant 
arrived at in his third antimony.  He believes we have two sets of conflicting beliefs: an 
intuitive belief that we have free will and are able to make free choices, and an empirical 
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belief that the physical world is governed by deterministic laws of nature.  But 
determinism is incompatible with free will, van Inwagen thinks.  Incompatibilists believe 
that we must reject one or the other, free will or determinism.  Yet good arguments can 
be made on both sides.  Van Inwagen resolves the dilemma by asserting that while he 
believes in agent causation, i.e., the human ability to make free choices, he does not 
understand how this is possible.  In short, human free will, though real, is a mystery.121  
He states:  “I accept this mystery because it seems to me to be the smallest mystery 
available.  If someone believes that human beings do not have free will, then that person 
accepts a mystery and in my view it is a greater, deeper mystery than the one I accept.”122     
William James also believed neither free will nor determinism can be proven or 
disproven.  Does this mean that the result is skepticism?  James believes, no, free will 
seems the better choice.   He thinks there are two kinds of people, possibility and anti-
possibility people.   “To this man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it – 
to that man more rational with possibilities excluded.”  James is a possibility man.  He 
believes that which way he walks home on any given night, by Oxford Street or by 
Divinity Avenue, is up to him to decide.123  He finds the implications of accepting 
determinism untenable.  He also cites the example of the murderer at Brockton, a man 
who took his wife to a deserted spot and shot her four times.  Dying, she asked him, “You 
didn’t do it on purpose, did you, dear?”  He replied, “No, I didn’t do it on purpose,” and 
then raised a rock and smashed in her skull.  James states he would rather live in the type 
of world in which one can say, “Such a murder ought not to have happened.”  In other 
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words, a world with free will.  In a determinist world, one governed entirely by natural 
laws, one cannot assert this.  The murder at Brockton had to happen, the determinist 
holds.  While free will is not necessarily dependent upon theism, it is more likely that 
humans are completely determined if metaphysical naturalism is true, since, on 
naturalism, the mind is reduced to or dependent upon the brain, or is a causally inert 
epiphenomenon.  James’ asking which world you would rather live in, a world with 
determinism or free will, is akin to asking which metaphysic do you prefer, naturalism or 
theism? 
In sum, it can be argued that theism offers a more satisfactory worldview than 
naturalism because it can ‘cover,’ i.e.,  provide an explanation for, near death 
experiences, the hard problem of consciousness, paranormal phenomenon, the existence 
of an ordered universe, and the problem of free will.  As a result, Dennett’s claim that 
Darwin is a universal acid dissolving any kind of mind-first view of the world is 
unfounded.  Richard Dawkins states:  “the true scientists…knows exactly what it would 
take to change his mind:  Evidence….My passion is based on evidence.  Theirs [theists’], 
flying in the face of evidence as it does, is truly fundamentalist.”124  This idea that all the 
evidence science musters favors metaphysical naturalism and disproves theism, simply is 
not true.  If anything, the opposite is true.  Not only is there evidence for theism, theism 
can explain many phenomena that scientific naturalism cannot.  Jaegwon Kim has stated, 
“If a whole system of phenomena that are prima facie not among basic physical 
phenomena resists physical explanation, and especially if we don’t even know where or 
how to begin, it would be time to reexamine one’s physicalist commitments.”125  These 
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five phenomena demonstrate that naturalism is in need of reexamination and appears to 
be an insufficient explanation of reality, and to the extent that theism offers a better 
explanation for them, theism is a more coherent metaphysic. 
 
9.6  Is Evolution better explained by theism or naturalism? 
 
So far, we have cited five phenomena which appear anomalous to the scientific 
naturalist paradigm but which theism can ‘cover.’  What about evolution?  Is it fatal to 
theism or naturalism?  Let us now examine which model, theism or metaphysical 
naturalism, better covers evolution.  As noted a number of times above, Daniel Dennett 
and others think evolution is not anomalous to naturalism, and see it as providing 
evidence against theism.  Alvin Plantinga thinks evolution is anomalous to metaphysical 
naturalism because of the EAAN.  His view is that evolution favors organisms 
constructed for survival, rather than for truth tracking, ones whose cognitive faculties are 
unreliable.  Michael Behe sees evolution as anomalous due to its inability to account for 
biological complexity.  Behe is an intelligent design theorist, but not a theist in the usual 
sense.  However, the views of both can be used as evidence against metaphysical 
naturalism. Unlike the previous five phenomenon, which were cited as better explained 
by theism than naturalism, evolution seems equally well explained by both naturalism 
and theism.  In other words, it appears possible that evolution could have occurred 
through strictly natural processes, or it could have been guided.  In other words, evolution 
is not an anomaly to scientific naturalism.  It is ‘covered’ equally well by either theory; 
each metaphysical position seems epistemologically satisfactory.  However, if Michael 
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Behe is correct about the complexity of eukaryotic cells, then the evidence might tip 
toward theism.   
As a result, how one interprets evolution, as guided or unguided, often depends on 
one’s previous metaphysical beliefs.  If one is a naturalist, one sees an unguided, blind 
process.  If one is a theist, one is more likely to see a guided process.  If one accepts 
many of the stories and claims found in the Bible, it is hard not to see evolution as 
guided.  The Israelites constantly run to Daddy for help, who sends manna from heaven 
and rescues them when the Amalekites come knocking.  The Jews consider themselves a 
‘chosen’ people, which means God looks after and protects them.  It appears that having 
the most powerful force in the universe behind you is an evolutionary advantage, and that 
having God’s blessing rather than curse increases your chances of surviving, being 
fruitful, and multiplying.  Belief in God and worship of God may serve as adaptive 
behavior which is highly favored by the selective pressures of the environment not only if 
God exists but even if He doesn’t.  Even Dennett and Dawkins admit that religion leads 
to social cohesion, clan protection, and helps one find mates.  Of course, the belief that 
God is the creator of the universe, fine tunes the universe, jump-started life, and takes an 
active role in it, is more consistent with guided rather than unguided evolution. 
If, on the other hand, a person is a metaphysical naturalist, evolution by means of 
unguided, natural selection is the only game in town.  There is no explanation other than 
natural processes, so there is no explanation other than a naturalistic one for how 
complex creatures like ourselves have arisen, unless perhaps one wants to argue that 
extraterrestrials seeded the planet with life.  But it is simply dogmatic to hold a priori that 
no explanation counts as an explanation except a strictly natural one. 
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10.  Skepticism and the Limits of Knowledge: 
 
Robert Solomon, in his book Continental Philosophy since 1750, raises the 
question whether many philosophers of the Western tradition, particularly Descartes and 
Kant, are guilty of what he calls ‘transcendental pretence.’  One way transcendental 
pretence occurs is when we project subjective knowledge of ourselves to ‘knowledge’ 
about a universal human essence.  In doing so, we assume that the structures and 
workings of our own minds are universal and necessary to all.  Hence the self, in 
knowing itself, knows all other selves, since everyone is essentially the same.126  This is a 
weak inductive inference, based as it is upon an extremely small sample, only oneself.  
For such essentialists, the transcendental pretence is not pretentious at all because there is 
an objective human essence which we share.  By knowing ourselves through 
introspection, we come to know this common human self.  Many great thinkers have 
erroneously held to an essentialism so based.  Just because Calvin thought he had a 
sensus divinitatis, does not mean everyone does.  Just because Freud was attracted to his 
mother as a young boy, does not mean that all men have an oedipal complex.  Just 
because Richard Dawkins is an adherent of scientism, does not mean that all non-
scientists suffer from “physics envy.”127  These are non sequitors.    
Existentialists argue that the only ‘essential fact’ about human nature is that we 
are indeterminate, self-determining beings whose self-essence is chosen rather than 
                                                 
126 Robert Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750:  The Rise and Fall of the Self  (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1988), 3-7, 31. 
127 Richard Dawkins, A Devil’s Chaplain (New York:  Houghton Mifflin Co., 2003), 6.  
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given.  If there is no common human essence, then all we really know in introspection is 
ourselves and nothing more.  To project our essence onto others is to be guilty of 
transcendental pretence, and we should not claim to know what others are like simply on 
the basis of ourselves.  Almost all philosophers up to Kant assert that reason is the human 
essence.  But can we know what people are like who make different choices, or have 
different backgrounds, or are of different races, genders, nationalities, or historical time 
periods?  Empiricists such as Locke and Rousseau argue that at birth the mind is a tabula 
rasa.  Our nature is therefore very plastic and is molded by all the unique experiences 
that collectively constitute our life, including religious experiences or the lack thereof.  
Charles Mills argues that knowledge of others seems limited to knowledge of one’s local 
culture.  A fairly affluent Caucasian in America can never really understand what it’s like 
to be a minority who is discriminated against on the basis of skin color.128 
 Population Genetics comes to a slightly different conclusion.  Evolutionists 
generally think that human nature is determined more by our genes than by our 
environment.  Studies of identical twins suggest that the ratio of what is determined 
genetically vs the environment, is roughly three to two (or 60% to 40%).   IQ tends to be 
hereditary, but also needs to be exposed to the right environment in order to develop to its 
full potential.  So whether one is ‘rational’ is more a result of nature (genes) than of 
nurture, but is influenced by both.  Ernst Mayr argues that Darwin’s basic insight was 
that organisms do not consist of invariable essences, but of highly variable populations.129  
Thus one can argue that each person is a law unto themselves, because they are 
                                                 
128 Charles W. Mills, “Non-Cartesian Sums,” in Blackness Visible, Essays on Philosophy and Race  (Ithaca, 
NY:  Cornell University Press, 1998), 1-20. 
129 Ernst Mayr, What Evolution Is (New York:  Basic Books, 2001), 75. 
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genetically distinct.  Evolutionary theory seems to confirm Solomon’s claim that it is 
pretentious to argue that all humans are basically the same. 
 In his novel Lord of Flies, William Golding offers contrasting views of human 
nature as personified in the two groups of boys who are stranded on an island in the 
middle of the ocean.  One group follows Ralph, and the other group follows Jack.  Ralph 
represents the optimistic view of human beings.  Ralph wants to maintain a link to 
civilization, to be civilized, and to be rescued.  He has a peaceful, rational, methodical 
nature and puts the community first.  In order to maintain law and order, Ralph argues the 
boys “gotta work together” and “have to have rules.”  Jack, on the other hand, is wild, 
violent, and irrational.   He does not want to return to civilization, and leads his gang in 
chanting ‘We like it here, we love it here, we found ourselves a home.’130  Jack is 
bloodthirsty for meat and wants to hunt pig.  He paints his face with blood and likes to 
fight.  He does not follow rules but leads through raw power and the arbitrary dictates of 
his will.  He steals and murders to obtain whatever he wants, with no remorse or guilt.  
Thus, if you extrapolate from Ralph’s nature, you get an entirely different view of human 
nature than if you extrapolate from Jack’s.  But which archetype is indicative of the 
human essence?  In a sense, transcendental pretence and population genetics says both 
are, and neither is.  There is no such thing as an objective, human essence.  Human nature 
is a social construction.  Everyone is different; we are neither inherently selfish nor 
inherently rational and cooperative.  Each human being is genetically and experientially a 
law unto him or herself.    
                                                 
130 Found in the 1990 film based on the book. 
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 Kant’s pretense to ‘know’ the nature of every human being, is even more 
unbelievable given that Kant never travelled more than 50 miles from the town where he 
was born.  The oldest bipedal hominin fossil finds date back to approximately six million 
years ago.  The origin and evolution of life itself on earth began close to four billion years 
ago.  Yet Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins claim to know what happened during 
those four billion years and that it was strictly by means of strictly natural processes.  
Again, such a claim seems to exceed the boundaries of what is knowable, hence is 
pretentious.  Similarly, is Patricia Churchland really in a position to tell someone who has 
had a near-death experience and claims his or her soul survived death, that he or she is 
simply mistaken, when Churchland herself has never had such an experience?  Just 
because Dawkins and Russell are not convinced by the arguments for God’s existence, 
does this mean that others don’t find them convincing?  Isn’t it a logical stretch to get 
from ‘this is how I see the world hanging together’, to the normative claim that ‘this is 
how everyone ought to see the world hanging together’?   
Nevertheless, Dennett, Dawkins, Churchland, and Harris are self-proclaimed 
experts, and say, “trust us, we know, those other people out there, the laymen, are 
unschooled in the ways of science and are not experts like us.  They don’t know.”  But are 
there really any experts when it comes to metaphysics?  Are there really any authorities 
on the topic that everyone else must listen to?  Or are Dennett and Dawkins pretentious, 
guilty of hubris, guilty of making arrogant claims to knowledge they do not have?  All 
Dennett is warranted in saying when he claims “Darwin is a universal acid who inverses 
the Mind-first view of the universe,” is that to him Darwin is a universal acid.  But to 
claim that Darwin should be seen as a universal acid by everyone else, is to be guilty of 
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transcendental pretence.  If Socrates were alive today, Dennett would likely be targeted 
by Socrates as a ‘pretender’ to knowledge that he thinks he has, but really doesn’t.  To 
claim one knows the universe was designed or that it is strictly the result of natural 
processes, is to make arrogant claims to knowledge one does not have.  
Dennett, like Kant, claims too much.  He claims to have knowledge where 
knowledge does not exist.  If the traditional necessary and sufficient conditions for 
knowledge are justified true belief, it is clear when we come to metaphysics we have only 
two of these three criteria satisfied:  justification, and belief, but not objective truth.  No 
one can know with objective certainty whether the naturalist or theist metaphysic is true.  
Good reasons can be given for either, but there is no way of determining the truth value 
of either naturalism or theism.  The method of science, if limited to studying the natural 
world, cannot provide sufficient justification for metaphysical conclusions.  Hence there 
is no possibility for knowledge here.  Kant argued in the antimonies, good arguments can 
be made for and against metaphysical claims.  Hence justification concerning 
metaphysical beliefs is inconclusive.  As the truth values of these claims contradict each 
other, either one or the other must be true.  But which truth value it is, cannot be 
established. 
Kierkegaard famously defined faith as an “objective uncertainty.”131  But this 
does not mean there is no evidence at all for religious belief or that all faith is blind.  The 
point is simply that there is no way of distinguishing whether theism or naturalism is true 
with any kind of certainty.  Reasons can be advanced to justify metaphysical beliefs, but 
ultimately one can never know with certainty which metaphysical beliefs are true.  
                                                 
131 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter  Lowrie.  
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1974), 182. 
377 
 
 
 
Metaphysical beliefs, even more than empirical beliefs, are underdetermined.  Evolution 
can be read as the result of a guided intentional process or as an unguided natural process.   
Evolution is thus akin to a Rorschach, or inkblot test.  What you see reflects your 
theories, the patterns of your thinking you use to structure experience, not necessarily 
‘what’s out there.’  Here the ambiguous inkblot being studied is nature.  How you 
interpret it is determined by your theory, and multiple theories are capable of ‘covering’ 
the facts.  Underdetermination of theory states that scientific evidence falls short of 
providing conclusive proof based on the evidence.  The fossil record is incomplete.  
Written history spans only a few thousand years.  Yet we are making conclusions over 
what has took place over millions, if not billions, of years.  As Sellars argues in “The 
Myth of the Given,” the sensory data we do have is in need of conceptual and theoretical 
interpretation, which is part of the superstructure of belief, and not given in sense 
experience.  Much of evolutionary theory is inferred, not observed (no one has observed 
the transition from inorganic substances to living beings, or from one species to another).  
And those facts which we do have are always seen in light of the scientific theories of the 
day and the metaphysical beliefs of the individual scientist.  So while Michael Ruse sees 
no good evidence for theism in evolution, Michael Behe does.  They each interpret the 
facts differently.  There are no theory-free ‘facts’ – all facts are theory laden.  It is 
possible to read A.J. Ayer’s account of his near death experience as consistent with 
naturalism, and as consistent with theism.  One person can see a heart attack as strictly 
natural processes, another can see it as ‘God taking him.’  
 So knowledge is not really possible here.  The best we can do is better or worse 
belief.  One can believe in theism or metaphysical naturalism, and one can provide 
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support for one’s beliefs, but it is impossible to determine objectively the truth of either. 
This is Thomas Nagel’s position in Mind and Cosmos.  In addition, the issue defies an 
objective solution because what one sees as ‘evidence’ is determined or interpreted in 
light of one’s own prior metaphysical views.  As a result, any side that claims to know 
that either metaphysical naturalism or theism is true, is making claims which cannot be 
either sufficiently confirmed or justified to allow any one side to claim victory.  As a 
result, the only possible position one can take is one of uncertainty.  
 Socrates was said to be the wisest man alive by the Oracle at Delphi.  Yet 
Socrates is famous for stating that “All I know is that I know nothing.”132  Socratic irony 
is based upon his claim to be ignorant while clearly knowing much.  One way to make 
sense of what Socrates says is this:  Socrates’ wisdom consists in knowledge of his 
ignorance.  Socrates does not claim to have knowledge he does not have.  So the wisdom 
of Socrates, consists in recognizing the boundaries of one’s knowledge and not violating 
them.  Let us be willing to adopt some Socratic intellectual humility and admit there are 
limits to what can and cannot be known.  The New Atheists claim to ‘know’ that 
naturalism is true, that religion is false, and that science delivers the epistemological 
goods and religion doesn’t.  But knowledge is this particular case is not possible.  
 Why set yourself up as an expert, and make inflated claims to knowledge?  
Because knowledge is power, and with the title of expert comes status, position, and 
power.  One would not pay good money to see a physician if the physician did not know 
what causes illness, or how to treat illness.  One would not go to college if the teachers 
there had nothing to offer in the way of knowledge or insight.  The danger, however, is 
                                                 
132 Plato, Apology, 29b-c.  Translations vary, but this is the general meaning. 
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that those who are experts in one field think they are experts in all the others.  That one is 
an expert in biology or cognitive science does not make one an expert in metaphysics; 
specialized knowledge does not entail knowledge outside the specialization.  In addition, 
since power, position, and wealth often accompany specialized knowledge, there are 
those who will make inflated claims to knowledge in order to advance their career, gain 
prestige, or set themselves up as an authority so as to bully others into accepting their 
beliefs.  Daniel Dennett and other naturalists refer to themselves as ‘brights.’133   He and 
other ‘brights’ claim they have solved the mystery of consciousness, know how life 
originated, and know how the universe came into being.  Dennett says to theists, “I for 
one am not in awe of your faith.  I am appalled by your arrogance, by your unreasonable 
certainty that you have all the answers.”134  Yet who is being arrogant here?  Is not the 
claim to have solved the mystery of consciousness arrogant?  Is it not arrogant to claim to 
know the process by which life evolved over a 3 billion year time period, and to know that 
at no time ever did an intelligent designer interfere?  Is Daniel Dennett omniscient and 
omnipresent?  Did he carefully observe every mutation that ever arose, and is he able to 
discern that each was strictly the product of natural causes?  Is this a claim that anyone 
could possibly claim to know, except maybe God?  Who’s being arrogant here?  One is 
reminded of God demanding of Job:  “Where were you when I laid the earth’s 
foundation?  Tell me, if you understand.  Who marked off its dimensions?  Surely you 
know!”135 
                                                 
133 New York Times essay, July 12, 2003 ‘The Bright Stuff;’ see also Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 21. 
134 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 51. 
135 Job 38:2-5. 
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 Dennett, Dawkins, and Churchland are guilty of claiming to know more than is 
possible, in this case, that God does not exist and that evolution is a strictly natural, 
unguided, blind process.   Likewise, Aquinas and Locke are also all guilty of claiming to 
know that God does exist, as is Plantinga in claiming that evolution was probably guided 
by a divine designer.  Knowledge here is not possible because metaphysical beliefs are 
not capable of being proven true or false.  Whether God exists or not, or evolution was 
guided or not, is a gap in our knowledge that is filled by the prevailing metaphysical 
position which guides our system of beliefs.  At best, we make an educated guess, based 
upon the worldview that each person thinks is the most coherent and comprehensive.  As 
a result, how we fill in the gaps in knowledge is simply an extrapolation of those theories 
we already adhere to.  But, at least in this lifetime, it is not possible to determine whether 
metaphysical naturalism or theism is true of false.  While science can establish whether 
or not there is a causal connection between smoking and cancer, it cannot establish why 
there is a universe, or what happened the moment before the Big Bang.  There are no 
authorities or experts when it comes to metaphysical beliefs.   
 
11.  Conclusion 
 
Russell, Dawkins, Churchland, and others, all argue that science is in conflict with 
religion and triumphs over religion.  Evolution is the latest battle in which science has 
emerged victorious, and is its most commanding victory.  The solution to the problem 
that evolution poses for theism, Dennett and others say, is to abandon any type of Mind-
first metaphysic and adopt metaphysical naturalism in its place.  But this conclusion is 
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not warranted.  Dennett and others create a straw man of theists by presenting them all as 
fundamentalists who have no evidence to support their beliefs.  The New Atheists further 
claim that science contradicts theism and supports metaphysical naturalism.  As 
previously argued, using methodological naturalism to justify metaphysical naturalism is 
not a legitimate inference.  Naturalists say only scientific answers arrived at through 
methodological naturalism count as explanations or justification.  If methodological 
naturalism is the only legitimate method of justification and explanation, and this method 
precludes from the outset explanations that transcend the physical universe, then the 
result is a foregone conclusion, all that exists is natural processes.  Science studies the 
natural world.  If science restricts itself to providing physical explanations, and God is an 
immaterial being, isn’t the supernatural simply beyond the scope of science to 
investigate?  But if God is the author of creation, isn’t the study of nature the study of 
God’s mind?  To theists, the real goal of scientists is to think God’s thoughts.  Science is 
not incompatible with religion; in fact, science grew out of natural philosophy and 
theology.   
Those who see the Conflict model as governing the relationship between science 
and religion, adhere to a false model.  The Conflict or Warfare thesis of Draper, Russell, 
and the New Atheists is a caricature, based on cherry picking various passages in the 
Bible, taking them literally, and thus making the Bible ridiculous and easily knocked 
down by modern day scientific worldview.  Brookes finds all four models of the 
relationship governing science and religion to be inadequate.136  He argues that the best 
way of viewing the way science and religion interact is the complexity model.  
                                                 
136 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion, Some Historical Perspectives  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
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Sometimes there is conflict, sometimes there is dialogue, sometimes there is 
independence, and sometimes there is integration.  No one model fits, just like no single 
model of scientific reasoning captures how scientists do science.  David Ray Griffin’s 
position, however, is closer to describing the current debate over the role of evolution in 
deciding metaphysical standpoints.  He sees the relation “in terms of two opposing 
trajectories:  one of increasing conflict and one of convergence.”137  The New Atheists 
adhere to increasing conflict and hostility, while Process philosophies see integration and 
harmony. 
Ultimately, science and religion are after the same thing.  Both aim to satisfy 
curiosity, to provide answers to ultimate questions, to investigate why we’re here.  If 
truth is one, and both science and religion seek the truth about reality, then they both can 
be seen to converge.  Scientific questioning might lead to theism to solve the questions 
we face.  It has been shown how theism can provide answers to questions science cannot, 
and in that respect, it might offer up a more coherent worldview.  In addition, science is 
neither unified nor internally consistent.  It does not offer up a seamless view of the 
universe.  Relativity contradicts Newtonian physics.  Quantum theory contradicts 
relativity.  Quantum theory, chaos theory, and evolutionary theory all fail to yield definite 
predictions and defy a mechanistic, deterministic view of the universe.  Science lacks a 
firmly established method and even asserting that methodological naturalism is its 
guiding methodological principle is arbitrary and dogmatic.  To divide religion and 
science into separate domains is arbitrary.  How can a scientist tell the difference between 
a natural and a supernatural process, or a primary and a secondary cause?  Is it possible to 
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determine if a heart attack was the result of strictly natural processes and not caused by 
the divine will?   
Similarly, not all theists believe the same things.  Theism says there is a 
transcendent divine being who is the creator of the universe, and omnipotent, omniscient, 
and benevolent.  Christianity sees the revelation of this divine being as being recorded in 
the Bible.  But the Bible should not be taken to be a science manual.  Yes, some theists 
are fundamentalists and fideists and read the Bible literally, but this does not mean that 
all theists are fundamentalists or fideists or literalists.  In view of all this, one might argue 
that the only plausible, justified model for the relationship between science and religion is 
the complexity model.  Each particular clash between science and religion is so complex 
and unique that no general conclusion can really be offered up.  Consider even the 
‘Galileo affair.’  In truth, it was more about who was the governing authority to interpret 
Scripture than it was about whether the earth revolved around the sun. 
In addition, why should we accept the evidentialist objectionist criteria, that only 
beliefs which are rational and have scientific evidence are justified?  Should science as 
practiced by naturalists have a privileged position in our epistemology?  If all there is, is 
the natural world, the view might be credible.  But even then, science is a descriptive 
enterprise and can offer no guidance on ethics, or tell us how we should live.  But if 
theism is true and there is a supernatural world, then no, science is not the final truth.  
C.P. Snow’s literary intellectuals derogated science out of Platonic contempt for the 
material and physical world, in favor of the spiritual.  As a result, the “exploration of the 
natural order is of no interest” to them.138  If this world is the world of appearances, the 
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world of Maya – if science studies the shadows on the cave’s wall, the baser of the two 
Platonic worlds of sensibility and intelligibility, a transient world in which we are merely 
passing through on our way to an eternal reality – then the science which is grounded in it 
should not be privileged over the study of that which is higher, eternal, immutable, and 
the ultimate ground of reality.   
Is there any evidence that this world is only the apparent world and not the real 
world?  Is it true that religious beliefs depend upon taking a blind leap of faith for which 
there no objective evidence?  If it is, as Dawkins, et al. say it is, then why choose one 
religion over another?  Why choose Christianity over Islam?  Why not Buddhism?  Or 
Hinduism?  Or the Greek gods?  Clearly, there are reasons one can give for favoring one 
religion over another.  Suppose you were alive and in Jerusalem when Jesus was, and saw 
and heard him?  Would you be convinced he was divine?  In the Philosophical 
Fragments Kierkegaard says that if one were to see Jesus alive, all one would see is a 
man, and nothing would necessarily convince one that this person is God.  No scientific 
test could confirm that Jesus was indeed the Son of God.  Some believed it, others didn’t.  
Is there any way short of dying to determine the truth of this metaphysical belief?  Can 
Science prove or disprove this belief?  Concerning evolution, can Science prove that 
evolution occurred in a strictly naturalistic fashion?  Or, that God never intervened in the 
process?  The only correct answer is, no, there is no way to monitor billions of years of 
the evolutionary past to definitively rule out any kind of divine or supernatural 
intervention.  If there is a being that is powerful and intelligent enough to create the 
universe, such a being could well interfere in evolutionary processes. 
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The evidentialist objection that theism lacks any kind of justification is just plain 
false.  There is a wide range of evidence that has been provided, some of which even 
satisfies scientific criteria and is based upon empirical evidence:  religious experiences, 
Aquinas’ Five ways (all are a posteriori arguments), Paley’s Watch/watchmaker design 
argument, Collin’s Fine-Tuning Argument, Behe’s Irreducible Complexity Argument, 
Locke’s argument, and Plantinga’s EAAN argument.  To the religious skeptic who sees 
Scripture as simply expressing an outdated and pre-scientific world view, near-death 
experiences may well be particularly compelling evidence for theism, because they are 
reported by people who have a modern scientific understanding of the world.  Moody 
reports that many who have them are convinced consciousness survives death and, as a 
result, have a reduced fear of death. He cites this as confirmation of their reality.139  
 The naturalist’s inability to explain various phenomena by means of strictly 
physical processes casts doubt on it as a credible metaphysic.  The naturalist has no 
recourse to explain an event such as someone walking on water other than to merely say 
it didn’t happen.  If too many anomalous phenomena defy reduction and lie beyond the 
naturalists’ ability to successfully explain them, and the theist model, with its expanded 
view of reality, is successful in accounting for them, then theism is arguably a more 
satisfactory metaphysic than naturalism.  It is difficult to reduce the mind to the brain, 
love to hormones and neurochemicals, near-death experiences to hypoxia and 
hallucinations, morality to social values, mathematical and logical laws to tautologies.  
The law of identity says that if two things are identical, then their properties are identical, 
yet mental properties differ radically from physical properties.  Since consciousness does 
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not have the same properties as the brain, it must follow ‘the mind ≠ brain.’  As a result 
of this asymmetry, consciousness is and remains a mystery, a Black Box.   
When Michael Silberstein proclaims “the philosophy of mind is over,” that 
Scholasticism has been replaced by the fields of cognitive and neural science, all 
Silberstein is saying is “I don’t play the game of scholasticism and theism.  I play the 
game of scientific naturalism.” 140  The Churchlands’ name for the language game of 
scholasticism is ‘folk psychology.’  There is no denying that cognitive and brain science 
has greatly expanded our knowledge of how the brain affects sense perception, 
movement, and consciousness.  But it does not explain all the various phenomena 
associated with consciousness?  Paul Feyerabend recognizes that philosophers who argue 
against materialism emphasize the fact that materialists change “the use of ‘mental’ 
terms, [and anti-materialist philosophers] illustrate the consequences of the change with 
amusing absurdities…The absurdities show that materialism clashes with our usual ways 
of speaking about minds.”141  But if ordinary language is an indication of anything, the 
language game of Scholasticism is embedded in the very way we conceive of 
consciousness.  The fact that few have adopted the type of language game the 
Churchlands advocate – pure materialism – suggests that  the philosophy of mind is not 
over. 
To anyone who has studied the near-death experience literature, it is evident that 
the language game of Scholasticism is not dead, but alive and well and still being played 
by the living dead – those who died and are now alive.  Naturalists often attempt to 
                                                 
140 Michael Silberstein and Anthony Chemero, “After the Philosophy of Mind:  Replacing Scholasticism 
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justify their position by appealing to Ockham’s razor.  Quine argues that when 
unexpected observations or recalcitrant experience force us to reevaluate familiar 
principles, we should favor “minimum revision” to our core beliefs.142  Naturalism posits 
only one basic kind of metaphysical stuff, physical matter and energy.  Theism, on the 
other hand, requires two worlds and two kinds of substances to explain what naturalism 
explains using only one.  Which worldview is more economical?  Naturalism.  But 
consider:  Thales’s theory is that all is water.  Modern chemistry states that there are 118 
confirmed elements.  Ockham’s razor would have you side with the wrong theory.  Yet 
no one would use Ockham’s razor today to side with Thales.143  Simplicity is not the only 
virtue, even if it is more aesthetically pleasing.  And it also seems to be subjective.  David 
Deutsch would have you believe a multiverse is the simplest explanation of why there is 
a world, while Richard Swinburne would say God is.144   
Russell, Dawkins, and Churchland say they are not content with mystery, or gaps 
in knowledge.  Science, they claim, offers a method to solve the mysteries.  Cognitive 
scientists such as Dennett and Silberstein, and biologists such as Dawkins, perpetrate the 
illusion that they have access to special, privileged information that the rest of us don’t 
have, and that establishes them as authorities that the rest of us must bow to.   Many 
people don’t think so.  Science can’t cure the common cold, or even tell you what causes 
a headache.  Can Science answer the question, Why is there something rather than 
nothing?  Can science tell us what happened the moment before the Big Bang?  Theists 
claim they have an explanation, but naturalists don’t.  But even if they do, both sides 
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need to admit that when it comes to ultimate metaphysical explanations, claims by both 
sides are just proposed solutions to gaps in knowledge, mysteries for which knowledge 
may never be possible.  What counts as a good answer here is often determined not by the 
evidence, but by the theories we already adhere to.   
Gaps in knowledge are filled in by theists with God, whereas science fills in gaps 
by issuing promissory notes to yet unknown natural processes.  But theism is not blind or 
without evidence.  It is based upon all of the knowledge one has acquired during one’s 
life, and sees it as the most coherent and comprehensive overall view of reality.  While 
science may offer an adequate explanation of most physical processes, theists see it as 
inadequate, since it does not cover the whole of reality.  Extrapolations from what we do 
know to ‘cover’ what we do not know with blank, contentless projections, does not result 
in knowledge.  Whether we are merely bipedal apes with highly evolved brains or beings 
a little lower than the angels with divinely created souls, is an issue in which knowledge 
is not possible in this lifetime.  Those who claim to know the answer transgress the 
boundaries of knowledge.  If the history of philosophy teaches anything, it is that when it 
comes to metaphysics no one is in a position to declare victory, or in a position to 
announce that the mystery has been solved, or that the debate is over.   
Metaphysical naturalism is not entailed or strongly supported by evolution.  
Evolution is a scientific theory.  Metaphysical naturalism is a position that cannot be 
proven or disproven by science, since to use methodological naturalism to prove 
metaphysical naturalism is circular.  Griffin nicely puts the point:  “On the one hand the 
main reason for sticking with the consensus view of materialistic naturalism is that it is 
said to be adequate to account for all human experiences.  On the other hand, this 
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materialistic view is used as the criterion for deciding a priori which alleged human 
experiences actually occur.”145  If methodological naturalism does not allow for evolution 
to be guided by anything other than natural processes, this ensures that only natural 
processes will be considered.  But this does not mean than evolution has not been guided.    
 Theism is more comprehensive and coherent than naturalism.  Theism does not 
justify itself circularly, as metaphysical naturalism does when it claims methodological 
naturalism confirms it.  Nor is theism simply dogmatically asserted, considering the vast 
amount of work in natural theology which constitutes an inspection of Clifford’s ship.  
Theism does not involve an infinite regress, as appeal to a multi-verse, or infinite possible 
worlds, might.  Theism can be supported with foundational beliefs, such as the self-
evident idea of a perfect being whose essence is existence, and whose existence is 
necessary.  It can also be supported with noetic religious experience.  Inductive 
inferences from the empirical facts, such as the existence of the universe and the presence 
of order and design, make theism more likely than not.  Abductive reasoning from 
observed facts to unobserved causes finds theism offers a better explanation of the 
universe and design than naturalism.  Last, naturalism appears internally deficient in that 
it fails to explain a wide variety of phenomena which serve as anomalies to the 
naturalistic paradigm.  The physicist John Polkinghorne has stated:  “Physics is unable to 
offer a seamless account of what is going on in the world…it has failed to establish the 
causal closure of the universe on its own physicalist terms.”146  The reports of many 
people who have been declared medically dead suggest that consciousness survives death 
                                                 
145 Griffin, Religion and Scientific Naturalism, 71. 
146 John Polkinghorne, “The Universe as Creation,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Michael Peterson  
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014), 582. 
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and can continue without the body and that there is more to reality than just the physical 
world.   
 It is impossible to determine if evolution proceeded from guided or unguided 
processes.  As was demonstrated in Chapter five, it is impossible to even determine 
whether an event is of natural or supernatural origination.  Metaphysics is not physics, 
and the rules that apply to physics do not apply to metaphysics.  The alleged objectivity 
that scientists claim to achieve in physics is not possible in metaphysics.  It is possible to 
see the universe idealistically, as a creation, an emanation, as energy, or as strictly 
physical.  But there is no way of determining which it is with any type of certainty.  If 
one is a neurophilosopher like Dennett or Harris, one sees strictly natural processes.  If 
one is a theist, and views Scripture as divinely revealed truths, one sees a world guided 
by God.  However, using Quine’s criteria of comprehensiveness and coherence, it is 
possible to conclude with Thomas Nagel (although not with Quine) that scientism and 
naturalism cannot explain all of reality.  All of the arguments in this study suggest the 
scales are tipped in favor of theism.  But this does not mean that anyone can know, apart 
from a mystical experience, that theism is true and metaphysical naturalism is false.  As 
Noson Yanofsky concludes, “Unless you are doctrinaire and accept on faith one of the 
schools of thought, you have to join the rest of us wavering mortals and realize that the 
fundamental nature of our universe is simply beyond the limits of reason.”147
                                                 
147 Noson S. Yanofsky, The Outer Limits of Reason, What Science, Mathematics, and Logic cannot tell us 
(Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 2016), 212. 
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